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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyse the application of 
excusable non-performance of contract through a comparison between the 
rules of the Common law, Civil law, international Conventions, and the 
standard form contracts on the subject. The approach is to consider and 
analyse the problem from an international as well as from a national 
perspective, viz., the English, American, French, and German laws of 
contract. The main thrust of the thesis is that the problem of excusable non­
performance viewed in doctrinal terms, presents extraordinary difficulties 
which have troubled legal scholars for many years. The emphasis is given to 
the potential ability of parties to regulate their own affairs by means of their 
contract. For this purpose, the study is aimed at examining drafting techniques 
and providing suggestions for the formulation of a force majeure clause in 
such a manner so as to introduce the clause as a means of contract security 
and a way of avoiding potential conflicts.
More specifically, the thesis is divided into four parts. Part one deals 
with excusable non-performance and conditions under which a contract is 
discharged. In this part, the concept of the excuse doctrines as well as the 
historical development of the doctrines will be examined, analysed and 
compared. Part two analyses the effects of total and partial excusable non­
performance in which the important questions of rights and liabilities of 
contracting parties will be examined. Part three considers the problem and its 
confrontation at international level with regard to international Conventions, 
standard form contracts, and proposed theories. In part four, the thesis 
examines the role of force majeure clauses in the contracts. The thesis 
concludes with recommendations on how the problems of excusable non­
performance can be eliminated by a well-drafted immunity clause.
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INTRODUCTION:
Throughout history, contracting parties have grappled with the problem 
of non-performance of their contract caused by unexpected events. According 
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, parties involved in contracts, both in 
national and international contexts, are bound to perform their obligations. 
However, in the course of performance of a contract or before that, 
supervening events may occur which prevent or, at least, make more difficult 
the achievement of the purpose that the parties had in mind. Thus, 
performance of contracts is subject to a variety of risks, including the vagaries 
of nature, both on the land and on sea, legal, political, social, industrial and 
technological change, economic upheavals or foreign currency exposure, and 
the impact of insolvency. Excuse may be justified in terms of the contract itself 
or justified by the provisions of national laws.
Generally, where the parties try to deal with such contingencies 
beforehand rather than leave the question open, there exists a relaxation in 
negotiations between the parties which blind their eyes to any downside risk in 
their bargain. In consequence, they deny themselves the chance to address 
those problems which are capable of identification with reasonable foresight, 
and to make provision in their contracts for the contingency of their 
occurrence. This failure to make adequate and satisfactory provision for 
supervening events which occur after a contract has been formed, is so 
widespread that a body of legal doctrines has grown up around it. These 
doctrines are described under different titles: frustration, impossibility, force 
majeure, impracticability, imprevision, wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage, 
excuse, relief, etc. The problem of excusable non-performance of contracts, 
viewed in doctrinal terms, presents extraordinary difficulty, uneasiness and 
has troubled legal scholars for many years. While these concepts share a 
common rationale, much confusion and perplexity has attended their 
application to international contracts due to differences in the notions, and 
variations in the approaches taken by different national laws in dealing with 
them. The words "frustration", "impossible", "outside control", "unforeseen", 
"unforeseeable" and "supervening" are imprecise, elastic and are subject to a 
variety of interpretations, not only among the various legal systems of the 
world, but even within a single jurisdiction.
While the problem of excusable non-performance is fairly general, the 
solutions provided by the various legal regimes are far from uniform. It will be 
seen that even in the Common law which is well known for its empirical 
approach, the problem is treated differently. With wide diverging views on the
2subject it is extremely difficult to arrive at a definition of excusable non­
performance which would be universally acceptable. Either it is too narrow 
and restrictive or too liberal if judged by any one standard. One of the greatest 
difficulties is that most countries have two different standards, one for 
impossibility and the other for imprevision, geschaftsgrundlage, etc. In this 
thesis, an attempt will be made to provide a brief analysis of the different 
concepts and how they have been dealt with in the past in different legal 
systems.
The present argument is that the above doctrines, notwithstanding 
certain comparative differences in scope and effect, are not entirely 
satisfactory. At international level, rules in most legal systems concerning 
exemption from the legal consequences of a failure to perform may lead to 
results which are incompatible with the circumstances and needs of 
international trade. Apart from the problems inherent in the evolutive character 
of the proper law, the parties to transnational commercial contracts may find 
out that the proper law may not always supply a precise and suitable answer 
to the problems that they may encounter as a consequence of supervening 
events interfering with the expected performance of the contract or rendering 
it impossible for the obligor to perform. This comparative law analysis will 
reveal that domestic rules are not always exempt from ambiguity. The parties 
to transnational contracts must be conscious that a stipulation of applicable 
law may not necessarily or always ensure the stability of their relationship. In 
view of the diversity of domestic rules, aggravated by the vagaries of case- 
law, the parties to transnational contracts should attempt to deal directly with 
the problem and to include in their contract an exemption clause defining 
exempting impediments and specifying the legal consequences of those 
impediments. Force majeure and hardship clauses can provide a more 
comprehensive and reliable form of protection. In this study, such clauses, 
particularly force majeure clauses, will not only be considered in conjunction 
with doctrines of excuse but also in isolation from them.
One of the basic impressions obtained from negotiation practice is that 
very often it is extremely difficult for a lawyer to have a legally satisfactory 
hardship, force majeure or special risks clause included in the text of the 
contract. A legal system which intervenes in the contractual regime and grants 
an excuse from performance on grounds of "impossibility", "frustration" or the 
"disappearance of the foundation of the contract" ignores the capacity of the 
parties to regulate their own affairs on the basis of mutual accord. It 
disregards the capacity of the parties to make their own bargains in the face of
3impediments to performance. To grant a performance adjustment to parties 
where a contract provides for no excuse, is to displace the intention of the 
parties and to replace it with the intention of the court. Moreover, it is 
debatable, questionable, and even uncertain whether the law provides 
appropriate mechanisms to deal with the problem - the legal tools are suitable 
for a less dynamic world, possibly an abstract world which never existed.
The self-sufficiency of parties can be portrayed by a precise and 
comprehensive clause which specifies the limits of performance obligations. 
Parties can provide the circumstances in which excusable non-performance 
will be permitted. Parties can provide contractual provisions for changes in the 
price of the contract in the event of fluctuations. They can provide for an 
appropriate suspension of performance or termination of the contract. 
Accordingly, the contract can constitute the law of the parties. Consequently, 
this thesis contends that parties who assume obligations to perform in terms 
of their contract do so intentionally. The existence of an appropriate formula or 
machinery within the contract for gap-filling may often be crucial in saving the 
contract. In reinforcing this theme, the study identifies the parties' ability to 
foresee non-performance risks and burdens and to provide for them expressly 
in their contracts with an appropriate mechanism. Emphasis is given to their 
capacity to devise extensive contractual provisions.
The main thrust of this thesis is, therefore, to describe the potential 
ability of parties to regulate their own affairs by means of their contracts and 
the need to determine the ambit of the right of non-performance through 
contractual provisions rather than by superimposing an excuse into the 
contract by way of judicial construction. The self-reliance of the contracts 
illustrates the inappropriateness of imposing mandatory legal rules upon the 
parties.
The thesis therefore stresses that parties both at national and 
international levels through the use of comprehensive performance clauses in 
their contracts, are able to regulate a wide spectrum of events that affect their 
business ventures. Consequently, this thesis aims to show that parties 
involved in contracts should be excused where such an excuse is provided for 
in terms of their contract itself. In supporting this central theme, emphasis is 
placed upon the terms of the contract. Stress is given to the parties' potential 
ability to provide for a precise and comprehensive sequence of performance 
risks within detailed non-performance and performance adjustment clauses. 
Thus, this thesis undertakes to contribute to the issue by discussing some 
specific problems concerning the force majeure contract provisions. For this
4purpose, this thesis is aimed at examining drafting techniques and providing 
suggestions for the formulation of the clause and its elements in such a 
manner so as to introduce the clause as a means of contract security and also 
as a means of avoiding potential conflicts as well.
Parties to a contract, especially at international level, are inevitably 
aware of a number of undesirable consequences that may occur due to 
change or unexpected circumstances beyond their control. International 
confrontation, regional and global warfare with world consequences that 
effectively inhibit and sometimes even prevent the fulfilment of contracts may 
occur. However, none of these circumstances justifies that parties should 
automatically be entitled to a right of non-performance on the occurrence of a 
supervening event. None of these events should automatically confirm the 
parties' right of non-performance on the grounds that a severe disruption 
prevented his capacity to perform. They have every opportunity, given their 
detailed experience and knowledge, to deal directly with the problem and to 
specify in their contracts the type of situations which they are willing to 
consider as force majeure or hardship events and the consequences ascribed 
to such contingencies should they occur. Thus, it is the parties themselves 
who are bound to regulate performance risks in their contracts. It is they who, 
for reasons of cost and convenience, should provide under what 
circumstances the performance of their obligations should terminate or alter in 
nature.
However, as the governing law of the contract can be a legal system 
which has a different concept of excusable non-performance from that which a 
contracting party is aware, it is important to understand the application of 
different doctrines of excuse. Further, since the scope of transnational 
commercial transactions is wide, an effective analysis of the subject-matter 
must not only incorporate an international perspective but must also be 
sufficiently selective in providing a detailed examination of particular systems 
of law. Thus, in this regard, this thesis also seeks to present a comparative 
survey of excusable non-performance with particular emphasis on the 
evaluation of excuse doctrines. The emphasis is primarily on English, 
American, French, and German laws.
The above systems have been chosen for the following reasons: At 
first, these countries - which are usually the governing law of the majority of 
contracts - are leading systems and each of them has a distinctive historical, 
legal, political and economic structure and recognises different doctrines of 
excuse from each other. For example, whereas the German doctrine of
5wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage is generally recognised as broad and flexible, 
the French doctrine of force majeure is generally recognised as strict and 
narrow. English law probably stands in the middle. Secondly, the analysis of 
these doctrines in different legal systems adds a sharper focus to the 
problems of excusable non-performance especially when the problem is 
considered at international level, since, where practical problems of 
international commercial law are concerned, a solution can only be found by a 
detailed comparative examination of the various national legal rules in 
question. It will become clear that even in a subject of strong international 
flavour such as the law of international sales (for example, Vienna 
Convention) those rules are greatly influenced by doctrinal concepts which 
may vary considerably in the various national systems of law. Indeed, any law 
of international trade of the future with synthetic non-national legal concepts is 
the product of such comparative law that may pave the way to the unification 
or harmonisation of the law of international trade. Thirdly, the above 
comparative analysis will show that irrespective of the varying degrees of 
contractual protection available under these doctrines, in practice relief by the 
operation of the law still falls short of the scope of protection afforded under 
force majeure or hardship clauses. Finally, international contracts usually set 
out the rights and duties of the parties in detail, in which case national law will 
be referred to only so as to fill any gaps left by the contract, or national law 
may make a clause in the contract involved. But recourse to national law 
remains inevitable. In other words, in the absence of any contractual clauses 
dealing with such questions, the parties will have recourse to the relevant 
rules laid down by the law applicable to the contract.
More specifically, this thesis consists of four parts: Part one deals with 
excusable non-performance and conditions under which a contract is 
excused. Chapter one is a short historical survey tracing the origin and early 
development of the problem of excusable non-performance. From this 
historical examination the origins of certain features of the modern doctrines 
emerge and are exposed to critical analysis. Chapter two evaluates the 
different laws governing non-performance. In chapter three all requisites 
which must be met to consider a contract excused will be fully discussed. The 
non-foreseeability of the frustrating events as a vital requirement to render a 
contract frustrated is explained in this chapter. In addition, to manifest the 
differences between discharge under breach of contract and under excuse 
doctrines, this chapter speaks of "non-fault of the party seeking relief' as 
another important requisite rendering a contract excused.
6Part two deals with the most important part of the excuse doctrines, that is, 
the question of rights and liabilities of contracting parties under an excused 
contract. Furthermore, having regard to the significance of the distinction 
between "total and partial excusable non-performance" in determining the 
effect of excusable non-performance and the contracting parties' rights and 
liabilities, chapter four is devoted to the effects of total excusable non­
performance and chapter five to the effects of partial excusable non­
performance. Part three examines, analyses and evaluates the problem and 
its confrontation at international level with regard to international Conventions, 
standard form contracts and proposed theories of excusable non­
performance.
All the above topics are dealt with by comparing the relevant rules and 
provisions of the following laws and international rules concerning non­
performance: Common law, Civil law, the 1964 Hague Convention on Uniform 
Law for International Sale of Goods (ULIS), the 1980 Vienna Convention on 
Contracts for International Sale of Goods (CISG), the models contracts 
sponsored by the United Nations Commissions for Europe (ECE) and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) rules relating to international 
transactions and FIDIC's conditions for contract for work of civil engineering 
construction. The study also includes some discussion on other standard form 
contracts which are widely used in international transactions, the problems 
created by them in abuse of the freedom of contract and the means by which 
the victims of this exploitation are and can be further protected.
Finally, in part four, the closing chapter of this thesis, having regard to the 
close relationship between excuse doctrines and force majeure clauses, we 
examine the role of force majeure clauses in contracts and reveal the potential 
capacity of the parties to regulate their own affairs by means of contractual 
provisions. Further, the thesis suggests some important drafting techniques 
which can be employed in contracts both at national and international levels.
In conclusion, this proposition underlies the thesis: The need to have 
force majeure and hardship clauses in contracts and the need to have a 
precise and comprehensive formulation with regard to these clauses. Indeed, 
It is the purpose of this thesis to show that most, if not all, problems of 
excusable non-performance can and should adequately be solved by 
application of well established immunity clauses. Parties should rely more 
heavily upon the terms of the contract by drafting comprehensive force 
majeure and hardship clauses rather than general legal doctrines prevailing in
7one country or another. Thus, the parties can make their own law and this 
need not necessarily be a system of national law.
In the end, it should be added that this thesis will use the words 
"excusable non-performance" "doctrines of excuse" to describe those 
situations in which the agreed performance has been prevented or has 
become onerous or can no longer accomplish its principal purpose.
8PART ONE ■ EXCUSABLE NON-PERFORMANCE AND 
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A CONTRACT IS DISCHARGED 
CHAPTER ONE: 
SOME HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF EXCUSABLE NON­
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT
For a better understanding of the nature of the problem of excusable 
non-performance and its application in different contracts both at domestic 
and international levels, and to find a satisfactory answer to the problem, it is 
at first essential to go into details and examine the history of the doctrine and 
its development in various legal systems. A brief account of historical 
development may provide a useful perspective and a deeper understanding of 
the parallel developments and scope of methods of excuse.
A. CIVIL LAW
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PRIOR TO NINETEENTH 
CENTURY
The ancient maxim pacta sunt servanda required faithful performance 
of contractual obligations. According to the maxim, Roman law, at least as jus 
strictum, denied relief for excusable non-performance and did not recognise 
the doctrine. Consent was held to be an essentia! element of contract. 
Therefore, when the parties had entered into a contract, it followed logically 
that the obligation arising from it should be performed. However, along with 
this idea, there gradually grew up another theory, namely, that a person must 
not be held liable to do the impossible - nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. 
Supervening impossibility of performance (only absolute and objective 
impossibility) operated to extinguish an obligation.1 While the texts do not give 
other instances of this rule than destruction of subject matter, Buckland 
concludes that the principle does not appear to be confined to this one case.2 
What is clear, however, is that Roman law at least recognised that 
impossibility of performance whether initial {impossibilitas) or supervening 
(casus), would absolve the obligor from his duty to perform.3
l . R. W. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law, 4th ed. 1959, at 349-350; W. W . Buckland, Elementary 
Principles of the Roman Private Law, 1912, at 286, 287; W. W. Buckland, The Text-Book of Roman 
Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd ed. 1963, at 562.
2 Loc. cit. See also W. W. Buckland, Casus and Frustration in Roman Law and Common Law, 46 
Harv. L. Rev. 1933, at 1281; G. Wassermann, 12 Revue du Barreau la Province Quebec, 1952, 366.
3. W. A. Ramsden, Some Historical Aspects of Supervening Impossibility of Performance of Contract, 
38 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law, 1975, 153.
9The generic expressions used to denote the events which might be the 
cause of impossibility were vis major and casus fortuitus4 According to the 
above, in principle, if performance was ab initio physically or legally impossible 
the contract became void, and the party whose performance was made 
impossible, without any fault or fraud, was released from his obligation.5 Thus, 
the Roman law of contract extinguished obligations of innocent parties where 
the thing was destroyed without the debtor's act or fault. It was applied in 
Roman times, for example, to save from liability a man who promised to 
deliver a slave by a certain day if the slave died before delivery.6 This did not 
release the promisor if he was already in mora, or if it was imputable to him, 
for example due to his culpa\ when he would be liable for culpaP To sum up, it 
should be said that in ancient Roman law relief would be given provided that:
- The impossibility was not due to the fault of the party seeking relief;
- Performance must have been objectively, and not merely subjectively 
impossible.
Roman impossibility of performance as a means of exonerating an 
obligor for non-performance of his obligation has been incorporated into many 
systems of laws, for example German, French, etc.
However, through the development of bona fide institutions like the 
exceptio doiis generalis, relief would be given sporadically. This can be 
regarded as the origin of the clausula rebus sic stantibus* the theory that 
every contract is subject to an implied or tacit condition under which 
contractual undertakings cease to be obligatory as soon as the facts out of 
which they arose have changed.9 After many centuries, as a result of 
medieval canon law, difficultas became an excuse for non-performance: this 
doctrine released a debtor from performance of his obligation if it had become 
excessively difficult to do so. Thus, rebus sic stantibus was an ancient 
doctrine of canon law and applied by the ecclesiastical courts, who suspected 
usury whenever one party's bargain seemed too beneficial.10 The canonists
4. Loc. cit.
5. R. W. Lee, op. cit/, W. W. Buckland, (1912), op. cit/, W. W. Buckland, (1933), op. cit.; Bucland 
and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 1936, at 179-183.
6. Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, 3d ed. 1907, 439, 440.
1. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, 2nd ed. 1981, at 342.
8. M. G. Rapsomanikis, Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Comparative Law, 18 
Duq. L. Rev. 1980, 551, at 552.
9. R. B. Schlesinger, Comparative Law - Cases, Text and Materials, 2d ed. 1959, at 365, 366 (note).
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disapproved any enrichment of one party at the expense of the other.11 Rebus 
sic stantibus was considered as an implied term in contracts, by which the 
parties were obliged to keep their contractual promises only so long as the 
circumstances remained unchanged. This allowed a contract to be rescinded 
or modified when the contract was unprofitable. Its basis was what has 
become known in England as the theory of the implied term. In this regard, 
good faith was a vital element in the performance of the contracts and where, 
without the fault of the parties, a change of circumstances created hardship, 
the court was able to apply the doctrine. By the sixteenth century at the latest, 
this doctrine had been accepted by the secular Civil law.12
The approach taken by the natural law and by pre-19th-century jurists 
to the problems of impossibility and changed circumstances is to be found in 
their theory of contract.13 According to the natural law jurists, contract was 
defined as a means of voluntarily assuming a legal obligation to transfer 
resources from one party to another. An illegal performance was not included 
among such resources; since there could be no legal obligation to perform, a 
party therefore could not intend to contract for an illegal performance. 
Moreover, one could not, properly speaking, intend to enter into a contract for 
a physically impossible performance, since a contract contemplated a transfer 
of resources between the parties and an impossible transfer would be no 
transfer at all. The same analysis was applied when there was excessive 
onerousness of performance. Thus, in this era, due to the natural law, three 
cases of relief, viz., legal impossibility, physical impossibility and excessive 
onerousness of performance were recognised.14 The doctrine of clausula 
rebus sic stantibus - the beginning of which date back to canonist authors and 
can be traced through the medieval period to Grotious and Pufondorf - 
became the prevailing medieval theory.15 The doctrine not only made a great 
impression upon legal practice and theory but also was accepted in major
10. Mejers, La Force Obligatoire des Contrats et ses Modifications dans les Droits Modems, In Acts 
du Congres International de Droit Prive, 1950, at 99, 101. See also Keith S. Rossen, Law and 
Inflation, 1982, at 85.
n . Marcel Planiol, Georges Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil Francais, 2d ed., Vol. VI, 
Obligations, 1952, no. 391 ff. See also Joseph Dainow, Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations, 1969, 
at 153, 154.
12. See K. W. Ryan, An Introduction to the Civil Law, 1962, at 55.
13. A. T. Von Mehren and J. R. Gordley, The Civil Law System, 2d ed. 1977, at 1038.
14 Loc. cit., at 1041-1043.
15. J. Meinecke, Frustration in West German Law of Contract, The Irish Jurist, 1978, at 83.
11
eighteenth century codifications.16 Under the doctrine, it only remained to 
determine which changes of circumstances had sufficient significance to 
justify discharge from the obligation.
However, the doctrine was forgotten in Europe, particularly in Germany, 
during the nineteenth century.17 In the face of the economic disequilibrium 
resulting from World War I, many European courts sought theoretical 
justification for excusing the party whose performance had become 
exceedingly burdensome. Thus, the doctrine was reclaimed and recycled 
under a variety of names. French jurists developed theori de I'mprevision and 
the Germans advanced the doctrine of wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage.
2. EXCUSABLE NON-PERFORMANCE AFTER THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY
2.1. GERMANY
Medieval German law had adopted the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. 
The doctrine was embodied in the legislation of the eighteenth century in the 
Bavarian Landrecht of 1756 and the Prussian Allegemienes Landrecht.18 
During the nineteenth century, the doctrine lost its currency in Germany and 
the BGB (German Civil Code) which came into force on 1 January 1900, 
generally did not recognise it.19 However, the starting point in Germany was 
the concept of impossibility of performance, which was fundamental to the 
scheme of contractual liability expressed in BGB but which was not defined in 
it. Causes contributing to the demise of the doctrine of clausula rebus sic 
stantibus were: emerging ideas of economic liberty and the feeling that the 
doctrine posed a danger to commerce because of the insecurity of contract 
implied in its acceptance, the influence of the school of scientific positivism; 
and the advocacy by the historical school of classical concepts, particularly of 
Roman law, which did not recognise the doctrine.20
In 1852, the famous German jurist, Windsheid, presented a new 
doctrine under the title "voraussetzung" (presupposition theory)21 in which he
16. Loc. cit.
17. P. Hay, Frustration and its Solution in German Law, 10 Am. J. Comp. Law, 1961, at 345-346; 6 
Planiol & Ripert, op. cit., at 526-527.
18. P. Hay, op. cit., at 358; H. Lesguillons, Frustration, Force Majeure, Imprevision, Wegfall der 
Geschaftsgrundlage, 5 Droit et Pratique du Commerce International, 1979, 505, at 527.
19. J. Meineck, op. cit. See also Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914- 
1924, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1934, at 176, n. 22.
20. P. Hay, op. cit., at 345, 346; J. Meinecke, op. cit., at 83, 84.
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pleaded for the implication of a presupposition in every contract. According to 
this theory, "presupposition" is an "undeveloped condition" that the legal effect 
of the contract will remain in force as far as a certain situation exists. Thus, 
where the other party is in a position to conclude from the circumstances of a 
transaction that the presupposition forms an element of the other party's 
intention, the latter, according to Windschied, can refuse performance or 
recover any performance made by him if the presupposition is not complied 
with. However, this concept which is comparable to an implied condition was 
rejected by Windschied's contemporaries.22 With the rejection of the clausula 
and the inadequacy of the traditional concept of impossibility in the light of 
extraordinary economic changes after World War I, the German courts 
developed two applications analogous to the theory of impossibility.23 First, 
economic impossibility arising from a change in the contents of the obligation. 
This would apply when performance was delayed because of temporary 
impossibility. Reichsgericht applied this view to contracts of sale of raw 
materials which the war made it impossible or very difficult to import. In such 
cases, the vendor was excused if delivery after the end of the prolonged war 
would take place in economic conditions entirely different from those 
prevailing in peacetime when the contracts were originally made.24 
Second, there was economic impossibility due to "unzumutbarkeit" (non 
imputability) which resulted when changes had occurred, following the 
conclusion of the contract, but before its performance, which altered the 
economic significance of the performance. Under the "unzumutbarkeit", the 
obligor would no longer be required to perform the original contract when such 
a claim imposed an unreasonably heavy burden. This view was applied in a 
case where the vendor of salmon was freed from his obligation because the 
war had destroyed the German market in such foreign wares, even although 
the vendor had previously, sporadically and exceptionally, found ways and 
means of obtaining some supplies.25
The above "economic impossibility" as the criterion of performance was 
a vague concept and difficult to apply. Finally, in 1918, the Supreme Court
21. See E. J. Cohn, Frustration of Contract in German Law, 22 J. Comp. Leg. Int'l. L. 1946, 15, at 20; 
A. T. Von Mehren and J. R. Gordley, op. cit., at 1044-1048.
22. Loc. cit.
23. P. Hay, op. cit., at 359; J. Meineck, op. cit., at 90.
24 RGZ 94, 68, 69. (Cited in K. Zweigert, H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 1977, at 
191).
25. RG JW 1919, 499. (Cited in Zweigert, Kotz, op. cit.).
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(Reichsgericht), for the first time basing itself on the "treu und glauben" (good 
faith) provisions of paragraphs 157 and 242 of the German Civil Code, 
declared that the plaintiff was not obliged to perform the contract when the 
value of what was to be performed in return had become inadequate because 
of the effects of war.26 In another case,27 in 1920, the court allowed a suit for 
the increase of the price in a contract which, because of extreme inflation, had 
now become excessively onerous. The court held that due to unzumutbarkeit, 
paragraphs 157 and 242 and economic impossibility (paragraph 325), the 
continued obligation to perform would place an unconscionable burden on the 
obligor: whereas these paragraphs justify termination of the contract, the court 
held that it must also be permissible to modify the contract, provided both 
parties desired its continuation and on condition that good faith and equity so 
require. In another case, the court released a lessor who had contracted to 
supply the lessee with steam in a situation in which the cost of providing the 
steam reached 10 times the amount of rent received by the lessor. The 
Supreme Court ordered the trial court to determine a reasonable price for the 
steam in the light of changed conditions.28
However, the difficulty in defining the theoretical basis for the concept 
of excusable non-performance and elaborating a uniform approach is 
illustrated by the fact that one year later the court held that relief from a 
contract was available when equivalence of performance had been disturbed 
to such an extent that the obligor would not receive an equivalent for his 
performance. Thus, notions of economic impossibility, the threatened 
economic ruin of obligor (amounting to unzumutbarkeit), and the theory of 
equivalence of performance existed side by side.29
In 1921, under the impact of the cases growing out of the currency 
inflation, Oertmann began to evolve the theory of the "wegfall der 
geschaftsgrundlage" (the collapse of the foundation of the contract).30 This 
theory combined the previous approaches and defined frustration in terms of 
whether the change in circumstances affects the foundation of the contract, so 
that the consequences place an unconscionable burden on the obligor. 
According to the theory, a contract may lapse as a result of altered
26. P. Hay, op. cit.', J. Meineck, op. cit.
27. Cited in P. Hay, op. cit., at 359,360; J. Meineck, op. cit., at 90-92
28. Judgment of September 21,1920, 100 RGZ 129.
29. Dawson, op. cit., at 181-189.
30. E. J. Cohn. op. cit., at 20, 2; J. Meineck, op. cit., at 92 et seq.
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circumstances if the expectations, assumptions or suppositions entertained by 
the parties at the time of contracting are frustrated by subsequent events. 
Thus, an uncontrollable change in the circumstances surrounding the contract 
that leads to fundamental disequilibrium in the contract and puts an undue 
burden on the party who had not anticipated that risk in the contract, justifies 
an adaptation or termination of the contract.31 This German version of 
changed circumstances was first applied by the German Supreme Court in 
1923 in the aftermath of the first World War, when revolutionary events and 
hyper-inflation affected the German economy and disrupted the basis of many 
contracts. Although the German Supreme Court had no hesitation in rejecting 
Windschied's theory, because of the immediate post-war inflationary period, it 
subsequently accepted the theory of geschaftsgrundlage proposed by 
Oertmann.
With slight modifications, the above theory forms the basis of the present 
German doctrine of excusable non-performance and has mainly been derived 
from the case law.32 Reichsgericht defined the doctrine of 
"geschaftsgrundlage" as follows: The geschaftsgrundlage is formed by the 
assumption made at the time of contracting by one party, the importance of 
which is known to the other party and which is not objected to by him, or by 
the common assumption of both parties, of the existence or the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of certain circumstances which have determined the intention 
to contract. Thus, upon a failure of that assumption, the obligation to perform 
in terms of the existing contract ceases. It is not, however, upon the basis of 
an implied term in the contract that the obligation to perform is excused. The 
principle applied is that it is contrary to good faith for a party to hold the other 
to performance when he is aware that the other party has contracted only on 
the basis of certain assumptions which have turned out to be incorrect.33
By the combined effect of the doctrines of geschaftsgrundlage, of 
economic impossibility, and the greatly extended scope of the application of 
paragraph 242 of the BGB, German courts began to adjudicate the mass of 
cases arising out of economic strain and war emergencies. However, the 
major criticism of Oertmann's doctrine is its inapplicability in cases where the 
subsequent alteration of circumstances could not be foreseen by the parties at
31. N. Horn, H. Kotz and H. Leser, German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction, 1982, at 
141 et seq.
32. See P. Hay, op. cit., at 361; J. Meineck, op. cit., at 84.
33. RG 168, 126. (Cited in K. W. Ryan, op. cit., at 59).
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the time of contracting. Indeed, the parties when entering into the contract 
regard the continuance of the existing circumstances as self-evident and do 
not consciously form, much less express, any assumptions about the future 
course of events.34
To sum up, it should be said that in response to the dislocations caused 
by disastrous inflation following World War I, the German courts, relying on 
the good faith principle, first began to relax the strict rules of the doctrine of 
impossibility. They found in this general language adequate authority for 
holding that revision was appropriate when great inflation disrupted the 
foundation of the contracts rather than simply cancelling them. Finally, in the 
period after World War II, Court-imposed adjustment ceased to be an 
occasional remedy and became the standard and preferred solution.35 What 
will be evident as the discussion proceeds is the wide divergence which has 
developed between German law on the one hand and Anglo-American and 
French law on the other hand. This divergence may be due to disasters 
encountered by Germany in the 1920's.
2.2. FRANCE
As pointed out above, owing to the prevalence of the economic and 
political theories of capitalism and liberalism and other factors, the clausula 
rebus sic stantibus started its decline towards the end of the eighteenth 
century. Since then, and for over a century, the theory was being replaced by 
pacta sunt servanda that is "contracts must be honoured": this has the 
implication that a contract must be performed regardless of any change in 
circumstances and regardless of cost, effort, or sacrifice to the obligor.36 The 
doctrine was also rejected by the great French jurists of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Neither Domat nor Pothier accepted the validity of an 
implied clausula rebus sic stantibus in contracts. Thus, it is no surprise to find 
French law at the time of codification omitting a general provision concerning 
the modification of contracts.37 Indeed, French draftsmen felt no need to 
introduce the doctrine into the law since it had not really been part of their
34 K. Zweigert, H. Kotz, op. cit., at 193.
35. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63 B. U. L. Rev. 1983, 1039, 1045- 
1051, 1075.
36. Pothier, Traite des Obligations, Partie III, Ch. 6, Art. 3, S. 668. See generally on the relation of 
Pothier's treatment of impossibility to that in Roman law, W. W. Buckland, Casus and Frustration in 
Roman Law and Common Law, op. cit.
37. See Joseph Dainow, op. cit., at 154.
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legal tradition. As we have seen, the position in Germany was completely 
different from that obtaining in France. The doctrine survived longer in 
Germany than in France.
However, the ancient Roman maxim with regard to impossibility of 
performance, and also the writings of Pothier on the subject, did create the 
basis of the French civil law on impossibility of performance as a means of 
excusing an obligation. The French jurist, Pothier,38 writing in the eighteenth 
century, stated the rule to be as follows:
"The debtor corporis certi is free from his obligation when the thing has 
perished neither by his act, nor his neglect, and before he is in default, unless 
by some stipulation he has taken upon himself the risk of the particular 
misfortune which has occurred."
From this foundation developed the modern French law of force majeure. 
According to Articles 1147 and 1148 of the Code Napoleon, there is no award 
of damages when performance is prevented by cas fortuit or force majeure. 
As expounded by traditional doctrine and applied by cautious jurisprudence, 
for a contract to be discharged, performance must be rendered absolutely 
impossible, not merely more onerous.39 In the event of force majeure, the 
contract is treated as a nullity, i.e., terminated, contrary to the German 
practice of adjustment.
After World War I, owing to circumstances incident to that war, 
especially the fall in the value of French currency, there was a tendency after 
1914 to extend the notion of force majeure. From this there emerged in 
France a new doctrine, known as "theorie de I'imprevision" (lack of foresight or 
theory of unexpected circumstances).40 According to the doctrine, the parties 
of a contract are relieved if the performance of their contract has subsequently 
become very onerous, by means of interpreting their wills and the bona fides 
Article 1134 of the French Civil Code. This theory was not included in the 
French codification of private law. However, undue burden on a party caused 
by an unforeseen and uncontrollable event was recognised as an excuse for 
non-performance in government contracts.41 In the Gaz de Bordeaux case,42 
the Conseil d'Etat extended the theory of force majeure where performance
38. Pothier, op. cit.
39. R. David, Frustration of Contract in French Law, 28 J. Comp. Leg. Int'l. L. 1946, at 11, 12.
40. Rene David, op. cit., at 12.
41. Loc. cit., at 13. See also Planiol and Ripert, Traite du Droit Civil Francais, 1952, 2em ed. Tome 
VI, Nos. 391-98.
42 March 30, 1916, S. 1916. 3. 17.
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had merely become more onerous although not impossible. Consequently, the 
court was allowed to adapt or modify contractual obligations.
The civil courts were quite unmoved by such decisions of the Conseil d'Etat. 
Supervening events only justify rescission of the contract if the very strict 
conditions of force majeure are met. This remains the position in France to 
this day.43
B. COMMON LAW
1. ENGLAND
The traditional position of the English common law of contract, unlike 
the Roman law, was that the liability to perform a contract was generally 
absolute and that the promisor was liable for breach of contract even though 
the non-performance was not due to any fault on his side. The classic case 
illustrating the rule is the seventeenth century decision, Paradine v. Jane,44 
here the plaintiff, the lessor, sued the defendant, the lessee, for unpaid rent. 
The defendant pleaded that he had been evicted by an enemy alien, such an 
event was beyond his control, and he was prevented from taking any profits 
from the land as he had intended when he had taken the lease. The 
defendant's plea was held to be insufficient. The court reasoned that since the 
defendant had not made his promise to pay the rent conditional on his ability 
peacefully to enjoy the land, he was bound to pay the rent even though he 
had been unable to use it. The court also added that the law will not protect a 
promisor beyond the contract and that since the defendant was to have the 
advantage of all profits accruing from the land, it was fair that he bore the risk 
of casual losses.45 However, contrary to the above decision, on the Continent 
the courts applied at the same period a much more liberal rule. Indeed, the 
basic provision of pacta sunt servanda had been tempered by the doctrine of 
the clausula rebus sic stantibus.
But according to early English law, a clause listing circumstances under 
which performance was excused, or a force majeure clause, could alleviate 
the necessity of applying or developing the doctrine of impossibility. As a 
result, the doctrine of absolute contracts works well where it is usual to make
43. See, e.g., Civ. 6 June 1921. 1. 73; Civ. 15 Nov. 1933, Gaz Pal. 1934. 1. 68; Com. 18 Jan. 1950, D. 
1950, 227.
44 Paradine v. Jane (1646) aleyn, 26; 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647). This harsh rule applied in equity 
as well. Sqq Leeds v. Cheetham (1827)1 Sim. 146, 150.
45. This exaltation of the principle of sanctity of contract was even applied to commercial contracts. 
See Hills v. Sughrue (1846) 15 M. & W. 253.
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provision for the supervening event, or where the party could reasonably have 
been expected to make such provision. But in other cases, the doctrine is 
considered as an unsatisfactory way of dealing with situations occasioned by 
supervening events. The Paradine rule was an inflexible rule of contract 
enforcement, extremely literal in application, often resulting in harsh or absurd 
consequences. Looking only to the words that the parties had chosen was not 
an ideal approach. This was, perhaps, not the best way to effectuate what the 
parties intended. However, despite earlier cases that recognised excuses for 
non-performance,46 for over two centuries after the above decision (from 1647 
to 1863), the rule was more or less rigorously applied. This doctrine meant 
that many English contracts became verbose collections of exemption 
clauses. However, in the early part of the 19th century, it was recognised that 
some injustice occurred as a result of adherence to the principle.47 Justice 
required that some exceptions be made to the rule. The first rupture of the 
doctrine was brought about by the case of Taylor v. Caldwell48 which 
established the excuse for physical impossibility of performance, as well as 
the "implied condition" theory. In this case, the owner of a music hall had 
agreed to rent the hall to the lessee to hold concerts. The hall was 
accidentally destroyed by fire before the concerts. The court hearing the case 
refused to apply the theory of the absolute contract and held that there was an 
implied condition precedent in the contract that the hall was in existence when 
the concerts were given; since that condition was discharged both the owner 
(from paying damages for non-performance of the rental contract) and the 
lessee (from paying the agreed rental) were excused performances. The claim 
failed, not because the owner of the hall was unable to perform the contract 
by reason of an event for which he was not responsible - as would have been 
the basis for the decision in Germany under paragraph 275 BGB - but 
because the contract of hire was construed to contain an "implied condition" 
that the parties shall be excused in cases where the performance becomes 
impossible from the perishing of the thing without default of the contractor. 
The court in the Paradine case49 would not have been prepared to imply a
46. See, e.g., Abbott of Westminister v. Clerke, 73 Eng. Rep. 59 (K.B. 1536) (Illegality due to 
subsequent act of Parliament); Hyde v. Dean & Canons of Windsor, 78 Eng. Rep. 798 (K.B. 1597) 
(Death of party to personal service contract); and Williams v. Lloyd, 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1628) 
(Destruction of chattel that was specific subject matter of bailment contract).
47 See, e.g., Hadely v. Clarke (1799) 8 T.R. 259; Blight v. Page (1801) 3 B. & P. 295 (n); Hall v. 
Wright (1859) E.B. & E. 446.
48. (1863) 3 B. & S. 826; 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
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condition and interpret the contract in the way that Blackburn J. did in the 
Taylor case.
Taylor v. Caldwell is interesting for civil lawyers because in order to 
find authority for his position, the judge had resort to the Digest and to 
Pothier.50 Although the case may have been decided under the doctrine of 
impossibility, which was then already in existence,51 it appears that the case 
created a new doctrine of frustration.52 However, this celebrated case, which 
brought some degree of flexibility into an exceptionally rigid law, expanded the 
second of the exceptions of "absolute contract" into a general principle that 
destruction of specific subject-matter would excuse performance even though 
the contract contained no express provision to that effect. The great advance 
which the case represented was that a distinction between absolute contracts 
and contracts which were subject to such an implied condition was drawn. 
This case is the starting point for the further development of the doctrine of 
frustration, and its principle was soon applied in other cases,53 and was also 
accepted by the legislature in relation to agreements for the sale of goods.54 
Although this case gave credence to impossibility of performance as a 
contractual defence, it limited its application to cases where the subject matter 
of the contract was destroyed, thereby rendering performance physically 
impossible. Despite its lengthy establishment period and late birth in 1863, the 
doctrine of excusable non-performance has grown quickly since Taylor, but 
still has not reached full maturity.
However, the doctrine was developed by the courts in order to 
encompass not only the destruction of a "specific thing" but also the non­
occurrence of certain events. Not long afterwards, this can be illustrated by 
three cases known as the Coronation cases, heard by the same court. In Krell 
v. Henry,55 one of the cases growing out of the cancellation of the Coronation
49. Paradine v. Jane, (1964) aleyn, 26; 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
50 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312-313 (Q.B. 1863).
51.See for example, Melville v. Dewolfe (1855, Q.B.) 4E1 & B l. 844; Hughes v. Wamsutta Mills 
(1865, Mass.) II Allen, 201. See also Comment, Impossibility and the Doctrine of Frustration of the 
Commercial Object, Yale. L. J. 1924, 91, 92.
52 See generally, Anson, Law of Contract, 24th ed. 1975, at 477; Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of 
Contract, 7th ed. 1969, at 507.
53. See, e.g., Appleby v. Myers (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651; Howell v. Coupland (1874) L. R. 9 Q.B. 462.
54 Section 7 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893.
55. [1903] 2 K.B. 740. See also Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 K.B 493; Herne Bay Steamboat Co. v. 
Hutton [1903] 2K.B. 683. See also R. G. McElroy & G. Williams, The Coronation Cases (part 1 & 2 
), 4 M. L. Rev. 1941, at 241-260; 5 Mod. L. Rev. 1941, at 1-20.
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of Edward VII, the lessee had hired a flat for reviewing the Coronation 
procession of the King. When the Coronation was cancelled due to the 
unexpected illness of the King, the tenant was discharged from his obligation 
to pay for the flat, because both parties were aware of the specific purpose for 
which the flat had been rented. Moreover, the other party's performance 
became valueless to him, although he was willing and able to perform.
In both Taylor56 and Krell, the parties failed to foresee and provide for 
an event that prevented completion of their respective contracts. These cases 
have been allied under the topic of frustration, yet they differ in a decisive 
respect, i.e., in the former the parties jointly suffered a loss; in the latter they 
did not. Krell v. Henry,57 which illustrates frustration of purpose, is more 
complex because it is less objectively determined. One can see that a building 
has burned; one can not determine so easily whether purpose, an intangible, 
has been so altered as to impair the essence of an agreement.
The rule of Taylor v. Caldwell,5* which was restricted to physical 
impossibility, was later extended to legal impossibility.59 However the most 
important development of the doctrine of frustration grew out of the so called 
"true cases of frustration of the adventure". Most of the cases of this kind of 
frustration dealt with problems of delay in the performance of charterparties. 
One of the leading older cases which illustrates the point, is Jackson v. 
Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd .60 A ship was chartered in November 1871, 
to proceed with all possible despatch, dangers and accidents of navigation 
excepted, from Liverpool to Newport and there to load a cargo of iron rails for 
carriage to San Francisco. She sailed on January 2, but on the 3rd ran 
aground, and it took six weeks to refloat her, and another six months to 
complete repair. On February 15, the charterers repudiated the contract. The 
question was whether the charterers were liable for not loading the ship, or 
whether the time likely to be required for repairs was so long as to excuse 
their failure to do so. This question was answered by the jury in the affirmative 
and the Court of Exchequer Chamber held that the charterparty ended upon
56. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B. & S. 826; 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
57. [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
58. (1863) 3 B. & S. 826; 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
59. See Fibrosa Spolka Akcying v. Fairbrain Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. [1943] A.C. 32; 
Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr and Co. [1988] A.C. 119; Denny, Mott and Dickson Ltd. v. 
James B. Fraser and Co. Ltd. [1944] A.C. 265.
60. L.R. 10 C.P. 125 (Ex. 1874).
21
the mishap. On this finding, it was held that the adventure contemplated by 
the parties was frustrated and the contract discharged. A voyage to San 
Francisco carried out after the repair of the ship would have been a totally 
different adventure from that originally envisaged. Thus, "the adventure", said 
Bramwell J., "was frustrated by perils of the sea, both parties were 
discharged, and a loading of cargo in August would have been a new 
adventure, a new agreement."61
The rule of "frustration of adventure" was further applied in TampUn (F.A.) S. 
S. Co. v. Anglo Mexican Petroleum Products Co.62 In this case, Tamplin 
was chartered for five years. After the outbreak of World War I, the British 
government requisitioned the ship for service as a troopship. The ship owner 
claimed that the charterparty was frustrated in order to obtain a larger amount 
of compensation from the government. The House of Lords held that a 5 year 
charterparty which still had 3 years to run was not frustrated and the contract 
was still in effect.
It seems that although the different results in the above cases may be 
explained by the fact that in the latter the charterparty was substantially longer 
than the former, nevertheless, the different views held by the House of Lords 
can not be explained by any difference in their Lordships' opinions on the 
principles of law to be applied.63 It is sufficient to note that these different 
views within the highest tribunal show that cases of frustration raise most 
difficult questions of fact as well as law. However, the Tamplin case 
introduced another theory under the title of "foundation of contract" analogous 
to the German doctrine of geschaftsgrundlage. Lord Loreburn in this case 
held: "No court has an absolving power, but it can infer from the nature of the 
contract and the surrounding circumstances that a condition which was not 
expressed was the foundation upon which the parties contracted."64 
It can be said that theories of the "implied condition" and the "disappearance 
of the foundation of the contract" are only differently worded expressions of 
the same principle. Indeed, the doctrine of frustration rests upon the common
61. Loc. cit., at 148. See also J. Ramberg, Cancellation of Contracts of Affreightment, 1969, at 166, n. 
17, indicating that this decision has been criticesed for misapplication of the doctrine; instead of the 
doctrine of frustration, the doctrine of failure of consideration should have been applied.
62. [1916] 2 A. C. 397. See also Bank Line v. Cape I (Arthur) and Co. [1919] 1 A. C. 435.
63. [1916] 2 A.C. 397. Held by Lord Buckmaster L.C., Earl Loreburn, and Lord Parker of Waddington 
(Viscount Haldane and Lord Atkinson dissenting), that the interruption was not of such a character as 
that the Court ought to imply a condition that the parties should be excused from further performance 
of the contract, and that the requisition did not determine or suspend the contract.
64. Loc. cit., at 404.
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intentions of the parties of the contract and that it is simply the function of the 
courts to interpret the contract. However, in later years, this principle was 
challenged and the peak of the evolution was reached by the advance of Lord 
Wright's theory which was developed in the 1940s.65 According to the theory, 
the courts were able to impose on the parties what they think "just and 
reasonable". The doctrine of frustration was really a device by which the 
courts reconciled the principle of sanctity of contract with special exceptions 
which justice demanded. According to the above, the doctrine had thus 
developed in a way that instead of interpreting the provisions of contract itself, 
it sought to base the excuse on extra contractual factors and considerations. 
There is an important criticism which can be made against the theory. Indeed, 
this approach is contrary to the principle that contracts should be construed by 
the courts rather than remade by them. However, in British Movietonews 
Ltd., v. London and Dist. Cinemas Ltd.,66 fearing that the principle of the 
sanctity of contracts was at risk, the House of Lords overturned a decision of 
the Court of Appeal which had adopted Lord Wright's theory. That is to say 
that the Court of Appeal had appeared to be willing to accept the theory of 
clausula rebus sic stantibus in the widest sense which was the direct 
antithesis of pacta sunt servanda. The facts of the case were as follows: the 
plaintiffs were film distributors and the defendants were owners of a chain of 
cinemas. In 1941 the plaintiffs contracted to supply the defendants with films. 
In 1943, at the height of the War, the parties entered into a supplementary 
agreement in which it was agreed that the producers should supply the 
cinemas with news reels on payment of a weekly sum as long as the 
Government Order controlling the supply of raw films was in force. After the 
War, the Order was retained by the Government for a different purpose, viz., 
the restriction of imports of raw films from countries with hard currencies. In 
1948, the defendants gave four weeks notice, in accordance with the original 
agreement, to terminate the contract. The plaintiffs refused to accept this 
notice as valid, and sued for breach of contract, the order still being in force. 
The question before the courts were whether the cinema owners were still 
bound by their war-time agreement. The Court of Appeal in a unanimous 
decision delivered by Denning L.J. answered this question in the negative. 
Adopting the theory of inherent jurisdiction, the court held that it had "a
65. Denny, Mott & Dickson, Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co., [1944] A.C. 265, 274-276; Joseph 
Constantine S.S. Line v. Imperial Corp., [1942] A.C. 154, 182-187.
66. [1952] A.C. 166 ( Heard in the Court of Appeal at [1951] 1 K.B. 190).
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qualifying power" in the uncontemplated change of circumstances which had 
occurred by the retention of the Government Order in time of peace to do 
"what is just and reasonable" and ruled that the agreement of the parties had 
ceased to be binding. This radical test for frustration, under which the court 
has an absolving power and could impose a just and reasonable solution to 
the problem raised by the new circumstances,67 was promptly repudiated on 
appeal by the House of Lords. The House held that a court had no power to 
qualify the literal words of the contract which referred to the particular 
statutory Order. Lord Simon said:
"The parties to an executory contract are often faced, in the course of carrying 
it out, with a turn of events which they did not at all anticipate - a wholly 
abnormal rise or fall in prices, a sudden depreciation of currency, an 
unexpected obstacle to execution, or the like. Yet this does not in itself affect 
the bargain they have made. If, on the other hand, a consideration of the 
circumstances existing when it was made, shows that they never agreed to be 
bound in a fundamentally emerged, the contract ceases to bind at that point - 
not because the court in its discretion thinks it just and reasonable to quality 
the terms of the contract, but because on its true construction it does not 
apply in that situation."68
Since the above case, there seems to have been some restrictions in the 
scope of the doctrine of frustration. Many factors account for this trend:69
- The reluctance of the courts to allow a party to rely on the doctrine as an 
excuse for escaping from a bad bargain;
- The difficulty of drawing the line between the cases of frustration and cases 
where liability for breach of contract is strict;
- The tendency of businessmen to avoid operation of the doctrine of frustration 
by making their own express provisions for obstacles to performance.
However, five years after the above decision, a new doctrine of 
frustration was attempted in Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban 
District Council,70 and a new test was introduced. In this case, Lord Radcliffe 
held that:
"Frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of either 
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed 
because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it 
a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract. Non 
haec in foedera veni - it was not this that I promised to do."71
67. [1951] 1 K.B. 190, 202.
68. [1952] A.C. 166, 185.
69. See G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 1983, at 650.
70. [1956] A.C. 696.
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This theory - change in the obligation or radically different performance - is the 
most acceptable of the conservative theories, and the one which had received 
the warmest commendation. The theory prevails in English law today, and has 
been approved by academic writers72 and two House of Lords decisions, 
National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd.,13 and The Nema.14
However, although the doctrine of "radically different performance" 
prevails in English law, its theoretical basis has not been clarified and is still 
obscure. It seems that the application of doctrine of frustration is not easy in 
actual cases and the controversy as to the theoritical basis is well known.
As the above history shows, the early English law - contrary to French 
law by which impossibility was a ground of excuse - started with a harsh rule 
to the effect that impossibility could not excuse the contract. However, when 
English courts departed from that principle, English law continued its 
development while French law maintained the above principle and this 
position is continually emphasised by the Cour de Cassation.75
With regard to the effects of frustration of contract, it should be added 
that until 1943, there was only one form of judicial discharge. Declaration of 
frustration meant termination of the agreement, and no restitution was given 
for performance already rendered when the obligation to perform preceded 
the discharge. That was the case with regard to down payments: reliance 
expenses were also not recoverable.76 However, in Fibrosa Spolka Akeyjna 
v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd.,11 the House of Lords held that a 
buyer could recover an advance payment in quasi-contract, when the contract 
had been terminated by the war.78 The court refused to allow the seller to 
keep any part of a down payment, even though he had incurred expenses. 
Furthermore, the court indicated that no quasi-contractual remedy would be 
available if a benefit, however small, had been conferred on the buyer. The 
decision in this case and a more general settlement of the matter, including 
apportionment of reliance expenses, was achieved by the Law Reform
71. Loc. cit., at 720.
72. E.g., Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract, 5th ed. 1960, at 469. See also Anson (1975), at 493.
73. [981] A.C. 675.
74. [1981] A.C. 239; Lloyd's Rep. 239 (H.L.).
75. Infra, pp. 83 et seq.
76. Infra, pp. 144 et seq.
11. [1943] A.C. 32; [1942] 2 All E. R. 122.
78. To this extent, the House of Lords overruled Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
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(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, which affords a greater range of remedies 
when a contract is discharged. However, the 1943 Act has given rise to 
problems of interpretation. The lack of case law has also aggravated. British 
Petroleum Exploration v. Hunt,19 is the first and only authoritative 
interpretation of the 1943 Act. Mr. Justice Goff in this case made an important 
contribution to the understanding of the application of the Act particularly as 
no case had been previously reported on the topic since the Act became law. 
This case, and the above matters will be amplified in the next part of this 
thesis.80
2. SCOTLAND
Although nowadays in Scots law, frustration is accepted and 
understood in the same sense as in English law, its historical development is 
different from England.81 Thus, the application of the doctrine in individual 
cases arises from the different legal background of Scots law.
Generally, Scots law has recognised the problems of impossibility of 
performance for a very long time. While Lord Cooper finds the origins at the 
beginning of 17th century,82 it is believed that frustration can be traced back at 
least a century earlier to Balfour.83 For this purpose, it is enough to say that 
Balfour reports the case of Abbot of Holyroodhouse v. Monypenny in 
154984 in which it was held that tiends were not payable if corn was destroyed 
by uncontrollable force. In this era, factors such as hostility, water, force and 
violence which burnt, wasted or destroyed the rented lands, could discharge 
the tenants from their obligation to pay rent during the period of destruction.85 
According to this early history of Scots law relating to frustration, it can be said 
that the classic English case of Paradine v. Ja/ie86 would have been decided 
differently in Scotland.
79. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 236; [1982] 2 W. L. R. 253.
80. Infra, at 151 et seq.
81. Cooper, Frustration of Contract in Scots Law, 28 J. Comp. Leg. Int'l. L. 1946, pp. 1-5; W. W. 
McBryde, Frustration of Contract, Jurid. Rev. 1980,1, 6,7.
82. Cooper, op. cit., at 6.
83. W. W. McBryde, op. cit., at 6.
84. Balfour's Prackticks, p. 146; M. 10142. See also Abbot of Holyroodhouse v. Laird o f Inverleith, 
Balfour, op. cit., M. 10142; The Chapter of Glasgow v. Laird ofCessford, Balfour, op. cit., M. 10143.
85. Balfour, op. cit., at 200. See also Anderson (1583) M. 10082 where storm was treated as 
frustration.
86. (1646) aleyn, 26; 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
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With the growth of the legal theory of frustration in the 17th century 
based on Roman law or its inspiration,87 a mass of decisions accumulated 
dealing with problems of frustration by which a contract could be discharged 
by destruction of some specific thing essential to its performance. These 
decisions introduced a well-known technical term, rei interitus which is now 
the most obvious example of supervening impossibility.88 By the 19th century, 
Scots law had collected a large number of opportunist doctrines which, as 
mentioned in above, was mainly based upon Roman law. Indeed, before the 
20th century, the Scots law had amassed most of the raw materials which are 
required for the construction of a modern doctrine of frustration. However, 
there had not been enough attempt to rationalise the rules in a generalised 
theory and articulate them as principles of the law of contract.89
Scots law has always recognised that if a contract is frustrated, money 
paid is recoverable as paid for a consideration which has failed, on the 
principle of the conditio causa data, causa non secuta.90 In 1923, the harsh 
rule of Chandler v. Webster91 was expressly repudiated by the House of 
Lords in Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding C o 92 In this case, 
restitution of the first instalment paid of the price of an engine was ordered on 
the ground of failure of consideration, subject to any counter-claim established 
for work done under the contract. It was held:
". . . in order to formulate the rule applicable to this case, it is necessary to 
consider first the Roman law as a source of Scottish law, and secondly the 
Scottish authorities which show how far the Roman law applicable to this topic 
has been received and applied in the law of Scotland . . ,".93
Lord Shaw stated that the case would be a "typical case of restitution under
the Roman law and one for the application of the maxim, 'causa data causa
non secuta' . . .".94
87 See Cooper, op. cit., at 2.
88. See D. M. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, 1988, Vol. II, at 135.
89. Cooper, op. cit.
90. Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding Co., 1923, S.C. (H.L.) 105. On the early origin of the 
doctrine in Scots law, see Craig, Jus Feudale, III, v. 23.
91. [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
92. [1924] A. C. 226. See also Watson v. Shankland (1872) 10 M. 142; (1873) 11 M. (H.L.) 51. Cf. 
Fibrosa v. Fairbairn [1943] A.C. 32 and as to contracts governed by English law, Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.
93. [1924] A.C. 226, at 234.
94. Loc. cit., at 259.
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He also added that while the rule of Chandler v. Webster,95 may be the law 
of England and applies the maxim of "potior est conditio possidentis", this 
maxim is not part or ever was a part of the law of Scotland.96
However, the principles of frustration which are now used in Scots law 
harmonise in most essentials with those of England.97 Like English law, if 
performance merely becomes more onerous, commercially impossible or 
unprofitable, the contract will not be frustrated.98
3. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
It is, of course, well known that the general body of contract law of the 
United States was received as part of the legacy of the Common law 
bequeathed to Americans by the English. Thus, American courts tended to 
follow the doctrine of absolute liability that was articulated by the rule in 
Paradine v. Jane99 which was transplanted from England in the nineteenth 
century and was sanctioned by the American courts for a long time.100 The 
equally harsh nature of the American doctrine of impossibility is illustrated by 
Stees v. Leonard,101 in which the defendant, a contractor, agreed to "build, 
erect and complete" a structure for the plaintiffs. The building was nearly 
completed when it collapsed as a result of a latent defect in the soil as 
opposed to the poor workmanship or materials of the defendant. The second 
attempt to build the structure was also unsuccessful, and for this reason the 
defendant abandoned the work and refused further performance. The court 
stated:
"No hardship, no unforeseen hindrance, no difficulty short of absolute 
impossibility, will excuse him from what he has expressly agreed to do so."102
95. [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
96. [1924] A.C. at 260.
91. For physical destruction of subject matter, see Leitch v. Edinburgh Ice Co. (1900) 2 F. 904; Toy 
Salmon Fisheries Co. Ltd. v. Speedie, 1929, S.C. 593. For supervening illegality, see Scott v. Desel, 
1923, S.C. (H.L.) 37; James B. Fraser & Co. Ltd. v. Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd., 1944 S.C.(H.L.) 35. 
For frustration, see McMaster v. Cox, McEuen & Co., 1921, S.C. (H.L.) 24, 28.
98. See Blacklock & Macarthur v. Kirk, 1919, S.C. 57; Duncan v. Terrel, 1918, 2 S.L.T. 3; Hong 
Kong etc., Dock Co. v. Netherton Shipping Co., 1909, S.C. 34.
99 (1646) aleyn, 26; 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
10°. G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract, 1974, 45-47. See also Thomas R. Hurst, Freedom of Contract 
in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks under UCC Section 2-615, 54 N. 
C. L. Rev. 1976, 545, 549; Comment, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-615: Commercial 
Impracticability from the Buyer's perspective, 51 Temp. L. Q. 1978, 518.
101. 20 Minn. 494 (1874).
102. Loc. cit., at 503.
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According to the decision, the defendant was obliged to construct the 
structure completely regardless of the hardship or expense involved.103 
The concept of absolute liability has also been applied to contracts other than 
construction agreements.104 In all cases, where the defendant, agreed to build 
a structure or other specific performance without stipulating express 
exemption clauses, like force majeure or risk of loss, the courts assumed that 
the promisor made an unconditional promise to perform. However, as this rule 
produced harsh results and whereas performance of these kinds of contracts 
at times proved to be unduly burdensome and oppressive, by the end of 
nineteenth century,105 American courts began eventually to recognise 
instances where parties should be excused performance.106 At first, a majority 
of the American courts that considered the issue adhered, until recently, to the 
Taylor107 standard of impossibility. Justice Holmes expressed the nearly 
universal attitude in Day v. United Sfafes,108 when he commented that "one 
who makes a contract never can be absolutely certain that he will be able to 
perform it when the time comes, and the very essence of it is that he takes the 
risk within the limits of his undertaking."
The celebrated case of Butterfield v. Byron109 represents a counter 
point to the hard-line of the Paradine110 rule. In this case, Byron agreed to 
make, erect, and finish a three and one half storey frame hotel. Butterfield 
agreed to pay $8,500 for the structure. On May 25, 1889, a bolt of lightning 
struck the partially completed building, causing it to burn to the ground.
103. Loc. cit., at 507. See Also School Dist. No. 1 v. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 530, 535 (1857) (In which 
defendant agreed to complete a school house, but it was struck by lightning prior to completion. The 
contractor was not excused from doing what he had agreed to do so); Adams v. Nicholas, 36 Mass. (19 
Pick), 275, 278 (1837); School Trustees of Trenton v. Bennett, 27 NJ.L. 513, 522 (1859).
104 See The Hariman, 76 U.S. 161, 175 (1869) (Where the court stated that a military blockade does 
not constitute a supervening event which renders performance of charterparty impossible); Robinson 
v. Mississipi River Logging Co., 61 F. 893, 899-900 (C.C.N.D. Iowa E.D. 1894), affd, 69 F. 773, 789 
(8th Cir. 1895); Stottlemeyer v. Bobb, 7 Mo.App. 578, (1879).
105. G. Gilmore, op. cit., at 80-81. See generally 6 A. Corbin, Contracts, Sec. 1324 (1962); W. H. 
Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 1920, 589, 
592-594.
106. Slater v. South Carolina Ry., 29 S.C. 96, 6 S.E. 936 (1888); Buchanan v. Layne, 95 Mo.App. 148, 
154, 68 S.W. 952, 953 (1902); Arming v. Steinway, 35 Misc. 220, 222, 71 N.Y.S. 810, 811 (Sup.Ct. 
1901) (In this case, the contract terminated upon an essential party's death); Dixon v. Breon, 22 Pa. 
Super. Q. 340, 348 (1903).
107. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B. & S. 826; 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
108. 245 U.S. 159, 161 (1917).
109. 153 Mass. 517 (1890).
110. Paradine v. Jane (1646) aleyn, 26; 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
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Thereafter, no further work was done. Although Butterfield collected insurance 
to the tune of $6,914.08, he sued on the contract for breach. The court found 
in favour of Byron and argued that when the building is not wholly the 
responsibility of the builder - "as where repairs are to be made on the property 
of the other" - there is an implied term that the building shall continue in 
existence: "The destruction of it without the fault of either of the parties will 
excuse performance of the contract, and leave no right to recovery of 
damages in favour of either against the other."111 The court stated that 
Butterfield could sue for payments already made to Byron, and that Byron 
could sue on implied assumpsit (for work done and materials supplied). To 
effect these findings, the verdict was set aside and Byron was given leave to 
file a declaration in set-off.
This case illustrates the more active role taken by American courts in 
impossibility cases near 1900.
As time went on, the door was opened to others. In due course, the 
courts excused acts which were not impossible, but greatly burdensome to 
perform. The expression "impracticability", introduced in this century, 
promoted the relaxation. In Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard,112 a more 
liberal standard of excuse was adopted and for the first time the court excused 
performance on the basis of impracticability rather that impossibility. In this 
case, the defendants agreed to haul sand and gravel from the plaintiffs land 
which would be sufficient to construct a bridge. The defendants removed only 
part of the sand and gravel from the plaintiffs land and acquired the rest from 
elsewhere. The plaintiff sued the defendants to pay him the original contract 
price for the gravel purchased elsewhere. The defendants claimed excuse 
because the rest of the gravel and sand on the plaintiffs land was under water 
and the cost of removing it would have been ten to twelve times the contract 
price. In excusing the promisor's performance, the court found that the parties 
contemplated and assumed, as a basis of their agreement, that the land 
contained the requisite quantity of earth and gravel available for use, and that 
the removal of gravel located below the water level was not within the parties' 
contemplation. In this case, the court gave substantial weight to the ten to 
twelve fold cost increase attributable to this condition. An expense of ten to 
twelve times that stipulated in the contract is more than just a hardship; rather,
1U. Loc. cit., at 518, 519.
112. 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
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such a prohibitive cost is sufficient to excuse the promisor from liability for 
non-performance.
This case reveals a widening of the excuse doctrine. To the Sfees113 court, 
impossible meant that a thing could not by any means be accomplished; to 
the Mineral Park114 court, it meant that performance would be difficult. The 
importance of this case as a leading pre-code case on commercial 
impracticability, lies in the expanded definition of impossibility to include 
impracticability due to the increased expenses of carrying out a contract, an 
expression which was later accepted by the Restatement of Contracts 
(First)115 and was inserted into section 2-615 Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC).116 Until this decision, the court had never excused the promisor's 
performance for hardship alone or because a contract had become 
unprofitable. Even after the Mineral Park case, the case law often refrained 
from excusing performance on the basis of hardship alone.117 The American 
common law, however, was unsatisfactory with regard to hardship cases. As 
the doctrine of impracticability developed, it became clear that mere additional 
expenses or even extreme expenses or losses of profits still did not entitle 
parties to relief.118 Indeed, it offered no relief from burdensome contracts to 
businessmen who were not sufficiently well represented to ensure that 
exemption clauses were expressly agreed in their contracts. To correct this 
situation, Karl Llewellyn drafted section 87 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act, 
the forerunner to section 2-615 of the UCC. Llewellyn explained that the 
primary object of section 87 was to amalgamate and unify all the common law 
developments in this particular area under a universal criterion of excuse: 
unforeseen and supervening commercial impracticability.119 The statutory 
language of section 87 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act and section 2-615 of 
UCC is similar.120
113. Steesv. Leonard, 20 Minn. 494 (1874).
114. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
115. Sec. 454 (1932).
116. See generally J. D. Wladis, Impracticability as Risk Allocation: The effect of Changed 
Circumstances upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1988, 503, 542.
117. See, e.g., Freidco v. Farmers Bank of Del., 529 F.Supp. 822 (D.Del. 1981).
118. See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916) ; Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 
Cal.2d 48,153 P.2d 47 (1944) (Loss of profits did not excuse performance).
119. See Hawldand, op. cit., at 77.
120. For a full explanation of the history behind the drafting of section 2-615 UCC, see generally J. D. 
Wladis, op. cit., 506 et seq.
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With regard to the "frustration of contract" or "frustration of purpose" 
doctrine, it should be said that although a few American courts121 and the 
Restatement (First)122 have recognised the doctrine as a means of discharging 
performance, as a practical matter, it has largely been rejected by most 
American courts. The most commonly cited modern American case involving 
aversion to accepting the frustration doctrine is Lloyd v. Murphy.123 In this 
case, the defendant had leased a location for five years for the sole purpose 
of conducting a new car dealership. Four months later, due to the outbreak of 
World War II, the Federal government prohibited the manufacture of any new 
cars. The lessor waived the restrictions on the use of the leased premises and 
on subletting or assigning the lease, but the defendant did not accept it and 
left the leasehold claiming that the purposes of the contract were frustrated by 
the Federal regulations. The court refused to invoke the doctrine of frustration 
on the basis that the Federal regulations were foreseeable and the frustration 
was less than total.124
From their common starting-point, American and English law have 
tended to move in somewhat different doctrinal directions. English law 
expanded the doctrine of implied conditions to include tacit assumptions with 
regard to the purpose of the contract. American courts, however, expanded 
the doctrine of implied conditions to include tacit assumptions regarding the 
kinds of circumstances which will excuse and not merely the kinds of 
circumstances which will not occur.
As a result of the rejection of the frustration doctrine by most American 
courts, if parties to a contract wanted to ensure that they would be discharged 
from their liabilities in the event of frustrating events, especially change of 
circumstances, they were obliged to use force majeure clauses or their own 
express contractual provisions for relief from performance. Parties of a
121. See e.g., Garner v. Ellingson, 18 Ariz.App. 181, 182-184, 501 P.2d 22, 24-25 (1972); La 
Chambre Golf and County Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co., 205 Cal. 422, 425-426, 271 P. 476 
(1928) (Where fire destroyed hotel, defendant - Hotel Co., was excused from its contract with Country 
Club providing its guest with use of the club's golf course); 20th Century Lites, Inc. v. Goodman, 46 
Cal.App.2d 938, 943-946, 149 P.2d 88, 93 (1944) (In this case, buyer of neon sign was relieved from 
making further payments on sign where government ordered indefinite blackout); Johnson v. Atkins, 
53 Cal. App. 2d 430, 435, 127 P.2d 1027, 1029-1030 (1942).
122 Sec. 288.
123. 25 Cal.2d48, 153 P.2d47 (1944). See also Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 1308 
(Ct.Cl. 1979)
124 25 Cal.2d at 53-58, 153 P.2d at 50-53.
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contract who used force majeure clauses would get relief only if they stated 
the contingency precisely in their contract.125
In summary, the breakdown of absolute liability in the United States of 
America by the end of nineteenth century emerged through the use of various 
devices. At first, a distinction between subjective and objective impossibility 
was made, and this distinction was adopted in the First Restatement of 
Contracts. Secondly, some cases of discharging impossibility, similar to those 
of English law, were adopted. Thirdly, the concept of "impracticability" 
emerged and entitled the promisor to an excuse for non-performance. This 
term was widely used in the Uniform Commercial Code126 and replaced the 
term "impossibility" in the Restatement of Contracts Second (1981).
125. See W. D. Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Com. L. J.1974, 76, 77; S. E. Wuorinen, Comment, North Indiana Public Service Company v. Carbon 
County Coal Company: Risk Assumption in Claims of Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration 
of Purpose, Ohio St. L. J. 1989, 163, 166.
126. Section 2-615.
CHAPTER TWO: 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF EXCUSE DOCTRINES IN 
DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS
As discussed above, most legal regimes take notice of problems of 
frustration and acknowledge the fact that supervening events beyond the 
control of the parties may be a cause of excuse for non-performance and 
make provision for the discharge of the contract. However, circumstances on 
which this defence is based, vary and contain different responses in various 
legal systems. Thus, the concept of excusable non-performance is different in 
each legal regime and the solutions provided by them for problems of 
frustration are far from uniform. Indeed, there exists no uniform set of rules 
regarding the issue in national legal systems nor in international practice. That 
is because of different academic concepts in various national laws of contract, 
in the sense that legal thinking regarding the concept of excusable non­
performance varies from country to country. Effects of economic and political 
events of the first half of the twentieth century are other factors for such 
differences.
As will be seen, both the Common law and the Civil law have accepted 
excuse from performance in the event of impossibility, frustration, 
impracticability, force majeure, imprevision, wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage. 
As this thesis will explore, frustration is not equivalent to force majeure or 
wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage nor is force majeure the same as 
impracticability; even force majeure under Belgian law is not force majeure 
under French law. Thus, even within a single system, there are differences 
between the formulation of the law and its application.
However, the purpose of this chapter is to examine, analyse, criticise 
and compare the treatment given to excused non-performance in the law of 
contemporary legal systems.
A. COMMON LAW
1. ENGLAND
1.1. DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT AND THE 
JUDICIAL DEBATE CONCERNING THE THEORITICAL BASIS 
OF THE DOCTRINE
As discussed before,127 the doctrine has been developed by the courts. 
Since the seventeenth century several theories have been evolved. Today,
127. Supra, pp. 17-25.
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the doctrine is not completely clear and despite the fact that it may be used to 
achieve justice in some cases, by and large the doctrine is not one that can be 
safely asserted by the parties. Confusion at a theoretical level128 and difficulty 
in applying the doctrine in actual cases are important reasons for the 
confusion surrounding the doctrine. The "implied theory" which was 
introduced by the court in Taylor v. Caldwell,129 presumed that the parties 
had intended that a particular thing or state of thing would continue to exist. If 
they have done so, then a term to that effect will be implied, though it is not 
expressed in the contract.
The fallacy of the implied term theory can be exposed as follows: First, the 
difficulty of ascertaining the parties' intention and the latitude of judicial 
discretion may lead to uncertainty in the results reached by the courts. Thus, 
application of the doctrine involves judicial speculation to imply what the 
parties would have provided if they had anticipated the event. Indeed, the 
whole problem is left to the whim of the court without providing a standard 
affording even a minimal degree of certainty and predictability. Implication of 
fictitious conditions, where not based on a rule of law, seems to be 
incompatible with responsible administration of justice. The question is 
whether the court is better prepared to find out the true intentions of the 
parties? In no place in the history of contract law has this uncertainty been 
more conspicuous than in the disintegration of the doctrine of impossibility. 
Secondly, in borderline cases, it is possible that the application of the doctrine 
will lead to different conclusion on similar facts. Thirdly, the major criticism of 
the doctrine is its lack of a logical foundation.130 Indeed, the theory is artificial 
and can be criticised for its ambiguity and fictitious nature,131 since there 
would hardly be a indisputable common intention to terminate the contract 
upon the occurrence of the particular contingency in question. In this regard, 
Lord Denning has stated that: "the theory of an implied term has now been 
discarded by everyone, or nearly everyone, for the simple reason that it does 
not represent the truth."132 Fourthly, the theory may refer to a term, which,
128. See generally McNair, Frustration of Contract by War, 56 L. Q. Rev. 1940, 173; Treitel, The Law 
of Contract, 7th ed. pp. 712-716; Chitty on Contracts, 26th ed. Paras. 1634-1641.
129. (1863) 3 B. & S. 826; 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
130. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Doctrine 
of implied conditions is "fictional" and "unrealistic").
131. Cf. Leon E. Trakman, Frustrated Contracts and Legal Fictions, 46 Mod. L. Rev. 1983, 39.
132. The Eugenia, [1964] 2 Q.B. 226, 238. See also Donald Harris, Contract and the doctrine of 
Frustration, 104 Solic. J. 1960, 966-968.
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although the parties have not actually expressed it, the court implies in their 
contract by applying the reasonable man test. On the contrary, the parties 
may have actually foreseen the possibility of the event and considered it not to 
discharge the contract, but the court, by application of the theory, could 
nevertheless hold that the contract was frustrated by the event. Fifthly, if the 
doctrine of frustration depends on the implied term theory, the ordinary rules 
of admissibility of extrinsic evidence may apply.133
"Disappearance of the foundation of the contract", is the theory which 
was recognised in the Coronation cases discussed above.134 Possibly in 
response to the fictional nature of the implied condition analysis, the courts 
developed the doctrine. The key point in this test is that every contract is built 
on a certain foundation, and when this disappears the contract is frustrated. 
The theory, however, seems open to serious criticisms. The test is so vague 
and speculative as to create a serious danger of confusion.135 Moreover, in 
order to find out the foundation of the contract the court will probably refer to 
the nature of the contract and surrounding circumstances to infer whether in 
the contemplation of the parties, the continued existence of the conditions 
prevailing at the time of contracting was the foundation of their contract. In this 
regard, the test does not explain on what grounds the implication of any 
condition is permissible. Moreover, it fails to provide any justification for the 
propriety of the particular condition which can be implied.
"Just and reasonable solution", is the theory which was developed by 
Lord Wright.136 According to this theory, the court has absolving power and 
may impose a just and reasonable solution to the problem raised by new 
circumstances. The doctrine seems identical with those legal systems, such 
as Germany,137 which advocate the modification of contract on consideration 
of what is just and reasonable. Indeed, in this sense, the court is making a 
contract for the parties. However, there are inherent weaknesses in this theory 
and it is open to the objection that a judge may not revise the contract 
according to the intentions of the parties. Such a theory is too wide, gives too 
much power to the court to decide what is reasonable and just and ignores the
133. D. Hams, op. cit., at 968.
134 Supra, at 19 et seq.
135. Cf. McEllory & Williams, Impossibility of Performance, 1941, 61-63.
136. See Denny, Mott & Dickson, Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. [1944] A.C. 265, 274-276; Joseph 
Constantine S.S. Line v. Imperial Corp. [1942] A.C. 154, 182-187.
137 Infra, at 97 et seq.
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limited data for the court's decision: it suggests that attention should be 
focused on the harshness of enforcing the contract in the new 
circumstances.138 The theory misconceives the significance of sanctity of 
contract. Moreover, it is contrary to English legal tradition which requires that 
policy should be skilfully deployed under the techniques of the law. The just 
and reasonable solution is not such a technique but the end purpose of the 
technique.139
Lord Radcliffe's theory of "change in the obligation" as a basis of 
frustration is probably the most acceptable theory which prevails in English 
law today.140 According to Radcliffe's statement, in operating the theory, the 
courts should discover what was the original "obligation" and what would be 
the new "obligation". The next step is to compare the two obligations so as to 
see whether the new obligation is a "radical" or "fundamental" change from 
the original obligation.141 In fact, the emphasis is on the fundamental 
difference between the obligation as originally agreed and the obligation that 
is now being required. The idea is that when a performance is still physically 
possible but, because of changed circumstances, becomes substantially 
different from what was reasonably expected, the contract is frustrated. 
Indeed, Lord Radcliffe's definition of frustration also includes contracts which 
are still executory but fundamentally different from the original one. According 
to this view, the doctrine now extends beyond the strict criteria of legal and 
physical impossibility to cases where a dramatically different situation has 
arisen. The question to be asked is just how radically the change in 
circumstances must be to frustrate the contract. The definition does not tell us 
what amounts to substantially different performance or what kinds of 
contingencies or events will cause performance to be substantially different. 
Indeed, the problem of the definition is related to how substantial the changed 
circumstances have to be so as to extinguish the contract. Moreover, this 
case also leaves aside the question of who decides what is "radically 
different". At one time, judges focused attention on what the parties wanted, 
implying what was not expressly provided for. However, today the courts just 
straightforwardly state that it is they who are applying their judicial judgment to
138. See Donald Harris, op. cit., at 968.
139. Fengming Liu, The Doctrine of Frustration: An Overview of English Law, 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 
1988, 261, at 270.
140. Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C., [1956] A.C. 696, at 720.
141. Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C., [1956] A.C. 696, at 720-721, 729.
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decide what is "radically different" and to come to the conclusion, on all the 
circumstances of the case, including the contract terms and the event itself, 
whether it is fair and reasonable that the contract be excused on the ground of 
supervening event. This leads us to the point that frustration of contract is a 
matter of degree, whether or not the changed circumstances are 
fundamentally different.142 Thus, the position is that each case of frustration 
has to be decided on its particular set of circumstances and a court should set 
a contract aside if after examining it in the light of all the circumstances the 
court reaches the conclusion that a reasonable man in the position of the 
judge would have considered the obligation to be fundamentally altered. In 
fact, the test for frustration is objective. It is a matter of positive judicial 
intervention, and not subjective inquiry into actual or presumed intentions of 
the parties,143 as was suggested by the older theory of the implied term. Thus, 
it can be said that there is no uniform standard or unequivocal opinion which 
apply it to cases of frustration; it is a matter of degree and most of the time 
different opinions will emerge. As Lord Diplock has said: "Where questions of 
degree are involved, opinions may and often legitimately do differ."144
According to the above considerations, it is thus difficult for legal 
advisers, using the above formulation of the law, to advise clients as to what 
precisely would cause any particular contract to be frustrated or whether any 
particular sequence of circumstances has caused frustration.
1.2. FLAWS IN THE DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION
The doctrine of frustration has fundamental flaws and does nothing to 
clarify the law of excusable non-performance. One of the problems of the 
doctrine relates to the difficulty of applying the doctrine in actual cases. In this 
regard, the dividing line between repudiation and frustration is not always 
clear and the doctrine may frequently be confused with other doctrines that 
may also discharge one or both parties from their contractual obligations 
under different circumstances.145 Take the famous case, Poussard v. 
Spiers,146 in which the defendant employed the plaintiff to sing in an opera.
142. The Nema, [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 254.
143. Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Farham U.D.C., [1956] A.C. 696, at 728. See also statement of Lord 
Summer in Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue SS. Co. [1926] A.C. 497, at 510.
144 See The Nema, [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 254.
145. See J. E. Stannard, Frustrating Delay, 46 Mod. L. Rev. 1983, 738, at 739-740.
146. (1876) 1 Q.B. 410.
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Owing to illness she was unable to be present at the opening night or for the 
first week. When she recovered, the defendant, who had by now hired an 
understudy, refused to take her back. He was held to be justified in doing so, 
and therefore not liable in damages. The question arises whether this case 
should be classified as a case of repudiation or a case of frustration? If the 
case is considered as a case of breach, then the defendant has a choice 
whether or not to treat himself as excused. However, the plaintiff must pay 
damages and can not refuse to come back if her services are demanded after 
all. If we consider the case as frustration, the contract automatically comes to 
an end at some stage and both parties are excused.147 If, however, the case is 
considered as some sort of non-performance which is neither breach nor 
frustration then the defendant is discharged in any case, whereas the plaintiff 
may not be excused depending on the length and nature of her illness. Now, 
of course, all this is academic, because the plaintiffs liability was not the 
question. However, this analysis shows that there must be something wrong 
with the doctrine which makes such a simple case so hard to classify.
Although there are differences between the doctrine of frustration and 
the doctrines of repudiation and fundamental breach, if a person examines the 
circumstances which would bring the doctrine of frustration into play 
(regardless of who brought it about) and the circumstances which would bring 
into play the doctrines of repudiation and fundamental breach, they seem to 
be exactly similar. Indeed, they are sufficiently similar that one could form a 
test that would cover all three doctrines. The problem can be illustrated by the 
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha.148 In this case, 
Hong Kong Fir was chartered for a period of 24 months, from her delivery at 
Liverpool in February, 1957. Her engines at the time of delivery were in 
reasonably good condition, but because of their age, required careful 
attention. However, when delivered, her engine-room staff were too few and 
too incompetent to cope with her antiquated machinery. Consequently, there 
was, on the very first voyage, a succession of serious engine failures. On her 
voyage to Osaka she was delayed for 5 weeks owing to engine trouble and at 
Osaka, 15 more weeks were lost. Before the ship was again ready for sea, the 
charterers (defendants) repudiated the charter and the owner (plaintiff) 
claimed damages on the ground that the repudiation was wrongful.149
147 For effects of frustration of contract, see infra, pp. 140 et seq.
148. (The Hong Kong Fir), [1962] 2 Q.B. 26, [1961] 2 Llolyd's Rep. 478, C.A.
149. (The Hong Kong Fir), [1961] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 478-485.
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In this case, the Court of Appeal considered whether delay by 
unseaworthiness amounted to a condition in order to entitle the aggrieved 
party to repudiate the contract, or whether it amounted to a warranty so as to 
entitle the aggrieved party to damages only. In determining this issue, the 
Court held that unseaworthiness did not per se amount to a breach of 
condition. It added that delay constituting a breach of condition had to be so 
great as to frustrate the commercial purpose of the charter. According to this 
case, the term "frustration" is being used in the context of breach of contract: 
indeed, frustration has become a blanket expression.
In this regard, Salmon J., In the court of first instance, held that the 
circumstances in which performance was demanded, with 17 months still to 
run, did not make it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken. 
That is to say the charterparty was not frustrated. The judge added that 
although the charterers may have been entitled to damages resulting from 
unseaworthiness, they had no right to repudiate the charterparty.150 
On appeal, Mr. Roskill asked the following questions.
"Is the seaworthiness obligation in the charterparty a condition, the breach of 
which entitled the charterers in the circumstances to treat the contract as 
repudiated?"151
"Where in a breach of contract a party failed to perform it, by what standard 
did the ensuing delay fall to be measured for the purposes of determining 
whether an innocent party was entitled to treat the contract as repudiated?"
He argued that the case was not a frustration case at all, but one of breach of
contract: thus "that delay must be so great as to frustrate the commercial
purpose of the contract" was simply the wrong criterion to apply. The correct
criterion should be "had a reasonable time elapsed or not, within which the
party not in breach was entitled to say 'I regard this contract as at an end'? Mr.
Roskill added that:
"It would be highly unjust that an innocent party should, before being allowed 
to treat a contract as at an end, have to wait as long as it would be necessary 
to wait, in order that the contract would be brought to an end by the operation 
of the doctrine of frustration."152
With regard to the first question, Diplock L.J., stated that the question was 
wrong, since 'There are many contractual undertakings of a more complex 
character which can not be categorised as being conditions or warranties." He 
added that the old technicalities of the condition-warranty dichotomy are more
15°. Loc. cit.
151. [1961] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 483.
152. Loc. cit.
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than a century out of date. From Diplock L.J.s' point of view the problem 
should not be solved by debating whether the shipowner's express or implied 
obligation to tender a seaworthy ship is a "condition" or "warranty".153 
According to Diplock L.J., attention should be focused on the question 
whether the breach has frustrated the contract. Thus, the idea of frustrating 
breach was brought to the forefront of English law by the Court of Appeal. In 
this case, frustrating breach was defined as a breach having consequences 
which would attract the doctrine of frustration, had those consequences been 
extraneously induced.154 Indeed, Diplock L.J., took the opportunity to review 
the cases on repudiation and frustration by delay and affirmed that these 
doctrines were two applications of the same principle. After reviewing the early 
cases, he stated:
"It was no t . . . until Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd .,155 that it 
was recognised that it was the happening of the event and not the fact that the 
event was the result of a breach by one party . . . that relieved the other party 
from further performance of his obligation."156
Diplock L.J.'s explanation is desirable in that it would reduce much of the 
confusion between the different doctrines. Unfortunately, it has still left 
untouched the much more difficult question: How is one to identify when a 
contract is frustrated? Moreover, because of the emphasis on the fact that the 
event requiring application of the different doctrines is the same, it may in fact 
lead to more confused use of the various doctrines being argued in a 
particular case and make it more complex to find out which doctrine was 
precisely relied upon by the court.157
It is interesting to note that a similar argument had been used in 
Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati,15* a pre Hong Kong Fir159 
decision: this case employed the standard of frustrating time in relation to a 
serious breach of a minor term. It established that a breach of contract which 
does not of itself (i.e., by virtue of the term broken) entitle the innocent party to
153. Loc. cit., at 494.
154 By Diplock L.J. [1962] 2 Q.B. at 66; and by Upjohn L. J. at 64.
155. L.R. 10 C.P. 125 (Ex. 1874).
156 [1962] 2 Q.B. at 68.
157 F. Liu, The Doctrine of Frustration: An Overview of English Law, 19 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1988, 
261,281.
158. [1957] 2 Q.B. 401.
159. Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 2 Q.B. 26; [1961] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
478, C.A.
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end the contract must be such as, in effect, deprives him of his expected 
benefit. This was reaffirmed in the Hong Kong Fir case, in which the analogy 
with the doctrine of frustration is strongly drawn by Diplock L.J.
Again, in this case, Mr. Roskill had tendered the same argument. Referring to 
Devlin J.'s opinion in the Citati case, in which he had adopted the test of 
frustration, Sellers L.J. simply held that all the authorities were conclusive and 
consistent with Devlin J.'s holding.160
Another problem of the application of the doctrine of frustration relates 
to situations in which it works as a sword as well as a shield.161 As we know, in 
the large majority of cases of frustration, the doctrine is used as defence or as 
an excuse for non-performance. However, it is possible to use the doctrine as 
a cause of action as well. In this situation, the doctrine may work as a shield 
and as a sword. Indeed, a party who has performed his obligations may argue 
that the contract has been frustrated so as to be remunerated not at the 
contract price, but on a quantum meruit. Take the well-known case of Davis 
Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham UDC,162 in which the builders in an attempt to 
recover a sum of money in excess of the contract price, argued that the 
contract had been brought to an end by frustration. However, they added that 
since they had performed the obligations arising under the contract, they 
should be remunerated not at the contract price but on a quantum meruit for 
the value of the work done. One fact made it specially difficult for the 
contractors to argue frustration. They had never stopped performing nor 
claimed that as of that time the contract was at an end. However, that such an 
argument could be put forward at all is surprising; what is similarly surprising 
is the failure of the analysis of the doctrine of frustration to distinguish 
between these cases and the more usual ones where frustration operates as 
a defence.
However, contrary to the above case, such a contention was successfully put 
forward in Societe Franco-Tunisienne d'Armement v. Sidermar SPA,163 
one of the Suez Canal cases. There the court held that the voyage- 
charterparty was frustrated and imposed on the charterer an obligation to pay 
the ship owners a reasonable freight, i.e., a quantum meruit as opposed to the 
contract price.
160. Hong Kong Fir case, [1961] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 480.
161. See J. E. Stannard, op. cit., at 743, 744.
162. [1956] A.C. 656.
163. [1961] 2 Q.B. 278.
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Such a claim in French law would be inconceivable, since this kind of 
contention clearly shows that there was no impossibility of performance of the 
contract. This suffices, of course, peremptorily to exclude force majeure.164
1.3. LIMITED SCOPE OF DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION AND 
THE PROBLEM OF HARDSHIP CASES
Another problem with the doctrine of frustration relates to hardship 
cases. The point is that the English courts have construed the concept of 
frustration quite narrowly and have refused to apply it in cases of mere 
hardship to one of the parties. For example, if a change in circumstances has 
rendered performance much more onerous or burdensome, the party seeking 
relief can not invoke the doctrine as a result of hardship per se.165 For 
instance, in The Nema,166 Lord Diplock stressed:
". . . that the doctrine is not lightly to be invoked to relieve contracting parties 
of the normal consequences of imprudent commercial bargain."
In another case, Bailhache J. held:
"Nothing in my opinion, is more dangerous in commercial contracts than to 
allow an easy escape from obligations undertaken; and I desire to reiterate 
what the older judges have so often said, that the parties must be held strictly 
to their contracts; it is their own fault if they have not adequately protected 
themselves by suitable language."167
In construction contracts, it will be particularly difficult to rely on the doctrine 
and the contractor will not be excused because of difficulties with the soil, 
requiring additional foundations, or because it turns out he has 
underestimated the time needed to build according to the plan.168 Additional 
expense is also not an event which will per se frustrate the contract. This is 
well illustrated in the Suez Canal cases where it was held that the only 
contracts in which performance could be excused were the ones which 
expressly provided that shipment was to be made via the canal.169
164. Infra, pp. 82 et seq.
165. See, e.g., Brauer case [1952] 2 All E.R. 497; Albert D. Gaon and Co. v. Societe 
Interprofessionelle des Oleagineux Fluides Alimentaires [1959] 3 W.L.R. 622.
166 [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 239 at 254.
167. Comptor Commercial v. Power [1961] 1 K.B. 868, 878.
168. Bottoms v. York Corporation (1892), Hudson's B.C. 4th ed. Vol. 2, p. 8.
169. See Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee and Thorl GmbH [1962] A.C. 93. See also Schlegel, Of Nuts, 
and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez and Frustrating Things - The Doctrine of Impossibility of 
Performance, 23 Rutchers L. Rev. 1969, at 429-438; Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal 
Cases: Excuse for Non-Performance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20 
Hasting L. J. 1969, at 1400-1406.
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The approach in Scots law reveals the reluctance of the system to 
recognise economic impracticability as a cause of excusable non-performance 
as well. In Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock Co. Ltd. v. Netherton 
Shipping Co. Ltd.,170 the defenders who had contracted with the pursuers for 
the repair of their ship, discovered that it would be far more expensive than 
they had expected. Accordingly, they tried to cancel the contract arguing that 
performance was no longer "commercially possible". The court flatly rejected 
the argument holding that if performance becomes more onerous or 
commercially impossible the contract will not be frustrated.171 
However, in an analysis of Scots law in respect of the above problem, 
McBryde has suggested that severe inflation may excuse the performance of 
the contract. He also purports to find a decision in Scots law to justify the 
conclusion that the total collapse of a currency may frustrate a contract.172 
Arguments of this kind tend to stress the broad, flexible and equitable nature 
of the doctrine in Scots law. However, for the present, none of the more recent 
decisions suggests that the Scottish courts are more willing than their English 
counterparts to accommodate commercial impossibility as a ground of 
excusable non-performance.173
What can be concluded from the above discussion is as follows:
(1) The parties to a contract are relieved of performance when without the 
default of either party, unforeseen events, occurring after the conclusion of 
contract, render the performance fundamentally different from that envisaged 
by the parties at the time of contracting;
(2) As a general rule, mere difficulty of performance or mere increase in the 
cost of performance do not excuse performance;
(3) In many cases, frustration of contract is a matter of degree.
The above discussion demonstrates the unwillingness of the modern 
courts to invoke the application of the doctrine of frustration when economic 
circumstances have changed. But in the world of today, there is a need for 
more flexibility, especially in international long-term contracts. However, the 
above approach also demonstrates the advantage which can be taken by
170. 1909, S.C. 34, at 40, per Lord Pearson. See also Davidson v. Macpherson (1889) 30 S.L.R. 2. Cf. 
British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas Ltd. [1952] A.C. 166, at 185, per Viscount 
Simon; The Eugenia [1964] 2 Q.B.226.
171. 1909, S.C. 34, at 40, per Lord Pearson.
172 McBryde, Frustration of Contract, (1980), op. cit., pp. 10-12.
173. Cf A. D. M. Forte, Economic Frustration of Commercial Contracts: A Comparative Analysis 
with Particular Reference to the United Kingdom, Jurid. Rev., 1986, 1, 10-12.
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inserting immunity clauses into contracts to cover such contingencies.174 
English courts recognise force majeure and hardship clauses in contracts.175 
The concept of hardship is very similar, if not identical, to that of frustration,176 
but there the similarity ends since the purpose of the hardship clause is 
primarily to adapt the contract to the exigencies of an event which may, 
otherwise, frustrate the contract.
In the light of the limitations inherent in the doctrine of frustration, it is 
submitted that parties would be well advised to incorporate force majeure or 
hardship clauses into their contracts. The purpose of such clauses is to permit 
the contracting parties to obtain these advantages by reliance on the 
provisions of the clauses. Such a clause, if clearly expressed, is valid and 
enforceable in English law. A comprehensive clause is potentially wider than 
the scope of frustration. However, a question which here arises is whether the 
presence of force majeure clause in the contract excludes the application of 
the doctrine of frustration.177 It has been suggested that a force majeure 
clause will not necessarily prevent the application of the doctrine if an event 
comprehended within the clause nevertheless renders performance illegal or 
fundamentally alters the nature of the contractual obligations undertaken by 
the parties.178 This was approved in The Super Servant Two,179 in which 
there was no suggestion that frustration could not be invoked on the ground 
that the contract contained force majeure clause per se. Rather, the position 
was that a clause may be relied upon as evidence that the parties have made 
express provision for the alleged frustrating event or, at least, that the event 
was one which was within their reasonable contemplation at the time of entry 
into the contract. However, the question here is that if the parties draw up a 
comprehensive force majeure clause, why should the courts not take them at 
their word and entirely refuse to apply the doctrine of frustration? When the 
parties both economically are strong enough to strike equal bargains why 
should they not be allowed to do so? This was the argument which was in fact
174. See pp. 293 etseq.
175. See Superior Overseas Development Corporation v. British Gas Coporation [1982] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 262.
176 See Clive M. Schmitthoff, Hardship and Intervener Clauses, J. Bus. L. 1980, 82.
177. See Ewan McKendrick, Force Majeure Clauses: An Explanation, 4 Law for Business, 1992, 52- 
62.
178. See F. A. Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co. Ltd. [1916] A.C. 
397, at 406 (H.L.).
179. [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1.
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put to Mocatta J., in the case of Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. v. 
Vanden Avenne-lzegem P.V.B.A.1*0 Although there may be much to be said 
for this proposition as a matter of principle, and indeed, one commentator has 
stated "it is time to take up the suggestion of Mocatta J.",181 it must be 
conceded that as a matter of authority the presence of the clause does not of 
itself exclude the application of the doctrine of frustration.
It is therefore extremely difficult, if not impossible, to draft a force 
majeure clause which excludes the doctrine of frustration completely, because 
even the widest drawn clauses may be held not to cover a particular, 
catastrophic event: further, a force majeure clause which makes provision for 
an extension of time may indicate to the court that the scope of the clause is 
confined to a temporary interruption in performance. On this basis, it should 
be noted that English courts interpret the force majeure clause very narrowly. 
A good example of this restrictive approach is provided by the case of 
Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr and Co. Ltd.1*2 Contractors agreed 
in July 1914, to construct a reservoir in six years. In the event of delays 
"however occasioned", they were to be given an extension of time. In 1916 
the contractors were required by Government Order to stop the work and sell 
their plant. The contractors claimed that the contract had been frustrated. The 
Water Board argued that the contract had not been frustrated because the 
contract stated that, in event of delay "whatsoever and howsoever 
occasioned", the procedure was for the contractors to apply to the engineer 
for an extension of time. The House of Lords rejected the Water Board's 
argument and held that the contract was frustrated because the delay clause 
was intended to cover only temporary difficulties and not changes which 
"vitally and fundamentally Tchanae thel conditions of the contract, and could 
not possibly have been in the contemplation of the parties to the contract 
when it was made."183
What is understood from the case is that where a force majeure clause 
provides for a specified event (i.e., it is intended by the parties as a full and 
complete provision if the event occurs), this will normally preclude the court
180. [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 133, at 163. See also Ewan McKendrick, Frustration and Force Majeure - 
Their Relationship and a Comparative Assessment, (In Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, 
Edited by Ewan McKendrick, 1991, at 27 et seq).
181. Hedley, Carriage by Sea - Frustration and Force Majeure, 1990, 209, at 211.
182. [1918] A.C. 119.
183. See also Fibrosa case, [1943] A.C.32, especially the speech of Viscount Simon at p. 40 (A 
provision in the contract does not prevent frustration from application).
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from holding that the contract is frustrated.184 But, if on its true construction, 
the clause is found not to be intended to make full and complete provision for 
the situation created by the subsequent event, then it is still open to the court 
to find that the contract has been frustrated. As we have seen, in this case the 
court held that the provision was not intended to cover every effect of the 
event. Indeed, the provision was limited in extent. Thus, contracting parties 
would be well advised to include within their contract, not only a clearly drafted 
clause, but also a clause which specifically provides for the rights and duties 
of the parties in the event of frustration.185
If a force majeure clause does not of itself exclude the operation of the 
doctrine of frustration and if, as the law presently stands, it is subjected to a 
narrow interpretation, the question then arises whether any advantage can be 
taken by relying upon the force majeure clause. The answer to this question 
lies in the fact that the doctrine of frustration applies within very restricted 
confines and can not be invoked simply because contractual performance has 
become more onerous.186 Moreover, as discussed above, the juridical basis of 
frustration has long been a source of debate. Although this debate does not 
have significant practical consequences, it does make it very difficult to predict 
when the courts will rely on the doctrine; if we are not sure of the basis of 
frustration we are unlikely to be able to predict with any degree of certainty the 
circumstances in which the courts will invoke the doctrine. Uncertainty is 
therefore inherent in the doctrine. This uncertainty and the flaws of the 
doctrine can be eliminated to a large extent by incorporation into a contract of 
a suitably drafted force majeure clause. The clause can specify the 
circumstances in which it is to apply and the role of the court is then reduced 
to the interpretation of the clause. By using such a clause in the contract, the 
parties can avoid the drastic consequences of frustration, by which the 
contract is automatically brought to an end.187 By relying on these clauses, the 
parties can also escape the limitations imposed by the doctrine.
Another question which arises with regard to a force majeure clause is 
the applicability of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.188 Do these clauses
184 See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed. 1992, at 281.
185. For a detailed guidance, see the final chapter of this thesis.
186. See Ewan McKendrick, Frustration and Force Majeure - Their Relationship and a Comparative 
Assessment, op. cit., 27-49.
187 Infra, pp. 142 et seq.
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attract the test of reasonableness imposed by section 3 of the Act? Although it 
has been said that force majeure clauses are not exemption clauses,189 it is 
difficult to draw any clear line of differentiation between the two types of 
clauses. On the one hand, the effect of force majeure clause may be analysed 
as relieving a contracting party of an obligation or liability to which he would 
otherwise be subject; if so, force majeure clauses would be subject to the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. On the other hand, it can be said that since 
force majeure clauses merely define the obligation assumed rather than 
excuse or limit the consequences of breach, they do not exclude or restrict 
liability; viz., they do not operate to shield a promisor from liability for a breach 
of contract. If this analysis is accepted, force majeure clauses would not be 
subject to the statutory requirement of reasonableness under the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977.190
However, even if the 1977 Act was applicable it is doubtful that a 
clause which merely permits one party to suspend, postpone or cancel 
performance upon the happening of events beyond his control would, in a 
commercial contract, be held to be unreasonable. Nevertheless, there may be 
circumstances where such a clause would be unreasonable, for example in an 
exclusive dealing agreement, when the seller was entitled to suspend delivery 
in such an event but the buyer was not entitled, during the period of 
suspension, to purchase supplies from elsewhere.191 However, it should be 
relatively easy to satisfy the reasonableness test if the clause operates for the 
benefit of all the parties to the contract and is restricted to events beyond the 
control of any of them.
1.4. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION 7 OF THE SALE OF 
GOODS ACT 1979
All cases of non-performance caused by events beyond the control of 
the parties, which occur after the formation of a contract, have to be resolved 
on the basis of the common law except those cases which fall within section 7
188. It is submitted that the same issues arise in the context of the Scottish provisions of Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977.
189. Fairclough, Dodd & Jones Ltd. v. J. H. Vantol Ltd. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 136, 143; Trade and 
Transport Inc. v. lino Kaiun Kaisha Ltd. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 210, 230-231; The Super Servant Two 
[1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1, 7, 12.
190. See William Swadling, The Judicial Construction of Force Majeure Clauses, (In Ewan 
McKendrick, Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, op. cit., at 11-20).
191. See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed. 1992, at 393; Chitty on Contracts, 26th ed., Vol. 1, at 633.
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of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. In this regard, in addition to preserving the 
general rules of the common law (section 62(2)), including the rules as to 
frustration, the Act contains two provisions - sections 6 and 7 - which deal with 
specific goods which have perished. In theory, there is no reason why the 
general doctrine of frustration should not apply to the special case provided in 
section 7.
In practice, however, section 7 provides a statutory rule for one case of 
frustration, viz:
"Where there is an agreement to sell specific goods and subsequently the 
goods, without any fault on the part of the seller or buyer, perish before the 
risk passes to the buyer, the agreement is thereby avoided."
The scope of the section is comparatively narrow. According to the section, an
agreement to sell may be frustrated when the goods have perished provided
neither the property nor the risk has passed to the buyer. The section only
applies where there is an agreement to sell, and not a sale of the goods.192 It
does not have application where property has passed.193 It is clear that cases
involving frustration of a contract to sell generic goods do not fall within
section 7. Moreover section 7 only applies when the goods have perished as
opposed to suffering damage.194 When section 7 does not apply, the general
principles of the common law are still relevant and the doctrine of frustration
may, therefore, operate to terminate the agreement to sell goods.195
Sections 6 and 7 of the Act deal with cases which apparently have 
much in common. In both cases the contract is for the sale of specific goods 
and the goods accidentally perish without any wrongful act on the part of the 
parties. However, there are the following differences between the two 
sections. Section 6 deals with a situation where the goods have already 
perished prior to the making of the contract196 while section 7 is concerned 
with events occurring after the contract was made but before the passing of 
the risk from the seller to the buyer. Thus, section 6 deals with the case of 
common mistake and section 7, on the other hand, deals with the case of 
frustration. However, if section 6 applies, the contract is void: but if section 7
192. Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed. 1992, at 269.
193. See e.g., Horn v. Minister of Food, [1948] 2 All E.Rep.1036.
194 See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 1974, at Sec. 425, p. 423; P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, 7th ed. 
at 327.
195. See Nickoll & Knight v. Ashton, Edrige & Co. [1901] 2 K.B. 126 (Agreement to sell goods to be 
shipped by specified ship which was stranded before shipment).
196. In German law, this case is categorised as initial impossibility. See pp. 94, 95.
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applies the contract is avoided or frustrated. Thus the effect is not the same. 
In both cases, the buyer can recover the purchase price or any part payment, 
while the seller is not entitled to retain or recover his expenses. As regards 
common mistake (section 6), this is in harmony with the general principles of 
law since the destruction of the subject matter is of fundamental 
importance;197 as regards frustration (section 7), this is an exception from the 
rules laid down in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.198 
The effect of section 7 is quite clear. When it applies, it excuses the seller's 
obligation to deliver, and the buyer's obligation to pay the price. However, the 
scope of the operation of the section is not completely clear and may lead to 
different interpretations. For example, it is not clear whether the term "specific" 
should be interpreted as referring only to goods in existence at the time of 
making the contract. The question here is whether it also applies to cases 
such as Howell v. Coupland?199 Cases of this kind do not fit easily within the 
Act's definition of "specific goods", viz goods identified and agreed upon at the 
time the contract of sale was made (section 61 (1)).
According to the section, in order to apply, the goods must have 
perished. It clearly covers the physical destruction of the goods. However, it 
has been suggested that the goods need not have been totally destroyed, 
provided that they have been so altered in nature by damage or deterioration 
that as a matter of business, they have become something other than that 
which was described in the contract.200 It is, nevertheless, difficult to ascertain 
the degree of deterioration short of total destruction of the subject matter 
which will bring the section into operation. Moreover, the concept of the term 
"perishing" does not afford a reasonable solution to the problem of partial 
impossibility where a part of the subject matter is destroyed. If only part of the 
goods perish, does the section operate to frustrate the contract and discharge 
the seller? It seems that there is no difficulty if the seller's obligation with 
regard to goods which have been destroyed is severable:201 the contract for 
the portion still in existence is enforceable and performance of the contract for
197 See Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd. [1932] A.C.161, 226 (per Lord Atkin).
198. Infra, at 163, 164.
199.An agreement to sell 200 tons of potatoes to be grown on a land. For complete discussion of the 
case, see, pp. 219-222.
200. Benjamin's Sale of Goods, (1992), at 269. See also John D. McCamus, The Doctrine of 
Frustration in the Law of Sales, Ontario Law Reform Commission, Research Paper No. II.7, 1974, at 
47.
201. See J. D. McCamus, op. cit.
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the purchase of the destroyed part will be excused. However, if the contract is 
indivisible, it seems that partial loss of the goods avoids the contract under 
section 7, and excuses the buyer's liability for the price.202
A different problem arises where the goods are no longer available to 
the seller, yet they have not "perished" in any physical sense; for example, 
cases such as theft or requisition of the goods by a government authority. 
There is judicial support for the proposition that goods which are irretrievably 
lost by theft, are deemed to have perished for the purposes of section 7.203 
Moreover, the section seems to apply where the goods deteriorate to such an 
extent as to be unsaleable under the contract description.204 It may also cover 
a case where the goods are requisitioned by a government.205
Section 7 attracts another criticism by restricting its application to 
situations where risk has not passed to the buyer. Accordingly, when the seller 
passes the risk to the buyer before property has passed or before delivery of 
the goods to the buyer, the seller can not rely on the section.
There is an additional deficiency in the formulation of the section. The 
problem is that the word "fault" is defined in the Act as "a wrongful act or 
default".206 The question arises whether the section disentitles a seller from 
relying on the section where the goods have perished as a result of his 
negligence. It appears that there is no authority in the law of sale of goods on 
the point. In the context of frustration generally, the point was expressly left 
open by the House of Lords in Joseph Constantine S. S. Line Ltd. v. 
imperial Smelting.207
By referring to a lack of fault of both parties, the section unnecessarily 
excludes from its application a case where the goods have perished as a 
result of the fault of the buyer.
202. Cf. Barrow Lane & Ballard Ltd. v. Phillip Phillips & Co. Ltd., [1929] 1 K.B. 574; P. S. Atiyah, 
The Sale of Goods, 1990, at 328. See also chapter five, pp. 223, 224.
203. That is what which was decided in Barrow Lane & Ballard Ltd. v. Phillip Phillips & Co. Ltd., 
(op. cit.), where 700 bags of nuts in a warehouse - identified and agreed upon, and therefore specific - 
were sold. In fact at the time of contracting, 109 bags had been stolen, so that there were only 591 
bags in the warehouse. The court held that the parcel of 700 bags had ceased to exist, and thus 
"perished", and that section 6 applied so that the contract was void.
204 See Asfar & Company v. Blundell [1896] 1 Q.B. 123 (Dates contaminated by sewage).
205. See Re Shipton Anderson & Co., [1915] 3 K.B. 676.
206. Sec. 61 (1).
207'. [1942] A.C. 154. For a detailed analysis of the problem, see cahpter 3, pp. 136, 137. However, for 
support for the view that negligence precludes application of the doctrine of frustration, see Re 
Arthur's Estate (1880), 14 Ch. D. 603; Lebeaupin v. Richard Crispin & Co., [1920] 2 K.B. 714.
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Finally, the limited scope of the section should be noted. The section 
does not cover quasi-specific goods, nor does it cover goods which have been 
ascertained after the conclusion of the contract. Why the section should draw 
this distinction is not clear.
It appears, however, that section 7 does not provide an absolute rule, 
but may be negatived or varied by express agreement, or by the course of 
dealings between the parties, or by such usage as binds both parties to the 
contract.208
Questions of frustration rarely arise in connection with the sale of
unascertained goods. This is because in a sale of unascertained goods, the
seller usually has to find the goods from any source.209 If one source is not
available then the seller must find another. In this regard, it has been held:
"a bare and unqualified contract for the sale of unascertained goods . . . will 
not be dissolved by the operation of the principle [of frustration], even though 
there has been so grave and unforeseen a change of circumstances as to 
render it impossible for the vendor to fulfil his bargain."210
Only if the seller and the buyer expressly or impliedly agree on the basis of a
common assumption that the goods are to come from a particular source and
no other, will frustration occur.211
However, it must not be supposed that a contract for unascertained goods can 
never be frustrated. There seems to be no reason why the doctrine of 
frustration should not apply. Even in contracts of this kind, a frustrating event 
may occur, such as the passing of legislation dealing with the goods in 
question (for example a prohibition on export from a country which is the only 
source of the goods, or the outbreak of war).212
2. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2.1. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS OF EXCUSABLE NON­
PERFORMANCE
In the United States of America, excuse of non-performance still 
remains an unclear and unsettled doctrine. Moreover, the solutions advanced 
are not always consistent with the theories involved. The various terms
208. Sale of Goods Act 1979, Sec. 55(1).
209. See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed. (1992), at 272.
210 Blackburn Bobbin Co. Ltd. v. T. W. Allen & Sons Ltd. [1918] 1 K.B. 540, 550, affd. [1918] 2 
K.B. 467.
211. See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit.
212. See, e.g., Re Badische Co. Ltd. [1921] 2 Ch. 331. See also Benjamin's Sale of Goods, op. cit.
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relating to excusable non-performance are often ambiguous, confusing, and 
even conflicting. Today the terms "impossibility", "impracticability" and 
"frustration" are used in sense of excuse from performance. While 
impossibility and impracticability are used interchangeably, they traditionally 
expressed distinct but related ideas. Generally, impossibility refers to a 
performance that could not be accomplished, whereas impracticability refers 
to performance that could be accomplished but only at an unreasonable or 
excessive cost. This concept, was expanded in comment 3 to section 2-615 of 
the UCC to "commercial impracticability," which is another undefined phrase. 
The comment, merely states that the term was chosen so as to call attention 
to the commercial character of the criterion.
Restatement (Second) of contracts substitutes the term "impracticability" for
"impossibility". The term, "frustration", is reserved for a situation where
performance is fully possible but the exchange has become undesirable.
Indeed, frustration of contract is regarded as a change in circumstances that
makes the performance virtually worthless.213 In contrast to its treatment in the
First Restatement, frustration is included within the chapter on impracticability.
The doctrine has never acquired much precision or clarity of meaning in
American law. For example, most of the time frustration has been used as a
sort of loose synonym for what is called impossibility.214 A finding that the
promisor's performance has become impossible or that the frustrating event
has destroyed the "foundation of the contract" establish the two most popular
rationales. Sometimes these two concepts are inextricably bound together: 
"where the performance depends upon the continued existence of a thing 
which is assumed as a basis of the agreement, the destruction of the thing by 
the enactment of a law terminates the obligation."215
Commentators have not agreed on the extent to which the doctrine of 
frustration is part of American law. In this regard, even if a limited form of the
213. For the explanation of the above mentioned terms ("impracticability", "impossibility" and 
"frustration"), see D. L. Jacobs, Legal Realism of Legal Fiction? Impracticability under the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 87 Com. L. J. 1982, 289-298; Comments, Contracts - Frustration 
of Purpose, op. cit., at 98, 99; B. N. Henszey, UCC Section 2-615 - Does "Impracticable" Mean 
Impossible? 10 U.C.C. L.J. 1977, at 109. See also Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 
156 P. 458 (1916).
214 Marcaria J. Speziale, The Turn of the Twentieth Century As the Dawn of Contract 
"Interpretation": Reflections in Theories of Impossibility, 17 Duq. L. Rev. 1978-79, 555, at 580.
215. Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 451, 60 So. 876, 878 (1912). See also T. Ward 
Chapman, Comments, Contracts, Frustration of Purpose, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 98, at 111.
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doctrine is recognised, it has not received substantial acceptance in many 
states.216
As a result of these factors, it is extremely difficult to arrive at a
definition of excusable non-performance in American law. In Housing
Authority v. East Tennessee Light and Power Co.,217 the court stated that: 
"the conclusions reached in the decided cases are not harmonious, due, 
perhaps in part, to the multitude of circumstances or conditions under which 
the question was presented. It is impossible to state a general rule which will 
be applicable to all classes of cases."
Both American and English courts have therefore struggled over the 
centuries with the problem of excusable non-performance of contracts. This 
struggle, unfortunately, has not resulted in the development of a coherent 
positive theory consistent with the typical outcomes in the decided cases. The 
problem will be discussed in the context of both the American common law 
and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
2.2. AMERICAN COMMON LAW
2.2.1. THE TRADITIONAL CATEGORIES OF EXCUSABLE NON­
PERFORMANCE: FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT AND
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
Although the American courts have for the most part rejected the 
doctrine of frustration of purpose, there are cases which show that the 
doctrine has been accepted in, at least, some states.218 The doctrine of 
frustration has been incorporated into both the first219 and second220 
Restatements. Although the doctrine is not expressly recognised by section 2- 
615 of the UCC, there is a little doubt that it is applicable to contracts for the 
sale of goods.221 The section is designed to apply in situations involving the
216. See A. Anderson, Frustration of Contract - A Rejected Doctrine, 3 De Paul L. Rev. 1953, 1-22. 
Compare it with H. Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 
Colum. L. Rev. 1958, 287, 309.
217 183 Va. 64, 31 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1944).
218. See, e.g., West Los Angeless Inst, for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1966), 
cert, denied, 385 U.S. 1010 (1967) (Seller of business to tax-exempt entity could rescind when "sale 
and leasback arrangement was frustrated by Revenue Ruling . .. while rejected the tax premises upon 
which the transaction was based"); La Cumbre Golf Country Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co., 205 
Cal. 422, 271 P. 476 (1928) (Hotel company was excused from paying flat fee for golf privileges for 
its guests when hotel burned down). See also Comments, Contracts - Frustration of Purpose, 59 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1960, 98; E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, 1982, at 689 etseq.
219. Section 288.
220. Section 265.
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doctrine of commercial frustration as well. Comment 9 states that a buyer is 
discharged where the reasonable commercial understanding of the agreement 
is that the buyer agreed to purchase for a particular purpose and that purpose 
has been frustrated.
According to Restatement (Second), the party who claims that his 
purpose has been frustrated by a supervening event must meet four 
requirements:222
- The event must have "substantially frustrated his principal purpose".
- It must have been a "basic assumption on which the contract was made" that 
the event would not occur.
- The occurrence of event must not have been due to the fault of the party 
relying on frustration.
- The party seeking relief must not have assumed a greater obligation than the 
law imposes.223
The American cases dealing with frustration are very limited. Only a 
few judgments have accepted the doctrine. In fact, frustration has been 
invoked with even less success than impracticability.224 In short, the U.S. 
courts have relied less on the doctrine of frustration than their English 
counterparts. A 1960 survey found only twenty-nine cases which reflected 
acceptance of the doctrine in America.225 In general, these decisions and their 
justifying reasons have been similar to those of the English courts especially 
with regard to the fiction of the implied term.226 Moreover, it should be added 
that although the American courts have for the most part rejected the English 
doctrine of frustration, they have, however, reached similar results by 
expanding the doctrine of implied conditions to include tacit assumptions
221. Farnsworth, op. cit., at 690; Note, Frustration as an Agricultural Buyer's Excuse under UCC 
Section 2-615, 11 University of California, Davis Law Review, 1978, 351. See also Nora Springs 
Coal Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1976) (Dictum: UCC 2-615 should be "equally 
applicable to buyers [since] the code expressly recognizes the doctrine of commercial frustration").
222. Restatement (Second), Sec. 265; Farnsworth, op. cit.
223. Restatement (Second), Sec. 265 expresses this by phrase "unless the language or the 
circumstances indicate the contrary."
224 See Birmingham, A Second Look at Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of 
Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20 Hastings L. J. 1393, 1394, 1969.
225. Comments, Contract, Frustration of Purpose, op. cit., 98, 106. On the basis of a 1953, Anderson 
concluded that the doctrine of frustration had not been accepted by any American courts of last resort. 
See Anderson, op. cit.
226. See Arthur L. Corbin, Frustration of Contract in U.S.A., J. Comp. Leg. Int'l. L. (Third Series), I, 
1947, at 3. See also Olson v. Carbonara, 21, Ill..App.2d 69, 157 N.E.2d 273, at 275 (1959), leave to 
appeal denied 17 111.2d 147 (1959).
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regarding the kinds of circumstances which will discharge a contract. In 
particular, they have often held that it was the implied intention of the parties 
that performance should be discharged when such performance became 
"impracticable" because of the extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, 
injury or loss involved. It can therefore be said that since the American courts 
have been prepared to apply the theory of implied conditions, there are in fact 
more exonerating circumstances in U.S. law than are covered by the English 
doctrine of frustration. Both the impossibility and frustration rationales are 
often explained in terms of an "implied condition". In Patch v. Solar Corp.,221 
for example, the court stated:
"whether you call it impossibility of performance or frustration, the result is the 
same. In either event the court will imply a condition excusing both parties 
from performance . . . ,"228
Sometimes, however, a court states an "implied condition" in a manner which 
does not seem merely to be a way of stating the doctrines of impossibility or 
frustration. These varying uses of "implied condition" lead to the conclusion 
that there is a separate rationale for the doctrine of frustration which may be 
called the "implied condition" rationale. Indeed, one court has asserted that an 
alternative name for the doctrine of frustration itself is the "doctrine of implied 
condition."229
However, while the doctrines of impossibility of performance and 
frustration of purpose are similar, it should be emphasised that frustration is 
not a form of impossibility.230 In American law, impossibility refers to factual 
situations where the contractual purpose becomes impossible to perform; 
frustration of purpose refers to the circumstances where the purpose for which 
a party entered into the contract has been frustrated due to a failure of 
consideration. Indeed, the doctrine refers to situations in which the contracted 
performance remains possible, but the original intentions of either the 
promisor or promisee will not be achieved by performance.231
227. 149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 326 U.S. 741 (1945).
228. 149 F.2d at 560.
229. Woodv. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944).
230 Comments, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-615: Commercial Impracticability from Buyer's 
Perspective, 51 Temp. L. Q. 1978, 518, at 528. See also Crown Ice Mach. Leasing Co. v. Sam Senter 
Farms, Inc., 174 So.2d 614, 617 (Fla. 1965).
23  ^ Perry v. Champlain Oil Co., 101 N.H. 97, 98, 134 A.2d 65, 66 (1957). See also 6 A. Corbin, 
Contracts, Sec. 1325 at 338 (1962 and Supp. 1964); 6 S. Williston, op. cit., Sec. 1935 (rev. ed. 1938); 
Restatement of Contracts, Sections 288, 454 (1932).
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With regard to impracticability, as the court noted in Lloyd v. 
Murphy,232 there are significant conceptual differences between 
impracticability and frustration:
"Although the doctrine of frustration is akin to the doctrine of impossibility of 
performance . . . since both have developed from the commercial necessity of 
excusing performance in cases of extreme hardship, frustration is not a form 
of impossibility even under the modern definition of that term, which includes 
not only cases of physical impossibility but also cases of extreme 
impracticability of performance. Performance remains possible but the 
expected value of performance to the party seeking to be excused has been 
destroyed by the fortuitous event, which supervenes to cause an actual but 
not literal failure of consideration."
From a comparative point of view, it should be noted that the English 
judges, unlike their American counterparts, regard frustration as substantially 
identical with impossibility.233 Indeed, the term "frustration" in England 
encompasses both frustration of purpose and impossibility of performance. 
While in American law, as discussed, the terms refer to two different 
situations. Thus the doctrine of frustration in English law is essentially similar 
to the United States doctrine of impossibility where it refers to impossibility of 
performance. Further, the terms such as "physical impossibility", "legal 
impossibility", "subjective and objective impossibility", "personal inability", 
"increased difficulty" and "frustration of object" are also found in American 
law.234 Like English law, in order to be operative as an excuse of performance, 
frustration and impossibility must be determined objectively rather than 
subjectively.235
2.2.2. COMPLICATIONS IN THE DOCTRINE OF 
IMPRACTICABILITY
As discussed in the preceding chapter,236 impracticability developed 
from the doctrine of impossibility. The concept of impracticability evolved to 
allow excuse when an event did not render performance impossible but,
232 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 53, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944).
233. See john D. Calamari, The Law of Contracts, 1977, at 475 etseq.
234 See generally, 6 A. Corbin, op. cit;, 6 Williston, op. cit.; Restatement of Contracts, op. cit.
235. Sachs v. Precision Prod. Co., 257 Or. 273, 476 P.2d 199 (1970); Ballou v. Basic Constr. Co., 407 
F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. 1969); Williams v. Carter, 129 Vt. 619, 285 A.2d 735 (1971); White Lakes Shop. 
Ctr. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 208 Kan. 121, 490 P.2d 609 (1971). See also Restatement 
(First) of Contracts, Sec. 455.
236. Supra, pp. 27 et seq.
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nevertheless, substantially different from that contemplated by the parties.237 
This development represents the most liberal extension of the American 
common law on excusable non-performance. A modern statement of the 
synthesis appears in a recent case:
"The doctrine of impossibility of performance has gradually been freed from 
the earlier fictional and unrealistic strictures of such tests as 'implied term1 and 
parties' 'contemplation'. It is now recognized that a thing is impossible in legal 
contemplation where it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it 
can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost."238
Some American courts define the term "impracticability" solely as 
increased cost.239 However, it seems that an excessive cost increase may 
constitute but one example of impracticability.240 The rationale for the doctrine 
is that the circumstances causing breach have made performance so vitally 
different from what was anticipated that the contract cannot reasonably be 
thought to govern.241 However, the following cases indicate that the doctrine of 
impracticability has been translated into other concepts as well. In Asphalt 
International, Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp.,242 for example, the 
defendant shipowner refused to repair a vessel chartered to the plaintiff after it 
had been severely damaged in a collision, notwithstanding the defendant's 
contractual duty to repair. The cost of repairing the vessel significantly 
exceeded the value of the ship. The plaintiff sued for loss of profits to be 
derived from the ship, claiming that the owner failed to repair the ship in 
accordance with the charterparty. The owner defended its failure to repair by 
claiming an excuse under section 2-615. Recognising that the section applied 
solely to the sale of goods, the court nevertheless applied its principles to 
discharge the defendant.243 The court tried to determine whether, under the 
circumstances, performance would be "essentially different" from that for 
which the parties had contracted or whether the event altered the essential
237. Note, UCC Section 2-615: Excusing the Impracticable, 60 B. U. L. Rev. 1980, 575, at 592.
238. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d312, 313 (D.C.Cir. 1966 (Skelly Wright J.).
239. See also Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
240. Note, op. cit., at 592, 593. See also West L. A. Inst., 366 F.2d at 220; Kinzer Constr. Co., 125 
N.Y.S. 46 (Ct. Cl. 1910), affd 145 A.D. 41, 129 N.Y.S. 567 (1911).
241. Note, op. cit. See also Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Mcdonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 991 
(5th Cir. 1976); Standard Constr. Co. v. National Tea Co., 240 Minn. 422, 430-431, 62 N.W.2d 201, 
206 (1953).
242 667 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1981).
243. Loc. cit., at 266.
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nature of the contract.244 In doing so, the court emphasised the change in the 
"essential nature" of the contractual performance rather than the magnitude of 
hardship to the parties. The court excused the owner because the subject 
matter of the contract had essentially been destroyed. The reasoning 
underlies the exceptions to the absolute performance rule of the early 
common law. However, "impracticability" is used instead of "impossibility" or 
"frustration".
In Waldinger Corp. v. GRS Group Engineers, Inc.,245 a subcontractor was 
sued by a contractor for breach of a contract to supply specially engineered 
equipment for use in a sewage treatment plant. The contract expressly listed 
several restrictive specifications for the equipment. The defendant supplied 
equipment that met the performance requirements issued by the federal law 
but which did not strictly comply with the engineering specifications listed in 
the contract. In defending the suit, the defendant raised the impracticability 
defence of section 2-615, arguing that it had relied on the government rules 
prohibiting the type of restrictive specifications found in the contract and 
claiming that if it had complied with the restrictive specifications, its machine 
would not have performed in accordance with the government rules.246 The 
court accepted the defendant's argument and discharged its non-performance 
under the agreement. The court stated that the defendant's inability to supply 
a filter press that would both satisfy the plaintiffs mechanical specifications 
and perform as required by federal law was commercially impracticable.247 In 
this case, the court discharged the subcontractor because federal law 
prevented performance in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
The above decisions are important because they show how the courts 
interpret the concept of impracticability in different ways. While the concept of 
impracticability may have been intended as a major improvement in terms of 
coverage, clarity and simplicity, its meaning and scope are not totally clear. 
On the one hand, some decisions reveal the similarity of the impossibility and 
impracticability concepts. These decisions bolster the argument that the two 
excuses are dealt with in the same way. On the other hand, other decisions 
define impracticability differently from impossibility, i.e., exclusively in terms of 
increased costs.
244 Loc. cit.
245. 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985).
246. Loc. cit., at 784-786.
247 Loc. cit., at 789.
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Both UCC Section 2-615 (for the sale of goods) and Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts248 (for all other type of contracts) have adopted the new 
doctrine of impracticability249 with the same formulations. In both, 
impracticability is not distinguished from impossibility. Instead, both authorities 
use only the term "impracticability".
According to Restatement (Second), death or incapacity of a person required 
for performance, destruction of subject matter, illegality, severe shortage of 
raw materials or supplies due to war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen 
shutdown of major sources of supply and severe cost increases (cost increase 
alone - wages, raw materials, or construction - if they fall outside the "normal 
range") are grounds for impracticability.250 It should be noted that in the 
context of the new synthesis of "impracticability", the party seeking relief 
should also meet four requirements, viz:
- The event must have made performance "impracticable".
- It must have been a "basic assumption on which the contract was made" that 
the event would not occur.
- The occurrence of event must not have been due to the fault of the party 
relying on impracticability.
- The party seeking relief must not have assumed a greater obligation than the 
law imposes.
Although the doctrine of impracticability in the sense of excessive cost 
increase has been fully accepted by commentators,251 the UCC252 and the 
Restatement Second,253 in practice most American courts are extremely 
reluctant to accept anything short of impossibility as discharging 
performance,254 even though the standard is technically "impracticability".255
248. Sec. 261.
249. The term "impossibility" used in the First Restatement. It has been said that this difference is 
merely in nomenclature, because the First Restatement defined "impossibility" as not only strict 
impossibility but impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or 
loss involved. Indeed, the First Restatement equated extreme impracticability with impossibility. See 
First Restatement, Sec. 454 (1932) accord H. B. Zachry Co. v. Travellers Indent. Co., 391 F.2d 43 
(5th Cir. 1968); City of Littleton v. Employers Firs Ins. Co., 169 Colo. 104, 453 P.2d 810 (1969).
250. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Sections 261, comment c & d, 262, 263, 264. Cf. First 
Restatement.
251. See Comment, Impracticability as Excuse from Performance on Contracts for the Sale of Forest 
Timber, 20 Willmette L. Rev. 1984, 43, at 54.
252 Sec. 2-615.
253. Sections 261-272.
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However, in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard,256 a leading pre-code case 
on commercial impracticability, the court held that the defendant was excused 
from performance because of excessive and unreasonable cost. In 
comparison with other cases, this decision constitutes an example of a liberal 
application of the doctrine and offers in theory at least, greater protection from 
supervening commercial hardship. But given that the doctrine has not been 
accepted by the majority of states, the place of the doctrine in American law 
remains unsettled.
From a comparative point of view, both American and English courts 
are reluctant to grant relief from contractual obligations because of 
commercial hardship per se.257 Non-performance is not generally excused as 
a result of the increased cost of performance. Thus the best protection from 
supervening commercial hardship in contracts is that expressly contracted by 
parties themselves in their agreement. Although the American doctrine of 
impracticability theoretically at least is much wider than what is generally 
accepted in practice by the courts, it seems that the doctrine is accepted 
neither in theory nor in practice in English law. The vital difference is that the 
English doctrine of frustration is concerned with physical aspects of 
performance, for example, whether goods would be adversely affected if 
performance was carried out in the new situation or whether personal safety 
would jeopardised: whereas, the American commercial impracticability 
doctrine focuses on the commercial aspect of hardship to the parties. In Davis 
Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U. D. C.,258 contractors agreed to build 78
254. Hudson v. D. & V. Mason Contractors, Inc., 252 A.2d 166 (Del.Super. 1969); Columbus Railway, 
Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 39 S.Ct. 349, 63 L.Ed. 669 (1919); 
International Paper Co. v. Rockefeller, 161 App.Div. 180, 146 N.Y.S. 371 (3d Dep't 1914); Neal- 
Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974); Maple Farms, Inc. v. City 
School District of City of Elmira, 76 Misc.2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup.Ct. 1974); Portland 
Section of Council of Jewish Women v. Sisters of Charity of Providence in Oregon, 513 P.2d 1183 
(Or. 1973).
In above cases, the courts continued to hold firm against allowing sellers to be discharged because of 
inflationary rises in cost.
255. See Wischhusen v. American Medicinal Spirits Co., 163 Md. 565, 163 A. 685 (1933); Piaggio v. 
Somerville, 119 Miss. 6, 80 So. 342 (1919); Browne & Byran Lumber Co. v. Toney, 188 Miss. 71, 194 
So. 296 (1940).
256. 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916). See also Swiss Oil Corp. v. Riggsby, 252 Ky. 374, 67 S.W.2d 30 
(1934); Carroza v. Williams, 190 Md. 143, 57 A.2d 782 (1948); Brick Co. v. Pond, 38 Oihio St. 65 
(1882).
257. See also John J. Gorman, Notes - Commercial Hardship and Discharge of Contractual Obligations 
under American and British Law, 13 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. 1980, 107-140.
258. [1956] A.C. 696.
I
I
i
61
houses for a local authority in eight months for £94,000. Because of labour 
shortages, the work took 22 months and cost the contractors £115,000. The 
contractors claimed that the contract had been frustrated, but the House of 
Lords rejected the claim. Lord Radcliffe said:
"It is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself which calls the 
principle of frustration into play. There must be as well such a change in the 
significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, if performed, be 
a different thing from that contracted for."259
A different result would obtain in any State which adopted the approach of the 
court in Mineral Park Land Co., v. Howard.260
2.3. EXCUSE OF NON-PERFORMANCE UNDER UCC
The Uniform Commercial Code attempts to broaden the American 
common law on excuse for non-performance. In the area of contracts for the 
sale of goods, three sections of the UCC cover changes in circumstances. 
Viz., sections 2-613, 2-614 and 2-615.
2.3.1. SECTION 2-613 OF UCC26*
Section 2-613 of UCC codifies the generally accepted rule of casualty 
to specific goods. The section discharges the seller's duty of performance in 
certain cases involving the total or partial destruction of goods identified to the 
contract. This section contains provisions similar to section 7 of the British 
Sale of Goods Act 1979.262 However, contrary to British law, the section 
applies whether the goods were already destroyed at the time of contracting 
without the knowledge of either party or whether they were destroyed 
subsequently, but before the risk of loss passed to the buyer.263 Indeed, in
259. Loc. cit., at 729.
260. 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
261. The text of UCC Sec. 2-613 states: "Where the contract requires for its performance goods 
identified when the contract is made, and the goods suffer casualty without fault of either party before 
the risk of loss passes to the buyer, or in a proper case under a 'no arrival, no sale' term (section 2- 
324)then
(a) if the loss is total the contract is avoided; and
(b) if the loss is partial or the goods have so deteriorated as no longer to comform to the contract the 
buyer may nevertheless demand inspection and at his option either treat the contract as avoided or 
accept the goods with due allowance from the contract price for the deterioration or the deficiency in 
quantity but without further right against the seller."
262. Supra, pp. 47 et seq.
263. The UCC Commentary on Sec. 2-613, Comment 2.
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section 2-613, sections 6 and 7 of the 1979 Act are merged into a single 
provision.
According to the section, as a general rule, there are three conditions for the 
seller's excuse of non-performance; viz:264
(a) the goods must be identified when the contract is made;
(b) the absence of fault on the part of either party.
(c) the risk of loss must not have passed to the buyer.
Most of the cases which have been decided under the section involve 
contracts for the sale of crops planted at the time of the contract which were 
later lost or damaged due to flood, disease or some other scourge. A contract 
for the sale of crops to be grown on designated land is covered by this section 
only if the crops have been planted and can thus be identified when the 
contract is concluded.265 When the seller is a grower rather than a dealer, 
excuse has been granted when he has sold a particular crop which was to be 
grown on particular land. If the contract requires the grower to supply a 
particular crop to be planted on particular land and the crop is destroyed, 
impracticability would result since the seller is not obliged under the contract 
to acquire the crops from another source of supply.266 Some courts have 
refused to discharge a farmer-grower when the contract did not expressly 
confine his obligation to crops from a particular source. A leading case is 
Bunge Corp. v. Recker,267 in which the contract identified the goods only by 
"kind and amount" and the seller apparently warranted delivery from crops 
grown within the "continental United States." It was held that there was no 
evidence that the goods to be sold were intended to be produced on identified 
land. The court concluded:
264. See David C. Bugg, Crop Destruction and Forward Grain Contracts: Why Don't Sections 2-613 
and 2-615 of the UCC Provide More Relief? 12 Hamline L. Rev. 1989, 669, at 671.
265. See John D. Wladis, Impracticability As Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circumstances 
upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 1988, 503, at 533. According to 
section 2-501(l)(c), crops to be grown become identified to the contract when planted. The section 
provides: " (1 ).. . Such identification can be made at any time and in any manner explicitly agreed to 
by the parties. In the absence of explicit agreement identifiction occurs (a ). . . (b) . . . (c) when the 
crops are planted or . . .."
266. See Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 652 (Miss. 1975) (Existing crops); Dunavant 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Ford, 294 So. 2d 788; Campbell v. Hostetter Farms, Inc., 251 Pa. Super.Ct. 232, 
380 A.2d 463 (1977). But see Pearce-Young-Angel Co. v. Charles R. Allen, Inc., 213 S.C. 578, 50 
S.E.2d 698 (1948) (In this case, dealer excused when bad weather prevented seller from obtaining 
"Texas" blackeyed peas from a particular locality). See also Richard E. Speidel, Excusable 
Nonperformance in Sales Contracts: Some Thoughts about Risk Management, S.C.L. Rev. 1980, 241, 
at 255, 256.
267. 519 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1975).
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"[s]ince the beans were not identified other than by kind and amount, we 
agree with the trial judge that the destruction by weather did not constitute an 
act of God which would excuse performance . . . .  Obviously the appellee 
could have fulfilled its contractual obligation by acquiring the beans from any 
place or source . . .".
If the crops were not identified at the time of contracting, i.e., not planted, the 
excuse question is governed by section 2-615.268 As we shall see, section 2- 
615 applies to a wide range of circumstances. This distinction could become 
important when pleading a lawsuit, but in either instance, if the crop fails for 
reasons beyond the seller's control, he is excused.
In addition to the identification requirement, the goods also must suffer 
casualty. It appears that this section is not limited to the "perishing" of the 
goods. "Perishing" of the goods is only one instance of the application of the 
broader concept of "suffer casualty". The term "suffer casualty" is not defined 
in the code, but would presumably include any damage to the goods. Thus the 
term "casualty" effects a further improvement by establishing that both 
destruction and deterioration of the goods is comprehended by the section.269
If the goods "perish" in the English sense, this would, no doubt, be a 
total loss within section 2-613 (a), leading to avoidance; but under paragraph
(b) of the section, a partial loss would not automatically lead to avoidance. If 
the facts of Barrow, Lane and Ballard Ltd. v. Phillip Phillips & Co. Ltd.270 
were to arise under section 2-613, it could be argued that the loss was total 
under paragraph (a) since the parcel of 700 bags had ceased to exist.
Section 2-613 makes it clear that in the case of a "no arrival, no sale" 
contract, "casualty" includes not only physical change in the goods but also 
delay in arrival or delivery.271 The reason for this and for the specific reference 
to the "no arrival, no sale" term in the section is to allow the buyer the option 
of taking the goods under section 2-613 when they arrive late rather than 
voiding the contract for the delay and thus, perhaps, giving the seller a 
fortuitous profit.272
It can be argued that the casualty of specific goods is only one instance 
of the application of the broader rule codified in section 2-615. The question is
268. See UCC Sec. 2-615, Comment 9; Dunavant Enterprises, Inc. v. Ford, 294 So.2d 788 (Miss. 
1974) (Crops to be planted).
269 JohnD. Wladis, op. cit., at 532, 533.
270. For the facts of the case, see pp. 223.
271. See UCC Sec. 2-613, Official Comment 3.
272. JohnD. Wladis, op. cit., at 533.
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whether any purpose is served by including a separate section such as 2-613. 
Two reasons may be given for providing such a provision. First, section 2-613 
provides explicitly for the rights of a buyer in the event of seller's discharge, 
whereas there is doubt whether section 2-615 applies to buyers.273 Secondly, 
even if section 2-615 applies to buyers, it may be useful to make it apparent 
that casualty to identified goods is unarguably "the occurrence of a 
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which 
the contract was made" and consequently is covered by the more specific 
provision. But the danger inherent in providing a provision which covers only a 
narrow range of cases is that it creates unnecessary problems of definition.274
According to the section, the goods must suffer casualty without fault of 
either party and the risk of loss must not yet have passed to the buyer. If the 
risk of loss has passed to the buyer, the seller may not avoid the contract 
under the section and since the buyer has the risk of loss, he is presumably 
liable to the seller for the price. As the term "fault" is defined in the UCC,275 it is 
clear that the negligence of either party prevents discharge. The section does 
continue to require that both parties be innocent of fault.
Section 2-613 seems to apply absolutely, regardless of the 
foreseeability of the casualty and regardless of any undertaking on the seller's 
part to assume liability for delivery in any event. In accord with the discussion 
of the relevance of the foresight criterion,276 it appears that the operation of 
the section will be excluded when the casualty of the goods in question is 
sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of contracting. Further, excusable non­
performance should also be negated where the seller assumes responsibility 
for the continued and faultless existence of the goods. In this regard, the court 
should be authorised to go beyond the terms of the contract and take into 
account trade customs and circumstances surrounding formation of the 
contract, including the foreseeability of the event by either party, in attempting 
to determine whether the seller had assumed the risk of such casualty.277
273. See infra, pp. 79-82.
274 See also J. D. McCamus, op. cit., at 75-78.
275. "Fault" includes negligence as well as willful misconduct. UCC, Sec. 2-163, comment 1. See 
also UCC, Sec. 1-201 (Definition of fault). In English law, this point was left open by the House of 
Lords, Joseph Constantine Steamship Line v. Imperial Smelting Corp. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 154; [1941] 2 
All E.R. 165; see also pp. 136 et seq.
276. Infra, pp. 116 et seq.
277'. Cf. Sec. 2-615, comment 8.
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2.3.2 SECTION 2-614 OF UCC™
Section 2-614 of UCC deals with transportation and payment problems. 
Subsection 2-614(1) allows the seller to substitute a "commercially 
reasonable" means of delivery for the one agreed upon if it becomes 
unavailable or commercially impracticable. This rule is consistent with some 
American pre-code case law. In Meyer v. Sullivan,279 a contract called for 
delivery of wheat, "F.O.B. Kosmos Steamer at Seattle." The sellers duly 
engaged shipping space on that line. Due to the war conditions, the steam­
ship line cancelled its shipping schedule. The plaintiffs (buyers) suggested 
they should take delivery of the goods at the shipper's dock, but the 
defendants would not agree. The court noted that the sellers' objection to 
such a commercially reasonable substitute performance was motivated by a 
desire to end the deal, because of a change in the market price of the goods 
sold.280 The court did not discharge the sellers and held that they should have 
honoured the buyers' offer of substitute delivery arrangements. Further, 
performance of the essential part of the agreement, transfer of the goods to 
the buyer, was still possible through commercially practicable means, because 
the buyers were prepared to take delivery at the steamship line's warehouse 
dock. Under the current code, section 2-614(1) would have applied and the 
seller would have been obliged to perform the defendants' demand that the 
goods be delivered to the dock.
Section 2-614(2) is obviously a response to certain types of 
governmental regulation which is regarded as unfair. The provisions attempt 
to ensure the payment of a commercial equivalent and seem to be an 
equitable solution to a difficult problem. Thus, the buyer is permitted to modify
278. The text of UCC Sec. 2-614 is:
"(1) Where without fault of either party the agreed berthing, loading, or unloading facilities fail or an 
agreed type of carrier becomes unavailable or the agreed manner of delivery otherwise becomes 
commercially impracticable but a commercially reasonable substitute is available, such substitute 
must be tendered and accepted.
(2) If  the agreed means or manner of payment fails because of domestic or foreign governmental 
regulation, the seller may withhold or stop delivery unless the buyer provides a means or manner of 
payment which is commercially a substantial equivalent. If  delivery has already been taken, payment 
by the means or in the manner provided by the regulation discharges the buyer's obligation unless the 
regulation is discriminatory, oppressive or predatory."
279. 40 Cal.App. 723, 181 P. 847 (1919). See also Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 463, comment b, 
(1932) (Reference to performance being possible with only insubstantial variation).
280. 40 Cal.App. at 726, 181 P. at 848.
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the means or manner of payment to any "commercially substantial equivalent" 
if the agreed means or manner fails because of government law or regulation.
The evident purpose of section 2-614 is to rescue a contract when 
basically full performance is possible in a commercially reasonable manner, 
although not by the precise means agreed by the parties. The result is 
desirable, since an increase in the market price may probably be the real 
reason for the seller's failure to deliver the goods. In such a situation, the 
seller presumably wants to claim that the contract is ended so that he can sell 
the goods for a higher price.
Although the section appears to be another provision dealing with 
particular excuse situations,281 it is submitted that it is not really an excuse 
section at all, since it requires the party to render a commercially reasonable 
substitute performance where the agreed means of delivery or payment have 
failed.282 Indeed, the premise of the section that a substitute performance 
must be rendered if the agreed performance fails, is limited to failures which 
are incidental to the main purpose of the contract. In other words, while the 
means of performance is frustrated, the essential part or purpose of the 
agreement is not. The distinction between the present section and sections 2- 
613 and 2-615 therefore lies in whether non-performance is concerned with 
an incidental part or goes to the very heart of the contract.283
The application of this difference between essential and incidental 
aspects of the contract is illustrated by two pre-code cases. In International 
Paper Co. v. Rockefeller,284 there was a contract to sell wood to be cut from 
a particular tract of land. When a fire destroyed the trees on that tract, the 
seller was held excused from his obligation to supply since performance was 
impossible. The fire had prevented performance of an essential part of the
281. See George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial Frustration of the 
UCC Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, The Notre Dame Lawyer, 1979, 
203, at 208.
282. See also John D. Wladis, Impracticability As Risk Allocation: The Effects of Changed 
Circumstances upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 Georgia L. Rev. 1988, 503, at 
532.
283. For example, the transfer of the goods to the buyer in return for payment of the price is the 
essential aspects of performance; other parts of the contract, such as method of delivery or payment, 
are undertaken to carry out this essential aspects and are thus incidental to it. If  an incidental means of 
performance should become impracticable, yet the transfer of the goods and payment still be 
attainable through substitute means, then the section requires the substitute means to be tendered and 
accepted. (See Wladis, op. cit., at 538-9).
284. 161 App.Div. 180, 146 N.Y.S. 371 (1914).
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contract, the transfer of goods from the agreed source to the buyer.285 If the 
current code had been in force, section 2-614 would not have applied. In 
Meyer v. Sulivan,286 the sellers were held not to be excused. The court found 
that the sellers should have honoured the buyers' offer of substitute delivery 
arrangements. Performance of the essential part of the contract, transfer of 
the goods to the buyer, was still possible through commercially practicable 
means.
In deciding what constitutes a commercially reasonable substitute, 
American courts look to the difference in cost and difficulty to the seller 
between the substitute performance and agreed performance, and the 
difference in the value to the buyer between the substitute performance and 
the agreed performance.287 In Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goods Pasture, //?c.,288 
the court noted that the statute does not allocate the added expenses that a 
substitute manner of delivery may entail, and concluded that the seller should 
bear the added expenses under section 2-614. In another case,289 involving 
section 2-614(2), the parties were currency traders and the defendant had 
agreed to deliver Japanese yen to the plaintiff in the future. Following the 
devaluation of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese government imposed currency 
restrictions which prevented the defendant from delivering yen to the plaintiff 
in the United States. The defendant then offered a series of alternatives, none 
of which appealed to the plaintiff. The defendant then sold the yen held for the 
plaintiff, and credited the profits made by the plaintiff to his account in dollars. 
The court held that this was a commercially reasonable substitute for the 
failure to deliver yen to plaintiff.
What happens if an incidental part of an agreement fails and there is no 
commercially reasonable substitute available? According to the drafting 
history of sections 2-614 and 2-615 of the UCC, failures of incidental means of 
performance, such as the manner of delivery, can discharge the seller under 
section 2-615.290 This is understood impliedly from the text of section 2-615,
285. The official Comments to section 2-614 describe the interfering event as going "to the very heart 
of the contract." (UCC, Sec. 2-614, Official Comment 1).
286. 40 Cal.App. 723, 181 P. 847 (1919).
287 John D. Wladis, op. cit., at 536. See also Meyer v. Sullivan, 40 Cal.App. 723, 726, 181 P. 847, 
850 (1919).
288. 554 SW2d 743, at 751;21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1309 (Tex.Civ.App. 1977). See also Caruso-Rinella- 
Battaglia Co. v. Delano Crop, of America, 25 Agric.Dec. 1028, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 863 (1966).
289. United States Equities Co. v. First National City Bank (52 App.Div.2d 154, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6 
(1976).
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since the section is explicitly made subject to section 2-614. That connection 
is needed only if failures of incidental means of performance described in 
section 2-614 can be the basis for excuse under section 2-615. This was the 
result under pre-code law where both buyer and seller knew when they 
contracted that the agreed means of transportation were the only means.291
Another question which arises is what happens if an essential purpose 
of the agreement fails - for example, unavailability of the specific goods or 
source of supply - but a commercially reasonable substitute for that part is 
available to be tendered? The answer is clearly negative, since neither section 
2-613 nor 2-615 provide for substitute performance. Further, the explicit 
coverage of section 2-614 is only concerned with failure of transportation or 
payment facilities, and the Official Comments to that section carefully 
distinguish between essential and incidental failures and provide that the 
section applies only to the latter.292 Finally, under pre-code law, in such a 
situation substituted performance was not required.293
2.3.3. SECTION 2-615 OF UCC29*
The most important of the code's excuse provisions is section 2-615 
under the title of "excuse by failure of presupposed conditions". Indeed, the 
main innovation of the commercial code was its definition of impossibility, as a 
result of which, it is now enough that performance of a contract has become 
"impracticable". As discussed before,295 the Restatement (Second) adopted
290. See Wladis, Op. cit., at 540, 541.
291. Restatement of Contract, Sec. 460, illus. 9 (1932).
292 UCC, Sec. 2-614, Comment 1.
293. 6 A. Corbin on Contracts, (1962), Secs. 1337,1339.
294. The text of UCC Sec. 2-615 is:
"Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding section 
on substitute performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) 
and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made 
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or 
domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's capacity to perform, 
he must allocate production and deliveries among his customers but may at his option include regular 
customers not then under contract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so 
allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery and, when 
allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made available for the buyer."
295. Supra, at 32.
69
this and made it applicable to other kinds of contracts. Despite this adoption, 
several differences remain between the UCC and Restatement (Second). 
Unlike the Restatement, the UCC does not use the term "impossibility". The 
code uses the term, "impracticability". Furthermore, the UCC abandons the 
distinction between impossibility and frustration, whereas the Restatement 
treats them in separate sections. The section in the UCC encompasses the 
entire field of excuse, including impossibility and frustration. Finally, the 
section allows more judicial discretion in determining excuse than the 
Restatement.296 Both the Restatement and the UCC have adopted the same 
formulation of impracticability: and in both, impracticability is distinguished 
from impossibility.
According to section 2-615(a) of UCC, as a general rule, four conditions 
must be met if the promisor is to be discharged from performance of his 
obligations.297 These conditions are as follows: First, performance must be 
impracticable. Secondly, performance must have been predicated on the non­
occurrence of a contingency.298 Thirdly, the party seeking relief should not be 
at fault.299 Fourthly, the risk of the contingency must not have been assumed 
by either party nor must a greater obligation have been assumed.300 Thus, if a 
party expressly undertakes to perform a contract, even though performance 
becomes impracticable, impracticability will not excuse him, and he will be 
liable for damages if he fails to perform.301
(I) PROBLEMS INDIGENOUS TO IMPRACTICABILITY
According to section 2-615, an event or a contingency must have made 
performance impracticable. The code omitted use of the term "impossibility", 
because it seems that in some situations non-performance should be excused
296 See Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual 
Risks under UCC Section 2-615, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 1976, 545, at 554.
297. See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 3d ed. 1988, 155 et seq:, Farnsworth, op. 
cit., 670-671.
298 This will be discussed in chapter three pp. 116 et seq.
299. This will be discussed in chapter three, pp. 139,140.
300. Norman Prance, Energy Contract Planning: Allocating the Risks and Consequences of 
Commercial Impracticability, 3 Hasting Int'l. & Comp. L. Rev. 1980, 435, at 440. See also Eastern 
Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976); Iowa Electric Light & 
Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.Supp. 129 (N.D.Iowa 1978); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 415 F.Supp. 429 (S.D.Fla. 1975).
301. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977); Rowe v. Town of  
Peabody, 207 Mass. 226, 93 N.E. 604 (1911).
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even though it had not become significantly impossible. Indeed, the code does 
not require that a seller meet the earlier, stricter tests of impossibility or 
frustration.302 Thus, the term "impracticability" indicates that something less 
than actual impossibility will suffice, i.e., situations in which the cause of 
impossibility is not physical or legal but results from economic hardship. Even 
with this enlightenment, one is left with a rather vague idea of what 
impracticability implies. Further, as the courts applied the commercial 
impracticability standard infrequently and without enthusiasm, it is not clear 
whether the section was intended merely to codify the pre-existing common 
law of impossibility and frustration, or was intended to be a broad expansion 
of those doctrines to include impracticability as well. There are, however, 
indications that the provision in the code was intended to expand the 
circumscribed scope of impossibility at common law. Comment 3 emphasises 
the "commercial character" of the test in the code. The comment makes it 
clear that the term "impracticable" was chosen to stress and emphasise the 
drafters' intention that the courts should look to the commercial setting in 
which a problem arises rather than apply absolute (objective) notions of 
impossibility. This reading of comment 3 is supported by the terms of 
comment 4, which deals with cost increases as a basis for commercial 
impracticability. According to comment 4, what is implied in the section is that 
a seller will not be discharged if he encounters unanticipated difficulties or 
increased expenses, unless there were the results of an unforeseen 
contingency or a condition of severe economic hardship, which alters the 
nature of the performance. For example, a rise or a collapse in the market is 
not in itself a justification for applying impracticability, for that is exactly the 
type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are 
intended to cover: but a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to 
a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown 
of major sources of supply or the like, which either cause a marked increase 
in costs or prevent the seller from securing supplies necessary to his 
performance, falls within this section.
Because of the stress in the UCC on economic and commercial realities, 
impracticability denotes a situation in which excessive and unreasonable costs 
are encountered.303
302. See Crown Ice Mach. Leasing Co. v. Sam Senter Farms, Inc., 174 So.2d 614 (Fla.Dist .Ct.App. 
1965).
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Karl Llewellyn was the principal draftsman of Article 2 of UCC.304 His 
purpose in drafting the section appears in the official comments to the 
section.305 The draftsman of the section clearly envisaged that the comments 
would be relevant to the proper interpretation of the section. It is just as clear 
that the comments advance a broad reading of the statute. The comments 
indicate that Llewellyn intended the impracticability defence in the code to be 
available in more situations than the common law impossibility doctrine would 
have allowed.
In spite of the intent of the draftsmen of the section to achieve innovation and 
liberalisation of the law, it can be argued that judiciary has failed to heed this 
tendency.306 Indeed, as discussed above,307 the courts have been extremely 
hesitant to excuse performance in any circumstances short of physical 
impossibility. They have shown little enthusiasm for equating economic 
hardship and impossibility. The courts have treated code impracticability to be 
very much like the common law doctrine of impossibility. This means that they 
have not attempted to arrive at an economically rational solution which is the 
aim of the statute in commercial impracticable situations. They have, in effect, 
frustrated the purpose of section 2-615(a), the drafters' intention, the language 
of the statute and its comments. In the following discussion, the case law 
reveals that this new terminology did not necessarily result in new thinking in 
the area.
303. In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States (363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C.Cir. 1966)), the code 
was seemingly meant to replace the rigid "extreme and unreasonable" criterion with the more flexible 
criterion of commercial reasonableness. However, the court preceded this statement by quoting 
Mineral Park (172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916)) to the effect that a "thing is impracticable when it 
can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost."
304 Norman, R. Prance, Commercial Impracticability: A Textual and Economic Analysis of Section 
2-615 of the UCC, 19 Ind. L. Rev.457 (1986), at 459, 462; Soia Mentschikoff, Highlights of the UCC, 
27 Mod. L. Rev. 167, 1964.
305. The Official Comments to Article 2 are significant, if  not authoritative relevance, because 
Llewellyn believed that a sound development of the law could only be achieved if  there existed 
adequate commentary to guide a court's interpretation of the relevant statute. (Stephen G. York, Re: 
The Impracticability doctrine of the UCC, 29 Duq. L. Rev. 1991, 221, at 236).
306. See Wallash, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial Frustration of the UCC 
Attempt to Leberalise the Law of Commercial Impracticability. 55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 203, 1979; 
Paul Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts, 61 St. John's L. Rev. 225, 1987, at 259; 
Stephen G. York, Re: The Impracticability Doctrine of the UCC, 29 Duq. L. Rev. 1991, 221, at 235; 
Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section 2-615 from 
Common Law, 72 NW. U. L. Rev. 1978, 1032.
307. Supra, pp. 69 et seq.
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In Maple Farms v. City School District o f City o f Elmira,30* for 
example, the plaintiff had agreed to supply milk to the defendant. Six months 
later, the price of raw milk had increased by 23 percent.309 The substantial 
price increase in raw milk was occasioned by crop failures and the agreement 
between the United States and Russia to sell vast amounts of grain to Russia, 
which in turn created grain shortages in the United States. The plaintiff argued 
that its hardship would be compounded and its contemplated losses tripled 
because of similar fixed price contracts with other school districts. The court 
denied relief under section 2-615310 and declared that where economic 
hardship alone is involved, performance will not be excused. As to what extent 
increased costs should be the basis for excusing performance, the court held 
that "there is no precise point, though such could conceivably be reached, at 
which an increase in price of raw goods above the norm would be so 
disproportionate to the risk assumed as to amount to 'impracticability' in a 
commercial sense."311
In Publicker Industries v. Union Carbide Corp.,312 a loss in excess of 
$5.8 million due to a 25 percent increase in the cost of ethylene did not render 
the contract "impracticable" within the meaning of section 2-615. The court 
rejected Union Carbide's impracticability defence, stating that it was not aware 
of any cases where something less than a 100% cost increase had been held 
to make a seller's performance impracticable. The court relied on the 
Transatlantic313 and Maple Farms314 decisions as precedents despite the 
fact that the price increases in those cases were on a much smaller scale.
The oil crisis had the further effect of precipitating a greater demand for 
nuclear energy. Even radical changes in the price of certain commodities, 
such as uranium or oil, have been held insufficient for performance to be 
discharged. In In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts
308. 76 Misc.2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup.Ct. 1974).
309 Loc. cit., at 1081, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
310 The court stated that the issues raised by the facts of this case were analogous to those of 
Transatlantic (Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d 312 (D.C.Cir. 1966)), and thus it was 
persuaded to follow the decision, op. cit., at 1084-85, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
311. Loc. cit., at 1085 and at 790.
312. 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (E.D.Pa. 1975).
313. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363, F.2d 312 (D.C.Cir. 1966).
314. Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School District of City of Elmira, 76 Misc.2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 
(Sup.Ct. 1974).
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Litigation,315 Westinghouse had begun to enter contracts to provide uranium 
to its utility customers. Subsequent developments in the energy field caused 
enormous price increases for uranium, resulting in Westinghouse's 
announcement that performance had become commercially impracticable 
under the Uniform Commercial Code and it could not honour its obligations 
under these contracts. Westinghouse asserted that contract performance 
could result in losses to it of $2.5 billion. The court lacked sympathy for 
Westinghouse's position and rejected its impracticability defence on the 
grounds that Westinghouse was largely responsible for position in which it 
found itself.
What can be concluded is that the current impracticability doctrine is in 
a state of confusion. Its application does not mirror commercial reality and it 
does not comport with the intent of those who drafted it. The judiciary has shut 
the door to further judicial interpretation and expansion. Case law on the 
doctrine of impracticability, decided since the enactment of the section, 
reveals an area of contract law wrought with inactivity and stagnation. 
Because of the approach of the courts, the reform effected by this change has 
not been dramatic. The test that the courts have developed can be criticised 
as both unrealistic and lacking a proper foundation in the intent of the 
draftsmen.
Another problem in the new "impracticability" principle relates to the 
meaning and scope of the term. The standard of commercial impracticability is 
not defined in the UCC. Indeed, while the section may have been intended as 
a major improvement in terms of coverage, clarity and simplicity in the law the 
meaning and scope of the concept are not totally clear. For the present, a 
number of important questions remain unresolved. The main question is what 
does it mean to say that the doing of something has become impracticable? 
What are the guidelines for determining the magnitude of price increases that 
is not foreseeable in a given situation? The code has not made clear or has 
not specified the percentage of increases in costs for applying the doctrine of 
impracticability. If an unexpected difference in cost allows the promisor to be 
excused from performing his promises, where is the line to be drawn? Of 
course, there are several cases interpreting the code but these do not solve 
the problem. While a 1000 per cent cost increase has been held
315. 405 F.Supp. 316, 1975. (For analysis of the case, see James T. Otis, Robert A. Creamer and Paul 
K. Whitsitt, Commercial Impracticability in Mineral Transactions, Rocky MT. MIN. L. FDN. 1985, 
7.1, 7.5 et seq.).
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impracticable, increases of less than 100 per cent have not generally excused 
performance.316 For example, in Transatlantic Financing v. United 
States,317 the Court held that a 14% cost increase resulting from the closure 
of the Suez canal did not render the contract "commercially impracticable" 
under the UCC, section 2-615, and suggested that the percentage increase in 
cost had to be significant.318 In Pubiicker Industries v. Union Carbide 
Corp.,319 a 60 per cent cost increase did not amount to impracticability. In 
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard,320 where the actual cost of removing the 
gravel was ten to twelve times as much as the originally projected cost that 
difference was held to be sufficient to qualify for impracticability under 
American common law. The question remains whether eight times would be 
enough to qualify for impracticability? How about seven, six or five? Neither 
the Taylor case321 nor the Mineral Park Land case provide detailed guidance 
to these issues. The more foreseeable the increased cost, the more extreme 
the increase a seller must show to warrant excuse. Cases interpreting the 
section have rarely excused an obligor on the ground of mere increase in 
expense. The courts have required performance to be rendered "economically 
unrealistic",322 "economically senseless",323 or "so excessive and
316. See Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n., 518 P.2d 76, modified on other grounds, 523 P.2d 
1243 (Alaska 1974). In addition to finding that the contract was actually impossible to perform, the 
court relied on Restatement of Contracts and stated that a ninety-three percent increase was sufficient 
to meet the requirement of commercial impracticability. However, it seems that the court was clearly 
swayed by the loss of lives (resulting from the contractually stipulated method of hauling rocks over 
the frozen lake) and the hazards involved.
317. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C.Cir. 1966).
318 Loc. cit., at 319-320. It should be noted that although the court relied on UCC section 2-615, the 
UCC is not technically applicable, since the case involved in a contract for carriage, not for the sale of 
goods.
319. 17 UCC Rep. Serv. 989 [E.D.Pa. 1975]. See also American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l. 
Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972) (In this case, the court held that a 30 percent increase in cost 
not sufficient for applying the doctrine of commercial impracticability); United States v. Wegmatic 
Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) (In this case, one to one and half million dollars extra for redesign 
in 10 million dollar contract was not sufficient for excuse of non-performance); Maple Farms, Inc. v. 
City School Dist., 76 Misc.2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup.Ct. Chemung County 1974) (In this case, 
the court found that a 23 percent increase in cost of raw milk did not justify for applying the doctrine, 
because there had been a 10 percent increase in the cost of raw milk one year before the contract was 
concluded). See also B. S. Conneely and E. P. Muiphy, Sections 2-615 and 2-616 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Partial Solution to the Problem of Excuse, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 1976,167, at 186.
320. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916) (As discussed before, this 
case is the first United States case relating to excuse of non-performance on the grounds of 
commercial impracticability. Supra, pp. 29-30).
321. Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B. & S. 826; 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
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unreasonable that would result in grave injustice . . .  [or be] specially severe 
and unreasonable."324 Thus a moderate increase does not render the contract 
impracticable.325 Suffice to say that relief has not generally been granted when 
prices escalate 100%326 or indeed 400%.327 However, it must be 
acknowledged that when costs increase 1,000%, excuse is probably available. 
Indeed, a ten or twelve-fold cost increase has been held sufficient for applying 
the doctrine of impracticability. The Restatement has adopted the reasoning of 
the courts and requires an "extreme and unreasonable" increase, illustrated 
by a 1,000% price rise.328 But the range between 100% and 1,000% remains 
vague and unclear under the code. Even the "new spirit of commercial law", 
voiced in Aluminium Co. o f America (ALCOA),329 in which relief was granted 
from a 500% price increase, is unlikely to meet with the sympathy of those 
contemporary sellers who encounter great inflation every year.
The above discussion illustrates why parties should not rely solely upon 
section 2-615 and its doctrine of impracticability. Once again it is 
recommended that parties should draft contracts containing "escape" clauses 
such as force majeure and cost escalation clauses.330
In comparing American law with English law, it should be said that the 
situation under the English legal regime is, theoretically at least, less liberal. 
Under the English doctrine of frustration, it is not clear whether any cost
322 Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450, 457 (Ct.Cl. 1967) (Promisor not entitled to relief 
merely because he can not sustain his anticipated profit again).
323. Jennie - O - Foods, Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 400, 409 (Ct.Cl. 1978).
324 Gulf Oil Corp.v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978).
325. Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293 (7th Cir. 1974); Peerless 
Cas Co. v. Weymouth Gardens, 215 F.2d 362, 364 (1st Cir. 1954). See also F. D. Tannenbaum, 
Commercial Impracticability under the Uniform Commercial Code: Natural Gas Distributors' Vehicle 
for Excusing Long-Term Requirements Contracts? 20 Hous. L. Rev. 1983, 771, at 793.
326. See Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co., 256 Or. 539, 541, 574 P.2d 529, 530 (1970) (133% increase). 
See also Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 16 Misc.2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup.Ct. 1974); 
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (E.D.Pa. 1975); 
American Trading & Prod. Co. v. Shell Intl. Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972).
327'. See Eastern Air Lines Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. 415 F.Supp. 429 (S.D.Fla. 1975).
328. Restatement (First) of Contracts (1932), Sec. 454, Sec. 460, illustration 2; Sec. 467, illustration 4. 
See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Chapter 11, Introductory Note (1981), and Sec. 261, 
comment d; City of Vernon Hills v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal.2d 710, 719, 290 P.2d 841, 846 
(1955).
329. Alumimum Co. of America v. Essex Group Inc., 499 F.Supp. 53 (W.D.Pa. 1980) (For analysis of 
this case, see infra, pp. 173 et seq.).
330. See T. Black, Sales Contracts and Impracticability in a Changing World, 13 St. Mary's L. J. 1981, 
247, at 289.
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increase can render the performance of contract radically different from that 
which was undertaken by the parties. Some English judges have said that an 
"astronomical" cost increase can be a ground for frustration of contract.331 
What is clear is that in America impracticability can be achieved before 
increases in costs become astronomical. Indeed, while American courts use a 
ten to twelve-fold cost increase for applying the doctrine of impracticability, the 
English courts give a hundred-fold increase as an example of an astronomical 
increase which would result in frustration of the contract. In Brauer & Co. Ltd. 
v. James Clark, Ltd .,332 a seller was held not to be excused when the grant of 
an export license was made subject to payment by him which would exceed 
what he was entitled to claim from the buyer, but it was suggested that it might 
have been otherwise if he had had to pay a hundred times as much.
Excuse of non-performance on the ground of commercial hardship 
requires factors beyond the commercial parameters of agreement which have 
caused the impracticability or frustration. Under both doctrines, an increase in 
cost is not per se enough for excuse of non-performance; accordingly, a rise 
or collapse in a market is not sufficient for relief. Each legal system contains 
basically the same requirements relating to excuse of performance. The main 
difference is related to UCC "impracticability" and English frustration of 
contract. Under the former, the performance is excused when such 
performance has become "impracticable", whereas under the latter, it is 
necessary to have "frustrating event". However, the concept of impracticability 
clearly offers a more liberal excuse than the concept of frustration.
(II) OTHER GAPS IN SECTION 2-615 OF UCC
Other gaps in section 2-615 are troubling. The wording of the section 
raises the following questions:
First, may the section be amended or supplanted? Secondly, does the section 
apply to buyers as well as sellers?
(a) MAY SECTION 2-615 BE AMENDED OR SUPPLANTED?
3 3 See Tsakiroglou & Co., Ltd. v. Noblee & Thorl Gmbh [1961] 2 All E.R. 179, 186. See also Brauer 
& Co., Ltd. v. James Clark, Ltd., [1952] All E.R. 497, 501 (C.A.); John J. Gorman, Notes, 
Commercial Hardship and the Discharge of Contractual Obligations under American and British Law, 
13 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1980, 107, at 137-138.
332. [1952] 2 All E.R. 497, 500,501 (C.A.). See also Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovjracht 
(The Eugenia), [1964] (C.A. 1963) 2 Q.B. 226 (45% increase in cost not enough for frustration); 
Tsakiroglov & Co. v. Noblee Thorl G.Mb.H. [1960] 2 Q.B. 318 affd, [1962] A.C. 93 (1961) (In this 
case, doubled cost not sufficient for excuse).
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It is clear from the phrase in the section "except so far as a seller may
have assumed a greater obligation", and from the Official Comment,333 that
the parties can contract for a stricter standard of performance than is
contemplated by the section. The question which arises is whether the parties
can contract for a lesser obligation. Indeed, this doubt is underscored by the
sentence in Official Comment 8 to the section which provides:
". . . express agreement as to exemptions designed to enlarge upon or 
supplant the provisions of this section are to be read in the light of mercantile 
sense and reason, for this section itself sets up the commercial standard for 
normal and reasonable interpretation and provides a minimum beyond which 
agreement may not go. . .".
There seems to be no sensible reason why such agreements should be 
generally prohibited. Indeed, expressly allowing for a greater consensual 
obligation should not implicitly foreclose the converse. The view that the 
section is not subject to amendment by the parties has been 
unenthusiastically received by those commentators who have addressed the 
subject. Hawkland, after reviewing the notes of Karl Llewellyn, has argued that 
the "legislative history" of the section and the Official Comments thereto 
indicate that the authors did not intend to prevent the parties to a contract 
from adopting a more relaxed standard either through the use of force 
majeure provisions or otherwise.334 He has added that despite the "greater 
obligation" language, the intended power of contract was more consistent with 
the "unless otherwise agreed" language found throughout the code. He has 
suggested that the provisions of the section were designed to apply to those 
parties who had not made such specific provisions in their agreement. The 
section would apply particularly to the small businessmen who had not hired 
skilled legal advisors to assist in the drafting of exculpatory provisions.335 
Thus, the provisions of the section do not apply to contradict the express 
wishes of the parties or to impair their right to assume greater liability than that 
imposed by the code.
333. Comment 8: "The provisions of this section are made subject to assumption of greater liability by 
agreement and such agreement is to be found not only in the expressed terms of the contract but in the 
circumstances surrounding the contracting, in trade usage and the like. . . . " Thus, it appears that the 
"greater obligation" can be based upon both explicit and "tacit" risk assumption whitin the code's 
expansive concept of agreement
334 D. Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and the Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79 
Com. L.J. 75, 1974.
335. Loc. cit., at 77, 79.
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Support for Hawkland's view is implicit in the numerous cases336 which 
have held that a party is excused performance pursuant to a "contingency" 
clause or similar clause in the contract. Section 2-202(3) states a recurring 
theme of the UCC, especially Article 2, that the effective provisions of the 
UCC "may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act 
and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and 
care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the 
parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance 
of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly 
unreasonable."
This very issue was presented in Eastern Airlines Inc., v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp.337 If there was any uncertainty about the usefulness of force 
majeure and other exemption clauses, this case put that doubt to rest. In this 
case, McDonnell Douglas was sued by Eastern for damages caused by delay 
in the manufacture and delivery of commercial jets. The plaintiff recovered a 
large award of damages against McDonnell Douglas - an amount in excess of 
$24,000,000. The defence raised by the defendant was based upon the 
principles of UCC section 2-615 and a force majeure clause in the contract. 
The clause read that the seller would not be "deemed to be in default on 
account of delays in performance due to causes beyond seller's control and 
not occasioned by its fault or negligence, including but not limited to . . . any 
act of government, governmental priorities, allocation regulations or orders 
affecting material, equipment, facilities or completed aircraft."338 The principal 
thrust of McDonnell's defence was that the delays had been caused by the 
government's informal methods of establishing an enforcing priority for its 
military equipment requirements during the conduct of the Vietnam War. The 
court held that a force majeure clause was not merely duplicative of UCC 
section 2-615 principles. After referring to the debate in the literature on
336. That is, where such a clause gives the seller greater protection than would be available under the 
section, the courts' resort to this clause as determinative of the rights and obligations of the parties 
implies that the clause is enforceable and an appropriate source of the rules governing the parties' 
relationship. (For cases which either ascertain the paties' rights by reference to contractual stipulations 
or suggest that such stipulations would be appropriate, see, e.g., Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976); Intemar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F.Supp. 82, 
99 (E.D.Pa. 1973); Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas. Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 625 
(1974); Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map Construction Corp., 34 Md.App. 679, 368 A.2d 1088 (1977).
337. 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Squillante & Congalton, Force Majeure, 80 Com. L.J. 
1975, 4, at 8-9.
338. 432 F.2d 957, at 963 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976).
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whether the code permits parties to bargain for exemptions greater than those 
provided by UCC section 2-615,339 the court held that they could so bargain. 
However, the court noted that it was constrained by the language in the 
comments340 to hold that where the parties' intentions were unclear, it would 
limit the defence provided by a force majeure clause to the same kinds of 
defences which would have been provided by the application of UCC section 
2-615. Applying that theory to the force majeure clause before it, the court 
concluded that, if the excusing event were specifically listed in the force 
majeure clause, the defence is not lost even if the event was 
foreseeable.
"When the promisor has anticipated a particular event by specially providing 
for it in a contract, he should be relieved of liability for the occurrence of such 
event regardless of whether it was foreseeable."341
In summary, the above case makes two important contributions 
towards the clarification of the confusion that existed with respect to the 
relationship of force majeure clauses to UCC section 2-615. The first is that 
section 2-615 has not eliminated the need for such clauses. Any doubt about 
the wisdom of using such clause is resolved on a reading of Eastern A ir 
Lines, Inc., v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.342 Secondly, the case makes the 
forceful point that if a party provides specifically in an exemption clause for a 
certain event, a defence attributable to its occurrence will not be defeated by 
the foresight criteria. The specific provision allocates the risk of the 
occurrence to the other party.
(b) PROBLEM OF APPLICABILITY OR INAPPLICABILITY OF 
SECTION 2-615 OF UCC TO BUYERS
While the common law doctrines of impossibility and frustration make 
no apparent distinction between buyers and sellers, section 2-615, read 
literally, excuses only sellers from performance. No mention is made of buyers 
in section 2-615. By contrast, "Casualty to identified goods" (UCC section 2- 
613) and the "substitute performance" (UCC section 2-614) provisions 
establish defences that are expressly available to both sellers and buyers. 
This characteristic of section 2-615 has attracted considerable comment in the
339 Zoc. cit., at 991, 998.
340. UCC, Sec. 2-615, Comment 8.
341. 432 F.2d 957, at 992 (5th Cir. 1976).
342. 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
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literature. The result is that the position of buyers is regulated by the common 
law doctrine of excuse, which is available to them as a supplementary 
principle of law or equity in accordance with section 1-103 of the code. That is 
the view of most commentators: they argue that there is little justification for 
the omission and that reliance should be placed on section 1-103 UCC to cure 
the omission.343 While several commentators have acknowledged that the 
existing language of section 2-615 poses problems for the buyer, there is a 
divergence of opinion as to the extent to which section 2-615 precludes the 
buyer from its defence.344
Some courts, however, have determined that the section 2-615 does 
apply to buyers.345 In Nora Springs Cooperative Co. v. Brandau,346 for 
example, the court was concerned with a series of contracts for the sale of 
corn. Although the plaintiff accepted some of defendant's deliveries, many 
tenders of delivery were refused on the ground that the plaintiffs grain 
conveyor was full and because of a shortage of railroad cars the plaintiff could
343. See e.g., Murray, Long-Term Supply Contracts: Foreseeing the Unforeseeable, 2 Eastern Mineral 
Law Institute, 1981, 2-1, at 2-10; J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law under the UCC 128- 
129, 1980.
344 See J. Calamari & J Perillo, The Law of Contracts, 2d ed. 1977, at 506 (While the code is devoid 
of a provision which relieves the buyer from performance in the event of an unforeseen contingency 
and section 2-615 is strictly limited to the seller, buyer might resort to pre Code law via UCC Sec. 1- 
103); Duesenberg, Contract Impracticability: Courts Begin to Shape Section 2-615, 32 Bus. Law. 
1976, at 1091 (While section 2-615 is limited to sellers, Official Comment 9 intimates that a buyer 
may fall within section 2-615's purview under certain circumstances. Also the buyer could possibly 
get into section 2-615 via UCC Section 1-103); Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His 
Precarious Security, 74 Yale L.J. 1964, 217, 242 (Section 2-615 is only open to seller); Hurst, 
Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Rights under UCC 
Section 2-615, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 1976, 545, at 555 (Section 2-615 is limited to the seller); Sommer, 
Commercial Impracticability - an Overview, 13 Duq. L. Rev. 1975, 521, 542 (Official Comment 9 
intimates that section 2-615 might apply to buyers); Spies, Article 2: Breach, Repudiation and Excuse, 
30 Mo. L. Rev. 1965, 225, at 256 (While section 2-615 is silent with respect to the buyer, Official 
Comment 9 suggests that section 2-615 might be available to the buyer under the certain 
circumstances stated therein). See also Edmund M. Carney, The Nature and Extent of the Excuse 
Provided by a Force Majeure Event under a Coal Supply Agreement, 4 Eastern Minerla Law Institute, 
1983, 11.1, at 11.14 - 11.20; Comments, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-615: Commercial 
Impracticability from the Buyer's Perspective, 51 Temp. L. Q. 1978, 518.
345. See e.g., International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (1985) (Reversing 
lower court determination that Sec. 2-615 does not apply to buyers), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015 
(1986); Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 108 Idaho 892, 894, 702 P.2d 930, 932 (Idaho 
Ct.App. 1985)(Concluding that the section applies to buyers); Wisconsin Knife Works v. National 
Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986). The courts addressing this issue rely on comment 9, 
which states that in certain circumstances "the reason of the present section may well apply and entitle 
the buyer to the [excuse]." UCC Comment 9.
346. 247 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1976). See also Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 461 
N.E.2d 1049 (Ill.Int.App.Ct. 1984).
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not ship the grain to resale purchasers. After several of these rejections, the 
defendant sold the undelivered corn elsewhere. The plaintiff sued the 
defendant for breach of contract on the basis that the contract remained in 
effect as their delay in accepting the deliveries was excused by temporary 
impossibility. The court held:
"[Wjhile [UCC section 2-615] expressly mentions sellers, the explanations in 
comment 9 make it evident the provisions should be equally applicable to 
buyers."
This concession did not assist the buyer, however, for the court went on to 
hold that:
"[t]here was insufficient evidence to show circumstances constituting an 
impossibility sufficient to excuse the plaintiffs non acceptance of the grain."347
The court noted that impracticability had not been demonstrated because of
conflicting evidence as to the existence of the railroad car shortage, and
because the possibility of shipment by truck to resale purchasers was not
shown to involve so great an additional cost as to constitute impracticability.
In a later case,348 from Wyoming, a buyer of bull semen alleged excuse due to
cancellation of orders from his customers. The trial court's summary
judgement in favour of the buyer was reserved on appeal, but only after the
appellate court had expressly applied section 2-615 to the circumstances.349
Although in some cases, the code has been extended to buyers, there
are also cases which have not done so.350 In Northern Indiana Public
Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co:,351 the court expressed doubt
whether the impracticability defence of the section applies to buyers.
It is the view of commentators,352 that in the light of comment 9 to
section 2-615,353 the pre-code law of excuse and the historical development of
347. Loc. cit., at 748.
348. Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders v. Y-Tex Corp., 590 P.2d 1308 (Wyo. 1979).
349. Loc. cit., at 1309; accord Hanock Paper Co. v. Champion Int'l. Corp., 424 F.Supp. 285, 290 
(E.D.Pa. 1976) (Court presumed Sec. 2-615 applicable to buyer's claim of impracticability of 
performance but found rising market prices an insufficient excuse thereunder), affd mem., 565 F.2d 
151 (3d Cir. 1977).
35°. See, e.g.,R. C. Craig Ltd. v. Ships of the Sea, Inc., 401 F.Supp. 1051, 1059 (S.D.Ga. 1975).
351. 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
352. See also Norman R. Prance, Energy Contract Planning: Allocating the Risks and Consequences of 
Commercial Impracticability, op. cit., at 444; T. Black, op. cit., at 257.
353. UCC Sec. 2-615, Comment 9 provides in relevant part:" ... Exemption of the buyer in the case of 
a 'requirements' contract is covered by the 'Output and Requirements' section [2-306] both as to 
assumption and allocation of the relevant risks. But when a contract by a manufacturer to buy fuel or 
raw material makes no specific reference to a particular venture and no such reference may be drawn
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the section,354 that the section should in fact be available to buyers as well as 
sellers. A more direct manner of bringing buyers into the statute is illustrated 
by the Mississippi version of section 2-615, which through its special 
amendment to the section, has extended the provisions to buyers.355 
Hopefully, all of the other states will follow Mississippi's lead and amend the 
section to include the buyer. This will make clear that the buyer's ability to 
raise the impracticability defence exists in the statutory codification of the 
UCC.
However, given the wide divergence of views on whether or not the 
section is applicable to buyers, rather than relying on the code, the parties 
should expressly agree that buyers are included or use a typical force majeure 
clause in which they can broaden or narrow the relief clause. From a buyer's 
perspective, express contractual coverage may be done by simply opening 
the force majeure clause as follows: "Neither party shall be liable for non­
performance or delay in performance . . . " .
While a seller may reasonably agree with the above proposal, he may 
nonetheless insist that in no event should a force majeure clause excuse the 
buyer's obligation to pay. Thus, the seller may wish to provide: "Nothing 
herein contained shall relieve the buyer's obligation to pay in full fo r . . .
B. CIVIL LAW 
1. FRANCE
The doctrine of frustration of contract which has been developed by the 
courts in England is unknown to the French legal system, but the purpose of 
such theory is served there by two other doctrines, force majeure and 
imprevision.
from the circumstances, commercial understanding views it as a general deal in the general market 
and not conditioned on any assumption of the continuing operation of the buyer's plant. Even when 
notice is given by the buyer that the supplies are needed to fill a specific contract of a normal 
commercial kind, commercial understanding does not see such a supply contract as conditioned on the 
continuance of the buyer's further contract for outlet. On the other hand, where the buyer's contract is 
in reasonable commercial understanding conditioned on a definite and specific venture or assumption 
as, for instance, a war procurement subcontract known to be based on a prime contract which is 
subject to termination, or a supply contract for a particular construction venture, the reason of the 
present section may well apply and entitle the buyer to the exemption."
354 George Wallach, op. cit., at 386.
355. MISS. CODE ANN. Sec. 75-2-615. (1972).
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1.1. CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE FRENCH CONCEPT OF 
FORCE MAJEURE
As discussed before,356 the concept of force majeure finds its origin in 
those continental legal regimes which were influenced by Roman law. 
According to the doctrine of force majeure or cas fortuit, 357 a contract will be 
rescinded when force majeure occurs. Under the doctrine, expressed in 
Articles 1147 and 1148 of the Code Napoleon, an obligor who fails to perform 
is liable for damages unless his performance has been prevented by an event 
not reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the contract was made. 
Although force majeure is not defined in the Code, Jean Carbonier describes 
it as follows:
'An event only constitutes a force majeure, if it presents the threefold quality 
of being: insurmountable, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties' control 
(external cause)".358
Thus, the prerequisites for relief are as follows:359
(I) The event must be of such a nature that its occurrence could not 
reasonably have been foreseen at the time the contract was made.
(II) The event must render performance absolutely impossible, not merely 
more onerous. Thus the fact that performance may be made considerably 
more onerous for one of the parties by governmental acts,360 natural 
causes,361 or human agencies362 will generally not operate to excuse the party 
from the required performance. Furthermore, a serious economic crisis is not 
perse  sufficient to excuse non-performance.
(III) The event must arise independently of the will of the party who relies upon 
it and not be in his control (no fault of the party seeking relief).
Force majeure may be physical, such as an act of God or loss of the 
contractual object or seizure in war. It may be legal,363 as in the case of a fait
356. Supra, at 16.
357 While there was a long debate concerning the utility of drawing distinction between 1'force 
majeure" and "cas fortuit", legal writers gave up trying to distinguish between them and the courts 
employ them indifferently. See J. Denson Smith, Impossibility of Performance As an Excuse in 
French Law: The Doctrine of Force Majeure, 45 Yale L. J. 1936, at 452; F. H. Lawson, A. E. Anton 
& L. Neville Brown, Amos and Walton's Introduction to French Law, 1963, at 214.
358. Les Obligations, 1985, at 290.
359. See R. David, op. cit., at 11; J. Denson Smith, op. cit., at 454.
360. Hazard v. Leroy et Dubosca, Nov. 18, 1852; Devaux-Piketty v. Salmon et Forges et Acieries de la 
Marine, Trib. Sein, Nov. 16. 1917, Gaz. Pal., Dec. 31, 1917.
361. Brandicourt v. Martin, Cour de Paris, Dec. 30, 1932, D.H. 1935. 169.
362. Demanche v. Meyer, Trib. Sein, Feb. 9, 1916, D. 1917 II. 6.
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du prince - act of prince - that for instance prohibits exportation of the goods 
constituting the contractual object. Thus governmental acts and regulations by 
both national and local authorities,364 actions by foreign powers such as 
governmental decrees and operations of war,365 natural causes like flood,366 
drought,367 an unusual freeze,368 human agencies such as a strike369 and 
riotous assembly,370 are examples of force majeure in the French legal 
system.
The above requirements have been strictly enforced by the French civil 
courts and in the rare cases where relief has been granted, the contract has 
been treated as nullity. In a leading case, Canal de Craponne371 a company 
had entered into a contract in 1560 to irrigate the defendant's orchards for a 
certain annual sum of money, which had become ridiculously low in the 
course of centuries. Although the Court of first instance and the Court of 
Appeal had held that it was appropriate to increase this sum, the Court of 
Cassation mercilessly quashed the decision and held that no factor of time or 
equity can authorise a court to revise the terms of the contract ("aucune 
consideration de temps ou d'equite ne peut artoriser le juge de modifier les 
conditions des parties"). The parties themselves must provide for the case of 
possible change of circumstances., since in no case are the courts authorised 
to take into account the change of circumstances so as to revise the contract 
and write a new contract for the parties, even though such revision would be 
consistent with equity. The Court argued that the rules set forth in Articles 
1156-1164 of the French Civil Code on the interpretation of contracts do not 
go as far as to allow a court to read an implied rebus sic stantibus in every
363. L. M. Drachsler, Frustration of Contract: Comparative Law Aspects of Remedies in Cases of 
Supervening Illegality, 50 New York Law Forum, 1957, at 64; M. D. Aubrey, op. cit., at 1174.
364 See Elgnozi Aboab v. Epoux Treille, Cass. Civ., Dec. 8, 1926, S. 1927 I. 44; Remy v. Besson, 
Courde Paris, Jan. 11, 1928, S. 1930 II. 1.
365. Tabet v. Pemot, Trib. Montbeliard, Oct. 28, 1898, D. 1900 II. 405; Devaux-Piketty v. Salmon et 
Forges etAcieries de la Marine, Cour de Paris, Gaz. Pal. Dec. 31, 1917.
366. Chemin de Fer de Midi v. Cenac, Cour de Pau, Dec. 15, 1909, S. 1910 II. 13.
367 Credit Fonder v. Bollok, Cass. Civ. Jan. 30, 1923, D. 1924 I. 148.
368. Societe Thai-Thong et Cie v. Chemin de I'Indo-Chine, Cass. Req., Feb. 19, 1924.
369. Comp.desMessageriesMaritimes, Cons. d'Etat, Jan. 29, 1909 D. 1910 III. 89.
370. Cremieux et Cie v. Cippiotti, Trib. Sein, Jan. 20, 1915, S. 1916 II. 52.
371. Cass. Civ. 6 Mars 1876, D.P. 1876. 1. 193. See also Cass. Civ. 6 Juin 1921, D. 1921. 173; Cass. 
Civ. 18 Octobre 1926, D. 1927. 1. 101; Cass. Civ. 15 Novembre 1933, S. 1934. 1. 13.
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contract and in any rate the principle of good faith provided in article 1134 
does not empower the court to remake a contract.
This strict position which represents a policy of security for commercial 
transactions is, in spite of all the criticism to which it has been subject, still the 
position of the French courts. The Cour de Cassation reaffirmed its rigorous 
position in cases arising from the economic crisis following World War I.372 The 
majority of the French writers,373 with the possible exception of Ripert,374 seem 
to agree with the Cour de Cassation that the courts should not be allowed to 
revise the contracts unless the case falls precisely within the classic definition 
of force majeure. It should be noted that the reluctance to modify contracts is 
consistent with the general philosophy of the French Civil Code that only 
absolute impossibility of performance excuses performance. Colin and 
Capitan vigorously emphasise the necessity to maintain the stability of 
contracts as the basis of confidence and security in commercial relations. 
They believe that revision of contract, even under exceptional circumstances, 
would ultimately result in the destruction of certainty in commerce.375 This 
justification appears to be hardly convincing in the light of the fact that the 
more flexible approach of the German courts has not led to any of those 
harmful consequences. Moreover, if modification of contract is not allowed in 
exceptional cases, the obligor will suffer considerable prejudice and the other 
party will obtain an unjust profit from a contract that was not motivated by 
speculation.376
However, it should be added that there are some exceptions to the 
narrow concept of force majeure. These include the situation where 
performance, while not strictly impossible would endanger the life of a party.377 
The early case of Aquado C. de Beam et Consorts378 provides another 
example of such an exception. In this case, land was leased on the
372 Cass. Civ. Aug. 4, 1915, 1916 D.P. 1. 22.
373. See, e.g., Josserand, Le Contrat Dirige, D. 1933, Chr. 89; Capitant, Le Regime de la Violation des 
Contrats, D. 1934, Chr. 1; Azard, L'instabilite Monetaire et la Notion d'Equivalence dans les Contrats, 
J.C.P. 1953. 1. 1092.
374 Ripert, La Regie Morale dans les Obligations Civiles, 3d ed. 1935, 139 et seq. See also M. Planiol
and G. Ripert, (1952), op. cit., No. 391 et seq., specially Nos. 395-398.
375. Colin and Capitant, 2 Cours Elementaire de Droit Civil Francais, 1948, No. 130.
376. See Ripert, op. cit.
377. See J. Denson, op. cit., at 456, 457.
378. Cour de Paris, May 1, 1875, (1875) II D. 204; Esteve C. Dubois et Lacoste, Trib. Toulouse, June
1, 1915, (1916) II D.112.8. See also Michael D. Aubrey, op. cit., atll75, 1176.
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understanding that it was to be used for hunting. A government decree 
forbade hunting in the area. The court held that this entitled the lessee to a 
reduction in the rent payable. This liberal view is much nearer to the English 
doctrine of frustration and is based on the same principle as the English 
"Coronation cases",379 namely, the disappearance of the common aim of the 
parties.
Moreover, the French Civil Code contains certain provisions which allow 
some measure of judicial intervention in contractual performance. For 
example, Article 1244 authorises the courts to grant a delay in performance 
and Article 1769 allows abatement of rent to farmers.380 A series of laws 
enacted after World Wars I and II, such as Loi Faillot of 1918, allows 
relaxation of the strict rules of the Code with regard to performance.381 It thus 
appears that while judicial revision of contracts has been admitted in 
exceptional cases, the Cour de Cassation refuses to extend the concept of 
force majeure.
French law, therefore, exhibits a quite divergent approach from the 
English doctrine of frustration. It is clear that the concept of force majeure is 
too narrow to cover the needs of today's contracts. For example, if 
circumstances arise after the conclusion of a contract and upset the purpose 
or jeopardise the economic significance of the contract, will force majeure be 
operative? Of course, the answer will be negative. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that a legal advisor would hesitate to choose French law as the law 
applicable to an international contract when, given the current political and 
economic difficulties, it is impossible under French law to adapt the contract to 
circumstances which may arise during the performance of a long term 
contract. As will be discussed later,382 inflexible rules such as these 
discourage commercial bodies from contracting industrial, commercial or 
financial business on an international scale.
French courts have retained the traditional notion of force majeure and relief 
has rarely been granted. No doctrine of change of circumstances or economic 
impossibility or disappearance of the foundation of the contract or frustration 
of purpose has been admitted by the civil courts, even in the aftermath of two
379. Supra, pp. 19, 20.
380. See also Arts. 960,1889.
381. For the other rules see supra, pp. 191, 192.
382. Infra, pp. 178 et seq.
87
catastrophic wars. The impossibility must be absolute. In one case,383 a party 
agreed to erect a hydroelectric station on a river and to supply electricity to the 
other party, in return for that other party's giving up his rights over the river. A 
subsequent law prohibited the construction of such stations except under 
government authority. The Cour de Cassation held that this did not amount to 
force majeure, and that the prospective builder was therefore liable in 
damages for non-performance, since it had not been alleged that the law per 
se had proved an insurmountable obstacle to performance; the government 
might have allowed the station to be constructed, if it had been asked.
In another case,384 where contractors had agreed to carry out works at certain 
docks, a collective agreement reached shortly after the conclusion of the 
contract resulted in the payment of increased wages to the workmen. The 
Cour de Cassation held that this did not constitute force majeure, because it 
merely rendered the performance of the contract more onerous and did not 
make it impossible. These cases illustrate that subsequent changes of events 
which make the performance more difficult, onerous or expensive do not 
constitute force majeure, any more than they would constitute frustration 
under English law.385
However, Article 1148, in recognising that a contract can be excused 
due to force majeure, is not mandatory law. This is because the rules 
concerning force majeure are not imperative or "d'ordre public".386 Parties are 
free to make their own provisions with regard to supervening events. Thus a 
contractual force majeure clause is valid387 and the parties can stipulate what 
is to happen if a particular event occurs. The effect of such clauses will, of 
course, depend on the type of contract and the language of the clause.388 It 
should be noted that in French law, like English law, the courts will construe 
such clauses in a strict manner. Thus, parties would be well advised to ensure
383. Cass. Req. 27. 12. 1937., S. 1938.1. 52.
384 Cass. Civ. 17. 11. 1925, D.H. 1926. 35; Gaz. Pal. 1926.1. 68.
385. Compare Davis Contractors Ltd. v. FarehamU. D. C. [1956] A.C. 696.
386. See Jean Raduant, Du Cas Fortuit et de la Force Majeure, 1920, at 126. See also H. Lesguillons,
Frustration, Force Majeure, Imprevision, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, Droit et Pratique du
Commerce International, 1979, 507, at 518
387 See Mazeaux, Responsibilite, 1970, at 742.
388. See final chapter of this thesis, supra, at pp. 301-304.
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that not only is the clause clearly drafted but also that it regulates precisely the 
consequences of the supervening event.389
The French concept of force majeure has been adopted in the codes of 
other countries, but the meaning of the term may vary, depending upon the 
system of law applied. Parties to international contracts should therefore be 
very careful to know exactly what is meant by the term in the law which 
governs the contract in question. For example, with minor reservations, the 
French and Belgian concepts of force majeure are the same. However, 
French force majeure must be unforeseeable, unavoidable and beyond a 
party's control, whereas Belgian courts do not require proof that the event was 
exterior to the parties.390 As we have seen, although French and Belgian laws 
are the most exacting, some delicate differences can be found. In Swiss law, 
the criteria are also similar to those of France and Belgium. But Swiss law 
distinguishes force majeure from cas fortuit, the latter being a particular 
method of proving the absence of fault whereas force majeure is defined by 
writers in a manner similar to the French and Belgian definition.391 As 
discussed above,392 nowadays in France, force majeure is not distinguished 
from cas fortuit. Accordingly, although most jurisdiction with civil codes use the 
term force majeure, the definition and the consequences are not always the 
same, and even in these jurisdictions it is better to use a clause of the type 
which is suggested in the final chapter of this thesis.
In comparing the force majeure with the English doctrine of frustration, 
it should be said that the two principles are different ways of looking at the 
same problem. But while they overlap to some extent, they are by no means 
identical. At least partially, there is a limited parallel depending on the facts 
between frustration and force majeure. The doctrine of frustration does not 
apply where a party's intentional action caused the event. Apparently, in force 
majeure, the event must also arise independently of the will, or the fault of the 
obligor. Another common point between the two doctrines is that the events 
are outside the control of the parties are usually unforeseen by them at the 
date of conclusion of contract and arise subsequently to the date when the 
contract came into existence. Both doctrines will not be operative merely 
because the contract becomes more onerous. Neither the doctrine of
389. For detailed guidance on this point see the final chapter of this thesis.
390. H. Lesguillon, op. cit., at 519, 520.
391. Loc. cit., at 519.
392. Supra, note 357.
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frustration nor that of force majeure would seem to apply to the sale of 
substitutable things.
Apart from common points between the doctrines of frustration and force 
majeure, it should be noted that the differences between the doctrines are 
more important than their similarities. A contract is frustrated under English 
law, when the performance of such contract has become physically or legally 
impossible, and also where the contract by reason of circumstances which 
have arisen since its inception has lost its identity. Indeed, to apply frustration, 
the event must be deemed absolutely to negate the common intention of the 
parties and have been unforeseen by the parties in their contractual 
stipulations. However, to apply force majeure, the question is whether an 
event prevented performance. Therefore, in force majeure, the fact that a 
party's performance has become impossible is the key; whereas in frustration, 
the key is whether or not the realisation of the common intent of the parties 
has become impossible. Thus, the definitional scope of the French doctrine of 
force majeure, in which only physical and legal impossibility is admitted, is 
narrower than that of frustration in English law (which itself is markedly more 
restrictive than its counterpart in German law).393 The doctrine of frustration 
admits not only physical and legal impossibility, but also those events which 
make the performance radically different from that which the parties intended 
to be undertaken: whereas in France, force majeure can not be invoked while 
literal performance remains possible.394 Accordingly, the absolute impossibility 
required under the French concept of force majeure is more strict and more 
narrowly construed than under the common law, and substantially more so 
than that under the UCC.
Unlike the doctrine of frustration, force majeure plays a role in the law of 
delict. According to French law, a person is liable independently of any fault, if 
some damage has been caused by a thing which is under his control or 
custody. The only way to excuse himself from his liability is to prove that the 
damage was due to an external cause (cause etrangere), i.e., an event of 
force majeure or the victim's own fault. A very large number of cases are dealt 
with on this basis, particularly in road accidents. That is why force majeure is 
often invoked in delict, which may surprise a common or Scots lawyer.
!
393. See, e.g., Cass. Civ. 4. 8. 1915, S. 1916. 1. 17.
394 Paris, 9. 6. 1961, D. 1962. 297.
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The term, force majeure, is not truly known to the common law. 
However, the term has been used as a clause in contracts.395 Section 2-613 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code is a statutory enactment of the principle of 
force majeure.396 Force majeure has not been defined by English courts. 
Accordingly, parties who incorporate it into common law contracts without any 
formal definition in the contract, do so at their peril. In British Eiectrical etc., 
Industries v. Patley Pressings L td .391 a contract was made subject to 
various force majeure conditions. The court found that, the particular phrase 
was so ambiguous as to be incapable of any precise meaning. Because of this 
obscurity, the court reasoned that the parties had no intention to be bound 
and therefore no agreement was made between the parties with the 
consequence that no contract was created.
1.2. ANALYSIS OF FRENCH CONCEPT OF IMPREVISION
Another theory in French law allowing discharge is that of imprevision. 
This can be translated as the doctrine of unpredictable circumstances.398 The 
doctrine is based on the combination of Article 1134 of the Civil Code, which 
stipulates good faith in performance of contracts, Article 1135 of the Civil 
Code which requires reasonable compliance with contracts, and the doctrine 
of rebus sic stantibus. This doctrine is only applied in administrative contracts. 
However, it is applicable not only when the contract is silent on the point but 
even if the contract stipulates that the doctrine is not to apply. A decision of 
the Conseil d'Etat,399 openly admitted the imprevision theory, thus paving the 
way for the large discretionary powers which the French administrative 
tribunals still enjoy today.400 Indeed, the theory is designated not to alleviate 
the individual hardship of the parties but to ensure the general public interest. 
Under the doctrine, if because of unforeseen circumstances, the performance 
becomes exceedingly more onerous for the obligor, the courts may vary the 
contents of the contract in the light of unexpected and far-reaching changes. 
In other words, if the economic equilibrium of the contract is seriously affected
395. See infra, pp. 392 etseq.
396. Squillante, Force Majeure, Com. L. J. 1975, at 4.
397. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 280; [1953] 1 A11E.R. 94.
398. R. David, English Law and French Law, a Comparison in Substance, 1980, at 121.
3" . 30 Mars 1916, D. 1916. 3. 25; S. 1916. 3. 17.
400. See Conseil d'Etat, 27 Mars 1926, D. 1927. 3. 17; Conseil d'Etat, 9 Decembre 1932, D. 1933. 1. 
17; S. 1933. 3. 9.
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by an unforeseen change of circumstances, the doctrine applies to enable an 
equitable adjustment of the parties' rights and duties. The goal of this 
adjustment of obligations is to return to the "base essentiele" or equilibrium of 
interest, which existed at the time of contracting, and which has been 
disturbed by the occurrence of the unpredictable events. Three conditions 
must be met if the obligor is to be excused under the doctrine. These 
conditions are as follows:401
- The event must be unforeseeable, for example, increased salaries or prices 
of raw materials which the parties could not reasonably foresee when 
concluding their contract.
- The unforeseen event must basically change the economic balance of the 
contract, i.e., the loss must be essentially greater than that originally 
accepted.
- The event or difficulty must not be created by the fault or negligence of the 
party relying on the imprevision.
It should be added that the administrative courts have applied the 
doctrine of imprevision in many cases in order to adapt contracts which have 
become extremely burdensome. In the leading case, Compagnie General 
d'Edairage de Bordeaux c. Ville de Bordeaux (or Gaz de Bordeaux 
case),402 the Conseil d'Etat allowed the adaptation of a contract which had 
become extremely burdensome owing to an unexpected change in 
circumstances. In this case, the price of coal, and consequently the liabilities 
of the company, were considerably increased as a result of war. The company 
asked for modification of the contract. This was rejected by the Conseil de 
Prefecture of the department of Gironde. On appeal to the Conseil d'Etat, the 
decision was quashed. The Conseil d'Etat recognised that a new situation had 
arisen which was completely outside the expectations of the parties and which 
absolutely upset the economics of the contract. Adjustment was regarded as a 
suitable remedy because it was in the interests of the public that they should 
have access to public utilities. The case was returned to the Conseil de 
Prefecture in order to adjust the terms in the event that the parties could not 
agree themselves. This case paved the way for the large discretionary powers 
to adjust contracts that the French administrative courts still enjoy today.403
401. See H. Lesguillons, op. cit., at 443.
402 Conseil d'Etat, March 30, 1916, S. 1916. 3. 17; 1916 D. III. 25.
403. See Conseil d'Etat 27 Mars 1926, D. 1927. 3. 17; Conseil d'Etat 9 Decembre 1932, D. 1933. 1. 17; 
S. 1933. 3. 9.
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What is interesting to a British lawyer is the court's decision that failing 
some voluntary settlement by the parties, the court could adapt the contract to 
provide a fair price.
It should be acknowledged that the doctrine corresponds very closely to 
hardship clauses which are used in international contracts. When unexpected 
circumstances cause a fundamental alteration of the economic basis of a 
contract, the situation is covered by a hardship clause. The clause has been 
defined as follows:
"Hardship clause is one which allows for review of the contract, in the event of 
changed circumstances fundamentally altering the initial balance of the 
parties' obligations."404
Thus the hardship clause can be considered as an agreed adjustment of the 
contract.
Imprevision, however, is limited to long-term contracts where the party 
has undertaken to perform over a period of many years.405 Thus the concept 
of imprevision is very important in long-term international transactions where 
French is the applicable law. If the applicable law does not accept imprevision, 
hardship clauses will be important. On the other hand, when imprevision is 
recognised by the governing law, the purpose of a hardship clause is only to 
adapt a legal concept which is prima facie applicable. In that case, the clause 
is only used in so far as the provisions of the doctrine are too restrictive or too 
inflexible. Parties may wish to substitute their own procedure for adaptation 
other than that required by the applicable law and, in particular, may seek to 
avoid the jurisdiction of the courts.406 When drafting a hardship clause, the 
parties should be very careful if the governing law is French. They should 
provide either for a clear method of calculating the changes in price or for the 
appointment of a third party with the specific mandate of adjusting the price in 
the case of changed circumstances. Otherwise, the hardship clause may be 
held void., since under Articles 1591 and 1592 of the Civil Code, the price 
must be fixed by the consent of both contracting parties, or by a third person, 
but never unilaterally by one of the parties. In this regard, Article 1129 
requires that any obligation must have as its object a specified thing. The 
Cour de Cassation appears to hold that prices which are not precisely and 
objectively fixed render a contract void.407
404 M. Fontain, Hardship Clauses, Droit Pratique Commerce International, 1976, 51, at 54.
405. Leo. M. Drachsler, op. cit., at 67.
406. See Fontaine, Hardship Clauses, D.P.C.I. 1976, 51.
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The common link between the doctrines of imprevision and force 
majeure is the occurrence of unforeseeable and unavoidable events. The 
difference between them is that, in contrast to force majeure, for the purpose 
of imprevision the performance of the contractual obligations need only 
become excessively onerous - not necessarily impossible. The main elements 
are that the occurrence is unforeseeable and makes performance of the 
contract grossly inequitable. Thus imprevision is a more flexible concept than 
force majeure in the sense that force majeure totally prevents the 
performance of contract, whereas, imprevision does not do so, but merely 
upsets the economics of the contract. This flexible and liberal excuse of 
performance has, however, never been admitted by the civil and commercial 
courts in France. Indeed, attempts to expand the doctrine to private contracts 
have been regularly frustrated by the Cour de Cassation which has been 
inclined to release the obligor only if performance of the contract is literally 
impossible. Rene David points out the reasons as follows:408
- The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is a common doctrine in public law but 
not private law and clauses of rebus sic stantibus are commonly specified in 
French private contracts.
- Many commercial contracts give arbitrators the power to act as amiable 
compositeurs, in the sense that they will be authorised to disregard the rules 
of French law.
- There are number of regulations providing for variation of contracts in 
specific cases, for example, laws regulating the variation of wage scales and 
collective contracts. These numerous laws allow the revision, or cancellation 
of various classes of contracts. Thus, to some extent, the harsh effects of the 
denial of the doctrine are alleviated in the civil and commercial courts by the 
above mentioned factors.
Although imprevision is not applied in French civil contracts, the 
doctrine seems to be gaining acceptance in other countries.409
In comparing imprevision with frustration, it appears that they are 
different from each other. Frustration is more rigid than imprevision. While the
407. See A. H. Puelinckx, op. cit., at 59.
408. David, Frustration of Contract in French Law, op. cit., at 13,14.
409. See Drachsler, op. cit., at 79; Azevedo, Frustration of Contract in Latin-American Law and 
Particularly in Brazil, J. Comp. Leg. & Int'l. L. 1947, 3d Series, at 15-19; Couture, Frustration of 
Contract in Uruguayan Law, J. Comp. Leg. & Int'l. L. 1946-1947, 3d Series, 13-15; Horacio, A. 
Grigera Naon, Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts: An Argentine Substantive and Private 
International Law Outlook (In Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in International Trade and 
Finance, Edited by N. Horn, 1985, at 58).
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English doctrine of frustration recognises the termination of the contract, the 
doctrine of imprevision on the contrary is founded upon the continuation of the 
contract. Since in French law, a contract must be interpreted according to the 
parties' intention, the implied condition, "rebus sic stantibus", must be read 
into all contracts as having been agreed by the parties;410 further, Article 1134 
of the Civil Code requires bona fide performance of all contracts. Thus, it can 
be said that in this aspect, imprevision has its closest parallel to the English 
doctrine of frustration. Another similarity between the two doctrines lies in the 
circumstances which give rise to their application. Imprevision depends upon 
the existence of unforeseen circumstances which result in "bouleversement 
de I'economie du contrat", a phrase which is very close to Lord Wright's 
"frustration of the commercial purpose."411 However, an interesting 
comparison of the differences of interpretation between frustration, 
imprevision, and wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage can be made in the context 
of the Suez Canal cases in 1962. In these cases,412 several ships were 
chartered at the moment the Canal was closed. Therefore they had to travel 
around the Cape of Good Hope. Although the contracts basically lost their 
economic balance, the House of Lords ruled against the frustration of the 
contract.413 In only one case was performance excused, since the contract 
had expressly provided for a route through the Suez Canal.414 
If the above cases had been considered by a French court the judge would 
probably have regarded this situation not to be force majeure but imprevision, 
and a German judge would, of course, have ruled in favour of the adjustment 
of the contracts.
2. GERMANY
Like other legal systems, German contract law is based on the principle 
of sanctity of contract. Under German law, the rule of pacta sunt servanda is 
certainly no longer adhered to in its strictest sense. The German approach to 
the problem of excuse of non-performance is fairly flexible as it has developed
410. Leo M. Drachsler, op. cit., at 67.
411. See Joseph Constantine S.S. Line v. Imperial Corp. [1942] A.C. 154, at 182.
412. See, e.g., Societe Franco Tunisienne d'Armementv. Sidermar S. P. A. [1961] 2 Q.B. 278; [1960] 2 
All E.R. 529; Carapanayoti & Co. Ltd., v. E. T. Green Ltd. [1959] 1 Q.B. 131.
413. Tsagkiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee and Thorl G.m.b.H. [1960] 2 All E.R. 160, 169-172 (per Lord 
Herman L.J.), affirmed [1962] AC. 93.
414. Albert D. Gaon & Co. v. Societe Interprofessionnelle des Oleagineux Fluided Alimentaires [1960] 
2 Q.B. 334, affimed [1960] 2 Q.B. 348 C.A.
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a more liberal concept of impossibility. The situations in which relief from 
contractual performance is granted are impossibility and wegfall der 
geschaftsgrundlage.
2.1. IMPOSSIBILITY
The concept of force majeure finds no specific counterpart in the 
German law contract. However, the principle that no one can validly undertake 
to do the impossible - impossibilium nulla est obligatlo - has had a paramount 
significance.415 Like the French Code Civil, the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB) does not define impossibility. While the scope of the doctrine has been 
set forth by the courts and jurists, nevertheless several paragraphs of the 
BGB are related to impossibility.416 Paragraph 306 refers to initial impossibility 
which makes the performance of contract impossible for both parties, for 
example, a contract for delivery of a picture which has been destroyed by fire 
before the formation of the contract is null and void.417 A party would only be 
liable to pay damages if he had knowledge of the impossibility when it would 
be a breach of good faith. The damages would be those necessary to replace 
the negative interests.418 It should be noted that according to German law, the 
distinction between subjective impossibility (Unvermogen) and objective 
impossibility (Unmoglichkeit) becomes relevant in case of initial impossibility; 
only objectively ascertained initial impossibility makes the contract null and 
void.419 Nevertheless, a person who has given a generic promise may be 
subjected to a more stringent liability with regard to supervening impossibility, 
since his promise under the circumstances may be considered to contain a 
guarantee that the contract can be performed.420 In cases where the initial
415. Ramberg, op. cit., at 141.
416 B.G.B. Paragraphs 275, 279-280, 306-308, 319-325.
417 See N. Horn, H. Kotz & H. L. Leser, German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction, 
1982, at 96.
418. According to paragraph 307 BGB under the title of 'negative interest': "If a person in concluding a 
contract the performance of which is impossible, knew or should have known that it was impossible, 
he is obliged to make compensation for any damage which the other party has sustained by relying 
upon the validity of the contract; not, however, beyond the value of the interest which the other party 
had in the validity of the contract. The duty to make compensation does not arise if  the other party 
knew or should have known of the impossibility."
419. B.G.B. paragraph 306. See also J. Ramberg, op. cit., at 143.
420. B.G.B. paragraph 279; Ramberg, op. cit., at 143, 144.
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impossibility is subjective, the non-performing party will be liable for damages 
in every case, regardless of fault.421
It should be said that the scope of the doctrine of impossibility in 
German law is much wider than its common law counterparts. In this regard, 
initial impossibility in German civil law is an example of the classic doctrine of 
mistake in common law. For example, if the delivery of the specific thing 
before the conclusion of the contract was physically or legally impossible, the 
contract will be null because of impossibility of performance under German 
law and will be void under the doctrine of mistake at common law. However, 
according to German law, the relevant time for the determination of initial 
impossibility, is the time when the contract is made. Hence, it may depend on 
minutes or seconds whether initial impossibility or subsequent impossibility is 
the relevant principle. In initial impossibility, the performance of contract must 
be physically or legally impossible.422
Another paragraph relating to impossibility is paragraph 275. This is 
concerned with subsequent impossibility without fault. When this arises, the 
primary claim for specific performance is extinguished. In other words, the 
paragraph relieves a debtor from his obligation to perform if performance 
becomes impossible, (for example, the destruction of the subject matter) 
provided the promisor has not assumed responsibility for the circumstances 
which made the performance impossible. Responsibility is defined in terms of 
good faith423 and lack of bad intention or negligence.424 However, if the 
impossibility is in respect of a generic obligation (gattungschuld), the debtor is 
still obliged to carry out the contract or be responsible for non-performance 
under paragraph 279, even if he is not at fault. Conversely, if specific goods 
(stuckschuld) are physically destroyed and can not be replaced, the contract 
becomes impossible and consequently void (paragraph 306). If the 
performance of the contract remains physically possible but involves 
disproportionate cost or effort, in that case the courts may consider that the 
impossibility criterion is satisfied.425 Extension of the concept of impossibility
421. Para. 280. Initial impossibility also occurs when the contract is impossible to perform at the time 
of the agreement by the particular debtor, it does not matter that third paties could perform (Para. 275 
II). See also J. Barrigan Marcantonio, Unifying the Law of Impossibility, 8 Hasting Int'l. & Comp. L. 
Rev. 1984, at 54.
422 N. Horn, H. Kotz, and H. G. Leser, op. cit., at 96; Ramberg, op. cit., at 142.
423. B.G.B. Para. 242.
424 B.G.B. Para. 276. See also Michael D. Aubrey, op. cit., at 1177.
425. See Nigel G. Foster, German Law & Legal System, 1993, at 4.2.
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was made in the course of the World War I. The sharp rise in prices and the 
shortage of supplies due to the war probably persuaded the courts to accept 
the idea that economic impossibility should be equated with physical and legal 
impossibility as a form of objective impossibility. A debtor was therefore 
released if performance would result in his economic ruin. The test of 
impossibility of performance is also satisfied, if contractual performance is 
contrary to statutory prohibition; in these circumstances the contract is void 
(paragraph 309).
According to paragraph 323 BGB, both parties are discharged from 
contractual obligations if neither of them is responsible for the supervening 
impossibility; if one party is responsible for non-performance due to 
impossibility the other may demand damages, rescission or counter­
performance depending on whose performance has been rendered 
impossible.426 It should be noted that for cases of subsequent impossibility, 
contrary to initial impossibility, the distinction between subjective and objective 
is no longer material: both will be treated similarly.427
In considering the German approach to impossibility, it should be 
added that under paragraph 275 BGB, a party's performance is excused 
where it becomes impossible because of an event subsequent to the contract 
to perform and for which the party is not responsible. What is understood is 
that BGB does not require the event to be unforeseeable - only that it renders 
performance impossible. Like other systems, the impossibility may be 
physical, actual or legal, but it is judged with more flexibility than the 
unavoidable requirement of French law.428 This flexibility can be seen in other 
aspects, for example, where the party had to make sacrifices or efforts 
disproportionate to the performance originally contemplated; German courts 
admit these as impossibility cases. Because of this flexibility in the concept of 
impossibility, the courts have been able also to use paragraph 275 BGB as a 
common basis for force majeure and unforeseeable difficulties.429 Accordingly, 
the rationale of paragraph 275 is either a modification of performance or 
impossibility of performance. We can therefore say that impossibility in 
German law does not have the same absolute nature as unavoidability in 
French law. However, the different types and degrees of impossibility in
426. M. D. Aubrey, op. cit. See also paragraphs 324, 325.
427 J. B. Marcantonio, op. cit. See also B.G.B. paragraph 275 (2).
428. H. Lesguillons, op. cit., at 523.
429. Loc. cit.
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German law make it a complex matter. Indeed, the categories of impossibility 
of performance such as objective, subjective, initial, subsequent, legal, 
physical, permanent and temporary impossibility are artificial and unrealistic. 
The underlying doctrine of paragraph 242 BGB, "treu und glauben" (good 
faith), is itself wide enough to cover any type of impossibility, without the need 
for specific reference to the categories of impossibility embodied in 
paragraphs 275, 280, 306 and 323 BGB. Indeed, modern German law favours 
a limited application of the doctrine and suggests other means for solving the 
problem.
2.2. WEGFALL DER GESCHAFTSGRUNDLAGE
As discussed before,430 German courts have developed a general 
doctrine of relief under the title of wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage (collapse of 
the foundation of the contract)431. German case law defines 
"geschaftsgrundlage" as follows:
"The common representation of both contracting parties at the time of signing 
of the contract, or representation of one party which have been perceived and 
implicitly accepted by the other party with regard to the existence or future 
occurrence of circumstances upon which the intention for contracting of both 
parties is based."432
In this theory, all elements of a contract (tatbestand) are generally relevant for 
the determination of the basis of the contract.433 The absence of the 
foundation of the contract is a basis for relief, provided continued insistence 
on the obligor's performance would be against good faith. To require 
performance which would ruin the debtor economically, or would require 
undue sacrifices on his part (opfergrenze), or would basically disturb the 
equivalence of performance, is considered against good faith.434 According to
430. Supra, pp. 13-15
431. The doctrine has been translated as failure of the basis of the contract or disappearance of the 
contract. See P. Hay, op. cit., at 365 et seq:, K. Zweigert & H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative 
Law, 1977, Vol. II, 192 et seq:, Ralp, A. Newman, Equity and Law: A Comparative Study, 1961, at 
195.
432. Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements, 1986, at 
118-119. Professor Oetermann has defined it as follows: "Basis of the transaction is an assumption 
made by one party that has become obvious to the other during the formation of the contract and has 
received his acquiescence, provided that the assumption refers to the existence, or the coming into 
existence of circumstances forming the basis of the contractual intention. Alternatively, contractual 
basis is the common assumption on the part of the respective parties of such circumstances." (M. D. 
Aubrey, op. cit., at 1179).
433. P. Hay, op. cit., at 368.
434 Loc.cit. See also E. J. Cohn, Frustration of Contract in German Law, op. cit., at 22.
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the doctrine, a party ceases to be bound by his promise if the basis of the 
contract has been destroyed. Relief may take the form of adjustment rather 
than termination. Thus, if the material circumstances surrounding performance 
are so changed as to result in the alteration of the economic essence of the 
agreement, the doctrine will be applicable in the form of adaptation or 
termination of the contract.435
The authority of applying the doctrine is the principle of good faith 
which recognises that performance of a contract which leads to fundamental 
disequilibrium can no longer be insisted upon when, as a result of a complete 
change in conditions, the performance has become completely different from 
that originally expected. Indeed, the requirements of the principle which are 
expressed in paragraphs 242, 133 and 157 BGB are the basis for applying the 
doctrine of wegfall der geschafsgrundlage. For example, in the presence of 
profound economic disturbances, it is contrary to good faith for the creditor to 
insist that the contract be performed as originally anticipated.
The conditions under which the doctrine is applied can be summarised 
as follows:436
- Certain fundamental circumstances that are not terms of the contract but are 
not merely motives for entering into the contract, have been made basic to the 
contract either by both parties or by one party to the knowledge of the other;
- There has been a profound change in these circumstances leading to a 
fundamental disequilibrium of contract - being against the requirements of 
good faith - by unforeseeable and unavoidable events.
The courts, relying on good faith, have applied the doctrine to a variety 
of situations and events, including political developments, changes in 
legislation, denial of permission for a contract by authorities and frustration of 
purpose.437 The reduced purchasing power of money or inflation does not in 
itself justify applying the doctrine; that said, in rare and very exceptional cases 
substantial inflation has been a ground for adaptation.438 It must be added that 
the doctrine has been held to apply where a party, in performing his
435. P. Hay, op. cit.-, N. Horn, H. Kotz & H. G. Leser, op. cit., at 141 etseq.
436. O. Lando, Renegotiation and Revision of International Contracts, German Yearbook of 
International Law, 1980, 35, at 49; Cartwright, The Law of Obligation in England and Germany, 13 
Int'l. & Comp. L. Q. 1964, at 1316, 1335; Wolfgang Peter, op. cit., at 119.
437 N. Horn, Changes in Circumstances and the Revision of Contracts in Some European Laws and 
International Law, (In Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in International Trade and Finance, 
Edited by N. Horn,1985, at 19).
438. Wolfgang Peter, op. cit., at 119; N. Horn, op. cit., at 19, 20.
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obligation, encounters difficulties so great that he can not in fairness be 
expected to overcome them. For example, if repurchasing a stock of products 
- which has been completely destroyed by fire - is extraordinary difficult and 
expensive, the seller will be freed from his obligation to supply.439 Generally, 
the German courts have been much more flexible in using this doctrine than 
the courts in other countries. It is difficult to discover how much more 
expensive performance has to become for the doctrine to apply. Originally 
German courts insisted upon at least an 80% decrease in the value of the 
monetary performance; this was gradually reduced to two-thirds, one-half, and 
then to one third.440 Subsequent decisions have held that the disproportion 
between claim and performance justifying an increase in value need not to be 
strictly defined or expressed in monetary terms. In later decisions adopted by 
the Reichsgericht, the view is expressed that under special circumstances, an 
increase in value could be justified where the decrease in the value of 
performance was only moderate. Increasingly, general principles of good faith 
and fair weighing of the demands of the parties in the particular case, have 
been relied upon rather than the above mentioned criteria. Each decision 
attempts to provide a solution that is the most just and fair in the 
circumstances.441
However, the weakness of the doctrine is that the assumption of the 
parties may not be clear and yet relief is granted. Its vagueness can be 
considered to be unconductive to legal certainty and thus endangers the 
security of commerce. The doctrine describes a situation that is not properly 
met by other juridical conceptions and lacks a comprehensive formula. Thus, 
it can be applied in a large variety of situations, including those which do not 
really warrant adaptation. This is very close to the "qualifying power" to which 
Denning L.J. referred in the British Movietonenews case.442 The doctrine 
fails to explain why, in the absence of any supporting rule of law or express 
provision in the contract, the occurrence of such contemplated facts may be 
held to create an obligation for the continued existence of the contract. It also 
fails to explain why every minor disturbance of the basis of contract results in
439. S. P. de Cruz, A Comparative Survey of the Doctrine of Frustration, Legal Issues of European 
Integration, 1982, at 54.
440. See Keith S. Rossen, op. cit., at 94.
441. See G. Co. v. J. G. R. & S. Co., 147 RGZ, 286 (Reichsgericht, 1935) (Cited in A. Von Mehren, 
op. cit., at 751).
442. [1950] 2 All Eng.Rep. 390, at 395; [1951] 1 K.B. 190, at 200; [1952] A.C. 166, 171.
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the ineffectiveness of express contractual provisions.443 The disadvantage of 
this theory is also clear in the sense that parties do not know what attitude the 
court will take. Therefore, it is not desirable for parties to international 
commercial transactions, where there may be enough uncertainty in any case. 
Furthermore, as the doctrine has the potential to be interpreted in a large 
variety of situations, including those which do not really qualify for adaptation, 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda may be easily jeopardised by arbitrary 
application of the doctrine. The doctrine diverts attention from the fact that the 
judges are basically involved in an analysis of allocation of risk between the 
parties. Moreover, the fundamental principle underlying the doctrine is that of 
good faith. Good faith in German law is something more than the bona fides of 
Roman law, bonne foi of French law, or good faith in Anglo-American legal 
systems. It takes into account an ethical notion of mutual confidence and the 
relationship of the parties.444 The point is expressly noted in G. Co. J. G. R. & 
S. Co.,445 where a claim was allowed in the case of unforeseen circumstances 
in the value of the English pound and the American dollar. In this case, the 
parties to a contract of sale had relied on the stability of the English pound as 
a gold currency and had set the sale price in pounds sterling. After England 
suddenly left the gold standard, the Reichsgericht allowed the injured party 
(seller) to demand payment of compensation for the loss due to devaluation. 
The court pointed that:
"However, though the shaking of the basis of the transaction 
(Geschaftsgrundlage) is the legal conception fundamental to the action for 
equalization, in connection therewith the principles, as to the fair evaluation of 
the justified demands of both parties, of the action in equalization, developed 
by the Reichsgericht and derived from paragraph 242 of the Civil Code, are 
also to be applied. In connection with the application of these principles, all 
circumstances of the case that, under the fundamental principle of good faith 
in commerce, could come into consideration to determine a just equalization 
between the two performances, must be carefully cleared up, tested, and 
taken into consideration. "446
443. See H. Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1958, 287, at 290.
444 See Deschenaux, La Revision des Contracts en Droit Suisse, 30 J. Comp. Leg. Int'l. L. 1948, 15, 
at 59.
445. 2 April 1935, 147 ERG (Z) 286. (Cited in Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, The Civil Law systems, 
Cases and Materials for the Comparative Study of Law, 1957, at 751-754).
446. Loc. cit., at 753.
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In the celebrated case of ST. v. R.,447 again the central principle underlying 
frustration was held to be good faith. In this case, the Reichsgericht gave a 
strong impetus to the movement for a general revalorization of money 
obligations. In this case, the mortgagee of real estate refused to cancel the 
mortgage unless repaid a sum equivalent in value to the money loaned in 
1913. The court relied on paragraph 242 BGB to make the owner of the 
mortgaged property pay the mortgagee a supplementary sum over and above 
the nominal value of the mortgage so as to alleviate the very marked 
devaluation of paper money in Germany.
For the following reasons the Reichsgericht's decision is unconvincing:448 At 
first, the court dismissed legal tender legislation, the initial obstacle to 
revalorization, on the dubious ground that at the time of the enactment of the 
legal tender statute, the legislature had assumed there would be no paper 
money inflation and that the value of paper money would remain equal. 
Secondly, central to this decision is paragraph 242 BGB which requires that 
obligations be performed in good faith, taking ordinary commercial practice 
into consideration. However, it was hardly ordinary commercial practice for the 
debtors to revalorize their debts voluntarily.449 Thirdly, the court decision is 
open to criticism with regard to its obscurity about how revalorization was to 
be achieved. Indeed, the court expressly refused to set out a general standard 
or guideline for revalorization. Instead, it ordered the lower court to balance an 
array of equities on a case by case basis.
The decision received both high approval and severe criticism for undertaking 
to revalorize contractual obligations. Dawson has acclaimed the decision "a 
landmark in German legal history and a fitting climax to the magnificent work 
of the Reichsgericht in guiding a great nation through its darkest hours."450 
Nussbaum, on the other hand, characterised it as "one of thoroughgoing 
judicial aberration and confusion."451 While the political situation in Germany 
was clearly chaotic during revalorization nevertheless, it is submitted that the 
courts should not have intervened without legislation; but given that the
447. 107 RGZ, 78, 1923. (Cited in A. VonMehren, op. cit., at 743-746.)
448. See Keith S. Rosenn, op. cit., at 91.
449. Op. cit.
450. Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1934, 
171, at 205.
451. A. Nussbaum, Money in the Law National and International, (Rev. ed. 1950), at 210.
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legislature was no better equipped to cope with the situation, the courts had 
little choice but to intervene to ameliorate the nation's economic chaos.452
What can be concluded from the above discussion is that economic 
factors such as inflation, devaluation, price rises, and even increase in the 
cost of living453 can be grounds of excusable non-performance leading to 
termination or adjustment of contract.
It should be noted that the application of the doctrine of 
geschaftsgrundlage can be expressly excluded by the parties.454
It is obvious that the German approach is entirely different from the 
other doctrines we have discussed. There is a very important and basic 
difference between the Common law, French law and the law of Germany: 
The French and Common law (United States and England) operate the 
doctrine of excuse of non-performance on the basis of unforeseeabilitv. 
whereas German law operates on the basis of good faith. It is not, however, 
upon the basis of an implied term in the contract that the performance is 
excused. The principle applied is that it is contrary to good faith for a party to 
hold the other to performance of his contract when he is aware that the other 
has entered into the contract only on the basis of certain suppositions which 
have turned out to be incorrect. In addition, the German doctrine of collapse of 
foundation of contract affords relief in a great number of cases on the basis of 
good faith. Despite the presence of good faith provisions in Article 1134 of the 
Civil Code, French civil courts have chosen to apply the traditional view of 
contract that a contract is the immutable law between the parties. The doctrine 
of geschaftsgrundlage strongly resembles rebus sic stantibus; indeed, a 
number of German courts and commentators have equated the two 
doctrines.455 It also resembles the French theory of imprevision in the following 
common points: (a) there must be an unforeseeable change of circumstances; 
(b) the change must be actually exceptional, exceeding the normal risk 
assumed by the parties; (c) the change must render performance of the 
contract seriously burdensome; and (d) the change must occur without the 
fault of the party seeking relief.
452. See also Kieth S. Rossen, op. cit., at 93.
453. See, e.g., Sp. Co. v. F. Co., 1920, 100 RGZ, 129; B. V. F. 1920, 99 RGZ, 258; Marseiwerke v. H. 
1921, 103 RGZ, 177. (Cited in A. Von Mehren, op. cit., at 732-740).
454 See Wolfgang Peter, op. cit., at 118.
455. See Cohn, Frustration of Contract in German Law, op, cit., 15, 18.
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In comparison with German law, the doctrine of frustration is given a relatively 
narrow interpretation by the English courts. Indeed, the courts have not yet 
been prepared to hold that hardship situations per se can frustrate the 
contract. More precisely, the courts still cleave to the nominalist rule that a 
pound is a pound, whatever its international value.456 Consider, for example, 
Anderson v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc.,457 where the equitable claim for relief 
could not have been clearer. In this case, an Englishman living in Russia had 
purchased a life insurance policy from the German branch of an American 
insurance company. The death benefit was fixed at 60,000 German marks, 
payable in London. However, when the insured died in 1922, the insurance 
company paid his widow what was then the equivalent of 60,000 paper marks. 
As English law was the applicable law, the court reluctantly held that the 
widow was legally entitled to nothing more, though some judges expressed 
the hope that the insurance company would voluntarily pay something to the 
beneficiary out of considerations of justice and equity. As we see, the result in 
this case was very harsh. If this case had been considered by a German court 
it would probably have been decided differently. American courts, like English 
courts, have taken a similar approach with respect to debts expressed in 
collapsed currencies.458 Thus Anglo-American courts have been much more 
uncomfortable than German civil law courts with regard to modification of 
contracts. Indeed, they have been much slower than Civil law countries in 
developing excuse doctrines.
In the end of this chapter, we can conclude that neither the German nor 
the French nor the common law have yet achieved the proper solution for the 
problem of supervening events and the balance between private and social 
interests. Force majeure is very strict in the matter of changed circumstances, 
whereas German wegfall der geschafsgrudlage probably stands at the other 
extreme, with the common law systems somewhere in the middle. Parties who 
wish to escape from problems associated with the application of excuse 
doctrines should therefore plan their avoidance by drafting force majeure 
clause or hardship clauses in their contracts, rather than relying on the 
general principles of the applicable law.
456. See A. D. M. Forte, Economic Frustration of Commercial Contracts: A Comparative Analysis 
with Particular reference to the United Kingdom, The Juridical Law, 1986, 10, 12.
457 [1926] 134 L.T. 557, 42 T.L.R. 302.
458. See, e.g., Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1931), cert, denied, 285 U.S. 539; 
Tillman v. National City Bank, 118 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1941), cert, denied, 314 U.S. 650 (1941).
CHAPTER THREE: 
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A CONTRACT IS CONSIDERED 
EXCUSED 
I. NON-FORESEEABILITY
The state of confusion which is a feature of most issues in the law of 
excusable non-performance intensifies when we consider the question of the 
relevance, if any, of the fact that one or both parties have foreseen, or ought 
reasonably to have foreseen, the occurrence of the supervening event. The 
view could be taken that the parties should be obliged to carry out the contract 
in cases where the intervening events were, or ought to have been, foreseen. 
Foresight or foreseeability may thus play a pre-eminent role in limiting the 
scope of the doctrine of excusable non-performance. It is frequently asserted 
that a party may not be excused from performance if the supervening event 
preventing performance was foreseeable at the time of contracting. However, 
this statement is far too general to represent the truth. Although there is 
judicial support for this contention, this is not always the case. Statements 
stressing that the event must be "unexpected", "unforeseeable", "unforeseen", 
or "could not have been anticipated" are undoubtedly explained by the fact 
that the promisor in such cases has not been able to consider the possibility of 
such events interfering with his performance. If they still happen, his promise 
may be considered excused. On the other hand, if, at the time of contracting, 
he was in position to evaluate the risk of the occurrence of the event, prima 
facie he should be held to his promise. In such a case, the promisor could 
have protected himself by a provision in the contract and the fact that he did 
not, constitutes ample evidence that he was prepared to assume the risk 
himself. If a contingency is foreseen or foreseeable, the obligor is free not to 
enter the transaction; if however, he chooses to do so, he undertakes an 
absolute duty to perform and should be considered to have assumed the risk 
of the contingency arising.
Generally, escape doctrines deal in one way or another with excuse for 
non-performance when there is an unforeseeable or unforeseen contingency. 
It can therefore be said that the non-foreseeability of a contingency, which 
could not reasonably be expected to have been taken into account at the time 
of the conclusion of contract, is one of the most important pre-conditions of 
excusable non-performance in most legal systems.
Before analysing this important issue in detail, let us see what is the 
literal meaning of the word foreseeable. In Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, "to foresee", means "to see (as a future occurrence or
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development) as certain or unavoidable" beforehand.459 The compound form, 
used as an adjective, adds the suffix "-able" and thus modifies the meaning by 
adding "such as may reasonably be anticipated; lying within the range for 
which forecasts are possible . . "Foresee" and "foreseen" thus denote that 
which is or should be expected, that which is reasonably possible. Unforeseen 
means "not foreseen" or "unexpected". Unforeseeable, however, is defined 
much more restrictively and means "inapplicable of being foreseen, foretold, 
or anticipated".460 Therefore, while "foresee" suggests what is or should have 
been seen, "foreseeable" limits the situation to that which could have been 
seen. Black's Law Dictionary,461 in defining the word "foreseeability" says that 
foreseeability is "the ability to see or know in advance, hence, the reasonable 
anticipation that harm or injury is a likely result of acts or omissions".
These concepts are much more complex and controversial in practice 
especially in Common law systems. Parties to a contract should be relieved 
from liability if performance is prevented by circumstances which are beyond 
their control and which were unforeseen or unforeseeable. However, in 
Common law, particularly English law, unlike French law, the question of the 
foresight test and its role in frustration of contract is not clear. In this regard, 
there are some important differences between these two legal regimes. Let us 
examine the issue in detail in each legal system.
A. CIVIL LAW
1. FRANCE
According to the French concepts of force majeure462 and 
imprevision,463 the contingency or the changed circumstances must be 
unforeseeable (imprevisibilite)464 or beyond what could reasonably be
459 890, 1971.
460. Loc. cit.
461. 5th ed. at 584.
462 w eii Alex et Francois Terre, Droit Civil, Les Obligations, Dalloz, 1980, pp. 476, 477; Marty 
Gabriel et Raynaud Pierre, Droit Civil, Les Obligations, Tome II, Sirey, 1962, p. 530, Sec. 486; F. 
Chabas, Force Majeure, Encyclopedia Dalloz, (Repertoir de Driot Civil), vol. 4, n. 8.
463. Closset, Note in D. 1927, III. 17; G. Marty et P. Raynaud, op. cit., at 208. See also arthur Taylor 
Von Mehren, The Civil Law System (Cases and Materials for the Comparative Study of Law), 1957, 
at 712.
464 See Cass. Req. 15 June 1911, D. 1912,1. 181, affirming C.A. Alger, 30 May 1910 (Which held 
that en matiere de paiement, la maladie ne peut etre un cas de force majeure -, qu'elle peut et doit etre 
prevue et ne saurait etre consideree comme un de ces evenements qui echappent a toute prevision). 
See also C.A. Lyon, 28 May 1951, D. 1951, 478.
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foreseen by a diligent person (reasonable man) at the time of the formation of 
the contract. Indeed, if the event was foreseen at the time of contracting, the 
force majeure can not be invoked., since the obligor could foresee the 
contingency and could have refused to make the contract.465 By entering such 
a contract, he is at fault or he has accepted to bear the risk due to such a 
contingency.466 In Ste Bata v. Farge,467 B leased premises on March 18th 
1936, in order to carry on a business selling shoes. On May 24th 1936, he 
was notified that he was in default in continuing to sell shoes as a result of a 
law passed on March 22nd 1936 to the effect that; "during two years no new 
shops are allowed to be open, without an authorisation of the ministry of 
commerce". B argued that, given the law was passed after the conclusion of 
the contract, it was not possible for him to continue his activity as it was 
intended. He stated that the contract should be terminated because of an 
event of force majeure, viz., the passing of that law. The court rejected the 
argument and held that B must perform the contract by paying the rent; since 
the subsequent law, which prevented B from carrying on the business, was 
foreseeable at the time of contracting. It had been proved that B foresaw the 
passing of the law and deliberately concluded the contract before it came into 
force.
In Maiano v. S/mard,468 an Italian entered into a contract to construct a 
number of houses for Simard. Five months later and before the houses were 
completed, he was exiled from France. The court decided that Maiano was 
liable to pay damages since his expulsion was foreseeable in the light of the 
international situation which prevailed at the time of contracting.
Administrative delay in granting a building permit has been held to be a 
foreseeable contingency.469 On the other hand, an order to evacuate in 1940 
which caused an owner of a garage to leave behind the plaintiffs car was held 
to be unforeseeable.470 Delaying a ship for hygienic inspection has been held
465. J. Carbonier, Driot Civil, 4/ Les Obligations, 6eme, Press Universite France 1969, p. 243; Alex 
Weill, op. cit; Alex Weill and Francois Terre, op. cit., at 476.
466. H. L. & J. Mazeaud, Traite Theorique et Pratique de la Resposibilite Civil delictuelle et 
Contractuell, Tome II, Sixieme edition, Montchrestien, Paris, 1970, n. 1575, p. 689. See also C.A. 
Lyon, 22 June 1944, Gaz. Pal. 1944, II, 162.
467 Caen. Oct. 11th. 1937. Gaz. Pal. 1937. 2. 797.
468. Bordeaux, Nov. 26th. 1940, Gaz. Pal. 1941. 1. 29.
469. Cass. Com. 26. 10. 1954, D. 1955. 213.
47°. Cass. Civ. 22. 12. 1954, D. 1955. 252. See also Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract, 
1992, at 203.
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to be foreseeable because it could have been foreseen at the time of 
contracting.471
A force majeure was held to be inapplicable to a strike in a coal mine 
because strikes were known to be a very common contingency in the coal 
mining industry.472 However, it has been accepted in principle, that a strike by 
the debtor's workers may, in extreme cases, constitute force majeure, 
provided that the event was genuinely unforeseeable and irresistible.473 In 
Bouvier v. E. D. F.,474 E entered into a contract with B for the supply of 
electricity. Approximately one year later after the conclusion of the contract, all 
the employees of E went on a strike. B sued E for damages arising from the 
interruption of the supply of electricity. The tribunal stated that the strike was 
in fact irresistible, since it was a general strike, and covered the whole territory 
of France. However, the court held that E was not excused because the strike 
was not unforeseeable. This was due to the fact that before the strike, there 
had been some dissatisfaction amongst E's employees and that the 
negotiations between the representatives of both the employer and the 
employees had been negative.
A strike is therefore not in itself a case of force majeure. It has to be 
unforeseeable and irresistible.475 Both of these two conditions have to be met. 
They are not alternative but cumulative. For example, failure of telephone 
communications has been held to be unforeseeable but not irresistible, since 
other means of communication could have been used.476
Another example of foreseeability of the event relates to an 
impossibility the danger of which can be foreseen. For example, there is 
normally no force majeure when fog causes a road accident, since the peril 
can be foreseen and precautions may be taken.477 It has been said that war,
471. See Comp, descompt de Paris v. Hambro, Cour de Paris, April 25, 1863, D. 1863. I. 80; Ouest v. 
Loutrel, Cass. Civ. Feb. 17, 1874, D. 1874.1. 302.
472. Decroixv. Taffin-Ledieu, Trib. Hazebrouck, Jan. 18,1890, D. 1891. III. 24.
473. Cass. Civ. 7. 3. 1966 and Cass. Com. 28. 2. 1966, JCP 1966. II. 14878 (In both cases, 
nevertheless, the plea failed). A tendency is discernible in French Jurisprudence to hold that force 
majeure can be pleaded when the strike has been precipitated by governmental action (for example, a 
freeze on wages) and is therefore beyond the control of the employer. See Cass. Civ. 21. 11. 1967, 
JCP 1968. II. 15462, RT (1968), 733; Lyon 14. 6. 1980, JCP 1980. II. 19411. See also Barry Nicholas, 
The French Law of Contract, 1992, at 204.
474 April 29th. 1963. D. 1963. 673.
475. See also Mazeaud, Responsibilite, 1970, op. cit., at p. 710.
476. Paris, 30. 6. 1958, D. 1958. 578.
477 Civ. 14. 12. 1956. JCP 1975. II. 9737.
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invasion, death, floods, armed robbery, lightning and the enactment of a 
prohibitory law are unforeseeable events within the meaning of force 
majeure.41*
Accordingly, foreseeability plays a central role in questions of force 
majeure. A significant point which should be noted in French law is that the 
foreseeability should be considered in abstracto, "bon pere de famille" 479 The 
test of foreseeability is the abstract one of the reasonable man. It is thus clear 
that the criterion is not the subjective view of the particular obligor.480 It is not a 
question whether the obligor has or has not foreseen the contingency, but 
rather whether he should have foreseen the event. The test is that of a 
reasonable man in the same position as the obligor. If for example, the party 
seeking relief was a businessman, then the question is whether a reasonable 
businessman in his position would have foreseen the contingency. Should the 
answer be positive, then the party seeking relief is deemed to have foreseen 
the contingency. However, the obligor will not be excused by arguing he, 
personally, could foresee less than the reasonable or ordinary man in his 
situation. Unforeseeability is determined objectively, not subjectively. For force 
majeure to arise, the contingency must be such that it could not have been 
foreseen by a reasonable man in the position of the party seeking relief.481 
Appreciating that unforeseeability is objectively ascertained, Article 1150 of 
French Civil Code provides:
'When the non-performance of the obligation is not due to the dol of the 
debtor, he is liable only for such damage as was foreseen or as one could 
have foreseen at the time of contract."
The Article speaks of damage which one could have foreseen not which he 
could have foreseen.482 Thus, the criterion used for foreseeability is again 
objective not subjective. Nevertheless, the French courts sometimes have 
taken into account the ability and capability of the non-performing party to 
foresee the contingency.483
478. Comments (by M. Hunley), Supervening Impossibility as a Discharge of an Obligation, op. cit., at 
66; Gabriel Marty et Pierre Raynaud, op. cit., at 530, 531.
479. Mazeaud Henry et Leon, Mazeaud Jean, Lecon de Droit Civil, Tome II, Cinquieme edition, pp. 
584,585; Mazeaud, lecon de Driot, 1985, p. 663; G. Marty et P. Raynaud, op. cit., p. 530; G. Viney, 
Les Obligations - La Responsibilite - Conditions en Traite de Droit Civil, (Ed. J. Ghestin), vol. 4, 
Librairie General de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1982, n. 399.
480. H. L. et J. Mazeaud, (Cinquieme ed.), op. cit., p. 585.
481. See Veuve Jolyv. Grimault, June 29. 1966. D. 1966. 645.
482. See also Barry Nicholas, French Law of Contract, 1982, at 225, 226.
483. Chabas, op. cit., n. 22-23.
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The issue of foreseeability therefore plays a dual role in the context of 
force majeure. First, it is a basic factor in establishing a defence based upon 
force majeure. Second, the fact that the contingency is foreseeable 
necessarily infers that the promisor intended to assume the risk by entering 
such contract.
As will be discussed later,484 the French reasonable man standard is 
open to criticism. The objective standard may penalise a party who in fact 
subjectively fails to foresee an event which is objectively foreseeable. In other 
words, while a court may deem a contingency foreseeable, it does not mean 
that the party actually contemplated it. The deficiency of the test lies in its 
unrealistic overestimation of the foreknowledge of the party.
2. GERMANY
In German law, the issue of unforeseeability of the contingency is not 
as rigid as it is in France. According to paragraph 275 of BGB, a debtor is 
relieved from his obligation to perform if performance becomes impossible. 
The conclusion is that, contrary to French law, the BGB does not require the 
contingency to be unforeseeable - only that it results in impossibility of 
performance.485 However, the issue in the context of the doctrine of wegfall 
der geschaftsgrundlage (collapse of the foundation of the contract) is a little 
different. Although unforeseeability is one of the preconditions of the 
doctrine,486 German courts have been much more flexible than the French.487 
For example, in a sale contract, the seller was obliged to produce a number of 
specific drilling machines for the buyer. The place of delivery was East 
Germany. The seller knew that because of their specifications the drilling 
machines could only be sold in that country. However, after the contract was 
concluded, the Berlin Blockade prevented delivery of drills to East Germany. 
Although the blockade was in operation at the time the contract was made, 
the BGH (Federal Supreme Court) held that:
"both parties based their contract on the assumption that despite the 
blockade, already existing at the contract's conclusion, the delivery would be 
possible in the foreseeable future."488
484 Irtfra, pp. I l l ,  123 et seq.
485. Henry Lesguillons, op. cit., at 523.
486. Peter Wolfgang, op. cit., at 120.
487 M. Joachim, op. cit., at 105.
488. BGH MDR 1953, 282 (Cited in M. Joachim, op. cit.).
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The buyer was therefore relieved from the obligation to accept and pay for the 
goods, but as the contract had to be modified to the new situation, good faith 
demanded that he must pay one-quarter of the total agreed sum. The court 
indicated that the loss resulting from non-performance should fall on both 
parties. This would go some way to compensate the plaintiff for the 
expenditures incurred in beginning to perform the contract.489 This decision is 
open to criticism, since a purchaser who buys on his own account in the hope 
of gaining from a resale, must bear the risk of such a resale becoming 
impossible. This risk typically rests on him, and if he wants the vendor to 
share it, he should expressly so provide in the contract.
As this case illustrates, with regard to the foresight test, there is an 
important judicial difference between French and German law. Force majeure 
and imprevision operate on the basis of unforeseeability which is one of the 
essential conditions of the doctrines. In the German doctrines of impossibility 
of performance and wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage, foreseeability is not a 
precondition in the former and is not rigidly applied in the latter. It can be said 
that this difference arises for the different principles which underlie the two 
regimes of excusable non-performance, i.e., French law operates on the basis 
of unforeseeability, while German law operates on the basis of good faith.490
B. COMMON LAW 
1. ENGLAND
In contrast to French law, the question of foresight and its role in 
frustration of contract is not clear in English law. The issue remains 
controversial among both judges and commentators.491 The problem is that 
while some believe that unforeseeability is a precondition, others do not. The 
English cases seem to demonstrate considerable inconsistency with regard to 
the question of foreseeability, while the French jurisprudence acknowledges 
that only contingencies which are not foreseeable may free a contracting party 
from performance.
According to Treitel's thesis on foresight, the parties to a contract are 
free expressly to allocate the risk of contingencies. If they do not, it may be 
clear from the nature of transaction that they intended the risk of
489. Loc. cit. See also K. Zweigert, H. Kotz. op. cit., at 195.
490. See M. D. Aubrey, Frustration Reconsidered - Some Comparative Aspects, 12 Int'l. & Comp. 
L.Q. 1963, 1165, at 1180.
491. See G. H. Treitel, (1983), op. cit., at 675-682., and GlifFord G. Hall, Frustration and the Question 
of Foresight, 4 Leg. Stud. 1984, pp. 300 etseq\ Chitty on Contracts, op. cit., at 1646-1647.
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contingencies occurring to lie where it falls.492 A contract may not be frustrated 
if the parties precisely stipulated for an event which has occurred. However, a 
contract should not be frustrated by a contingency which was foreseeable or 
which should have been foreseen by the parties.,493 since in these 
circumstances, it is said that the parties have consciously accepted the risk 
and therefore intended the loss to lie where it falls.494 Although there are some 
cases which support Trietel's views, there are other cases which are to the 
contrary. Let us examine the problem case by case.
In Walton Harvey Ltd. v. Walker and Homfrays Ltd.,495 the defendants 
granted the plaintiffs the right to display an advertisement on defendant's 
hotel. Within the period of the contract, the local authority, under statutory 
powers, compulsory acquired the hotel and demolished it. It was held that the 
contract was not frustrated, because the defendants knew that there was a 
risk of this happening and could have provided against it, but did not do so.496 
Where by reason of special knowledge, one of the parties of transaction 
foresees the potentiality of the contingency and keeps it secret from the other 
party, there is considerable support497 for the view that as a matter of 
"elementary justice",498 he should not be excused. In effect, he has misled the 
promisee. In the absence of such conduct, however, it is more doubtful 
whether the same result should be obtained. In deciding whether or not the 
parties were excused from performance, Williams L.J., asked himself the 
following question:
'Was the event which prevented the performance of the contract of such a 
character that it can not reasonably be said to have been in the contemplation 
of the parties at the date of contract."499
This element of foreseeability was again emphasised in the Davis 
Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council.500 There a building 
contractor claimed frustration of contract on the basis that uncontemplated
492. G. H. Treitel, op. cit., at 676.
493. Loc. cit., at 679.
494 Loc. cit.
495. [1931] 1 Ch. 274.
496. Loc. cit., at 282.
497 G. H. Treitel, op. cit., at 679; Chitty on Contracts, op. cit., at 1027. See also Halsbury's Laws of 
England, 4th ed. vol. 9, London, 1974, at 321, Para. 456.
498. McElroy and Williams, Impossibility of Performance, 1941, at 244.
499 Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.), at 752.
50°. [1956] A.C. 696, at 731.
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circumstances such as shortage of labour and bad weather had resulted in 
the work taking twenty two months instead of the eight months as originally 
expected. One of the reasons Lord Radcliffe gave for refusing to find that the 
contract was frustrated was the fact that the delay was not due to 
circumstances which the parties could not reasonably have contemplated. He 
said:
". . . the cause of the delay was not any state of things which the parties could 
not reasonably be thought to have foreseen. On the contrary, the possibility of 
enough labour and materials not being available was before their eyes and 
could have been the subject of special contractual stipulation."501
In another case, Baily v. Decrespigney,502 it was said:
"Where the event is of such a character that it can not reasonably be in the 
contemplation of the contracting parties when the contract was made, they will 
not be held bound by general words which, though large enough to include, 
were not used with reference to the possibility of the particular contingency 
which afterwards happens."
Finally, in Interadex v. Leisure,503 sellers wanted to be excused on the basis 
of frustration of contract on account of a delay caused by a failure in their 
source of supply. This claim was rejected as follows:
"The events were not sufficient to warrant any finding of frustration. There was 
the breakdown of machinery at the factory. There was difficulty in getting raw 
materials down by rail. Such events are commonplace in the world of affairs. If 
a party desires to avoid such consequences, he must insert a stipulation to 
excuse him. He can not avoid them by a plea of frustration."504
As these cases show a plea of frustration is rejected if the contingencies are
as the result of foreseeable or commonplace events.
Accordingly, as these cases illustrate505 (and Treitel's thesis506) a contract is 
not frustrated by foreseen or foreseeable contingencies. The test used in 
deciding whether or not the contingency is unforeseeable is the objective 
reasonable man test, viz., "the event must be one which any person of
50L Loc. cit., at 731.
502. (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 180, at 185.
503. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509.
504 Loc. cit., per Lord Denning M.R. at 514.
505. See also Tamplin (F.A.) S.S. Co. v. Anglo Mexican Petroleum Products Co. [1916] 2 A.C. 397, 
426; Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 K.B. 493, per Romer L. J. at 501; Bank Line v. Capel (Arthur) and 
Co. op. cit\ Re Badische Co. Ltd. [1921] 2 Ch. 331, 379; Cricklewood Property and Investment Trust 
Ltd. v. Leighton's Invest. Trust Ltd. op. cit., at 228, per Viscount Simon; Denmark Productions Ltd. v. 
Boscobel Productions Ltd. [1969] 1 Q.B. 699, at 725, per Salmon L. J. See also the comments of 
Lord Brandon in The Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 103, at 112; F. C. Sphepherd and Co. 
Ltd. v. Jerrom [1986] 3 All E.R. 589 (C.A.), at 595, Para. b.
506. G. H. Treitel, op. cit., at 679.
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ordinary intelligence would regard as likely to occur."507 Another conclusion
which can be inferred from this discussion, is that in a such case, like French
courts' practice, if the event is foreseeable the party can not claim frustration
because he is deemed to have taken the risk of its occurrence.508
However, in contrast there are cases where foreseen or foreseeable
contingencies have nevertheless frustrated the contracts. For example, in
Palmco Shipping Inc. v. Continental Ore Corp.,509 it was said:
"It is not necessary in English law for an event to be unexpected for it to 
frustrate a contract."
This idea is evident in earlier cases such as Bank Line v. Capel & Co.510 and
Tatem Ltd. v. Gamboa.511 Both cases concerned war-time time charter
parties prevented from being performed during a certain periods as a result of
war. In the latter case, during the Spanish civil war, the defendant chartered a
vessel for the evacuation of civilians for the month of July. On July 14, the ship
was captured by the nationalists who kept her until September 7. The ship
owners who had been paid the hire for July in advance, claimed further hire
for the period running from August 1 to September 11. In this case, although
the risk of capture was known to the parties of contract, nevertheless, it was
held that the charterparty was frustrated. Goddard J. said:
"If the true foundation of the doctrine [of frustration] is that once the subject- 
matter of the contract is destroyed, or the existence of a certain state of facts 
has come to an end, the contract is at an end, that result follows whether or 
not the event causing it was contemplated by the parties."512
In another case, the Eugenia,513 Lord Denning M.R. in a well known dictum,
rejected the argument that frustration can be excluded on the basis that the
event is foreseeable. He said:
507. Loc. cit., at 680.
508. Loc. cit., at 679.
509. [1970] 2 Ll.'s L.R. 21, at 31 (per Mocatta J).
51°. [1919] A.C. 435, at 455, 456, (H.L.), per Lord Summer.
511. [1939] 1K.B. 132; [1938] 3 All E.R. 135. See also Geaning and Chapman Ltd. v. Woodman,
Matthews and Co. [1952] 2 T.L.R. 409, at 412, 413, C.A. obiter per Somervell L.J. ("Frustration may
apply although the event which frustrated [the contract] is an event which both parties may have 
realised might happen."); Societe Franco-Tunisienne D'Armement v. Sidemar S.P.A. [1961] 2 Q.B. 
278; [1960] 3 All E.R. 797 ("the possibility, appreciated by both parties at the time of making their 
contract, that a certain event may occur, is one of the surrounding circumstances to be taken into 
account in construing the contract, and will, of course, have greater or less weight according to the 
degree of probability or improbability and the facts of the case." [1960] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 594, Q.B.).
512. [1939] 1 K.B. 132 at 138.
513. [1964] 2 Q.B. 266, at 239. See also Nile Co. v. Bennet [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 555.
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"It has often been said that the doctrine of frustration only applies where the 
new situation is 'unforeseen' or 'unexpected' or 'uncontemplated' as if that 
were an essential feature. But it is not so. The only thing that is essential is 
that [the parties] should have made no provision for it in their contract."
From the viewpoint of French law, where it is frequently asserted that 
the contingency must be "unforeseeable", the former group of cases are not 
surprising. However, in the latter decisions, the only relevance of 
foreseeability is that the parties might have been expected to have provided 
for a foreseen contingency in their contract.514
Some authors also do not consider unforeseeable events to be a basic 
condition of frustration. McNair states that foreseeability is completely 
immaterial. It does not matter whether or not the frustrating event was 
foreseen by the parties to contract. In McNair's opinion the precondition for 
frustration, is that the event and its effects are such that performance under 
the contract becomes a thing totally different from that originally contemplated 
and the parties did not provide that they would be bound by their contract, 
notwithstanding the occurrence of that contingency.515 Schmitthoff believes 
that while the factor of unforeseeability of the contingency is relevant for the 
ascertainment of the common intention of the parties, in many systems, 
including English law, it is no longer the decisive test.516
In this respect, English law to the extent that foreseeability of the event 
does not exclude frustration, is similar to the German doctrine of impossibility 
which does not require foreseeability as a precondition.
Given the state of the authorities, it is not clear whether or not 
foreseeability precludes the operation of the doctrine of frustration. Treitel's 
thesis has been criticised517 on the basis that if a party foresees a contingency 
as a possibility but does not make provision in the contract, he should not be 
able to justify what would otherwise be a breach of contract by reference to 
the doctrine of frustration. That is why it is suggested that foreseeability 
should be included within the notion of self-induced frustration.518 
Consequently, if the parties have entered into a contract where a contingency
514 See also B. P. Exploration (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783. In this case, Goff J. said 
that the mere fact that frustration was a foreseeable probability at the time of formation of contract 
must not of itself exclude an award of restitution (Loc. cit. at 830).
515. Arnold D. McNair, Frustration of Contract by War, L. Q. Rev. 1940, 173, at 178. See also 
McElroy and Williams, op. cit., at 246.
516. Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 151.
517 Glifford G. Hall, op. cit.
518. Loc. cit., at 304 et seq.
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is foreseeable, they themselves are responsible for the failure expressly to 
stipulate what should happen to their contractual relationship should the event 
occur. It was their choice to take the risk of frustration of their contract. In 
other words, the parties must take the consequences if the foreseen 
contingency occurs.519
To sum up, it can not be said with assurance whether in English law 
foreseeability of the contingency, does or does not exclude frustration. Indeed, 
it is beyond question that the present state of the doctrine is unsatisfactory. 
The doctrine of frustration has often been interpreted by the courts in different 
ways. This may possibly be explained by the tendency of the English courts to 
refrain from general statements and to apply the doctrine of frustration to the 
particular facts of each case; in contrast the French courts are more inclined 
to comment upon the general prerequisites required to bring the remedies 
excusing from performance into operation. This being so, it is not surprising 
that foreseeability in English law may, or may not, become relevant. Because 
of this uncertainty, parties should not rely on the general principles of the 
English doctrine of frustration, particularly in transnational commercial 
transactions: instead, they should expressly deal with the issue in their 
contract.
2. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Generally, American courts take the view that a party who foresees the 
occurrence of a contingency will be deemed to bear the responsibility of such 
an occurrence. However, it should be noted that the issue is not always a 
conclusive factor. Indeed, considerable confusion exists among the 
commentators and also among the courts. Some authorities state that the test 
should be "unforeseeable" (objective test), others maintain that the test must 
be "unforeseen" (subjective test), and finally other approaches have been 
considered.
According to the Restatement of Contracts (First), the promisor will not 
be excused unless the court decides that the promisor had no reason to 
anticipate the occurrence.520 The Restatement stresses the importance of
519. Loc. cit.
520. Sec. 457. After finding the contingency foreseeable, the courts often held that the doctrine of 
impossibility was inapplicable. See Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Perscallo, 96 Cal.App.2d 799, 216 
P.2d 567 (1950); Shore Inv. Co. v. Hotel Trinidad, Inc., 158 Fla. 682, 29 So.2d 696 (1947); Carlson v. 
Sheehan, 157 Cal. 692, 109 Pac. 29 (1910) (In this case, foreseeability was deemed as a factor 
probative of assumption of the risk of impossibility). However, it should be also noted that in a few 
other courts, the factor of foreseeability was deemed probative of non-assumption of risk. See, e.g.,
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foreseeability as precondition of excusable non-performance. Thus, a 
contracting party can not invoke contingencies which he "knows or had reason 
to know"521 or had "reason to anticipate"522 at the time of the formation of the 
contract.523
On the other hand, both UCC524 and Restatement of Contracts 
(Second)525 allow discharge of performance when performance has become 
impracticable because of the occurrence of an event, the non occurrence of 
which was a basic assumption upon which the contract was made. By 
adopting the "basic assumption" criterion, the Restatement of Contract 
(Second) follows, to some extent, the analysis of the UCC. The Restatement 
(Second) specifies that in determining whether the non-occurrence of a 
particular event was or was not a basic assumption of the contract involves a 
judgment as to which party assumed the risk of its occurrence. For example, 
in a contract for constructing and delivery of goods at a fixed price, the seller 
assumes the risk of increased costs within the normal range. If, nevertheless, 
a catastrophe results in an abrupt ten-fold increase in the cost to the seller, in 
that case, it may be held that the seller did not assume the risk by concluding 
that the non-occurrence of the contingency was a "basic assumption" on 
which the contract was made.526
The commentary to the UCC provides for non-performance in the event 
of unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the contemplation of the 
parties.527 The First Restatement was concerned with whether or not the 
obligor had reason to see the occurrence of the event. The question in UCC is 
whether or not he foresaw the risk of the contingency and actually assumed 
the risk that it might occur. It can be said that the Restatement (First) used the 
standard of foreseeability to be found in the law of tort, i.e., that of the 
reasonable man who in the circumstances of the party would have anticipated
Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal.App.2d 430, 127 P.2d 1027 (1942); Fratelli Pantanella v. International 
Commercial Corp., 89 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Sup.Ct. 1949). See also Note, the Fetish Impossibility in the 
Law of Contracts, op. cit., at 98.
521. Restatement of Contracts, (1932) Secs. 456, 465.
522. Loc. cit. Sec. 457.
523. See also Corbin on Contracts, op. cit., Secs. 1333, 1354.
524 Sec. 2-615.
525. (1981), Sec. 261.
526. Farnsworth, op. cit., at 683; Restatement (Second), chapter 11, introductory note.
527. See UCC Sec. 2-615, comment 1:". . .unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the 
contemplation of the parties." See also comment 4 referring to ". . . unforeseen shutdown of major 
sources of supply or the like. .
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the supervening event. On the other hand, UCC regards the issue as whether 
the parties in fact knew of the contingency but did not provide for its 
occurrence in their contract. This explains why the UCC suggests that the 
supervening event must be "unforeseen" as opposed to unforeseeable.
The Restatement (Second) emphasises the requirement that the non­
occurrence of the supervening event must be a "basic assumption" of the 
parties to the contract and concludes that "[t]he fact that the event was 
foreseeable, or even foreseen, does not necessarily compel a conclusion that 
its non-occurrence was not a basic assumption."528 The Restatement 
(Second) argues that the foresight test is only one of the factors to be 
considered in determining whether the defence of impracticability is available. 
Thus, according to the Restatement (Second), in a complicated contract 
failure to deal with an improbable or insignificant contingency, even though 
foreseen, should not be deemed to amount to an assumption of the risk.529 
Indeed, the Restatement (Second) suggests that the parties did not assume 
the risk of all foreseeable or foreseen events: rather, the foresight criterion is 
simply a factor which can be used to determine the basic assumptions of the 
parties. In this regard, it had been stated that the party seeking relief should 
be free to make clear why there was no provision in the contract covering the 
contingency, for example, that the other party was the dominant economic 
party and therefore forced him to sign a standard form contract.530
To summarise, in contrast to the objective test in the First Restatement, 
the language of comments 1 and 4 of UCC section 2-615 which use the word 
"unforeseen", represents a shift from the objective test of what might 
"reasonably have been intended by the parties", to an apparently subjective 
test. The Code's shift, theoretically at least, results in the abandonment of the 
fiction of the reasonable man. The concept of reasonable foresight gives way 
to a new behavioural analysis with the inquiry being focused on what the 
parties actually contemplated. On the other hand, the UCC regards the 
foresight (subjective) test as a precondition, the Restatement (Second) 
regards foreseeability (objective or subjective) as only a factor in determining 
the parties' basic assumptions.
528. Sec. 261, comment b. See also Sec. 265, comment a.
529. See also L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Royal Norwegian Gov't., I l l  F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1949), certiorari
denied 339 U.S. 914, 70 S.Ct. 574, 94 L.Ed. 1340 (1950).
530. See John D. Calamari, and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, 3rd ed., 1987, at 571.
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Notwithstanding its language, the UCC's subjective search for actual 
foresight has not in fact displaced the centrality of objective foreseeability in 
U.S. law. In both Common law and UCC issues, most American courts have 
maintained that where an event was found to be foreseeable or should have 
been contemplated by the parties, relief should be denied unless the party 
seeking relief had provided for the contingency in his contract.531 Otherwise, 
the risk of the occurrence of the contingency falls on that party.532 The theory 
behind the foreseeability test is that if the contingency was foreseeable and 
the party seeking relief made no provision for it in his transaction then he is 
deemed to have assumed the risk of its occurrence.533 In the pre-code case, 
Lloyd v. Murphy,534 Justice Trynor makes the classic statement of the 
foreseeability rule:
"If [the contingency] was foreseeable there should have been provision for it in 
the contract, and the absence of such a provision gives rise to the inference 
that the risk was assumed."535
That is, of course, what French law also emphasises.
In Westinghouse I,536 and Westinghouse I I 531 Judge Merhige argued that 
the question whether or not the non-occurrence of a particular contingency 
was a basic assumption of the parties was to be answered not upon a factual 
finding of what the parties assumed but upon a judicial determination of
5 3 Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (Government 
regulation foreseeable to refuse relief); Mishara Const. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 365 
Mass. 122, 310 N.E.2d 363 (1974); Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp. 743 S.W.2d 
658, 663 (Tex.App. 1987), citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 706 F.2d 
444 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
532. See S. E. Wourinen, Case Comment, Northern Indiana Public Service Company v. Carbon 
County Coal Company: Risk Assumption in Claims of Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration 
of Purpose, 50 Ohio L. J. 1989, 162, at 173. See also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 
F.Supp. 429, 441-42 (S.D.Fla. 1975); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 
725-28 (Mo.App., W.D.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
533. Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1964); City of Minneapolis v. Republic 
Creosoting Co., 161 Minn. 178, 189, 201 N.W. 414, 419 (1924); Nebaco, Inc. v. Riverview Reality 
Co., 87 Nev. 55, 482 P.2d 305 (1971); Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde, 70 Cal.2d 666, 
451 P.2d 721, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1969) (Military action was discussed at the time of contracting, 
therefore, the contingency was foreseeable). See also Comments, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile 
Economy: Saving UCC Section 2-615 from the Common Law, 72 N.W. Uni. L. Rev. 1978, 1032, at 
1038.
534. 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
535. 25 Cal. 2d at 54, 153 P.2d at 50. For the discussion of Justice Trynor's style concerning the issue, 
see S. McCaulay, Justice Trynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 Stanford L. Rev. 1961, 812, 833-838.
536. 517 F.Supp. 440.
537. 597 F.Supp. 1456.
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whether the event was "foreseeable". The issue, then, is not whether the 
event was foreseen, but whether it might reasonably have been foreseen 
under the circumstances. This insistence on the mechanism of objective 
foreseeability as the indicator of a presumed intent can be seen as a 
conscious refusal to adopt the specific language of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. The judge stated that:
"[Wjhere the contingency may reasonably be said to have been foreseeable, 
courts have generally taken the view that the promisor should not be released 
from his obligation. This rule is based on the notion that where the parties can 
reasonably anticipate events that may affect performance, the prudent course 
is to provide for such eventualities in their contract."538
Unanticipated expenses, even approaching $100 million, can not obviate the
foreseeability problem because a reasonable person would take care to
"recognise and appreciate" the potential events that might affect the
contract.539
In Eastern A ir Lines inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,540 Gulf sought to avoid a long­
term contract under which it was to supply jet fuel to Eastern Airlines Inc. 
Gulfs commercial impracticability defence was based on the intervening 1973 
OPEC oil embargo, the energy crisis and unexpected Federal price controls. 
In Eastern Airline's action for specific performance of the contract, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected the excuse of 
impracticability raised by Gulf Oil. In applying the foreseeability test, the court 
stated:541
"Even if Gulf has established great hardship under UCC Sec. 2-615 which it 
has not, Gulf would not prevail because the events associated with the so- 
called energy crisis were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was 
executed. . . the foreseeability rule would defeat Gulfs claim."
In another case, United States v. Wegematic Corporation 542 Wegematic
had promised to sell the government a computer for $231,800, but later broke
its promise and claimed technical difficulties which it would take at least
$1,000,000 to correct. The court stated that the possible inability to develop
538. 517 F.Supp. at 454.
539. Westinghouse II, 597 F.Supp. at 1477-78. For analysis of these cases see Sheldon W. Halpem, 
Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for "the Wisdom of Solomon", 
135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1987, 1123, at 1148-1153.
540. 415 F.Supp. 429, 438, 441 (S.D.Fla. 1975).
541. Loc. cit., at 441-442.
542. 3 60 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
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the technology had been foreseeable and that the plaintiff had assumed that 
risk.
The significance of "foreseeability test" must not be exaggerated, 
because it is not always a conclusive factor. Indeed, some authorities argue 
that the rule should be abandoned or at least modified.543 An even more liberal 
view has been adopted by a few courts. The contention is that foreseeability is 
of no importance when it is clear that the parties did not intend that the risk of 
the occurrence should be assumed by the party seeking relief. West Los 
Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer644 is a leading case which 
helps to clarify the point being made. In this case, the defendant contracted to 
sell certain real property to the plaintiff and to lease it back. As the plaintiff was 
a tax-exempt charitable institution, the parties believed that certain very 
substantial tax benefits would accrue to the defendant. From the evidence, it 
is clear that the plaintiff knew that the defendant would not have contracted 
but for the prospective tax advantages and that the transaction was premised 
upon these advantages being obtained. The government issued a revenue 
ruling disallowing the kinds of tax advantages foreseen by the parties. The 
defendant refused to perform and argued that the contract was frustrated. The 
court accepted that the prospective tax advantage formed the basis upon 
which both parties had contracted. However, the plaintiff argued that 
defendant could not rely upon frustration because it was foreseeable that the 
government might disapprove of such contract. Despite this, the court decided 
that the defence was available because it was evident that the parties 
intended that neither party should assume this risk.
In Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States,545 the court was careful to note 
that the fact that a particular occurrence was foreseeable did not necessarily 
indicate how the risk of that occurrence had been allocated. The same 
position has been taken by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.546 The 
court stated:
"foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its 
allocation . . . .  Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the 
possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes because they can not agree,
543. E.g., see Jackson v. Royal Norwegian Gonv't. 177 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1949), Cert, denied 339 US 
914, 70 S.Ct. 574, 94 L.E. 1340 (1950).
544 366 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1966), certiorari denied 385 U.S. 1010, 87 S.Ct. 718, 17 L.Ed.2d 548 
(1967). See also Edward Maurer Co. v. Tubeless Tire Co., 285 F. 713 (6th Cir. 1922).
545. 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
546. Restatement 2d, Chapter 11, Introductory note; Sec. 261, Comments b and c.
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often simply because they are too busy. Moreover, that some abnormal risk 
was contemplated is probative but does not necessarily establish an allocation 
of the risk of the contingency which actually occurs."547
The American cases demonstrate considerable inconsistency with 
regard to the question of foresight test. While most cases generally 
acknowledge that only contingencies which were not foreseeable may free a 
contracting party from his promise, a few cases use other approaches.
It should be noted that the words "foreseeability" or "foreseeable" do 
not appear within the text of section 2-615 of the UCC. However, comments 1 
and 4 to the section employ the terms "unforeseen circumstances" and 
"unforeseen contingency" respectively. It has been argued that by using the 
term "unforeseen", the UCC draws distinction between "unforeseen 
contingency" and "unforeseeable contingency". The "foreseen standard" of 
the UCC is therefore a subjective test, referring to the actual intent of the 
parties, i.e., whether they actually foresaw the contingency. The phrase in 
comment 1, ". . . not within the contemplation of the parties", confirms the 
subjective approach of the UCC. On the other hand, the "foreseeable 
standard" refers to an objective test. An event is foreseeable if it is likely to 
have been foreseen by a reasonable person. Here, the question is whether 
the ordinary prudent person, in the position of the promisor, could reasonably 
have been expected to foresee the contingency. A subjective test, of course, 
imposes a less rigid requirements on the parties. Indeed, the concept of 
subjective "unforeseen contingencies" broadens the scope of excuse; 
whereas, the objective test may hold the seller to supervening events of which 
he is not aware.548 As the objective foreseeability test is based on flawed and 
imperfect assumptions about how the reallocation of risks must be done, it is 
the present writer's submission that the concept of "unforeseen" is preferable 
to the concept of "unforeseeability". The language of section 2-615 UCC does 
not require the application of the objective foreseeability criterion as the term 
"foreseeability" does not appear in either the text or comments to the section.
547 This view is expressly adopted in Opera Co. of Boston v. Trap Found, for Performing Arts, 817 
F.2d 1094 (4th Cir. 1987) and another well known impracticability case, Aluminum Co. of Am. v. 
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 53, 76 (1980) ("foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not 
necessarily prove its allocation." As we see Alcoa case rejects the strict approach of the foreseeability 
factor and adopts the view that foreseeability alone does not preclude relief.).
548. See P. Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts, 61 St. Jonh's L. Rev. 1987, 225, at 236, 
237; N. Prance, Commercial Impracticability: A Textual and Economic Analysis of Section 2-615 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Ind. L. Rev. 1986, 457, at 486, 487; Richard E. Speidel, Excusable 
Non-Performance in Sales Contracts: Some Thoughts about Risk Management, 32 S. C. L. Rev. 1980, 
241, at 261.
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Moreover, there is judicial support for the use of the "unforeseen" test. In 
Security Sewage Equipment Co. v. McFerren,549 the court held a contractor 
to be in breach when the contractor did not fix a sewer system in a residential 
development. As the contractor had not been able to get the necessary 
government permit, it was held that only a contingency which was "unforeseen 
and unusual" would excuse the non-performance of the contract. The court 
stated that the contractor, "by the nature of its business, possessed superior 
knowledge of the requirements of the Department of Health."550 Accordingly, 
the occurrence was not "unforeseen".
2.1. CRITICISM OF THE FORESEEABILITY TEST
Although most American courts use the "foreseeability test" in 
interpretation of section 2-615 of UCC and some commentators551 support it, 
many scholars have criticised this tendency.552 Some argue that while the 
foreseeability test may have probative weight with respect to risk assumption, 
it should not be determinative.553
It can be argued that, in theory at least, every contingency is possible 
and foreseeable;554 no event in the world is an unforeseeable contingency 
because every event in the world is foreseeable.555 Accordingly, impossibility 
should never excuse performance.556 For example, there is always some 
possibility that a fire will destroy the source of supply, that a key person in the
549. Ohio St.2d 251, 237 N.E.2d 898 (1968). Cf Eastern Airlines v. McDonnel Douglas Corp.,532 
F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
55°. Ohio St.2d 251, at 256, 237 N.E.2d at 900 and 901.
551. For example, see Benjamin N. Henszey, UCC Section 2-615 - Does "Impracticable" Means 
Impossible? 10 U.C.C. L. J. 1977, 107, at 111-114.
552. See Farnsworth, Diputes over Ommission in Contracts, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1968, 860, 879-880, 
885-887; Hurst, Freedom of Contracts in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallacation of Contractual 
Risks under UCC Section 2-615, op. cit., at 567-570; Aubrey, op. cit., at 1184-1186; Macaulay, 
Justice Trynor and the Law of Contracts, op. cit. at 833-838; Smit, Frustration of Contract: A 
Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, op. cit. -, Note, Fetish of Impossibility of Performance, op. cit., 
at 98, n. 23.
553. Hurst, op. cit., at 567-575; Note, The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance and the 
Foreseeability Test, op. cit., at 584-585; Note, Sections 2-615 and 2-616 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Partial Solutions to the Problem of Excuse, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 1976,167, at 186.
554 Marvin O. Young, Construction and Enforcement of Long-Term Coal Supply Agreements - 
Coping with Conditions Arising from Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Events - Force Majeure and 
Gross Inequities Clauses, Rocly Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 1981, 127 at 139; Paul L. Joskow, Commercial 
Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, The Journal of Legal Studies, at 158
555. Norman R. Prance, op. cit., at 487.
556 Stephen J. Siriani, op. cit., at 58.
124
contract will die, that there will be war, embargo or acts of God - like flood, 
typhoon, earthquake. This argument can be criticised on the ground that it is 
unrealistic to believe that the reasonable man, let alone the actual parties to 
the contract, can foresee all events. The parties are not prophets! Further, 
what is important is that which was actually foreseeable or foreseen; not what 
is possible to occur. We are concerned with foreseen or foreseeable events 
not possible events. Moreover, since the promisor has to prove that the 
supervening event which rendered performance impossible or impracticable 
was unforeseeable, he is faced with the difficulty of having to prove a 
negative. This has been said to be another reason for rejecting the foresight 
test.557 However, this argument does not appear to be rational because while 
proving a negative is difficult, it is not impossible, though, the burden of proof 
may be heavy. The result is that the courts may rarely find the event 
unforeseeable.
It is the present writer's submission that the "foresight" test should 
continue to be a precondition of excusable non-performance but that a 
subjective criterion should be used. The objective "foreseeability" test has 
been rejected for the following reasons:
The foreseeability test is based upon the fiction of the reasonable man's 
standards. This penalises a party who actually fails to contemplate the 
objectively foreseeable event. Although such a standard has been important 
in the law of negligence, in the context of frustration a court may deem a 
contingency foreseeable when the parties did not in fact contemplate it or 
intend to allocate the risk of its occurrence. A contingency may be unforeseen 
by the parties but at the same time be a logical possibility which is foreseeable 
by the reasonable man. In Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc.,55* 
a defendant-seller alleged that a train derailment made impracticable the 
defendant's performance. The court decided that the seller had not 
established the defence because "the derailment was not unforeseeable." In 
this respect the court stated, "Although it did not appear that Bende [the 
plaintiff] and Kiffe [the defendant] ever contemplated a train derailment . . . 
common sense dictates that they could easily have foreseen such an 
occurrence."559 Thus, although the parties did not in fact expect a train
557 Comments, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving UCC Section 2-615 from the 
Common Law, op. cit., at 1042; Stewart Macaulay, op. cit., at 835,836; Thomas Hurst, op. cit., at 568.
558. 548 F.Supp. 1018 (1982).
559. 548 F.Supp. at 1022.
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derailment to occur and the event was therefore unforeseen by them, the 
court deemed that event was foreseeable since the train derailment was a 
logical possibility. This case shows that the test based on the fiction of 
foreseeability is artificial: it lacks a realistic foundation and can be a 
troublesome barrier to relief.
Because of these difficulties, some commentators have proposed other 
tests for the interpretation of section 2-615 of UCC. It has been recommended 
that the courts should place emphasis on the words of the section, rather than 
to substitute the test of foreseeability. Impracticability by the occurrence of an 
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made, is not the same as impracticability by the occurrence of an 
unforeseen or unforeseeable contingency. A contingency can be foreseen or 
foreseeable and yet the parties may contract on the assumption that it will not 
occur. The "unforeseen" and "unforeseeable" tests can therefore be 
jettisoned.560
While rejecting the notion of foreseeability, Prance argues that the 
courts must at least use the subjective "foreseen" language of Official 
Comments of the section 2-615 of UCC in place of the objective "foreseeable" 
test which is not stipulated in the language of the section or its comments. He 
maintains that the courts must consider the language of the contract and any 
other relevant evidence in order to discover the parties' intentions: If, however, 
the contract is silent, then the court may refer to the section free of any 
concepts of foreseeability.561
Another approach is to concentrate on the assumption of risk.562 The 
purpose of this approach is to discover whether the parties actually intended 
at the time of formation of contract that the seller should assume the risk of 
the occurrence of the event which he later claims should discharge his 
performance. In this approach where the intentions of the parties regarding 
risk allocation concerning a particular contingency can not be found from the 
contract563 or parole evidence, the courts must rely upon what Coon has
560. Rodman Elfin, The Future Use of Unconscionability and Impracticability as Contract Doctrines, 
40 Mercer L. Rev. 1989, 937, 953-956.
561. Norman R. Prance, op. cit., at 486-487.
562. See Comments, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving UCC Section 2-615 from 
the Common Law, op. cit., at 1050-1053.
563. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fedeal Power Commission, 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977) (Applying the 
assumption of risk, the court held that "by warranting, rather that merely promising, the availability of 
sufficient quantities of gas, Gulf assumed for itself the entire risk that future conditions would raise 
the cost of gas"), op. cit., at 599.
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called the "uses of doubt and reason".564 Here the court exercises its 
discretion and settles the case in the light of commercial and equitable criteria. 
In this regard, the purpose, nature, history and the circumstances surrounding 
the contract are factors which can be used to determine the parties' intentions 
concerning the allocation of risk.565 If parole evidence is not available, 
Childres' "status"566 approach may be helpful. According to this thesis, if the 
bargaining powers of the parties are not equal in power or knowledge - for 
example, the weaker party was not able to protect himself with an excuse 
clause - the loss should be allocated in a way which will avoid the stronger 
party from taking advantage of this situation.
Carrol and Edwards567 advocate the "commercial foresight test". Under 
this criterion, which is a modified objective test, the courts are allowed to 
consider some subjective factors. The test urges the court to consider all the 
circumstances of the contract to discover what a business man might have 
contemplated beyond the occurrence of the contingency. The question 
becomes whether or not the obligor should have contemplated the 
contingency in the light of the commercial circumstances of the contract. Of 
course, the courts must also see whether or not good faith has been 
exercised by the party seeking excuse. Finally, it must, of course, be decided 
whether or not the contingency rendered performance impracticable within the 
commercial setting of the contract. Here, the question is whether or not the 
contingency rendered performance impracticable, in the light of both the 
individual contract and the broader commercial circumstances of the 
transaction.
Brown has argued568 that the court's initial inquiry should be whether 
the contingency was contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. 
The court must try to determine whether the party seeking discharge was
564 Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise - The Uses of Doubts and Reasons, 58 NW. U. 
L. Rev. 1964, 750.
565. Comments, op. cit., at 1052.
566. According to this thesis, three categories of contracts with regard to the expertise and bargaining 
power of the parties can be classified as follows: 1. Formal contracts, contracts where the parties are 
equal in expertise and bargaining power, 2. Informal contracts, contracts between parties who have 
equal bargaining power, but without expertise; 3. Adhision contracts, contracts where the parties are 
not equal. See Childres and Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971,1.
567 Note (Dan L. Caroll and Mark C. Edwards), Labor Strife and UCC Section 2-615: On Strike and 
You're out? U. C. Davis L. Rev. 1981, 669, at 684-686.
568. Charles G. Brown, The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance and Foreseeability Test, 6 Loy. 
U. Chi. L. J. 1975, 575, at 585-593.
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aware of the possibility of the event. This determination can be made from the 
terms of the transaction and the surrounding circumstances. Negotiations 
before the conclusion of the contract may reveal the parties' awareness. 
Consideration of the provisions in similar contract which the party seeking 
relief has entered will also be useful. The nature and source of the 
contingency and its remoteness to the subject matter, may be an indication of 
whether it was the type of risk of which a businessman would generally be 
aware. In the end, after deciding whether the contingency was foreseen, it 
must then be determined whether the promisor should be held to have 
assumed the risk. In this regard, the first stage is to attempt to discover the 
intentions of the parties. If their intentions can not be determined - because 
the parties have failed to express their intentions - the court should consider 
the following factors: the nature, purpose and the terms of the contract, the 
commercial sense of requiring performance, bargaining positions of the 
parties and the ability of the individual party to insure against the disabling 
event or to bear or distribute the loss. In the end, if the court still can not 
decide who should bear the risk, it should refer to the foreseeability test and 
its own sense of justice. For Brown foreseeability is neither the decisive factor 
nor totally irrelevant; it is to be considered together with other factors.
The present writer agrees with Brown's contention that the court's initial 
inquiry should be whether the party was actually aware of the contingency. 
But the remaining criteria can not be accepted. It is irrational to say that a 
party who has in fact foreseen the contingency, might not have assumed the 
risk of its occurrence. If the contingency is foreseen by the obligor, he can 
either refuse to contract or alternatively make express provision in the 
contract. If he does not do so, it follows that he has consciously entered into 
the contract on the basis that he has assumed the risk.
The present writer offers as a criterion of foresight the "concrete- 
abstract foresight test". This is a modified objective test. At first, a subjective 
criterion is used. If it is found that a promisor in fact foresaw the risk of the 
occurrence of the event, relief will be denied. Such a finding may be based on 
the promisor's express assumption of the risk, on circumstances surrounding 
the making of the contract, or on the presumption that certain risks normally 
are assumed by the promisor unless shifted by express contractual term. It is 
of course unlikely that it would always be possible directly, or even 
circumstantially, to demonstrate the actual intent of the contracting parties 
where the contract is silent. Accordingly, if after considering these subjective 
factors, the court can not discover whether the contingency was foreseen by
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the obligor (concrete foresight), then it can use the objective foreseeability 
test, i.e., the foresight of the reasonable man, the "bon pere de famille" of 
French law. This suggested test will be discussed in detail in the final chapter 
of this thesis.569
II. NO FAULT OF THE PARTY SEEKING RELIEF
The word "fault" is derived from the French word Taut", which 
originated from the Latin verb fallere, which expresses the notion of failing in 
some way.570 In this context, the word Tault" has the same meaning as 
default. When a person fails to perform his promise or fails to perform it 
adequately, he is said to be in default.571 In law the word has a wider meaning 
and includes negligence, an error or defect of conduct, any deviation from 
prudence, duty, or any shortcoming, or neglect of care or performance 
resulting from inattention, incapacity, or perversity; a wrong tendency, course 
or act; bad faith or mismanagement; neglect of duty.572 In section 62 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1893573 "fault" means "wrongful act or default". In the Law 
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, "fault" is defined as follows: 
"negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise 
to a liability in tort or would, apart from this Act, gives rise to the defence of 
contributory negligence."
In Civil law systems, "fault" is either an action with intent to cause 
damage or is an error of conduct that a reasonable man (bon pere de famille) 
would not have committed if placed in same situation as the author of 
damage.574 The word covers both intentional i.e., deliberate wrongdoing and 
negligence.575 The first is the state of mind of a person who consciously and
569. Infra, pp. 323 et seq.
570. F. H. Lawson, Sellected Essays, Vol. II, (North-Holland Pub. Co. Amestrad, New York - Oxford), 
1977, at 348.
571. Loc. cit.
572. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Sabine Towing Co., C.C.A.Tex., 117 F.2d 694, 697; UCC Sec. 1-201 
(16) (Wrongful act, omission or breach).
573. See now section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
574 Jean-Gabriel Castel, The Civil Law System of the Province of Quebec, Butterworth, 1962, at 402, 
403.
575. G. H. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, a Comparative Account, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1988, at 342; E. J. Cohn, Manual of German Law, vol. I, 1968, at 118; B. J. Markesinis, a 
Comparative Introduction to the German Law of Tort, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, at 45; 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, chapter I, vol. II (A General View of Contract), at 
84. See also Para. 276 BGB which lays down that the debtor is always responsible for deliberate or 
careless misbehaviour.
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willingly pursues a particular wrongful result,576 while the latter is the conduct 
of a person who fails to observe the standard of ordinary care577 (failure to use 
reasonable care).
Generally, excuse doctrines do not apply where the occurrence of the 
contingency is due to the fault of the party seeking relief.578 Indeed, the 
essential condition before vitiating factors such as frustration of contract, force 
majeure, wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage, imprevision and impracticability, 
apply, is that the contingency is not attributable to the fault of the party. Each 
legal system has its own variations on this condition.
A. CIVIL LAW
Following Roman law, in Civil law systems contractual liability depends 
on fault.579 In French law, force majeure does not exist whenever the party 
seeking relief is at fault. Indeed, absence of fault ("absence de faut" or "san la 
faut de debiteur") is a basic condition for release.580 If there is personal 
responsibility, i.e., negligence, the obligor is held liable for non-performance. 
No fault of the party seeking relief denotes that the event was beyond the 
obligor's control, exteriorite.581 The doctrine of force majeure can not be 
invoked in a contract of personal services if the illness was caused by the 
obligor's conduct, for example, addiction to alcohol.582 A strike does not 
constitute force majeure if workers go on strike for their justified demands;583 
but, a strike which is traceable to national labour unrest can be beyond the
576. B. S. Markesinis, op. cit. See also German Civil Code Paras. 276, 280, 285.
577. Loc. cit.; BGB Para. 276.
578. See Para. 323 BGB; Art. 1148 French and Belgian Civil Code; Art. 1933(3) of Louisiana Civil 
Code; Art. 17(24) Civil Code of Quebec. See also Treitel, The Law of Contract, (1983), op. cit., at 
683-685; Restatement of Contract (First), Sec. 457; Restatement (Second), Secs. 261, 265.
579. See B. Nicholas, (1982), op. cit., at 48; K. W. Ryan, An Introduction to the Civil Law, 1962, at 
56; Lawson, op. cit., at 359.
580. H. L. and Jean Mazeaud, Traite Theorique et Pratique de la Responsibilite Civil Delictuelle and 
Contractuelle, Tome II, sixieme ed. Montchrestien, 1970, p. 679, n. 1565; Jean Carbonier, Droit Civil, 
4 Les Obligations, 1956, at 243; A. Colin and H. Capitan, Traite de Droit Civil, Tome II, 1959, p. 
573, n. 851; H. L. and J. Mazeaud, Lecon de Driot Civil, cinquieme ed. p. 585, n. 575. See also Andre 
Tunc, Force Majeure et Absence de Faut en Matiere Contractuelle, 43 Revue Trimestrielle Civil, 
1945, at 235 et seq. See also Arts. 1302/1,1881, 1882 French Civil Code.
581. Tunc, Force Majeure et Absence de faut, op. cit.; Jean Carbonier, Les Obligations, 1985, at 291; 
Mazeard, Lecon de Droit, op. cit.
582. Mazeaud, (1970), op. cit., at 712, n. 1588. See also Paris, 7 Jan. 1910, D. 1910. 2. 292 (Serious 
toothache requiring surgery was regarded as an excuse for a writer's failure to deliver the manuscript 
of a play on time).
583. C.A. Poitiers, 12 January 1903, D. P. 1903, 2, 389.
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employer's control.584 The requirement of no fault of the party seeking relief is 
illustrated in the following case.585 A buyer bought a certain amount of rice 
from the seller. In order to guarantee the payment, the buyer agreed to furnish 
the seller with a confirmed letter of credit. However, the buyer did not succeed 
in obtaining authorisation from the committee of control of capital export which 
was necessary in order to open the credit. The buyer declared that this refusal 
frustrated performance. The seller instituted legal proceeding against the 
buyer for damages and interest. The court held that non-performance can 
only be excused as a result of a contingency in which the buyer played no 
part.
Thus force majeure excludes fault because the result can not be 
imputed to the promisor: but it is also correct to say that fault excludes force 
majeure.586
It should be noted that where damage arises because of force majeure 
and also the fault of the party, the legal solution is less clear cut. Some cases 
have allowed partial release of the obligor. For example, in the Affaire 
Lamoriciere,587 natural contingencies and the fault of the defendant had both 
contributed to the accident. The court held that the defendant's liability fell to 
be reduced proportionately to his share of responsibility for the accident. In 
another case,588 a contrary decision was reached. In this case, some goods 
were taken in a railway station by the enemy but the goods were only at the 
station because of delay on the part of the railway company. In these 
circumstances, the company was refused release: it was the company's fault 
which smoothed the path for robbery.
It must be acknowledged that today the second approach seems to be 
accepted in French law, i.e., the obligor will not be excused if the non­
performance is due to his fault as well as force majeure.5*9
Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the obligor is liable for non­
performance or delay in performing his contractual obligation unless he shows
584 Alex Weill, Obligations, (1980), at 460.
585 Freres Kahn v. Societe Frnaco-Belge D'extreme-Orient, Cass, req., January 4, 1927, Gaz. Pal. 
1927.1. 587.
586. Jean Carbonier, (1956), op. cit., at 243.
587. Civ. Sec. Com.(or Cass Com.) 19. 6. 1951, D. 1951, 717; Cass Civ. 10 March 1948, Bull. 1948, n. 
83, p. 254. See also Amos and Walton's Introduction to French Law, 3rd ed. (by F. H. Lawson, A. E. 
Anton and L. Neville Brown), Oxford, 1967, at 186.
588. J. Carbonier, (1959), op. cit., at 244.
589. H. L. & J. Mazeaud, (1970), op. cit., at 734 etseq., n. 1611 et seq.
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that non-performance was caused by an external cause which can not be 
imputed to him. As we have seen, implicit in this Article is the idea of fault. 
Consequently, French jurisprudence has identified two essential characters 
for force majeure: unforeseeability and irresistibility.590 Another important point 
is that the obligor must negative fault by proving that non-performance is 
attributable to a cause which was unforeseeable, irresistible and out of his 
control.591 It should be noted that we are concerned both with "obligation de 
resultat" (obligation of result) and "obligation de monyens" (obligation of 
means).592 In an obligation de resultat the obligor has to prove the cause 
etrangere. But in an obligation de moyens the obligor does not have to prove 
the externality of the event.593 His failure to take care is the basis of a claim for 
non-performance. But since he need only exercise the diligence of a bon pere 
de famille; the burden of proof lies on the obligee to show that such diligence 
has not been exercised and that the event which has made performance 
impossible would not have arisen if such care had been taken, i.e., that the 
obligor was at fault. In an obligation de resultat, the creditor has only to show 
that the contract has not been performed and it is then for the obligor to prove 
a cause etrangere.594
German law also bases liability on the principle of fault 
(verschldensprinzp) or responsibility.595 A party will be liable for all intentional 
and negligent acts.596 Thus supervening impossibility is considered to be a
590. Mazeaud, Lecon de Droit, (cinquieme ed.), op. cit.,at 584, n. 575.
591. Boris Stark, Droit Civil, Obligations, Librairies technique, 1972, at 616, n. 2081. See also Henry 
Depage, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil Beige, Tome 2 (3eme ed. Bruxelle), 1964, at 602.
592. In French law, two types of contract are identified. In one (obligation de moyens), the obligor is 
obliged to do no more than exercise the care of bon pere de famille (reasonable care). His obligation 
is to take the measures which a reasonable man would take to achieve the purpose of the contract. 
Indeed, in this type of contract, the promisor agrees to use his best efforts or to act as a prudent 
administrator. Contractual fault is the failure to comply with the standard of bon pere de famille. In 
the second type of contract (obligation de resultat), the promisor's obligation is not just to exercise due 
diligence, but to achieve the result which he has promised. In this type of contract, non-performance 
may be excused only by supervening impossibility. (See Barry Nicholas, French Law of Contract, 
(1982), op. cit., at 49).
593. Boris Stark, op. cit., at 617, n. 2082.
594 See B. Nicholas, op. cit., at 48 et seq.
595. E. J. Cohn, Frustration of Contract in German Law, op. cit., at 15; Kojo Yelpaala, Mauro Rubino- 
Sammartano and Denis Compbell, Drafting and Enforcing Contracts in Civil and Common Law 
Jurisprudence, Kluwer, 1973, at 98.
596. G. H. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, a Comparative Account, op. cit., at 342; E. J. 
Cohn, Manual of German Law, op. cit., at 118; B. J. Markesinis, op. cit., at 45. See also J. Barrigan 
Marcantanio, Unifying the Law of Impossibility, 8 Hasting Int'l. and Comp. L. Rev. 1984, 41, at 53.
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breach of contract rendering the obligor liable in damages if he is responsible 
for it.597 In that case, the other party can not claim specific performance, but 
other remedies such as damages and termination of the contract are 
available.598 According to German law, where the contingency is beyond the 
obligor's control, it is said that he is not at fault.599 For example, a seller is 
discharged from his liability where the impossibility of delivering the goods 
was not caused by his fault.600 However, where generic goods are promised to 
be delivered, according to paragraph 279 of the BGB, there will be no relief if 
the goods are unavailable anywhere in the world, notwithstanding the lack of 
culpa of the obligor.601 This is, of course, an example of strict liability.
Apart from BGB paragraph 275 which relieves a debtor from his 
obligation if performance becomes impossible due to circumstances for which 
he is not responsible, there are three other situations where impossibility is 
relevant.602 First, the impossibility may be in consequence of a circumstance 
for which neither party is responsible; in that case, BGB paragraph 323 
provides that both parties are discharged and according to the rule of unjust 
enrichment any performance already rendered must be restored. In the 
second, if the creditor is responsible for the impossibility, the debtor is relieved 
and retains the right to demand the counter performance (BGB paragraph 
324). In the third, if the debtor is responsible for the impossibility, the creditor 
has the right to choose between a claim for damages or termination of the 
contract (BGB paragraph 325).
As discussed above, the debtor is only responsible for circumstances 
caused by his wilful default or negligence. However, in case of a dispute, like 
French law in obligations de resultat, the burden of proving that the 
impossibility is not due to his fault rests upon the debtor.603
597. See BGB Paras. 276 etseq. and Para. 323.
598. Treitel, op. cit., at 36.
5" . See Horn, Kotz ans Leser, German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction, op. cit., at 93 
et seq.
600. Konard Zweigert, Aspects of German Law of Sale, Int'l. and Comp. L. Q. (Special publication, 
No. 9, symposium on some comparative aspects of the law relating to the sale of goods), 1964, at 6.
601. Loc. cit. See also Ernest J. Schuster, The Principle of German Civil Law, Oxford, 1907, at 168.
602. G. H. Treitel, op. cit., at 341-342; Aubrey, op. cit., at 1177; E. J. Cohn, (1968), op. cit., at 121; K. 
Zweigert and H. Kotz, op. cit., at 162 et seq.
603. BGB Para. 282. See also Ernest J. Schuster, op. cit., at 168; E. J. Cohn, (1968), op. cit., at 120; K. 
Zweigert and H. Kotz, op. cit., at 162.
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B. ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
While Civil law systems base contractual liability on fault, in Anglo- 
American law, generally, there is no place for fault in contractual liability. In the 
Common law contractual obligations have been traditionally thought to be 
absolute. Where the Civil law expresses the issue in terms of rules, the 
Common law resorts to the construction of the contract.604 While in French 
law, a contracting party is liable for fault, his English counterpart is usually 
liable for breach of an implied term to use due care.605 When a contract is not 
performed, a French court will ask the basic question: Is non-performance due 
to the obligor's fault? At Common law, the court will construe the contract and 
ask whether the contract can be performed; if not, the court will then ask 
whether there is a legal excuse for non-performance.606
Nonetheless, under both English607 and Scots608 laws, the frustrating 
event must arise without the fault of the party seeking relief (or the fault of 
those for whom he is responsible). It is a basic condition that the frustrating 
event must not arise from the act or election of the party. For example, if a 
foreign government enters into a contract of sale, then imposes prohibition, 
the government can not rely on the prohibition as a ground of excuse.609 A
604 E.g., in Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3 B. & S. 826, despite the parties' failure to insert an 
appropriate term in their contract, they were discharged from liability on the basis of presumed 
intention. While in French law, force majeure has nothing to do with intention and its rational is 
absence of fault.
605. B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract, op. cit., at 30, 31, 48, 49; Lawson, op. cit., at 359; G. H. 
Treitel, (1988), op. cit., at 346.
606. See Joseph Dainow, Essays on Civil Law of Obligations, Louisiana State University Press, 1969, 
at 152.
607. See Maritime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers [1935] A.C. 524 (Approved by H.L. in 
Joseph Constantin SS. Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 154.); Denmark 
Productions Ltd. v. Boscobel Productions Ltd. [1969] 1 Q.B. 699, at 725, 736, 737, [1968] 3 All E.R. 
513, at 523, 533, C.A.; Bank Line Ltd. v. Acapel and Co. [1919] A.C. 435, 452: "Reliance can not be 
placed on self-induced frustration." (per Lord Summer); Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht 
(The Eugenia) [1946] 2 Q.B. 226, 237; National Carriers Ltd. v.Panaplina (Northern) Ltd. [1981]
A.C. 675, 700; Metrens v. Home Freeholds Co. Ltd. [1921] 2 K.B. 526, at 535. See also Section 7 of 
the Sale of Goods Act.
608. See Duncan v. Arbroath (1668) Mor. 10075; founded on in Jacksons (Edinburgh) Ltd. v. 
Contractors John Brown Ltd., 1965 S.L.T. 37; James B. Fraser and Co. Ltd. v. Denny, Mott and 
Dickson Ltd. , 1944 S.C. (H.L.) 35, at 41; Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding ans Engineering 
Co., 1923, S.C. (H.L.) 105, at 111.
609. Prodexportv. E. D. andF. Man Ltd. [1973] 1 All E.R. 355. Cf. Rolimpex case, [1979] A.C. 351; 
[1978] 1 All E.R. 81 (In this case, Rolimpex was treated separately from the Polish government of 
Poland, therefore, was not prevented relying on the prohibition as a ground of frustration event.) (For 
detailed discussion of this case, see final chapter, pp. 338-341).
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party who intentionally induces illness in order to escape from an 
engagement, can not rely on the illness as a ground for frustration.610
The leading case on this point is Maritime National Fish Ltd. v. 
Ocean Trawlers.611 The appellants chartered a trawler from the respondents. 
The trawler was fitted with an otter trawl. Both parties knew at the time of 
contracting that it was illegal to use a trawl without a license from the Minister 
of Fisheries. The appellants were operating four otter trawlers besides the 
respondents' trawler. However, in reply to their application for five licences, 
they were informed that only three licenses would be granted and were 
required to choose three trawlers. The appellants named three trawlers other 
than the respondents. They later claimed that they were not bound by the 
charterparty as it had been frustrated by the Minister's refusal of a license. 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the charterparty was not 
frustrated, since the charterers were at fault, i.e., they had by their own 
election prevented the trawler in question from being used as an otter trawler.
This decision612 should, perhaps, have been distinguished from the 
later case of J. Lauritzen AS v. Wijsmuiler BV (The "Super Servant 
Two '1) .613 The defendants agreed to transport the plaintiffs drilling-rig from a 
Japanese shipyard to a location off Rotterdam, using, at their option, their 
Super Servant one (SS1) or Super Servant two (SS2) (both of which were 
adapted for this type of duty). The defendants also entered into contracts with 
other persons which required the use of SS1. They therefore allocated SS2 to 
the performance of the contract with plaintiffs. However, before the time of 
performance, SS2 sank. The plaintiffs were not able to carry out the contract 
by using SS1, because it had been allocated elsewhere and was unavailable. 
The defendants claimed frustration. The court rejected the claim, holding that 
the fact that the defendants had a choice as to the allocation of SS1 was 
sufficient to break the chain of causation and make this a case of self-induced 
frustration.
These two above mentioned cases emphasise the election of the defendants 
as proof of self-induced frustration. However, some important facts should be 
taken into account. In the Maritime National Fish case,614 two of the three
610. G.H. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, op. cit., at 35.
611. [1935] A.C. 524. (Approved by H.L. in Joseph Constantine SS. Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting 
Corp. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 154).
612. Maritime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers [1935] A.C. 524.
613. [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1.
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trawlers to which the licences were applied were owned by the defendants. 
Besides, before the conclusion of the contract the parties knew that only three 
licences would be granted. They had therefore a true option to decide which 
trawler should be allocated a licence. In J. Lauritzen AS v. Wijsmuller BV.;615 
on the other hand, at the time the SS2 sank, the defendants had no other 
option as to the allocation of SS1. If they had employed the remaining vessel 
for that specific contract, then the other users could have claimed breach of 
contract. It was simply not possible to allocate a ship to carry out all the 
concluded contracts. Accordingly, it is submitted that Maritime National Fish 
could have been distinguished and the court should have found the contract 
frustrated. This case shows how even modern courts are reluctant to use the 
doctrine of frustration except in exceptional cases, whereas the commercial 
world of today needs more flexibility in transactions, especially at international 
level. That is why this thesis emphasises that the parties to such contracts, 
instead of relying on general principles of domestic laws, should insert a force 
majeure clause or any other appropriate clauses in their contracts expressly to 
regulate the effects of contingencies arising.
It should be added that in English law, if a breach or an act of a party is 
one of the factors among others which causes the frustrating event, the 
application of the doctrine of frustration is precluded. The Eugenia616 provides 
an illustration. In this case, a charterer, who was in breach of a contractual 
clause forbidding him from bringing a ship into a war zone without the owner's 
consent, could not rely on the doctrine when the ship was trapped in the war 
zone: his breach of contract had caused the frustrating event.
The English law therefore differ from those French cases in which force 
majeure could be relied on even though the obligor was partially at fault.617
If an employee is imprisoned for a criminal offence, what will happen to 
his contract of employment? There are some cases which support the idea 
that the contract is frustrated.618 However, as Treitel rightly points out that this 
solution is contrary to the principle that frustration must not be self-induced;
614. [1935] A.C. 524.
615. [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1.
616. [1964] 2 Q.B. 226. See also Monarch SS. Co. v. A/B Karlshamns Oljefabriker [1949] A.C. 196; 
Cf The Sky [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 95, 98. (In this case, the position is different where the breach has 
no casual connection with the frustrating event).
However, the solution is the same where the frustration results from the breach of both parties. See 
Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 All E.R. 34.
617 Supra, at 130, note 587.
618. Hare v. Murphy Bros. [1974] I.C.R. 603; Harrington v. Kent C. C. [1980] I. R. L. R. 353.
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the better solution is that such an event does not frustrate the contract and 
gives the employer the right lawfully to terminate the contract.619
What kind of act or omission by the party seeking excuse will disentitle 
him to invoke frustration? There is no doubt that there is no frustration where 
the event has been brought about by a deliberate act.620 The problem is that it 
is not yet sufficiently clear what degree of fault will suffice.621 In particular, it is 
not clear whether negligence will constitute fault. The problem was discussed 
by the House of Lords in Joseph Constantine Steamship Line, Ltd. v. 
imperial Smelting Corporation, Ltd.622 In this case, there had been an 
explosion on board a vessel which had been chartered to carry a cargo from 
Australia to Europe (the cause of explosion was never ascertained). The 
explosion caused such extensive damage to the ship which prima facie 
frustrated the contract. The respondents alleged that the appellants had first 
to establish that the explosion occurred without their fault before they could 
rely on the doctrine of frustration and avoid liability for breach of contract. The 
House of Lords held that the sole question was one of burden of proof. Their 
unanimous decision was that the burden of proving that the event which 
causes frustration was due to the act or default of a party, lies on the party 
alleging it to be so. Since the respondents had failed to satisfy the court on 
this point, the contract was discharged.
In this case the House did not decide whether mere negligence of the party 
would suffice.623 However, there are dicta624 indicating that frustration may still 
be invoked where frustration is caused by negligence. Nevertheless, there 
exists contrary views which suggest that generally a negligent act will exclude 
the doctrine.625
619. Treitel, The Law of Contract, op. cit., at 682. See also Norris v. Southampton C. C. [1982] I. C. 
R. 177.
62°. See Maritime National Fishs v. Ocean Trawler [1935] A.C. 524. In Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 3
B. & S. 826, Lord Stemdale M.R. observed: "I do not think any authority has gone so far as to decide 
that if the defendant had burned down the music hall himself, he would have been entitled to say the 
subject matter was gone and the contract was frustrated.".
621. See Paal Wilson and Co. A/S v. Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 A.C. 854, at 909.
622 [1942] AC. 154; [1941] 2 All E.R. 165.
623. However, in a Scottish case a contract was held to be frustrated although the cause of frustration 
was due to the negligence of the party founding on it. (London and Edinburgh Shipping Co. v. The 
Admiralty, 1920, S.C. 309).
624. See Joseph Constantine Steamship Line, Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corporation, Ltd. [1942] A.C. 
154. See at p. 166 (Viscount Simon L.C.); at p. 179 (Lord Russel); at p. 195 (Lord Wright); at p. 205 
(Lord Porter).
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There is therefore no clear authority in English law on the scope of fault 
for this purpose of the doctrine of frustration.626 Because of the state of the 
authorities, McBryde takes the view that reference to the concept of fault is 
misleading. Instead, he emphasises the "beyond the control" test which he 
believes gives a more accurate picture of the circumstances in which 
frustration arises.627
"The frustrating event is something altogether outside the control of the 
parties - a war, a famine, a flood or some event of that sort - so that if the 
parties had thought to provide for it they would at once have agreed that on its 
happening the contract comes to an end."628
Fault differs from the "beyond the control" test. Fault in a wide sense
includes intentional and negligent acts, whereas the "beyond the control"
criterion is a standard applying irrespective of intention or negligence. For
example, if the performance of the contract is prevented by a strike of the
employees of one of the contracting party whether or not frustration could
operate might depend on whether the "fault" or the "beyond the control" test
was used. A strike may not be caused by the "fault" of anyone, but it could be
within the control of the employer to end the strike. However, the certainty of
the "beyond the control" test must not be overestimated. It is not always within
the control of employers to end strikes. However, the test is undoubtedly
useful. The present writer therefore suggests as one of the preconditions of
excusable non-performance is that the event must be "beyond the control and
not caused by the fault of the party seeking relief'.629
From a comparative point of view, we can conclude here that while the
French concept of force majeure excludes negligence, in English law it is not
authoritatively settled whether frustration is excluded by a party's negligent
act. In French law, the obligor who claims to be released must himself prove
force majeure, whereas in English law, the burden of proof does not rest on
party claiming frustration but the party who denies it.630 However, the English
625. See Treitel, op. cit., at 683; P. S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 3rd ed. oxford, 
Clarendon press, 1981, at 206; Christine Mogride, Frustration, Employment Contracts and Statutory 
Rights, New L. J. 1982, 795, at 796-797.
626 See Ewan McKendrick, Frustration and Force Majeure - Their Relationship and a Comparative 
Assessment (in Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, Edited By Mckendrick), op. cit., at 45; J. 
P. Swanton, The Concept of Self-induced Frustration, 2 Journal of Contract Law, 1990, 206, at 216- 
217.
627'. W. W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, Edinburgh, 1987, at 354.
628. Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Boscobel Productions Ltd. [1969] 1 Q.B. 699, at 736 (per Harman 
L. J.).
629. See Infra, pp. 319 et seq.
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rule is open to objection, for example, in the Joseph Constantine case, the 
charterer is much less likely than the owners to be able to prove how the 
explosion occurred.631
Under American common law632 and the Uniform Commercial Code, a 
party can not rely on the doctrine of excuse where the supervening event is 
caused by his own fault. Unlike sections 2-613 and 2-614 UCC which start 
with expressions of the requirement that neither party be at fault, the text of 
section 2-615 is totally silent on the fault issue. However, implicit in section 2- 
615(a),633 comment 5634 to the section, opinions of legal writers635 and explicit 
in the language of cases,636 it is now beyond challenge that fault is a basic 
element of section 2-615. The issue of fault is well illustrated in the leading 
case, Canadian industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co.637 The 
defendant, a middle man, agreed to sell to the plaintiff approximately 
1,500,000 gallons of molasses from certain refinery. Because the output of the 
refinery fell below its capacity, the defendant was only able to deliver just 
344,083 gallons. The plaintiff brought a suit for damages. The defendant 
pleaded the defence of impossibility as a result of the reduced production at 
the refinery. The court did not accept the defendant's defence, since he had 
not even bothered to obtain a contract from the refinery to meet his obligations
630. Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 154, 179, 
[1941] 2 All E.R. 165, H.L. (If for example a party of contract proves contingency which prima facie 
would frustrate contract the burden of proving that frustration was self-induced lies upon the other 
party).
631. See Treitel, op. cit., at 684.
632. Restatemet (First) of Contracts, Sec. 459; Restatement (Second) of Contrats, Sec. 261; Williston 
on Contracts, Sec. 1950; 6 A. Corbin, Contracts, Sec. 1329 (1962).
633. See James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 2d ed. 1980, at 128.
634 ''There is no excuse under this section, however, unless the seller has employed all due measures 
to assure himself that his source will not fail".
635. For example see, E. Allan Farnsworth, op. cit., at 678, note 8; Brian S. Conneely and Edmond P. 
Murphy, Section 2-615 of the UCC: Partial Solutions to the Problems of Excuse, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 
1976, 167, at 181; Comment (Henry Chajet), Contractual Excuse Based on a Failure of Presupposed 
Conditions, 14 Duq. L. Rev. 1976, 235, at 244; Fredric D. Tannenbaum, Commercial Impracticability 
Under the UCC: Natural Gas Distributors' Vihicle for Excusing Long-Term Requirements Contracts, 
20 Hous. L. Rev. 1983, 771, at 796; George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: 
Judicial Frustration of the UCC Attempt to Leberalize the law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 
Notre Dame Lawyer, 1979, 293.
636. For example see Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp. 467 F.Supp. 129 (N.D.Iowa, 
1978) (In this case, the court stated: "There is no doubt that many of those costs were not foreseen or 
considered likely to occur or to be substantial. But Atlas has failed to bear its burden on the counter 
claim to prove whcih and how much of the increases were reasonably unforeseen and not, in part, a 
function of its own actions.", op. cit., at 132-133).
637 2 5 8 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932).
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to the plaintiff. Indeed, the defendant was guilty of contributory fault in failing 
to do so.
It should be noted that fault can take many forms. In Jennie-o 
Foods,638 the fault consisted in a supplier's failure to seek alternative sources 
of supply. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission,639 the fault 
involved Gulfs overestimate of natural gas reserves that were in a natural gas 
field.
In American law, like German and French laws, but contrary to English 
law where the issue is not settled, fault includes negligence and is not 
restricted to wilful misconduct.640 Contributory fault includes any type of action 
or inaction or voluntary acts or omissions which disable the seller from 
performing the contract.641 Thus, a court will not discharge a seller who is 
unable to deliver the goods because they have been destroyed due to his 
negligence.642 This principle also prevents the promisor from relying on the 
doctrine of excuse where he has wilfully disabled himself in order not to 
render personal services that he has promised.643 It should also be added that 
the wilful commission of a crime by the obligor which leads to his 
imprisonment will prevent him relying on doctrine of excuse in a contract 
requiring him to render personal services.644 Contributory fault can take other 
forms. For example, in Washington Manufacturing Co. v. Midland Lumber 
Co.,645 the defendant who had failed to supply a specified quantity of lumber, 
claimed excuse of performance. The court said that the seller had failed to
638. Jennie-o Foods Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 400 (Ct.Cl. 1978).
639. 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Nealcooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974); City o f Albertville, 
Ala. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 272 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1960); Chemerton Corp. v. 
McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F.Supp. 245 (N.D.I11. 1974); Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map. Constr. Corp., 
3 Md.App. 679, 368 A.2d 1088 (1977).
640. The Restatement (Second) has a broad definition of fault to include not only wilful wrong but 
such other types of conduct as that amounting to breach of contract or to negligence (See Sec. 261, 
Comment d); UCC, Sec. 2-613 and comment 1 ("Fault is intended to include negligence and not only 
merely wilful wrong").
641. Comment, (by Henry Chajet), op. cit., at 244. See also United Societies Committee v. Madison 
Square Gardens Corp. 59 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1946); McNally v. Moser 122 A.2d 555 (1956).
642. Farnsworth, op. cit., at 684. See also Blount-Midyette and Co. v. Aeroglide Corp. 254 N.C. 484, 
119 S.E.2d 225 (1961).
643. Farnsworth, op. cit.', Restatement (First) of Contracts, Sec. 495; Williston on Contracts, op. cit., 
Sec. 1959.
644 Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, a Comparative Account, op. cit., at 35.
645. 113 Wash. 593, 194 P. I l l  (1921).
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employ "diligence and good faith in endeavouring to obtain . . .  a release . . . 
from the lumber embargo".646 This could have been done by simply applying 
for a release. The seller's inaction i.e., his failure to act in a commercially 
reasonable manner by applying for release amounted to contributory fault of 
the part of the seller which prevented him from relying on doctrine of excuse. 
That is why comment 5 emphasises that a seller must apply "all due 
measures to assure himself that his source will not fail."
An important point must be added. Under American law - like French 
law and German law - the burden of proof rests on the party relying on the 
doctrine of excuse. Thus, in Iowa Blount-Midyette and Co. v. Aeroglide 
Corp.,647 a contractor who had exclusive control of grain elevator which he 
was repairing, had the burden of showing that the fire was not his fault before 
he could rely on the doctrine. In another case,648 the Supreme Court held that: 
". . . It was incumbent upon the defendant (seller) to prove the damage 
occurred without his fault if he wished to have the benefit of the damage 
limitation provision in section 2-613 of UCC."649
646 Loc. cit., at 596, 194 P. at 778.
647. 254 N.C. 484, 119 S.E.2d 22d (1961). See also Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp. 
464 F.Supp. 129 (N.D.Iowa 1978).
648. Carlson v. Nelson, 285 N.W.2d 505 (Neb. 1979).
649. Loc. cit., at 510.
PART TWO ■ THE EFFECTS OF EXCUSABLE NON­
PERFORMANCE
It remains to be seen what are the consequences for the parties when 
the performance of contract has been excused. What are the parties' 
positions, their rights, their duties, and in particular what is the solution when 
the contract has only been temporarily or partially frustrated i.e. when there 
has been part performance. Courts faced with an excuse claim, may respond 
in variety of ways to these problems. The court could inter alia:
(a) Enforce the contract through an order of specific performance or award 
full contractual damages;
(b) Discharge the party seeking relief and award no damages;
(c) Grant relief coupled with restitution or adjustment of parties' relations;
(d) Suspend the performance of the contract;
(e) Try to induce a settlement by encouraging the parties to re-negotiate the 
terms of their own agreement;
(f) Reformulate the contract to allow performance to continue in a modified 
manner.
Traditionally, the courts of different legal systems under discussion usually 
solve the problem in one of two ways viz., enforce the original contract or 
discharge the burdened party. The reasoning behind this all-or-nothing 
approach is that since there is no fault on either side, the loss must lie where 
it falls.
Once a contract is discharged by reason of frustration, an important question 
is the extent to which the court is empowered to adjust the parties' relations. 
In this respect, other questions need to be answered. The problem is how the 
courts should deal with the losses suffered by the parties. There are basically 
four kinds of losses which need to be considered. First, expectation interests, 
which include loss of profit claims; second, reliance interest, or direct and 
indirect expenditures incurred in performance of the contract; third, the value 
of the subject matter of the contract which has been destroyed; and fourth, 
advance payments.
The last approach, reformation of the contract by court, has enjoyed 
little judicial acceptance. In this respect, the following questions should be 
answered: -
(a) What would be the likely effect of judicial power to rewrite contract terms 
upon the reliability and utility of the law of contract?
(b) When and how can a judge reconcile the divergent interests of the parties 
and devise terms to govern their future relations?
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(c) Why is a judge in a better position to revise the contract than the parties 
themselves?
(c) From what source does a judge derive the power to rewrite a new 
contract?
These problems are, of course, answered in different ways in different legal 
systems. In order to study and analyse the issues in detail, the Common law 
and Civil law approaches will be analysed, compared and criticised. In 
addition, a clear distinction will be drawn between "total" and "partial" 
frustration, since they appear to be governed by two completely different sets 
of rules.
CHAPTER FOUR 
EFFECTS OF TOTAL EXCUSABLE NON-PERFORMANCE 
A. COMMON LAW 
1. ENGLAND
In English and Scots law, the effects of frustration are as follows:1
1. Frustration terminates the contract from the date of the frustrating event; 
thus, performance of a frustrated contract is excused as to the future. In 
other words, the contract is not rendered void ab initio, but is avoided de 
futuro from the date when frustration occurs.
2. Frustration is automatic irrespective of the parties' choice, election or 
wishes. A frustrating event does not require notice of cancellation to 
terminate the contract.
The principle in English law that frustration is automatic has raised 
problems with respect to arbitration clauses. In Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue,2 
the Privy Council held that as frustration terminated the contract, the 
arbitration clause could not be invoked to resolve the parties' differences. 
This decision is not acceptable. The effect of frustration is merely to excuse 
performance of the contract in the future,3 and therefore an arbitration clause 
remains valid to determine disputes between the parties. Secondly, such a 
result negates the very purpose of arbitration which is to avoid judicial
1. The Joseph Constantine case [ 1942 ] A.C. 154 at 187; Fibrosa case, [1943] A.C. 32 at 50, 70; 
Fraser and Co. Ltd. v. Denny, Mott and Dickson Ltd, 1944 S.C. (H.L.) 35 at p. 41; Hirji Mulji v. 
Cheong Yue SS Co. Ltd. [1926] A.C. 497; Denny, Mott and Dickson v. James B. Fraser [1944] A.C. 
265; National carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. [1981] A.C. 675, 712; Heyman v. Darwins 
Ltd. [1942] A.C. 356, at 365, [1942] 1A11 E.R. 337 at 343, H.L., obiter per Viscount Simon L.C.; 
Blakely v. Muller and Co. [1903] 2 K.B. 760n; Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 K.B. 493, C.A.
2. Supra note 1.
3. See also Heyman v. Darwins [1942]A.C. 365 at p. 400 per Lord Porter.
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proceeding. That is probably why, it is now accepted that an arbitration 
clause may remain in force to solve matters up to the date of frustration or 
the issues arising from effects of frustration.4
The "automatic frustration" rule can be the source of other problems. 
For example, it does not work for temporary frustration. Indeed, if the 
contingency is only temporary - for example, in the case of a servant who 
falls ill - it may excuse delay but may not relieve the party's performance in 
the future.5 Moreover, it is often a difficult question to decide whether a 
transaction has been frustrated by a contingency which causes delay in 
performing the contract. In Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. B. T. P. Tioxide Ltd. 
(The Nema),6 Lord Roskill said:
"it is often necessary to wait upon events in order to see whether the delay 
already suffered and the prospects of further delay from that cause, will make 
any ultimate performance of the relevant contractual obligations radically 
different . . . from that which was undertaken by the contract. But, as has 
often been said, businessmen must not be required to await events too long. 
They are entitled to know where they stand. Whether or not the delay is such 
as to bring about frustration must be a question to be determined by an 
informed judgment based upon all the evidence of what has occurred and 
what is likely thereafter to occur. . . ".7
Therefore does "automatic frustration" apply in cases of frustrating 
delay? Another problem which arises is that it prevents the parties from 
solving their problems through negotiation and arbitration. That is also 
illustrated by Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue SS Co.,8 where, as we have seen, 
the Privy Council wrongly held that since the contract was frustrated, the 
arbitration clause had come to an end.
1.1. EFFECTS OF FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT PRIOR TO 
THE 1943 ACT
4 Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. [1942] A. c. 356, [1942] 1A11 E. R. 337,H.L.; Kruse v. Questier and Co. 
Ltd. [1953] IQ. B. 669, [1953] 1A11 E.R. 954; Government of Gilbraltar v. Kenney [1956] 2Q.B. 
410; Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. B. T. P. Tioxide Ltd. [1983] A. C. 724 at 742-44, 752-54; Scott and 
Sons Ltd. v. Del Sel, 1923 S. C.(H.L.) 37.
5. See e. g., Marshal v. Harland and Wolf Ltd. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 899 (Contract for employment). 
Thus temporary illness on the part of an employer will not necessarily discharge a contract of 
employment although it temporarily excuses the employee's nonperformance. See Storey v. Fulham 
Steelworks co. (1907) 24 T.L.R. 89, C.A.
6. [1982] A.C. 724, 752.
7. See also Anglo-Northern Trading Ltd., v. Jones [1917] 2 K. B. 78,85; Denny Mott and Dickson v. 
Fraser [1944] A.C. 265, 278. One must wait a reasonable time to see likely results: The Wenjiang 
(N0.2) [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 400.
8. Supra note 1.
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In English law, the consequence of frustration was that the "loss lay 
where it fell". The leading case was Chandler v. Webster,9 in which it was 
held that the plaintiff not only was not entitled to recover down payments 
made before frustration, but also was still bound to pay an additional sum 
which he had contracted to pay before the frustrating event occurred. The 
result would have been less harsh had the rule of Paradine v. Jane10 been 
applied. The plaintiff would at least have been entitled to the value of the 
defendant's performance, whatever that might have been construed to be. 
This rule seems to have been a unique development of English law. It does 
not appear in the Civil law.11 Scots law rejected the rule which was only 
considered workable "among tricksters, gamblers and thieves".12 Accordingly, 
down payment under Scots law was recoverable on the basis of condictio 
causa data causa non secuta.13 The rule in Chandler case14 has been 
generally rejected in the United States,15 although the approach has been 
reflected in a few scattered decisions.16
The harshness and hardship caused by this principle was recognised 
by the House of Lords in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyina v. Fairbairn Lawson 
Combe Barbour Ltd.17 In this case, the House overruled Chandler18 and 
allowed a buyer to recover a pre-payment from his seller on the basis of a 
total failure of consideration. The Fibrosa case was the first step towards 
developing adjustment rules but the solution remained open to criticism. 
Because money could only be recovered where the failure of consideration 
was total. This was considered to be an imperfect solution in that there could 
be no recovery if the consideration had only partially failed. Moreover, only 
money could be recovered. Some of the Law' Lords recognised the
9. [1904] 1 K.B. 493; See also Appleby v. Myers [1926] A.C. 497 at p. 505.
10. (1646) aleyn 26; 82 Eng. Rep. 898 (K.B. 1647).
n . The Roman Antecedents of the Civil law were thoroughly discussed in the Cantiere case, below.
12. Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd. [1924] A.C. 226 at p. 259.
13. Watson v. Shankland (1872) 10 M. 142; (1873) 11M. (H.L.) 51; Davis and Primose v. Clyde 
Shipping Co., 1917, 1 S.L.T. 297. Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipping Co., 1923 S. C. (H.L.) 105.
1 4  [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
15. See 6  Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1972 (1938); Restatement (First) of Contracts, Sec. 468.
1 6  See, e. g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Howard, (Mo.App. 1919) 211 S.W. 720; Cowley v. N.P.R. Co., 
6 8  Wash. 558, 123 P. 998 (1912); Seigel, Cooper and Co. v. Eaton & Prince Co., 165 ill. 550, 40 
N.E. 449 (1897), dictum.
17. [1943] A.C. 32.
18. [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
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harshness of the rule.19 They indicated that legislation was appropriate to 
make provisions for apportioning loss.20
In response, Parliament acted swiftly by passing the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.21 The Act made important changes in the 
common law relating to the consequences of frustration. It extended the 
scope of the Fibrosa case22 by covering the situation where a seller had 
made partial performance before frustration. In such a case, the Act provides 
that the seller has a quasi-contractual remedy for the value of the partial 
performance. If one party has conferred a benefit on another party before 
frustration, the Act permits recovery of the value of the benefit. Another effect 
of the Act is that it permits the courts, "having regard to all of the 
circumstances of the case", to make a limited equitable apportionment of 
losses following frustration. It has been claimed that the philosophy behind 
the Act, particularly sections 1(2) and (3), is to prevent unjust enrichment of 
either party to the contract at the other's expense.23 While it has been said 
that this is simply a statutory formulation of a basic principle of the English 
law of restitution,24 commentators have suggested that the Act is designed to 
provide more flexible machinery for the adjustment of loss than at common 
law.25 Moreover, in the Court of Appeal, Lawton L.J. has stated that the Court 
obtained "no help from the use of words which are not in the Statute".26 
Accordingly there is a fundamental problem in that the purpose of the 1943 
Act is not readily apparent.
1.2. SECTION 1(1) OF THE 1943 ACT
Section 1(1) provides:
"Where a contract is governed by English law has become impossible of 
performance or been otherwise frustrated, and the parties thereto have for 
that reason been discharged from the further performance of the contract,
19. Fibrosa SpolkaAkcyina v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. [1943] 32, at 49.
20 Loc. cit. at 49-50 (Viscount Simon), 54 (Lord Atkin), 63,72 (Lord Wright), 78 (Lord Porter).
21. 6  & 7 Geo. 6 , C. 40.
2 2  [1943] A.C. 32.
23. British Petroleum Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt (No. 2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 799, (by 
Robert Goff J).
24 Ibid.
25. See A. M. Hay Croft & D. M. Waksman, "Restitution & Frustration, J. Bus. L. (1984), 207, 225.
26. [1982] 1 All E.R. 925, 983. In Orakpo v. Manson Investments [1978] A.C. 95, at p. 104c. Lord 
Diplok stated that there is "no general doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in English law".
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the following provisions of this section shall subject to the provisions of 
section two of this Act, have effect in relation thereto."
The section sets out the circumstances under which the Act applies, 
namely, where the contract is governed by English law. The Act is therefore 
dealing with a provision relating to the conflicts of law. Moreover, the Act 
does not specify what principles will be applied by English courts to a 
contract the proper law of which is not English, for example French law.27 The 
American Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,28 states that the law to be 
applied in the situation dealt with by the 1943 Act is the law of place where 
the benefit is conferred, or where the enrichment takes place. This is the rule 
which is preferred by conflicts lawyers.29
The Act does not define frustration. However, it is generally accepted 
that it applies to supervening illegality.30 It is clear, however, that the Act does 
not apply to initial impossibility or where the contract is discharged by breach. 
Furthermore, the Act does not specify when a contract is frustrated. 
Nevertheless, the common law gives the answer. Generally, a contract is 
frustrated at the time of frustrating event., since the operation of frustration 
does not depend on a party's act or election.31 However, where the essence 
of the contract is the occurrence of a future event, such as Edward VII's 
Coronation, and this occasion is cancelled, frustration occurs on the 
announcement of the cancellation.32
An important question to be asked is whether the Act applies to a 
contract which includes a force majeure clause? This will depend on how the 
force majeure clause is drafted. If the clause specifies the consequences of 
the force majeure, the Act will not be applicable. But if the clause is silent, the 
Act will be operative.33
Of course, it should be emphasised that it is the present writer's thesis 
that - given the deficiencies of domestic laws on frustration - parties to
2 7  Glanville L. Williams, "The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943", London, 1944, 
Stevens & Sons, p. 19.
2 8  Sects. 452, 453.
29. Gutteridge & Lipstein, 7 Camb. L. J. 80.
30  McNair, (1944), 60 L. Q. Rev. 160, 162,163; Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed., at 
486.
31. See also Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp. Ltd. [1942] A. C. 154, at 
163, [1941] 2 All E. R. 165, at 171, H.L. (per Viscount Simon LC.).
3 2  See Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K. B. 740, C. A.
33. See section 2(3) of the 1943 Act. See also infra, pp. 160, 161.
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transnational commercial transactions should draft comprehensive force 
majeure clauses.
1.3. SECTION 1(2) OF THE 1943 ACT (RECOVERY OF MONEY)
Section 1 (2) provides:
"All sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the contract before the 
time when the parties were so discharged (in this Act referred to as 'the time 
of discharge') shall, in the case of sums so paid, be recoverable from him as 
money received by him for the use of the party by whom the sums were paid, 
and, in the case of sums so payable, cease to be payable:
Provided that, if the party to whom the sums were so paid or payable 
incurred expenses before the time of discharge in, or for the purpose of, the 
performance of the contract, the court may, if it considers it just to do so 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, allow him to retain or, as 
the case may be, recover the whole or any part of the sums so paid or 
payable, not being an amount in excess of the expenses so incurred."
The above section has two main elements. The first is that there is no 
requirement of a total failure of consideration. It means that sums paid are 
recoverable in cases of partial failure of consideration. Thus it reverses the 
decision in Whincup v. Hughes34 where it was held that no part of premium 
paid for an apprenticeship could be recovered when the master (watch 
maker) died during the currency of the apprenticeship. The second element 
of the section is the proviso which allows the recipient of the advance 
payment to set off against it such expenses incurred for the purpose of 
performance before the frustration, as the court thinks just.35 However, 
court's discretion to decide whether to allow any retention or deduction of an 
advance payment is limited to expenses before the time of frustration. 
Moreover, the payee can not recover more than the value of the prepayment.
This section, especially the proviso, gives rise to some problems of 
interpretation. The lack of case law also aggravates the issue. The effect of 
the section may result in the payer being able to withdraw from an 
unprofitable transaction, since the down payment is recoverable, regardless 
of the consideration which would have been received if the transaction had 
been performed.36
A further point is that the section does not provide for recovery of 
payments made after the time of frustration;37 for example, if it has been paid
34. (1871) L. R. 6  C. P. 78.
35. B. P. Exploration Co. Ltd v. Hunt [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, at p. 800.
36. Loc. cit.
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in ignorance of the facts which frustrated the contract, or in ignorance that 
known facts have operated to frustrate the contract.
Another criticism is that expenses38 which can be offset are restricted 
to those expenses which have been incurred "in, or for the purpose of, the 
performance of the contract." Accordingly, expenses incurred in reliance on 
the contract but not for the performance of the contract - such as pre 
contractual expenditure or incidental reliance - may not be taken into 
account.39 Moreover, the Act does not even protect a seller who incurs 
performance expenditure unless he has demanded a down payment from the 
buyer.
No provision is made in the section for an increase in the sum 
recoverable by the plaintiff, or the amount of expenses to be allowed to the 
defendant, to take into account the time value of money.40 This means that 
although money - or expenses incurred - has been paid a long time before 
the date of discharge, nevertheless, the sum recoverable can be no greater 
than the sum actually paid even though the defendant may have had the use 
and profit from the money during that period. However, under the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 section 3(1), the court has 
power to award interest on the principal sums from the date of the accrual of 
the cause of action.41
The most important deficiency of the section is that it does not make 
clear the basis under which the court is to calculate the amount of 
expenditure which a payee is entitled to retain for his expenses. There is as 
yet no authority on the assessment of the amount. The question is how much 
is the payee entitled to retain? Does it mean that the payee is entitled to
retain all of it? Half of it, some other portion of it, or none of it? The view of
the English Law Revision Committee42 that the payee should be able to retain 
the complete amount of expenses was approved by Robert Goff J. in B.P. v.
37. While both the New South Wales Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 Sec. 5(4) and the South Australia 
Frustrated Contracts Act 1988, Sec. 7(6) bring the issue within the control of the Act post-frustration 
performance.
3 8  According to the Act, expenses include a reasonable sum for overhead expenses and for work or 
services personally performed (Sec. 4).
3 9  "Emphasis on performance appears to eliminate from consideration such incidental reliance 
expenses unless they are subsumed by the 'all circumstances' terminology." Philip D. Weiss, 
Apportioning Loss after Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 Yale L.J. 
1960, 1055, at 1073.
40 B. P. Exploration v. Hunt [1981] 1 W L.R. 232, 244, C.A.
41. Goff & Jones, "The Law of Restitution", 3rd ed. London, 1986, at p. 489.
4 2  Seventh Interim Report (1939), Cmnd, 6009.
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Hunt (No. 2)43 which he justified on the basis of change of position; regarding 
the proviso as a statutory recognition of the doctrine.
In respect of prepayments, the English Law Revision Committee came 
to the conclusion that "it is reasonable to assume that in stipulating for 
prepayment the payee intended to protect himself against loss under the 
contract."44
This assumption can be criticised. If the purpose of the down payment 
is to compensate the payee for bearing the risk, then clearly he is entitled to 
keep the down payment - it is an insurance premium. But this is not always 
the case and the down payment may be completely unrelated to that 
purpose. In other words, it is actually difficult to understand why the fact that 
there is an advance payment should not have purposes apart from 
insurance. The purpose of the down payment may be to finance the 
purchase of supplies by the contractor or to improve the payee's financial 
situation in order to begin the job or to protect him against the risk of the 
payer's breach or insolvency or even against loss of profit. There are 
therefore a number of plausible reasons for down payments that are 
unrelated to the provision of insurance in the event of an occurrence which 
may prevent the completion of performance of the contract. The treatment of 
the proviso as a statutory recognition of the defence of change of position is 
also difficult to accept, since the English common law has not yet recognised 
the existence of such defence.45
Glanville Williams has argued that natural justice decrees that the 
distribution of loss should be equal.46 This approach has been adopted by the 
British Columbia Frustrated Contracts Act 1974, section 5(3) and New South 
Wales Frustrated Contracts Act 1978, section 12(2). The problem of this 
approach is that the equal division of loss is not always appropriate47 and it 
ignores the court's discretion in exercising its power to apportion the down 
payment which the payee can retain.
It has been supported by McKendrick that the onus of proof with 
regard to the proviso rests on the defendant.48 He argues that if the payee
43. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, at p. 800 (f).
4 4  Seventh Interim Report (1939), Cmnd, 6009.
45. See for e. g., Barclays Bank v. Simms [1980] Q. B. 677. See also A. M. Haycroft and D. M. 
Waksman, Frustration and Restitution, J. Bus. L.1984, 207, at 215.
4 6  Glanville L. Williams, The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, London, 1944, at 35,
36.
4 7  See New South Wales Act, Sec. 15.
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fails to discharge the onus, for example, where his expenditure resulted in a 
product which could be used in the performance of another contract49 then 
any loss lies on him. Where he satisfies the onus, he should be entitled to 
recover any loss incurred for the performance of the contract. The 
shortcoming of this view is, however, that it merely shifts the loss from one 
party to the other, and ignores the court's discretion.
Because of these difficulties of interpretation it is contended by the 
present writer that at the end of the day, it will be left to the court's sense of 
justice whether to order a retention or payment of expenses or split the loss 
and to quantify the amount involved. A party who has made or agreed to 
make prepayments may only recover or retain such sums as the court 
considers just in the light of the expenses incurred by the other party and all 
the circumstances of the case. In exercising this discretion, the courts will be 
influenced by the degree to which the expenses have no practical use or 
advantage as a result of the frustrating event. For example, if machinery 
made for a buyer can easily be sold to another, in that case the loss lies on 
payee. It should not be forgotten that the word "just" in the proviso should 
play an important role when the courts exercise their discretion. The courts 
have the responsibility to achieve justice between the parties leading to a "no 
winner" and "no loser" situation, i.e., to act ex aequo et bono. Suppose that 
one party has received 2000 pounds as a prepayment and has incurred 
expenses of exactly that amount. Both parties are faultless and equally 
relieved of performance of their contractual rights and duties. Here it seems 
most equitable that the court in exercising of its power under section 1(2) 
should divide the loss equally between them instead of merely shifting it from 
one party to the other. However, there can be situations where equal division 
of loss will not be equitable and just. For example, where the party incurs 
unusually high incidental reliance losses,50 to make the other party share the 
loss will not be just, as it may force him to spend more than he would have 
spent if the contract had not been discharged.
In other jurisdictions like New South Wales legislation, provides for 
equal division of loss.51 Nevertheless, even here the legislation recognises
48. See Ewan McKendrick, "Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract", Lloyd's of London Press 
Ltd. 1991, at p. 61.
49. In this regard see Davis and Pimose Ltd. v. Clyde Shipping and Engineering Co. Ltd. 1917, 1 
S.L.T. 297.
5 0  If incidental reliance expense is regarded as an expense made "in, or for the purpose of, the 
performance."
51. Act 1978, Sec. 12 (2)(b)(ii).
j
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that equal division is not always necessarily appropriate in all 
circumstances.52
It should always be remembered that the 1943 Act does not give the 
court carte blanche to make whatever adjustment seems just and equitable. 
The court's discretion is limited to expenses incurred before the date of 
frustration and to the value of prepayment.
1.4. SECTION 1(3) OF THE 1943 ACT (PAYMENT FOR 
VALUABLE BENEFIT OBTAINED)
Section 1 (3) provides that:
"Where any party to the contract has, by reason of anything done by any 
other party thereto in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, 
obtained a valuable benefit (other than a payment of money to which the last 
foregoing subsection applies) before the time of discharge, there shall be 
recoverable from him by the said other party such sum (if any), not 
exceeding the value of the said benefit to the party obtaining it, as the court 
considers just, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and, in 
particular-
(a) the amount of any expenses incurred before the time of discharge by the 
benefited party in, or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract, 
including any sums paid or payable by him to any other party in pursuance of 
the contract and retained or recoverable by that party under the last 
foregoing subsection, and
(b) the effect, in relation to the said benefit, of the circumstances giving rise 
to the frustration of the contract."
As discussed above, a party who has incurred expenses can not 
recover under section 1(2) if no down payment was paid or was payable prior 
to the time of frustration. However, a claim may be made under section 1 (3) 
against a party who has obtained a valuable benefit at the cost of the other 
party. Section 1(2) is restricted to payments of money, but section 1(3) is not 
so restricted. Accordingly, section 1(3) extends to all cases where a party by 
partial performance of the contract has conferred a valuable benefit on the 
other party. Thus section 1 (3) reverses the common law principle laid down 
in Cutter v. Powell,53 that nothing could be recovered under the doctrine of 
quantum meruit for services performed.
That said, section 1(3) is the most complicated and troublesome 
section in the Act. According to Robert Goff J., it must be applied in two 
distinct stages.54 First, the benefit should be identified and valued. Secondly,
5 2  Loc. cit., Sec. (15).
53. (1795) 6  Term Report, 320.
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the court has to consider the award of a just sum which is no greater than the 
value of the benefit. The section was applied in B.P. (Exploration) Libya 
Ltd. v. Hunt.55 This case is the first authoritative interpretation of the Act. The 
case arose from an agreement between British Petroleum (B.P.) and Mr. 
Hunt. In 1957, the Libyan government granted Mr. Hunt an oil concession. As 
he did not have the experience and equipment to explore and develop the 
concession himself, in 1960 he entered into a joint venture with B.P., a "farm 
in" agreement which was governed by English law. Under the agreement, 
B.P. agreed to finance its development in return for a 50 per cent interest in 
the concession plus three eighths of Hunt's share (called the "reimbursement 
oil") until B.P. had recovered an agreed sum (calculated by reference to 
B.P.'s expenditures). A large oil field was discovered and oil began to follow 
from it in 1967. In 1971 the contract between B.P. and Mr. Hunt was 
frustrated when the Libyan government expropriated B.P.'s interest (i.e., half­
share of the concession). At the time of the expropriation of the B.P.'s 
interest in December 1971, B.P. had received some but not all of the 
reimbursement oil to which they were entitled. Mr. Hunt's half-share or 
interest was also expropriated in 1973. However, Mr. Hunt had obtained 74 
million barrels of oil from this concession during that period. Both B.P. and 
Mr. Hunt received some compensation from the Libyan government. But 
since B.P. had not been completely reimbursed for its endeavours on behalf 
of Mr. Hunt, they alleged that the "farm in" agreement was frustrated and that 
they were entitled to a just sum under section 1 (3) of the Act. This claim was 
allowed by Robert Goff J. and affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords subject to relatively minor modification.56
1.4.1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT’S BENEFIT
The problem is that the Act does not define "benefit"; it can therefore 
be defined narrowly or broadly, depending on the view of the court. It is not 
clear whether the word means "actual" or "constructive" benefit. For example, 
if as in Appleby v. Myers,51 the work is completely destroyed before any real 
benefit is conferred; can there be a claim for partial performance of contract 
under section 1 (3)7 There are at least two possibilities:
54. B. P. v. Hunt [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 810 (This approach appears to have been impliedly accepted 
by the Court of Appeal [1981] 1 W.L.R. 232, 237).
55. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783; affirmed [ 1981] 1 W.L.R. 236, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 235.
56 [1981] 1 W. L. R. 236, 240; [1982] 2 W. L. R. 253, 258.
57. (1867), L.R. 2 C.P. 651.
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(a) The benefit is identified as the services themselves rendered by the 
plaintiff.
(b) The benefit is regarded as the end product of the services.
Glanville Williams believes that the words "valuable benefit" should be 
interpreted so as to include any performance received by the other party, 
whether or not he derives any sensible advantage from it.58 
However, in B.P. v. Hunt, Robert Goff J. held that "benefit" within the 
meaning of section 1(3) should be identified, not as the performance 
rendered by the party, but as the end product of the services.59 This definition 
of benefit can not be comprehensive. There are some cases when the 
services are not intended to have an end product, for example, transportation 
of goods. Moreover, an end product may have no objective value, for 
example, decorating a room - which is already in good decorative order - to 
appeal to the defendant's own execrable taste. The benefit of prospecting for 
minerals is not the discovery of the mineral but the knowledge of whether or 
not the mineral exists and the consequent enhancement of the value of the 
land.60 In the above examples, the benefit is presumably valued by reference 
to the value of the services performed by the plaintiff. That is why the learned 
judge did not fully rule out the possibility of the services themselves 
constituting a benefit.61 Robert Goff J. gave two reasons for his interpretation 
- viz., that "benefit" means the end product of services. First, section 1(3) 
distinguishes between the plaintiffs performance and the defendant's benefit. 
Secondly, paragraph (b) of section 1 (3) clearly relates to the product of the 
plaintiffs performance,62 since it requires the court to have regard to the 
effect on the benefit of the circumstances giving rise to frustration. According 
to the learned judge's interpretation, the result in Appleby v. Myers63 would 
be unaffected by section 1(3). This means that in the case where the end 
product of the services is destroyed by the frustrating event, the provider of 
the services can not recover under the Act, since there is no benefit to be 
valued. In other words, although it might be thought just to award a sum
58  Loc. cit. at pp. 48-51. Contrast Parsons Bros. Ltd. v. Shea (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 8 6  (Stove 
partially installed at height summer: actual benefit required).
59 [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 802.
60. See Francis Rose, Restitution after Frustration, New Law Journal, 1981, 955, at 956.
61. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 803.
62. Loc. cit. at 801 F.
63. (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651.
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assessed on a quantum meruit basis, the effect of section 1 (3)(b) - according 
to Robert Goff J.'s interpretation - will be to reduce the award to nil.
However, it should be noted that, Robert Goff J. was concerned that 
the Act had failed to provide that the labour itself might be considered to be a 
benefit.64 Although his interpretation may be correct, the section could be 
interpreted as being applicable where a valuable benefit was obtained before 
the time of frustration even although it no longer existed after the frustrating 
event. If this were so, the court would have to look at the facts as they were
before frustration occurred and not after. This view is supported by the
structure of the section. The section is introduced by the words "such sum as 
the court thinks just having regard to all the circumstances of the case and in 
particular (a) . . . (b) the effect, in relation to the said benefit, of the 
circumstances giving rise to the frustration of the contract". When a valuable 
benefit has been obtained, the court has power to make an award and
section 1(3)(b) is the guideline for the exercise of the court's power or
discretion to award a just sum.65 Moreover, the phrase "the value . . .  to the 
party obtaining it" indicates the time when the services were performed, not 
when they are received. In addition, the verb "has...obtained" a benefit can 
be used to indicate a performance which has been done in the past, i.e., 
before the frustrating event. Accordingly, the Act appears to provide that 
attention should be focused on the performance rather than the receipt of 
performance.
These two different interpretations are sustainable. However, it is the 
present writer's view that the performance of services should be valued even 
if there is no end-product. This interpretation - contrary to Robert Goff J.'s 
construction which creates an undesirable result - gives rise to equity, 
fairness and justice, because the court, in making an award, will be able to 
take into account the benefit which has been destroyed and, if appropriate, to 
split the loss in such proportions as it thinks just. The British Columbia 
Frustrated Contracts Act 1974, for example, provides that a benefit is 
"something done in the fulfilment of contractual obligations whether or not the 
person for whose benefit it was done received the benefit";66 and such loss 
can be split equally.67 If interpreted in this way, section1(3) of the 1943 Act
6 4  B. P. v. Hunt [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 802 E, F, 803 D.
65. See Treitel, (1983), op. cit. at p. 689.
6 6  Sec. 5(4).
67. Sec. 5(3). A similar provision is to be found in New South Wales Frustrated Contracts Act 1978, 
Sec. 12(2)(b)(ii).
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gives the court more flexible discretion. Even so, if a judge comes to the 
conclusion that no benefit had been obtained before frustration, he has no 
discretion to award anything. For example, if a person orders goods from a 
manufacturer and does not receive any benefits, the manufacturer can not 
claim under the section that he has bought raw materials and started to 
produce the goods.68
1.4.2. VALUATION OF THE BENEFIT
After identification of the benefit, the next step, according to Robert 
Goff J. is that the court must assess the value of the benefit to the defendant. 
This assessment fixes the maximum amount the plaintiff can recover. Since 
the benefit may be identified as the end product of the service, again some 
problems will be encountered.
At first, as Robert Goff J. recognised: "a small service may confer an 
enormous benefit and conversely, a very substantial service may confer only 
a very small benefit".69 For example, some very simple prospecting may 
discover a large deposit of valuable minerals. Vice versa, decorating rooms 
which are in good decorative order in accordance with the defendant's 
execrable taste may involve work costing substantial sum which is, 
objectively speaking, of little or no value. But if the services are taken into 
account as a benefit, the problem will be avoided because in that case, the 
court will simply concentrate on the objective value of the services which may 
be assessed on a quantum meruit basis. Under the British Columbia 
Frustrated Contracts Act 1974, receipt of benefit of partial performance is 
required to be demonstrated: the plaintiff can base his claim upon reasonable 
expenditure incurred in performing the contract.70
Recognising the consequences of his interpretation, the learned judge 
stated that "the work must be treated as a benefit to the defendant since he 
requested it and valued it as such".71 But if the judge was prepared to adopt 
this approach in this case, why did he not consider it to be of general 
application?
The second question to be asked is when the benefit should be 
valued? For example, building work or the transfer of goods may increase or
6 8  In this regard, see Treitel, op. cit., At p. 690. See also New Wales Frustrated Contracts, 1978, 
under which equal division is not approriate in all cases.
6 9  B.P. v. Hunt (No.2)[\919\ 1 W.L.R. 783, at 803A.
7 0  Sec. 7(a). It should be added that loss of profit will not be taken into account. Sec. 8 (a).
71. B.P. v. Hunt (No.2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, at 803C.
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decrease in value between the time of supply and frustrating event. In this 
regard, Robert Goff J. held that the benefit is to be valued at the time of 
frustration. He argued that section 1 (3)(b) places the risk of depreciation or 
destruction by frustrating event upon the plaintiff.72 Indeed, the section 
expressly requires the court to take into account the effect of frustration upon 
the value of the benefit.
However, if services are identified as benefit, there will not be such a 
problem, since a reasonable remuneration for the services rendered at the 
time of performance will be awarded. As we have argued, the subsection can 
be read as referring to a benefit being obtained before the date of frustration, 
and, accordingly that is the time at which the benefit should be valued.
Robert Goff J.'s approach opens further arguments. Suppose goods 
are supplied and sold long before the date of frustration. Does the learned 
judge's approach require that an allowance should be made for the time 
value of money obtained by the disposal of the goods so that a true valuation 
of the benefit can be obtained at the date of frustration? It is clear that to 
make allowance for the time value of money - which the defendant may have 
obtained by selling the benefit before the date of frustration - would lead to a 
more just result. Nevertheless, Robert Goff J. did not take this view: instead 
he argued that the defendant does not necessarily benefit from having the 
money over a period of time. Further, if this allowance is to be made then a 
comparable allowance should be made in respect of expenses incurred by 
the defendant.73
One further problem is that section 1 (3)(a) requires the court to have 
regard to the amount of any expenditure incurred before the time of 
frustration by the benefited party. The question is whether this should be 
deducted from the value of the benefit or the award of the just sum? For 
example, if the defendant's benefit is valued at 200 pounds, a just sum 
assessed at 150 pounds, and the defendant's expenses are 100 pounds, 
how much will be the final award? 100 pounds or 50 pounds? Robert Goff 
J.'s opinion is that it should be deducted from the value of the benefit on the 
ground that the allowance for expenses is a statutory recognition of the 
change of position defence.74 However, it seems that the wording of the
7 2  Loc. cit. at 803F.
73. Loc. cit. at 804. It should be added that the judge awarded interest from the time of frustration 
under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934.
74. Loc. cit.,at 804E.
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section 1(3)(a) provides that expenses are to be deducted from the just sum, 
not from the value of the benefit.
Robert Goff J. in this case states that if the benefit is identified with the 
end product which has been obtained partly by the efforts of both the plaintiff 
and the defendant, then the court has to do its best to apportion the benefit 
and decide what proportion is attributable to the work done by plaintiff. That 
proportion will then constitute the relevant benefit for the purposes of section 
1 (3) of the Act.
1.4.3. ASSESSMENT OF THE JUST SUM
According to Robert Goff J. the final stage is the assessment of the 
just sum. The Act itself gives no indication of the way in which the just sum is 
to be assessed. However, as discussed above, Robrt Goff J. explained that 
the principle at issue in assessment of the just sum is "the prevention of 
unjust enrichment of either party to the contract at the other's expense".75 The 
Court of Appeal, however stated that "we got no help from the use of words 
which are not in the statute."76 and held that "what is just is what the trial 
judge thinks just". The Court of Appeal added that an appeal court was not 
entitled to interfere with the assessment of the just sum by the trial judge 
"unless it is so plainly wrong that it can not be just".77 The Court of Appeal 
also recognised that the just sum might legitimately be assessed in a number 
of different ways.78 However, the methods of assessment were not 
considered. The problem is that it is very difficult to predict what a court will 
award as a just sum if the assessment is left to the virtual untrammelled 
discretion of the trial judge.79 On the other hand, Lawton L. J.'s statement that 
"what is just is what the trial judge thinks is just"80 does allow the necessary 
flexibility to reach a fair result. The court will therefore look at the facts as 
they were before frustration and will assess the value of the services. 
Moreover, section 1 (3)(a) and (b) provide guidelines for the exercise of 
court's discretion in assessing a just sum.
75. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 799.
7 6  [1981] 1 W.L.R. 232, 243; [1982] 1 All E.L. 925, 983.
77. B.P. [1982] 1 All E.R. 925, 980.
78. Loc. cit.
79. Ewan McKendrick, op. cit., at 67.
80  [1981] 1 W.L.R. 232, 243; [1982] 1 All E.R. 925, 983.
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1.5. APPLICATION OF ROBERT GOFF J.'S PRINCIPLES IN 
THE B.P. CASE
Robert Goff J. applied the above principles as follows:
First he identified the benefit, the enhancement of the value of Mr. Hunt's 
share in the concession resulting from B.P.'s work. The benefit was not the 
day - to - day work done by B.P. in prospecting for oil, but was the end - 
product of that work. However, that benefit was reduced to take account of 
the expropriation, i.e. by the effect of the circumstances giving rise to 
frustration of the contract. Accordingly, the enhancement was limited to the 
benefit of the oil (net amount of oil) Hunt received before and after his 
contract with B.P. had become frustrated plus the compensation paid to him 
by Libyan government. This total was then divided by two, to reflect the fact 
that Hunt already owned half of the concession, so that the enhancement in 
value was only 50 per cent attributable to B.P. The resulting figure was $ 
U.S. 85m.81 Ignoring the time value of money made a difference of some $ 
U.S. 5.4m.
In calculating the "just sum", however, the judge adopted the criterion 
which he had rejected in valuing the benefit, viz., the cost to B.P. of their 
work to the extent that it was done for Mr. Hunt, plus the contribution in cash 
and oil received by him, minus the reimbursement oil already received by 
B.P. On this basis the just sum was some $34.67m.82
It is submitted that the calculation of the valuable benefit merely acted 
as an irrelevant ceiling, and the just sum was basically the value of the 
services rendered to Hunt and the goods supplied to him by B.P. less the 
reimbursement.
1.6. SOME COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF ENGLISH AND 
SCOTS LAW
In the Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Co. Lfc/.,83 Scots law arrived at a similar result as that obtained by English 
law in the Fibrosa case.84 In Cantiere, Lord Shaw.stated that the case would
81. [1982] 1 All E.R. 925, 952e-953e.
82. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 236, 241; this contrasts with the figure of some $35.40m. in [1979] 1 W.L.R. 
783, 827. The difference is not explained and may be due to the adoption of different currency 
conversion factors at first instance and in the Court of Appeal. (Treitel, The Law of Contract, 1983, 
at 689).
83. 1923, S.L.T. 624. See supra pp.256,257.
8 4  [1943] A.C. 32.
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be a "typical case of restitution under the Roman law and one for application
of the maxim,'causa data causa non secuta'. . . " 85
There is also a possibility in Scots law that after frustration a party
might be remunerated on the basis of quantum meriut for work done.86
However, it should be noted that, although Lord Cooper opined that the Scots
courts have all the requisite powers for making adjustment,87 there is doubt
about the extent of the doctrine.88 The basis of the doubt is to be found in the
judgment of the Lord President (Inglis) in Watson v. Shankland.S9He stated: 
"there is no rule of the Civil law . . .  as adopted into all modern municipal 
codes and systems, better understood than this - that if money is advanced 
by one party to a mutual contract, on the condition and stipulation that 
something shall be afterwards paid or performed by the other party, and the 
latter party fails in performing his part of the contract, the former is entitled to 
repayment of his advance, on the ground of failure of consideration. If a 
person contracts to build me a house, and stipulates that I shall advance him 
a certain portion of the price before he begins to bring his materials to the 
ground, or to perform any part of the work, the money so advanced may 
certainly be recovered if he never performs any part, or any available part of 
his contract. No doubt, if he performs a part and then fails in completing the 
contract, I shall be bound in equity to allow him credit to the extent to which I 
am lucratus by his materials and labour, but no further; and if I am not 
lucratus at all, I shall be entitled to repetition of the whole advance, however 
great his expenditure and consequent loss may have been."
The dictum of the Lord President in Watson v. Shankland has been tacitly
approved by the House of Lords.,90 and was followed in Davis & Primose
Ltd. v. Clyde Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Ltd. and others.91
In spite of this authority, the view has been taken that the payee can
claim an adjustment for the expenses he has incurred. In the Fibrosa case,92
Lord Atkin stated, albeit obiter, that under Scots law the recovery of the
whole of the down payment is not allowed if the payee claims an adjustment
for the expenses he has incurred. In Cantiere San R occo93 there was no
express holding on this point, but the House of Lords impliedly approved the
85. Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding, [1924] A.C. 226, at 259.
86. Head Wrightson Aluminium Ltd. v. Aberdeen Harbour Comms., 1958, S.L.T. (Notes).
87  Cooper, Selected Papers 1922-1954 (1957), p. 124,125.
88  See Fibrosa case, [1943] A.C. 32, at 54per Lord Atkin; T. M. Cooper, op. cit., at 128.
89  (1871) 10 M. 142 at 152; on appeal (1873) 11 M. (H.L.) 51.
90  (1873) 11 M. (H.L.) 51.
91. 1917, 1 S.L.T. 297.
9 2  [1943] AC. 32 at 54.
93. [1924] A.C. 226.
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interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary (Lord Hunter) who believed that such an 
adjustment could be made. Moreover, in Penny v. Clyde Shipbuilding and  
Engineering Co;94 a counter claim for the payee's expenses was allowed.
Given the state of authorities, Lord Cooper's statement95 that the 
Scottish courts have all powers provided in the English Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 is open to doubt. For the time being, Scots 
law is much more susceptible of criticism than the present English law.96 In 
other words, although difficulties remain in English law, it now possesses 
much greater clarity than Scots law on the point.
1.7. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS OF THE 1943 ACT
1.7.1. SECTION 2(3), CONTRACTUAL PROVISION TO THE
CONTRARY
Section 2 (3) of the 1943 Act provides:
"Where any contract to which this Act applies contains any provisions which, 
upon the true construction of the contract, is intended to have effect in the 
event of circumstances arising which operate, or would but for the said 
provision operate, to frustrate the contract, or is intended to have effect 
whether such circumstances arise or not, the court shall give effect to the 
provision and shall only give effect to the foregoing section of this Act to such 
extent, if any, as appears to the court to be consistent with the said 
provision."
According to section 2(3) of the Act, parties can by express provision 
in the contract regulate the consequences of frustration and exclude the 
provisions of the Act.97 Accordingly, relief under the 1943 Act will be 
influenced by the parties' own allocation of risk. For example, if a plaintiff - 
whether expressly or by necessary implication98 - takes the risk of non­
payment in the event of frustration, the court should make no award under 
subsection 1(3).99 Thus section 2(3), gives contracting parties the opportunity 
to eliminate the problems of subsections 1(2) and 1(3), if they agree on some
9 4  1920, 1 S.L.T. 264.
95. 28 J.Comp.Legi. and Int'l L. (1946), 12.
9 6  See also Alexander A. M. Irvine, The Consequences of Frustration of Contract in Scots and
English Law, 1962, The Scots Law Times, 165, at 168.
97. This rule also applies to the common law action for the recovery of down payments created by 
the Fibrosa case. Thus the money may be paid out - and out, with the intention that the payee shall 
keep it in any event. (Fibrosa case, [1943] A.C. 32, at 43, 77.).
9 8  For example, the plaintiff may, by insuring against the consequences of frustrating event, agree to
bear the risk of its occurrence.
9 9  B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt (No. 2) [1983] 2 A.C. 352, 372 (Upholding the courts 
below: [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 807, 829-833; and [1981] 1 W.L.R. 232, 241 (C.A.).
161
different solution to the problems arising on the occurrence of a frustrating 
event.
In the B.P. case, Mr. Hunt argued that under the terms of the contract, 
B.P. took the risk of the exploration not proving commercially viable: only if 
enough oil was produced from the field, was B.P. to be reimbursed. He 
added that the clause 6100 of the agreement was one intended to have effect 
even in the event of frustration and so took priority, by virtue of section 2(3), 
over the statutory scheme for relief.
On its true construction, the clause was held not to exclude the Act, 
because it was not intended to deal with the risk of expropriation. That is why 
the House of Lords rejected the claim and held that there was nothing in the 
terms of the contract, or in the circumstances surrounding the making of it, to 
indicate expressly or by necessary implication, that the parties when they 
made their contract, had in contemplation the risks, such as the expropriation 
of the concession in whole or in part; or, that having had such risks in 
contemplation, they included in the contract any provision which, expressly or 
impliedly, was to take effect in the event of such risks materialising.101
Some important points about section 2(3) should be noted. Simply to 
exclude the Act by contractual provision is unwise: the parties to the contract 
- especially parties to transnational commercial transactions - must also 
provide for the consequences of frustration. Otherwise, the courts will refer to 
the common law rules with all their imperfections.
Secondly, according to Robert Goff J. the mere fact that the contract which is 
frustrated is an entire contract, for example, if a clause provides that payment 
is not due until the work is complete, is not enough for the court to infer that 
the clause precludes an award under section 1(3).102 Only if, upon the true 
construction of the contract a seller, for example, has agreed to receive no 
payment in the event which occurred will the fact that the contract is entire 
have the effect of precluding an award under the Act.103
1 0 0  Clause 6  of the letter agreement: "It is specifically understood and agreed that Mr. Hunt shall 
have no personal liability to repay the sums required in the operating agreement and this letter 
agreement to be advanced by B.P. for Mr. Hunt's account or paid to Mr. Hunt, but B.P.'s right to 
recover any such sums which B.P. is required to pay or advanced for Mr. Hunt's account; shall be 
limited to recovery solely out of three - eights of Mr. Hunt's half of the production, and in the 
manner specified under Sec. 9 of the operating agreement, if as and when produced saved and 
delivered at the Libyan sea terminal."
101. [1983] 2 A.C. 352, 372.
1 0 2  [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, at 807.
103. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, at 806, 807.
162
1.7.2. EFFECT OF PRIOR BREACH
In the B.P. case, Mr. Hunt claimed that before the frustrating event 
B.P. committed certain breaches of contract in developing the field: as a 
consequence he argued that the company was barred from claiming a just 
sum. Robert Goff J. rejected the submission on the facts and stated that such 
a breach does not affect the right of a party to repayment under section 1 (2), 
nor the award of a just sum under section 1(3). However, the defendant may 
raise his accrued right to damages, and this may be the subject of a set-off or 
counterclaim in the proceedings in which the claim is made.104
Robert Goff J.'s approach is right with regard to cases of prior non- 
repudiatory breach. But this is not always the case. For example, if a party 
commits a repudiatory breach which the other party accepts, then the Act 
does not apply. For according to wording of section 1(1) the contract must be 
. . impossible of performance or otherwise frustrated and the parties 
thereto have for that reason been discharged from . . . further performance". 
Accordingly, where a contract is discharged as a result of a repudiating 
breach and not from any impossibility of performance or frustration, the Act 
does not apply.
1.8. CONTRACTS EXCLUDED FROM THE 1943 ACT
Section 2(5) sets out certain types of contract to which the 1943 Act 
does not apply. These contracts are as follows:
1.8.1. VOYAGE CHARTERPARTIES AND OTHER CONTRACTS 
FOR THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA10*
A contract for the carriage of goods by sea or any charterparty are not 
covered by the Act, other than a time charterparty or a charterparty by way of 
demise. Accordingly, the freight payable or paid in advance remains payable 
in the event of frustration (for example, loss of vessel and cargo)106 unless 
the contract provides to the contrary.107
In carriage of goods by sea, the ship owner can not recover freight pro 
rata,108 if a vessel can not complete a voyage because of events outside his
10 4  [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 808.
105. Sec. 2 (5) (a).
106. See Byrne v. Schiller ( 1871) L.R. 6 EX. 319.
107 The Olivia [ 1972 ] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 458.
108 St. Enoch Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Phosphate Mining Co. [ 1916 ] 2 K. B. 625.
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control. The rule of Chandler v. Webster109 - though criticised - has been 
preserved by the 1943 Act. Glanville Williiams states that the philosophy 
behind the exclusive is that commercial practice has developed well-known 
rules for insurance against the risks inherent in these contracts.110
In the Scottish legal system, any advance payment of freight made by 
a charterer to a ship owner is recoverable if, for example the ship and the 
cargo were lost. In William Watson and Co. v. Robert Shankland,U1 Lord 
President (Inglis) criticised English law in this respect as not being in 
accordance with sound legal principle.
1.8.2. CONTRACT OF INSURANCE112
Under an insurance policy, once the risk has started to run the whole 
of the premium for that risk is treated as having been earned by insurer. Thus 
there can be no apportionment of premiums. The philosophy behind this is 
that" the contract is for the entire risk and no part of the consideration can be 
returned. "113
1.8.3. CERTAIN CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS11*
The Act does not apply to any contract to which section 7 of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 applies, or to "any other contract for the sale or for the 
sale and delivery, of specific goods, where the contract is frustrated by 
reason of the fact that the goods have perished." As was discussed,115 under 
section 7 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, an agreement to sell specific goods 
is avoided if the goods perish without any fault on the seller or buyer before 
the risk has passed to the buyer. The 1943 Act does apply inter alia to all 
contracts for the sale of unascertained goods and to contracts for the sale of 
specific goods which are frustrated by events other than the perishing of 
goods, for example, by subsequent illegality of the contract.
Where section 7 applies, its effect is that the contract comes to an end 
discharging both parties from performance of future obligations. However,
109. [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
11 0  Glanville Williams, Law Reform, op. cit., at p. 74.
m . (1872) 10 M. 142, at 153.
1 1 2  Sec. 2 (5) (b).
113. Tyrie v. Fletcher ( 1777 ) 2 Cowp. 6 6 6 , 6 6 8 . See also Bermon v. Woodbridge (1781) 2 Doug. 
781.
114. Sec. 2 (5) (c).
115. See supra, pp. 47-51.
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the section is not concerned with the consequential positions of the parties. 
This means that the section does not provide for apportionment of the loss 
and the seller is not allowed to retain or recover any sum in respect of 
expenses incurred by him before the date of frustration in, or for the purpose 
of, the performance of the contract. Accordingly, in such a case, the ordinary 
common law rules of frustration apply.116
It should be noted that the difference between the common law rules 
and 1943 Act is related to cases where there has been a down payment and 
part delivery. If the buyer has already paid the price in advance but does not 
get the goods, at common law he can recover what he has paid on the 
ground of total failure of consideration.117 If the Act was applicable, the same 
result would be achieved. In other words, there is no difference in that 
situation. This was the position even before the Fibrosa case118 since the 
rule in Chandler v. Webster did not apply in this situation.119 The difference 
is, of course, that where section 7 applies, the seller is prevented from setting 
off under the 1943 Act any expenses which he may have incurred before the 
time of discharge, for example putting the goods into a deliverable state.
Part delivery followed by frustration can be illustrated in two ways. If a 
buyer, after having paid in advance, gets only part of the goods agreed to be 
sold and the remainder subsequently perishes, then according to the 
common law rules, since consideration has only partially failed, he can not 
recover what he has paid. Moreover, he is not entitled to rely on the 1943 
Act. However, it has been argued that he may be able to recover back a 
proportionate part of the prepayment, if the risk in respect of those goods 
was on the seller at the time of perishing.120 This view produces a much more 
just allocation of the loss.
Secondly, where only a part of the goods has been delivered to the 
buyer, and the seller has not been paid anything, if the remaining goods 
perish, he can not rely on 1943 Act if there has been a valuable benefit 
conferred on the buyer. He may be able to recover under common law if a 
new contract can be implied from the buyer's keeping the goods after 
frustration.121 However, it is difficult to imply such a contract if the buyer no
116. See supra pp. 144, 145.
117. Rugg v. Minett (1809) 11 East 210; Logan v. Mesurier (1847) 6  Moo. P. C. 116.
11 8  [1943] A.C. 32; [1942] 2 All E.R. 122.
119 [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
120 See Atiyah, The Sale of Goods, 1985, at 336; Benjamin, op. cit, para. 422.
121. Treitel, op. cit., at 693.
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longer has the goods for example, because he had used them up or sold 
them before frustration.
In entire contracts, if one party has partly performed his contract, but 
as a result of frustration he is not able to complete performance, in that case, 
even though some benefit has been received by the other party, he is not 
entitled to any part of the agreed price.122 It has been argued that acceptance 
of this general common law rule in the contract of sale is difficult and the 
buyer should not be able to retain the goods without paying for the part 
retained. Accordingly, he should be held liable quantum meruit upon a new 
implied contract.123
There are two further issues. First, it is difficult to understand why 
section 7 agreement to sell should be excluded from the operation of 1943 
Act. Nor is there any reason why sales of specific goods should be 
distinguished from sales of unascertained goods. The statutory provisions of 
the 1943 Act for apportionment of loss should have been applicable when a 
contract has been frustrated because specific goods have perished. It has 
been argued124 that the case of frustration by the perishing of goods is 
peculiar to the law of sale, that especial rules applicable to the perishing of 
specific goods have been long established and are well understood by the 
commercial community so that there is no point in disturbing them. The 
fallacy underlying this argument is that if this is correct in relation to the 
perishing of specific goods, why does the argument not apply in other cases 
of frustration, for example the requisitioning of goods, or supervening 
illegality. In addition, if we accept the above argument, all sorts of contracts 
of sale of goods should have been excluded from the 1943 Act. Because 
every contract of sale has its own applicable especial rules which are 
understood by the commercial community. Accordingly, it is the present 
writer's view that the existence of section 2(5)(c), is completely unjustifiable 
and should be repealed in the interests of justice.
2. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2.1. EFFECTS OF IMPRACTICABILITY AND FRUSTRATION
The usual effect of escape doctrines under American law is excuse 
from further performance.125 Although discharge of obligations is the proper
122 Cutter v. Powell ( 1795 ) 6  TR 320; Appleby v. Myres (1867) LR 2 CP 65.
123. See Sumpter v. Hedges [1898] 1 Q. B. 673.
124 Chalmer's Sale of Goods Act 1979, 8 th ed. (by Michael Mark and Jonathan Mance), 1981, 
Butterworth and Co. at 19.
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remedy in many cases,126 it will cause injustice in some cases. That is what 
happened in 20th Century Lites v. Goodman127 in which the court 
automatically applied the rules by simply discharging the contract and leaving 
the parties without fair restitution. In this case, because of war regulations 
prohibiting lightning at night, the lease of a neon sign was terminated. The 
court, contrary to the lessor's argument that the prohibition had since been 
repealed and the lease should only be suspended, discharged all obligations 
without considering the lessor's manufacturing and installation costs.
In the American legal system, unlike English law, "automatic 
discharge" is not always the case. In the American cases sometimes either 
party128 or one party129 is entitled to put an end to the contract after 
performance has become impossible. On the other hand, some courts adopt 
the English position that impossibility or impracticability puts an end to the 
contract automatically. That is what happened in the /s/e of Mull130 where a 
ship under charter was requisitioned by the British government. The plaintiff 
insisted that the charter contract remained in force so that he could recover 
the higher rate of hire paid by the government. The district court held that the 
contract remained in force and the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount 
paid by the British government in excess of the charter price.131 However, this 
decision was reversed by the fourth circuit, which held that there was a 
frustration discharging both parties and that the owner was therefore no 
longer bound by the contract.132 As this case shows, "automatic frustration" 
may provide the opportunity for a party who has in no way been 
disadvantaged by the delay, to rely on frustration as an excuse to evade 
performance of an obligation.
125. See Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N.E. 667 (1891) (In this case the contractor was 
excused from oblgation to build a house where the house destroyed by fire after partial 
performance.); see also Restatement (First) of Contracts Para.457; Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, Paras. 261, 265. Cf. U.C.C. Sec. 2-615.
126. See e.g. Ask Mr. Foster Travel Service v. Tauck Tours, 181 Misc. 91, 43 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 
1943).
127. 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P.2d 8 8  (1944). Cf Kaiser v. Zeigler, 115 Misc. 281, 18 N.Y.Supp. 638 
(App.T. 1921).
12 8  For example U.C.C. Sec. 2-509 and Sec. 2-613.
12 9  In this regard, see Palmer, Mistake and Unjust Enrichment, 1962, at 62-63.
13°. 278 F. 131 (4th Cir. 1921). See also The Frankmere, 262 F. 819, affd. 278 F. 139 (C.C.A. 4), 
cert. den. 257 U.S. 662; Allanwilde Transp. Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U.S. 377, 386, 39 S.Ct. 
147, 63 L.Ed. 312, 3 A.L.R. 15 and annotation, 8  Brit. Rul. Cas. 507 etseq.
131. 257 F. 798 (D. Md. 1919).
1 3 2  278 F. at 135.
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To what extent are the American courts empowered to adjust the 
parties relations after frustration? It should be said that under both American 
and English laws, expectation interests have never been protected, nor has 
their loss ever been shared.133
The treatment of down payments in American law is relatively clear. 
Most courts of American states134 have rejected the rule of Chandler v. 
Webster.135 Accordingly, a down payment is recoverable when the contract is 
excused. Nevertheless, the Chandler rule has been applied in a few 
American courts.136 It should be added that, contrary to the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, advance freight is recoverable if the 
property is destroyed in transit.137
In a contract for personal services, failure to render performance, 
because of impossibility or frustration, entitles the employer to be reimbursed 
for any advance payment.138 However, if there is partial performance, the 
advance payment will usually be reimbursed after deducting the value of the 
services rendered.139
what is the approach in the UCC? Is the buyer entitled to recover any 
down payment which has been made? The non-code American common law
133. Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N.E. 667 (1891). See also Comment, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 
(1948), 401, 412; Comment, Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdonsome Contract: a 
Statutory Solution, 69 YaleL. Rev. 1960, 1054, 1059.
1 3 4  See for example the following cases: Hooe v. O'callaghan, 10 Cal.App. 567, 103 P. 175 (1909); 
Ogren v. Inner Harbor Land Co., 83 Cal.App. 197, 256 P. 607 (1927); Waldheim v. Englewood 
Heights Estates, 115 N.J.L. 220, 179 A. 19 (1935); Jordan v. McCammon, 56 Ohio St. 790, 49 
N.E.IIII (1897), revising McCammon v. Peck, 9 Ohio C.C. 589 (1895); Cowley v. N.P.R. Co., 6 8  
Wash. 558, 123 P. 998 (1912); Keeling v. Schastey and Vollmer, 18 Cal.App. 764, 766, 124 Pac. 
445, 446 (Dist.Ct.App. 1912); Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 522, 27 N.E. 667, 6 6 8  (1891); 
Coehran v. Forbes, 257 Mass. 135, 153 N.E. 566 (1926); Panto v. Kentucky Distilleries and 
Warehouse Co., 215 App.Div. 511, 214 N.Y.S. 19 (1926); Kirtleyv. Perham, 176 Cal. 333, 168 Pac. 
351 (1917); Bowser v. Chalifour, 334 Mass. 348, 352-53, 135 N.E.2d 643, 645 (1956); Tenner v. 
Retlaw Div. Corp., 163 Misc. 248, 295 N.Y.Supp. 31 (Sup.Ct. 1936); Stone and Gambrell v. Wait 
and Company, 8 8  Ala. 599 (1889); Hudson v. Hudson, 87 Ca. 678 (1891). See also Restatement 
(First), Para. 468; 6  Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1972 (1932); Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 1368.
135. [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
13 6  See e.g. Huyett and Smith Co., v. Edison Co., 167 ill. 233, 241, 47 N.E. 384, 387 (1897) 
(altemtive holding); Seigel v. Eaton and Prince Co., 165 ill. 550, 557-58, 46 N.E. 449, 451 (1897) 
(dictum). Cf. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Howard, 211 S.W. 720 (Mo.Ct.App. 1919).
137 Briggs v. Vanderbilt, (N.Y.S.Ct. 1855) 19 Barb. 222; Reina V. Cross, Cal. 29 (1856); Lawson v. 
Worms, 6  Cal. 366 (1856).
1 3 8  See e. g. Bucklin v. Morton, 105 Misc. 46, 172 N.Y.S. 344 (1918).
139. Moore v. Robinson, 92 ill. 491 (1879); Callahan v. Shotwell, 60 Mo. 398 (1875); Bucklin v. 
Morton, 105 Misc. 46, 172 N.Y.S. 344 (1918).
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allows recovery and there is no contrary provision in the code preventing the 
application of this rule to the sale of goods.
It should be added that where the risk of a contingency is impliedly or 
expressly assumed by the party seeking restitution of his down payment, the 
claim might be denied. This is what happened in Shelton v. Tuttle Motore 
Co.140 Shortly before the involvement of the United States in the Second 
World War, a buyer made an advance payment on the purchase of a car. It 
was expressly provided in the contract that the seller would not be liable for 
any delay or failure in making delivery through any cause whatsoever. 
Because of government regulations, the plaintiff was not able to obtain 
delivery and claimed restitution of his down payment which was denied on 
the ground that the parties "contracted against the very contingency which 
has arisen."
This case can be criticised on the ground that the court did not give 
the correct interpretation to the provision in the contract, viz., that the buyer 
had taken the risk of failure of delivery because of war. Indeed, it can be 
argued that the provision merely excluded the liability of the seller to pay 
damages in the event of failure to deliver. Principles of unjust enrichment and 
the seller obtaining the price without providing consideration are other factors 
for doubting the decision.
The American courts have generally taken the view that when 
performance of the contract is excused, the excused party is entitled to 
restitution of any benefit that he has conferred.141 Each party must pay for 
benefits received from the essential reliance expenditure of the other. 
Moreover, few American courts have followed the former English rule,142 
under which a person who has partly performed his contract to make repairs 
and additions to an existing building can get no compensation for his work, if 
the additions and the building are destroyed prior to his work being 
completed.
140. 223 N.C. 63, 25 S.E.2d451 (1943).
141. Buccini v. Parterno Const. Co. 253 N.Y. 256, 170 N.E. 910 (1930); In re Will-Low Cafeterias, 
111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940). See also 6  Coibin, Contracts, op. cit., Sections 1367-72; 6  Williston, 
Contracts, Sec. 1977 (rev. ed. 1938).
142 Enoch Shipping Co. v. Phosphate Mining Co., [1916] 2 K.B. 624; Appleby v. Myers, L.R. 
2C.P.651 (1867); Cutter v. Powell, 6 T.R. 320 (1975) (Illustrating former English law). See also 
Brumby v. Smith, 3 Ala. 123 (1841); Huyett and Smith Mfg. Co. v. Chicago Edison Co. 47 N.E. 384, 
167 ill. 233 (1897); Krause v. Board of Trustees, 70 N.E. 264, 162 Ind. 278 (1903); Garrety v. 
Brazell, 34 Iowa 100 (1871); Taulbee v. McCarty, 137 S.W. 1045, 144 Ky. 199 (1911) (Illustrating 
American law).
i
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Like English law, any benefit accruing from incidental reliance 
expenditure may not be compensatable.143
In defining benefit, there is confusion among the American courts. The 
overwhelming majority of cases define it as acts and services (labour) which 
are part of a promised performance (regardless of whether the promisee 
gains anything from the transaction) or materials incorporated in a building 
(even though the building is destroyed by a catastrophe).144 A few courts 
reject this definition and instead define it as a net gain having pecuniary 
advantage for the defendant.145 For example, in Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Mode Family Laundries,146 recovery of the value of storing furs - which 
were destroyed by fire - was denied on the ground that the services did not 
have pecuniary value to the defendant, because the goods had been 
destroyed. Here as we have seen, the definition of benefit is the same as that 
of Robert Goff J. in the B.P. case.147
The benefit is generally measured in terms of what it would have cost 
the owner to obtain or buy similar services and materials.148 In other words, 
the criterion when valuing the services rendered, is the value of the services 
at market rates.149 However, sometimes the benefit is measured by referring 
to the contract rate.150
143. See Woodward, Quasi Contracts, Sec. 49 ( 1913 ). Cf. United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 
227, 239-40 (1887); Davidson v. Weschesters Gas Light Co., 99 N.Y. 558, 566-67, 2 N.E. 892, 895 
(1885).
144 Whelan v. Ansonia Clock Co., 97 N.Y. 293 (1884); Anderson v. Shattuck, 16 N.H. 240, 81 Atl. 
781 (1911); F.M. Gabler Inc. v. Evans Labs., Inc., 129 Misc. 911, 913, 223 N.Y.Supp. 408, 410 
(Sup.Ct. 1927).
145. Independant Elec. Lightining Corp. v. Broodsky and Co., 118 Misc. 561, 194 N.Y.Supp. 1 
(Sup.Ct. 1922);Ryan and Associates v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P.2d 1053 (1936). 
Cf. Caroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan, 270, 164 Pac. 143 (1917).
146. 133 Conn. 433, 52 A.2d 137, 170 A.L.R. 975 (1947). Cf. Glough Stilwell Meat Co., 112 
Mo.App. 117 (1905) (On similar facts recovery of the value of services was upheld). See also 
Buccini v. Patemo Const. Co., 253 N.Y. 256, 170 N.E. 910 (1930).
147  [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 802.
148 Carrol v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, 164 P. 134 (1917); Young v. City of Chicopee, 186 Mass. 
518, 72 N.E. 63 (1904).
14 9  See Buccini v. Paterno Const. Co. 170 N.E. 910, 253 N.Y. 256 (1930) (Judgment for reasonable 
value of the service perfomed). See also West v. Peoples First Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 106 A.2d 
427, 378 Pa. 275 (1954); Dryer v. Lewis, 57 Ala. 551 (1877); Ryan v. Dayton, 25 Conn. 188 (1856); 
Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 79 (1853); Nesbitt v. Miller, 188 N.E. 702, 98 Ind.App. 195 ( 1943 ); Harrison 
v. Harrison, 100 N.W. 344, 124 Iowa 525 (1904); Stanley v. Kimbal, 118 A. 636, 80 N.H. 431 
(1922); Mendenhall v. Davis, 100 P. 336, 52 Wash. 169 (1909).
150 Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N.E. 667 (1891) (Builder "entitled to be compensated at 
the contract price for all he did before the fire."). Cf. Anderson v. Shattuck 81 A. 781, 76 N.H. 240 
(1911); Dame v. Wood, 70 A. 1081, 1082, 75 N.H. 38, 39; Weis v. Devlin, 67 Tex. 507 (1887).
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The overwhelming majority of American courts have based recovery 
on the principle of unjust enrichment.151 The question to be asked is whether 
there is another basis for recovery under which reliance interests can be 
protected. Either party or both may have incurred expenditure in reliance on 
the contract, for example, if materials which have been bought for 
performance of contract but not yet worked into the building are destroyed 
along with the building.
In English law, reliance losses are deductible from a restitution award. 
In other words, the plaintiff may recover expenses incurred "in, or for the 
purpose of, the performance of the contract", to the extent that the court 
considers that to be just.152 In American law, generally, the courts do not 
allow the plaintiff to offset such expenses against the restitution claim.153 
However, a few courts have rejected unjust enrichment as the sole basis of 
restitution and have allowed recovery for reliance expenditure. For example, 
in Angus v. Scully,154 the plaintiff had contracted to move the defendant's 
house. The house burned before the completion of the move, but the plaintiff 
was allowed to recover for work done. In Albre Marble and Tile Co. v. John 
Bowen Co.,155 the plaintiff recovered the fair value of work and labour in 
preparing "samples, shop drawings, tests and affidavits" for tiles and marble 
to be put in a hospital, even though none of this work was incorporated into 
the hospital. In this case, indeed, the court expressly permitted recovery of 
those losses despite an absence of unjust enrichment. However, the court, 
based its protection of the reliance interest partly on the peculiar facts of the 
case. First, the impossibility had been brought about by the acts of the
151. See Taulbee v. McCarty, 144 Ky. 199, 201, 137 S.W. 1045 (1911); Mathews Const. Co. v. 
Bradly, 104 N.J.L. 438, at 442, 140 A. 433 at 435 (1917); Carrol v. Bowerstock, 100 Kan. 270, 276, 
164 P. 143, 145 (1917); Ontario Deciduous Fruit-Packing Co.,134 Cal. 21, 6 6  P. 28 (1901); Buccini 
v. Paterno Const. Co., 253 N.Y. 256, 170 N.E. 910 (1930); Stratford, Inc.v. Seattle Brewing and 
Malting Co., 94 Wash. 125, 162 P. 31 (1916); Krause v. Board of Trustees, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 
264 (1904); Von Waldheim v. Englewood Heights Estates, Inc., 115 N.J.L. 220, 179 A. 19 
(Ct.Err.&App. 1935). See also Restatement of Contracts, (First), Sec. 468, Comment d. (1932).
152  Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, 6  & 7 Geo. 6 , C. 40, Sec. 1(2).
153. See e. g., Carrol v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, 164 P. 134 (1917) (No recovery for temporary 
devices employed to give form to the structure which was to be produced.); Young v. Chicopee, 186 
Mass. 518, 72 N.E. 63 (1904) (No recovery for lumber near bridge that had not been wrought into 
the bridge at the time of the fire); Wallace Studios v. Brochstein's Inc., 297 S.W.2d 218 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1956). Cf. The Isle of Mull, 278 F. 131 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 257 U.S. 662 (1921); 
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.Supp. 129 (N.D.Iowa 1978), rev'd on the other 
grounds, 603 F.2d 1301.
154. 176 Mass. 357, 57 N.E. 674 (1900).
155. 338 Mass. 394, 155 N.E.2d 437 (1959), affd on rehearing, 343 Mass. I l l ,  179 N.E.2d 321 
(1962).
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defendant. Secondly, the defendant had insisted that the work to be 
performed. Northern Corp. v. Chugach Electric Association,156 is another 
case justifying recovery based on reliance interests, rather than recovery 
being limited to benefits conferred. In this case, the plaintiff lost his 
equipment because of the defendant's insistence that a method of hauling 
rock across a frozen lake was feasible. The plaintiff was allowed to recover 
the losses incurred on reliance upon the theory of implied warranty of the 
method of performance.
In addition, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts157 also supports 
protection of the reliance interest by stating a rule that gives a court power, 
when the contracts fail, to "grant relief on such terms as justice requires, 
including protection of parties' reliance interests."
In the light of these developments, some writers' argue158 that the 
former emphasis on applying the theory of unjust enrichment has waned. 
This means that these developments contain the seeds from which the policy 
of dividing losses between the parties could evolve. That is what happened in 
Northern Corp. v. Chugach Electric Association in which the result was a 
division of reliance losses.159 Dividing losses between the parties in 
appropriate cases, promotes justice and fairness.
Unfortunately, the issue has not been clarified in UCC. Confused 
areas of American common law could have been eliminated if the code had 
provided the solution of the problem. This means that it might have served as 
a model in other cases. However, the seller who has made partial 
performance in terms of having shipped some of the goods to the buyer, is 
entitled to the contract price of the goods accepted.160 When the seller incurs 
expenses prior to impracticability, for example in reliance on the contract, 
while the code does not deal with the matter, a solution can be found in 
section 1-103 UCC which admits the application of supplementary principles 
of the common law.
1 5 6 518 P.2d 76 (Alaska), modified on rehearing, 523 P.2d 1243 (Alaska)1974, affd, 562 P.2d 1053 
(Alaska) (1977). For similar decision, see Bibb v. Mitchell, 165 Okla. 61, 65, 24 P.2d 997, 1001 
(1933).
157 Sec. 272 (2).
158 E.g., see Fuller and Perdue, The reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J., (1937), 
373, at 380; Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 Colum.L.Rev., (1981), 
37, 39. See also Perrilo, Restitution in Contractual Text, 73 Colum.L.Rev., (1973), at 1221.
1 5 9 523 P.2d. 1243, 1246-47, affd, 562 P.2d 1053.
1 6 0 U.C.C. Sec. 2-607 (1).
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2.2. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT AS ANOTHER EFFECT OF 
THE ESCAPE DOCTRINE IN LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
As discussed above, the remedy usually invoked under the escape 
doctrines is discharge of performance, sometimes coupled with restitution. 
The question arises whether there is a more flexible remedy than discharge 
of the contract? In other words, can we go one step further by ordering 
reformation of the contract to be accomplished by court order so that the 
expectations of the parties can be protected.
This issue is very important in long-term contracts. A number of 
distinctive features of long-term contractual relationships suggest that 
discharge should be avoided.161 To understand the problem, long-term 
contractual relations should be analysed. The main question is what is a 
long-term contract? Permanent lease arrangement,162 16163 or 20164 year old 
contracts can generally be considered long-term contracts. But are five, six or 
x years contracts, also long.term? For example, was the five year contract in 
Scullin Steel Co. v. PACCAAR, Inc.,165 on which the parties had made 
substantial reliance, a long-term contract? It seems that these kinds of 
contracts are also long-term, because they are more complex than the "one 
shot" sale contract. It is clear that the longer the term of the contract, the 
more likely it is that unforeseeable contingencies will intervene. Thus, the 
extended duration of long-term contract is much riskier than a short-term 
contract.166 Moreover, neither party, nor even skilled parties, will be able at 
the time of contracting, to predict and allocate all the potential risks that might 
develop during the life of the agreement. Furthermore, long-term contracts 
are inherently incomplete in their coverage, evolving obligations as they 
progress.
161. See generally McNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under 
Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Northwestern University Law Review, 
1978, 854; Michael N. Zundel, Equitable Reformation of Long-Term Contracts - The "New Spirit" 
of ALCOA, Utah Law Review, 1982, 985. See also Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss 
Sharing and Commercial Impracticability, 69 Minnesota Law Review, 1985, 471.
162 McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d at 767.
163. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc. 499 F.Supp. 53 (W.D.Pa. 1980).
164. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 at 267 (7th Cir. 
1986).
165. 708 S.W.2d 756, 758-60 (Mo.Ct.App. 1986).
166 See e.g., Iowa Elec. Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.Supp. 129, 140 (N.D.Iowa 1978) 
(Price of uranium rose approximately 58% over life of 4 year contrac causing supplier loss of $ 
3,097,312). See also Wall St.J. Nov. 10, 1972 at 28, Col.l (Describing Westinghouse's potential 
liability of over 2 billion dollers on uranium contract, where price rose from $ 9.50 a pound in 1975, 
to $ 40 a pound in 1977).
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Long-term contracts may also produce very complex reliance issue so 
that continued performance is much more preferable than discharge. For 
example, in the Alcoa case, in order to perform its part of the contract, 
Essex entered into a separate long-term agreement to obtain a supply of 
aluminium.167 Moreover, most long-term agreements involve public interest; 
accordingly, the public will benefit if the performance of the contract is 
continued.168 Finally, if litigation leading to discharge is avoided, the broader 
relationship between the contracting parties and the various third parties with 
whom they are associated will not be affected by termination. Thus the 
features of long-term agreements may exacerbate the problems linked with 
discharge cases. Accordingly, the exact formalism of the all-or-nothing 
approach should be avoided.
The reasons why courts usually refuse to revise contracts are that the 
parties are reasonably able to foresee the occurrence of the contingency at 
the time the contract was concluded or, at least, they are able to avoid its 
effects by taking precautions in the agreement. But in long-term contract, 
even skilled parties are not able to foresee and allocate all of the potential 
risks that might develop during the period of the contract. It seems that the 
most important factor which prevents the courts reforming contracts is that 
they do not want to break the habit of the traditional solution, viz., the all-or- 
nothing approach. Moreover, reforming the contracts presupposes fair, 
equitable and acceptable standards. This is a task that the judges do not 
want to be the first to attempt.
In summary, the approach of American cases to the problem is as
follows:
1. a few courts have discussed the matter without accepting it;169
2. reformation of contracts in American law has been limited to contracts 
where it can be proved by clear evidence that the contract warrants such 
reformation;170
167 Alcoa case, 499 Supp. 53, 82 (W.D.Pa. 1980) (Brief of defendant Essex Group, Inc., at 30, Alcoa 
case). See also Florida Power and Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F.Supp. 440, 444-46 
(E.D.Va. 1981).
1 6 8 See e.g., Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721.
169. See e.g., McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal and Coke Co., 570 F.2d 594, 610 (6 th Cir. 1978), 
cert, denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); Iowa Elec. Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.Supp. 129, 
135-36, 138-40 (N.D.Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8 th Cir. 1979) cert, denied, 
445 U.S. 911 (1980); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F.Supp. 429, 432 n.2 (S.D.Fla. 
1975); Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 UCC Rep.Serv. (callaghan) 989. 990 
(E.D.Pa. 1975).
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3. the Alcoa case is the only case that the court has revised the price of the 
contract and anticipated further performance.
2.2.1. ALCOA CASE
The traditional "all-or-nothing" approach was abandoned by the 
Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, when the 
court rewrote the price escalation formula in a long-term contract in 
Aluminium Co. of America v. Essex Group, lnc.,m ALCOA. In this case, 
Judge Teitelbaum attempted to fashion a new expansive approach to the 
doctrine of excuse in the form of modification of the contract.
In 1967, Aluminium Company of America (ALCOA) and Essex entered 
into a twenty-year contract.172 The contract provided that Essex would deliver 
alumina to ALCOA. ALCOA would convert the alumina to molten aluminium 
and sell it to Essex for later fabrication.173 In order to adjust for changes, the 
contract contained a price escalation clause in respect of the set price of 
aluminium sold to Essex. This clause contained three variable factors: a 
construction cost index, ALCOA's average hourly labour cost, and the 
wholesale price index for industrial commodities.174
Approximately eight years after the parties signed the contract, 
because of the Arab oil embargo and the subsequent energy crisis, ALCOA's 
costs increased far beyond what the escalation clause compensated. Indeed, 
ALCOA's non labour costs increased by five hundred percent, while the index 
increased only one hundred percent. This discrepancy left ALCOA with an 
estimated sixty million dollars loss on the contract. ALCOA sued Essex, 
seeking reformation of the price under the doctrines of mutual mistake of 
fact, unconscionability, frustration of purpose, and commercial 
impracticability.175
As the ALCOA demonstrates, the case is an example in which a price 
formula apparently failed to achieve the parties' goal of limiting their risks. 
Under the "all-or-nothing" approach, the court could have had either excused 
ALCOA from further performance or imposed specific performance. However,
170. See e. g., Day v. Fireman's Friend Ins. Co., 67 F. 2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1933) (Reformation of 
insurance contract to include mortgage clause). Cf. Oliver-Mercer Elec. Coop. v. Fisher, 146 
N.W.2d 346, 355 (N.D. 1966).
171. F.Supp. 53 (W.D.Pa. 1980).
172. Loc. cit., at 57.
173.ioc. cit., at 56-57.
174. Loc. cit., at 58.
175. Loc. cit., at 59.
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Judge Teitelbaum rejected the traditional alternatives of enforcement of the 
contract or discharge and instead, chose a third alternative and rewrote the 
price escalation clause to permit ALCOA a profit. In this regard, the court 
stated:
"A remedy modifying the price term of the contract in the light of 
circumstances which upset the price formula will better serve the purposes 
and expectations of the parties than any other remedy. Such a remedy is 
essential to avoid injustice in this case."176
The court decided that discharge would be unfair to Essex and would 
deprive it of the assured long-term aluminium supply for which it had 
bargained. Besides, this remedy would grant ALCOA a windfall gain in the 
current aluminium market.177 The court first concluded that there was a 
mutual mistake at the time of contracting in that the parties had anticipated 
that the escalation clause would adequately adjust for future changes in 
energy costs.178
In analysing ALCOA's alternative theories - impracticability and frustration of 
purpose - the court found that the unforeseeable dramatic increase in cost 
had in the circumstances made performance impracticable in a commercial 
sense.179 The court therefore granted ALCOA "some relief'. But the relief 
awarded was equitable reformation rather than discharge. In applying the 
doctrine of frustration of purpose, the court added that one of ALCOA's 
principal aims was to make a profit and avoid loss and those purposes had 
been frustrated.180 The court also cited the Restatement (Second)181 of 
Contracts to support its argument and in conclusion linked its use of 
equitable reformation to "gap filling" under UCC when the parties have 
omitted a necessary clause from their agreement.182
Although the ALCOA decision was appealed, the parties renegotiated 
their contract and settled before any judgment.183
Judge Teitelbaum's methodology has been criticised by some 
commentators. Dawson184 condemned the decision and described it as
176 ALCOA case, 499 F.Supp. 53, 79 (W.D.Pa. 1980).
177. Loc. cit., at 79-80.
178. Loc. cit.,at 63.
179. Loc. cit., at 76.
180 Loc. cit., at 76-77.
181. Loc. cit., at 79 n.21 (Citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sec. 296 (2)) (Unofficial 
version), which became Sec. 272 (2) of final version).
182 499 F.Supp. at 91 (Citing UCC sections 2-204, -305, -308, -310 (1972).
183. Stewart McCaulay, An Empirical View of Contract,Wisconcin L. Rev., (1985), 465, at 476.
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"grotesque", "a lonely monument on a bleak land scape" and "the frustrated 
venture of a single trial judge whose fancy was unusually free."
Siriani185 said, "If other courts adopt the ALCOA test, contracts - 
especially long-term ones - will become markedly less secure and there will 
be little basis upon which parties might ascertain in advance which contracts 
are vulnerable to reformation or avoidance."
It seems that Judge Teitelbaum's mistake was that he blurred the 
difference between the doctrines of mistake, frustration and impracticability. 
Mutual mistake is only applicable if the parties are mistaken as to the existing 
facts,186 while the doctrines of frustration of purpose and impracticability 
relate to future contingencies. Thus, the ALCOA court eliminated these 
distinctions and its analysis of mistake might be a threat to the stability of 
contract.
The ALCOA decision is the only American case which is authority for 
court-imposed modification. It should be noted that the ALCOA decision has 
had little impact on judicial thought in other American cases.187 However, 
there are dicta in some cases which have approved the new approach and 
have indicated that the judges are prepared to reform a contract in an 
appropriate case.188
184. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U.L. Rev., (1984), 
1, at 26, 35.
185. Siriani, The Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and Impossibility: Part 1, 14 
U.C.C.L.J. (1981), 30, at 35.
186 See e.g., Raphael v. Both Memorial Hosp., 67 A.D.2d 702, 412 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (App.Div. 
1979) (Denying plaintiffs request to cancel settlement agreement, because of agreement's adverse 
effect on another action on grounds that mistake did not concern a fact existing at the time the 
contract was entered); Turderville v. Upper Valley Farms, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex.Civ.App. 
1981) (Requirement of mutual mistake that the parties believe " in the present existence of a thing . . 
. that does not exist " satisfied by mistakes concerning ownership of land). Cf. Shear v. National 
Rifle Ass'n, 606 F.2d 1251 (D.C.Cir. 1979); Japhe v. A-T-0 Inc., 481 F.2d 366, 370 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Leasco Corp. v. Taussing, 473 F.2d 111, 781 (2d Cir. 1972); Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist. v. 
Denver andS.L.Ry. 45 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1930).
187. See e. g., Printing Indus. Ass'n. v. Graphic Arts International Union, Local No. 546, 628 F.Supp. 
1103 (N.D.Ohio 1985); Wooldridge v. E. Exxon Corp., 39 Conn.Supp. 190, 473 A.2d 1254 
(Conn.Super.Ct. 1984); Friedco, Ltd., v. Farmers' Bank, 529 F.Supp. 822 (D.Del. 1981); Louisiana 
Power and Light v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F.Supp. 1319 (E.D.La. 1981); Wabash, Inc. v. 
Avnet, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 995 (N.D.ill. 1981).
188 See Gerard v. Almouli, 746 F.2d 936, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1984); Friedco, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank, 529 
F.Supp. 822, 830n.9 (D.Del. 1981); Florida Power and Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 
F.Supp. 440, 458 (E.D.Va. 1981); Iowa Elec. Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.Supp. 129, 
135-36 (N.D.Iowa 1978), rev'd, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); 
McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d765, 779-81 (W.Va. 1984).
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Although there are many criticisms against this remedy, it is thought 
that advantages can be gained through the use of modification of contract in 
frustration situations especially in long-term agreements.
2.2.2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST COURT-IMPOSED 
MODIFICATION
The competence of courts to reform the parties' agreement invokes 
the following questions and criticisms:
1. Freedom to contract and sanctity of contracts (pacta sunt servanda) are 
the two fundamental corner stones of the law of contracts in both the Civil 
and the Common law systems. Accordingly, parties to a contract should be 
able to rely upon their contract. In this regard, Siriani argues that if the 
ALCOA's test is used in other contracts, the stability of contracts will be in 
danger189 and the impact of it will produce uncertainty between the parties. 
Suppose a supplier promises to carry out a carefully planned agreement. At 
the conclusion of the contract, he assumes the risk of onerous 
circumstances. The later adjustment of the contract will produce uncertainty 
and deter planning.190
2. The ALCOA decision is contrary to the maxim that the courts will not make 
a new contract for the parties. It has often been emphasised that the courts 
will neither consider hardship situations nor modify contracts.191 The court in 
ALCOA remade the contract and substituted its own pricing basis. Critics 
argue that the ALCOA case will restrict the parties' autonomy and they will 
not be able to rely on the terms of the contract that they themselves have 
created. Dawson192 questions the existence of such a judicial power so to act. 
He questions how the parties can be compelled to accept new terms that are 
manufactured by a court.
3. Such judicial determinations cost money and time and a court can rarely 
make a better agreement for the parties than they could make for 
themselves.193 Moreover, it is doubtful whether the court is capable of
189 Siriani, op. cit., at 35, 55. C f H. Deschenaux, La Revision des Contrats par le Juge, Revue de 
Droit Suiss, (1942), 509, at 518. See also Art. 1134 French Civil Code.
19°. See e. g., Wabash, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 995, 999 n.5 (N.D.ill. 1981); Printing Indus. 
Ass'n v. Int'l Printing and Graphic Communications Union. Local No. 546, 584 F.Supp. 990, 998 
(N.D.Ohio 1984).
191. See e. g., Cameron-Hawn Reality Co.v. City o f Albany, 207 N.Y. 377, 381-82, 101 N.E. 162, 
163 (1913). See also supra pp. 42-44, and 71-73.
192 Dawson, op. cit., at 27-31.
193. Loc. cit., at 36.
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managing the mass of evidence and proof necessary for making an 
appropriate reformation. Such a modification requires the courts to make 
difficult and complex decisions. A court may also find itself responsible for the 
supervision and perhaps readjustment of the agreement throughout the 
contract term.
In addition, courts do not have sufficient guidance on the appropriate 
terms of modification, and in any event, judges are personally ill-equipped to 
modify complex commercial contracts.194 The impact of such an approach 
would be haphazard and would deter planning.195
2.2.3. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF COURT-IMPOSED 
MODIFICATION
The present writer has defended the reformation of long-term 
contracts. However, modification should be admitted only, if at all, when 
some important conditions are met.
Modification of long-term contract can be properly imposed if it will 
help to stabilise contractual relationships. These contracts are inherently 
incomplete in their coverage and most evolve a series of obligations during 
the life of the contract. Accordingly, we can say that inherent in these 
contracts are a series of gaps which create uncertainty. This is magnified by 
paying attention to the situation where the contract also produces very 
complex and specialised reliance. For example, one of the parties may 
depend on the contract to finance the acquisition or development of coal 
reserves intended to be used to supply the other party. The increased 
incentive to keep performing the contract by modification is aptly illustrated 
by the fact that Essex built a processing plant adjacent to ALCOA's 
refinery.196 Accordingly, the possibility of an unforeseen or unforeseeable 
contingency causing the contract to be discharged deters the parties from 
entering into long-term contracts by which the public might benefit. 
Furthermore, as the parties are aware that any litigation for excuse of 
performance may result in a court-imposed modification, they will try to solve 
their problems through negotiation.
It should also be noted that in American law, the maxim that the courts 
will not make a contract for the parties, has lost most of its force. In other
194 Loc. cit.,at 17-18, 36-37.
195. Loc. cit., at 31.
196 Initially, to perform its part of the agreement, Essex entered into a separate long-term agreement 
to obtain a supply of aluminum. (ALCOA case, 499 F.Supp. 53, 82 (W.D.Pa. 1980).
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words, a court can often imply reasonable terms into a contract when the 
parties have failed to provide an express term. In this regard, Justice Holmes, 
the father of classical contract,197 states that a court may imply a condition for 
a variety of reasons: 'You always can imply a condition in contract. But why 
do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the 
community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, 
because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact 
quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact 
logical conclusion."198
But will parties be prepared to adjust voluntarily after the initial 
breakdown? Dawson concedes that parties are unlikely to do so. The 
German experience indicates that many parties lacked incentive to 
renegotiate during an inflationary period.199 Accordingly, the threat of a court- 
imposed adjustment may serve to encourage the parties to negotiate a 
solution.
Dawson argues that judges lack the parties' expertise in relation to the 
subject matter of the contract and their experience in bargaining contractual 
terms. He adds that problems such as risk allocation, understanding and 
applying complex accounting data and foreseeing future contingencies are 
complex matters unsuitable for judges. The present writer thinks that this 
argument is unconvincing. Complex matters are not unique to long-term 
agreements; they arise in short term contracts as well. Moreover, judges can 
refer to expert witnesses for advice.
Court-imposed modification also decreases the likelihood of litigation. 
Where there has been a frustrating event, the advantaged party does not 
have any option but to litigate in order to be excused further performance. 
Accordingly, security of long-term agreements will be increased.
The all-or-nothing approach in long-term contracts is conducive of 
other problems such as unexpected gains and losses, a lack of trust in good 
faith negotiation and a situation when the buyer usually wins. In Missouri 
Public Service Co. v. Peabody Coai Co.,200 the issue was whether a ten 
year contract, which included an index to adjust for inflation, should be
197 G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract, (1974) 5-55.
198 Oliver Wendell Holms, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev., (1897), 457,466; Hawkins v. 
Graham, 146 Mass. 284, at 287-88, 21 N.E. 312, at 313 (1889). Cf. Parv. Prod. Co. v. I. Rokeach 
and Sons, Inc., 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941); 18 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of 
Contracts, Sec. 1937, at 33 (3rd ed. 1978).
199 Dawson, op. cit., at 29-30.
200. 583, S.W.2d 721 (Mo.Ct.App.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
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discharged. Because of the failure of the index - resulting from a change in 
economic conditions precipitated by the Arab oil embargo - Peabody was left 
with an unexpected 3.4 million dollars loss on the contract.201 The Missouri 
Appeals court found that Peabody should have foreseen the embargo and its 
consequences for coal prices202 and left the loss where it fell. But if, contrary 
to court's decision, the embargo was not foreseeable,203 it is clear that such 
an imposition was unfair and inequitable.204
If economic analysis205 is applied in cases of impracticability, the seller 
will always lose the litigation, since the seller is in the better position to insure 
against possible contingencies. Moreover, as discussed before, interpretation 
of commercial impracticability by the courts is usually in favour of buyers.206
To place all the accidental loss on one party is very harsh in long-term 
contracts. When a contract is modified, neither party wins or loses as the loss 
will not fall entirely on one party. As we have seen in the ALCOA case, the 
loss was equitably split between the parties. Reformation is consonant with 
the principle that no one should knowingly cause harm to another without 
justification.207 The imposition of the entire loss on one party may undermine 
long-term relationships and may result in devastating economic effects for a 
large innocent group of independent suppliers and consumers. Reformation 
on the other hand may help both the parties to the contract and also persons 
indirectly affected, such as employees, subcontractors and agents. Thus, 
reformation operates to fill gaps in long-term commercial transactions and 
also provides a flexible process for the settlement of disputes. In other words, 
it may reflect what the parties would have agreed at the time of contracting if 
they had foreseen the problem of changed circumstances.
201. Loc. cit.
202 Loc. cit.
203. Some commentators have questioned the court's analysis of foreseeability. For example, see 
Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 Stan. L. Rev., 812, 835 (1961); Note, The 
UCC Section 2-615: Sharp Inflationary Increase in Cost as Excuse From Performance of Contract, 
50 Notre Dame Law, (1974), 297, 304-306; Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile 
Economy: Saving UCC Section 2-615 From the Common Law, 72 NW. U. L. Rev., (1978), 1032, 
1042.
204 Cf. Iowa Elec. Light and Power Co., v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D.Iowa, 1978), rev'd 
on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979).
205. Posner and Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: an Ecocomic 
Analysis, 6 J. Leg. Stud., (1977), 90-91.
206 For example , see Iowa Elec. Light Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa, 
1978) rev'd on the other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979). See also pp. 69 et seq.
207 Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 Cornell L. Rev., (1983), 
617, at 619.
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Court-imposed modification should be regarded as another aspect of 
the development of the current law of excuse. In other words, the court 
should not be limited to an all-or-nothing approach. If this were the case, the 
court would be able to prevent a party from being released from a 
disadvantageous contract since there is another option, i.e., modification 
which could be used to internalise some of the loss.
Finally, in the remedy of reformation, the judges have the benefit of 
hindsight to provide accurate information. This information helps the judges 
to modify the contract in a fair and equitable manner. For these reasons, it is 
thought that the all-or-nothing approach should be reappraised. In 
conclusion, it is submitted that:
(1) The remedy of modification should be available in extremely serious 
situations which arise in long-term agreements especially those concerned 
with international commerce where, for example, there are wide variations in 
foreign exchanges rates and the prices of many basic commodities such as 
oil and uranium.
(2) The events that bring about the change of circumstances and call for the 
application of modification, must be so extraordinary that they are not 
capable of being foreseen by the party and would not have been foreseeable 
by the reasonable man.
(3) As a general rule, a change of circumstances, even when fundamental, 
will not be relevant if the contract is speculative, for then the parties are 
deemed to have assumed the risk of such change of circumstances.
(4) Reasonable hardships or difficulties will not be taken into account; 
modification will only be appropriate if a party suffers considerable prejudice. 
In other words, the economic balance between the parties' respective 
performances must be drastically altered because of the increased onerosity 
of performance for one of the parties.
(5) The effects of the change of circumstances must be of such significance 
that the promisor would not have entered the contract had those changes 
been foreseeable.
(6) The party seeking modification must prove that because of the change of 
circumstances, the other party will obtain an unjust profit from the 
performance of the contract.
(7) Finally, long-term contracts can be terminated if the there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the basis of the contractual purpose is no longer 
existent.
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2.3. UCC TREATMENT OF MODIFICATION
Authority for judicial modification can be found in comment 6 to section 
2-615 UCC. The comment states that:
"In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either answer 
when the issue is posed in flat terms of 'excuse' or no 'excuse', adjustment 
under the various provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the 
sections on good faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading of all 
provisions in the light of their purposes, and the general policy of this Act to 
use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good 
faith."208
It is clear from the comment that sometimes the appropriate solution is 
adjustment of contract price rather than excuse or no excuse. The comment 
suggests that the court may fix a fair price where performance has become 
impracticable. The flexible nature of the comment permits remedies to be 
fashioned. This proposition is supported by the reference in the comment to 
section to the provisions on good faith when "neither sense nor justice is 
served" by a mechanical application of excuse or no excuse.
It should be noted that the comment gives little concrete guidance to 
judges who encounter the problem. In other words, it is not clear how the 
judges are to modify the contract. What does the concept of "good faith" 
cover? What is the relationship between the application of good faith and the 
assertion of a claim of impracticability? How should the "purposes and 
general policy" of the UCC be interpreted in relation to the contract?
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has adopted a provision 
analogous to comment 6 to UCC section 2-615 which is not particularly 
helpful. The Restatement provides only skeletal guidance to a judge 
attempting to reach a modification of contract. Section 272(2) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that when the traditional 
approach "will not avoid injustice" in discharge cases, the court may grant 
relief "on such terms as justice requires."
Two cases have addressed the issue of good faith. In Missouri 
Public Service Co. v. Peabody Coal Co.,209 the defendant informed its 
buyers that because of production cost increases it would not perform the 
contracts. Many of its customers acceded to an increase in price, but the 
Missouri Public Service Company refused to do so and sought specific 
performance. In his argument the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had
208 U.C.C. Sec. 2-615, Comment 6 (1978).
209 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1979). The second case considering the problem was Louisiana Power 
and Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Industries, 517 F.Supp. 1319 (E.D.La. 1981).
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acted in bad faith by refusing to accede to price modifications. The court 
rejected this argument, reasoning that:
"where an enforceable, unattained contract exists, refusing modification of 
price and seeking specific performance of valid covenants does not 
constitute bad faith or breach of contract. . . ".210
This case illustrates how the American courts are not willing to apply 
comment 6. However, whether or not the courts accept the remedy of 
modification, what is important is that both UCC and Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts as well as ALCOA decision constitute the first steps away from 
the "all or nothing" approach of the current discharge doctrine.
Although comment 6 and section 272 (2) of Restatement (Second) are 
not generally accepted by American courts, they are technically available if a 
court is confronted with a case in which neither discharge nor specific 
performance seems just. No such alternative can be found in current English 
law.
B. CIVIL LAW
1. FRANCE
1.1. EFFECTS OF FORCE MAJEURE
In principle, by the occurrence of force majeure - both in unilateral211 
and synallagmatic212 contracts - the debtor is totally exonerated from his 
obligation to perform and is discharged from his liability to pay damages for 
such non-performance.213 If the contract is unilateral, there is no problem., 
since in such case, there is only one obligation on the part of the debtor. For 
example, in a contract of loan, if the thing borrowed is destroyed by force 
majeure, the debtor is released.214 However, if the contract is synallagmatic 
and the debtor is released because of force majeure, does it mean that the 
creditor is also released? Article 1148 of French Civil Code only refers to 
debtor, and a literal interpretation of the Article would appear to limit the 
effect of force majeure to the debtor alone.
210. Missouri Public Service Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d. 721, at 725.
211. See Art. 1929 French Civil Code (Contract of Bailment [depot]).
212 Art. 1147 French Civil Code. See also Art. 1302 (Loss of the thing because of force majuere); 
Art. 1722 ( destruction of thing rented); Art. 1795 (Death of the worker, architect or entrepreneur). 
See also Arts. 1741, 1788,1790 and 1767.
213. Art. 1148. See also Civ., 14 Janv. 1941, D.A. 1941. 66.
214 See generally chapter 1, Sec. 2, Arts. 1880 et seq.
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Planiol maintains that since the obligations are conditional upon each 
other, neither party intends to bind himself to a contract without receiving 
counter performance: in which case, both should be discharged.215
Other jurists find a solution in the theory of risk (theorie de risques). 
They argue that the risk of the force majeure event lies on the debtor of the 
obligation which has become impossible. Accordingly, he can not seek the 
creditor's performance because it is terminated by force majeure.216 Murray 
relies on the notion of equivalence of the parties' obligations. He asserts that 
it is of the nature of a reciprocal contract that each party considers his 
performance as an equivalent for the counter-performance of the other: 
equivalence is nothing more than equivalence of values between reciprocal 
exchange.217
It seems that the most logical basis for excusing the counter­
performance is the failure of the cause of the obligation. In Civil law, contrary 
to English law, "no consideration" is needed to make an obligation 
enforceable, but a cause must be found at the root of every obligation so as 
to make it binding. In effect, in bilateral contracts, the obligation of one party 
acts as cause for the obligation of the other. That cause is the motive, 
reason, or purpose for which the party undertakes the obligation.218 If by 
reason of force majeure, the desired execution of one party becomes 
impossible, the other party is likewise released from his obligation to perform, 
since the obligation to perform disappears with the destruction of its cause. 
Capitant contends that Planiol's theory that the two obligations are 
conditional upon each other is merely the application of cause by a different 
name.219 It should be added that while the French Code does not expressly 
recognise this doctrine as a general principle, there are various particular 
applications of it in many Articles of the Code.220 If we regard force majeure 
as being related to theorie de la cause, the effect is that the doctrine
215. 2 Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil (1932), n. 1337, at 501.
216. See e. g ., H. Mazeaud, J. Mazeaud and Francois Chabas, Lecon de Droit, Tome II, premiere 
volume, Obligations, Theorie General, Montchrestien, 1991, pp. 663, 116 et seq; Jean Raduant, 
Force Majuere, Dalloz, Repertoir de Driot Civil, Tome II, 833, at 837 (1952). See also Arts. 1722, 
1741, and 1867.
217. Murray, Notion D'equivalence, 1920, at 31.
218 Capitant, De la Cause des Obligations (3 ed. 1927), nos. 7, 133, 138, pp. 30, 290, 301; Planiol et 
Repert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil Francais, vi (1930), n. 411. p. 576; Colin et Capitant, Cours 
Elementaire de Droit Civil Francais II (6 ed. 1931) at 299.
219 Capitant, op. cit., n. 138 at 301.
220 See e. g., Arts. 1722, 1741, 1788, 1790, 1867.
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necessarily entails the nullity of obligations without the need for recourse to a 
court to rescind the contract.221
When the question comes before the courts, they usually apply Article 
1184, French Civil Code.222 This Article gives the party to whom execution is 
due a right to demand specific performance or resolution with damages. In 
other words, it is concerned with the judicial rescission of the contract when 
non-performance is due to the fault of the debtor: no mention is made of the 
case where non-performance is due to excusable impossibility. Nevertheless, 
in a recent case,223 the Cour de Cassation has reaffirmed that Article 1184 
has general application and is relevant both in a case where non­
performance is imputable to the debtor and in a case of force majeure. The 
leading case, Ceccaldi v. Albertini,224 justifies the application of Article 1184 
in a case of force majeure in terms of cause. The court stated that Article 
1184 does not distinguish between causes of non-performance and does not 
prevent cancellation upon the ground of force majeure when one party has 
failed to perform his obligation. In effect:
"in a synallagmatic contract, the obligation of one party has a cause, the 
obligation of the other, and vice versa, such that if one is not fulfilled, the 
obligation of the other becomes without cause."225
The approach of the Cour de Cassation can be criticised. First, on a 
literal interpretation of the language used in Article 1184, its application is 
limited to those situations where rescission is sought because of non­
performance arising from the fault of the defendant. The words, "does not 
perform" in the Article lend weight to this argument. Moreover, the Article 
allows "dommage-interets" (damages) to be awarded but, as we have seen, 
damages should be irrelevant in cases of impossibility of performance. 
Secondly, the decisions of the Cour de Cassation unreasonably combine 
actions for rescission and actions for nullity of contract. The Article provides 
for resolution of the contract by the court, yet, according to the doctrine of 
cause, the contract is terminated automatically without the need for 
intervention by a judge.
221. See e. g., Arts. 1108 and 1131 . For a case of absence of cause, see Cass. Civ. 17. 12. 1959, D. 
1960. 294.
222 Ceccaldi v. Albertini, Cass. Civ., April 14, 1891, D. 1891,1. 329, S. 1894.1. 391; Cerfschmer v. 
Delobel, Cass. Civ., Aug. 3, 1875, D. 1875 I. 409; Former v. Gros, Cass. Civ., May 5, 1920, S. 1921 
I. 298. See also, 6 Dec. 1909, D.P. 1910. 1. 281; 5 Mai 1920, D.P.1926. 1. 37.
223. March 12th. 1985, Bull. Civ. 1. n: 94. p. 87.
224. Cass. Civ., April 14, 1891, D. 1891. 1. 329; S. 1894. 1. 391.
225. S. 1944. 1. 99.
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In English law, a frustrating event automatically brings the obligation to 
perform the contract to an end: in force majeure, the court acting under 
Article 1184 grants rescission of the contract. Under English and French law, 
both parties are discharged from further performance. The point to be made 
is that in English law the fact that both parties are discharged has long been 
settled by authority: whereas in French law this has been inferred from the 
Article, for the reasons discussed above . The ultimate result is therefore the 
same.
1.1,1. SCOPE OF RESTITUTION AFTER OCCURRENCE OF 
FORCE MAJEURE
A consequence of Article 1184 is that a decree of rescission operates 
retrospectively to annul the contract with the result that each party is bound 
to return to the other what he has received. Thus, restitution, in kind or in 
money, must be made of benefits received by each party.226 If restitution can 
not be made, when, for example, a thing has been consumed or services 
rendered, then compensation may have to be paid. In Anglo-American 
Telegraph Co. v. Compagnie Francaise de Paris a New York,227 the two 
companies entered into a long-term contract in 1880. In 1887, the French 
company refused to keep performing the contract and, indeed, was forbidden 
to carry out the contract by Ministerial letter of 21 May 1891. The Anglo- 
American company sued the French company and claimed the return of 
certain monies paid to the defendant since 1880 and damages. The Paris 
Cour d'Appel held that during the years 1880-86, the contract was being 
properly carried out and the plaintiff was entitled to nothing. During the years, 
1887-91, the French company was in breach and the court awarded an 
account of sums due. Finally, from 21 May 1891 to the expiry of the contract, 
the Ministerial letter was found to be force majeure and no damages were 
awarded in respect of that period.
The current English approach concerning the down payments is more 
or less the same as in France. According to the doctrine of cause, when the 
performance of one of the parties becomes excused due to force majeure, 
the performance of the other party is also excused. Both parties are then 
treated as if they had never entered the contract. Thus, money paid, for 
example, to secure the performance of the contract or paid to get the 
counterpart, is recoverable.
226 Cass. Civ. 4. 5. 1898, S. 1898. 1. 281; D. 1898.1. 457.
227. Loc. cit.
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As to the question whether or not a party can claim remuneration for 
partial performance, the solution given by French law, under Articles 1787- 
1790 of the Civil Code, is that a person whose work is destroyed before 
delivery by force majeure can not claim any remuneration.228 Similarly if 
materials are supplied for installation in a building and these materials - 
whether or not installed in the building - are destroyed by force majeure 
before delivery, then, again, the party who supplied the materials can not ask 
for remuneration.229 This result is radically different from that which would 
have been reached under the 1943 Act if as discussed above, the materials 
installed in the building were treated as a benefit.230 However, the French 
argue that under the maxim of res perit dominio, the risk of destruction of the 
materials lies on the owner.231
The question of reliance expenditure incurred by one party in 
preparing to carry out the contract has not been discussed at length in 
French law. The problem is resolved under the theory of "le risque 
contractuel". It appears that one of the parties must bear the whole risk.232 
For the reasons already discussed,233 this solution is not fair and in this 
respect French law requires amendment. The best solution is to impose the 
loss between the two innocent parties equally.
It has to be added that in the French legal system, the courts are not 
willing to reform the contracts in changed circumstances. The "all-or-nothing" 
approach is the only solution. In this regard, English courts are more flexible 
than their French counterparts.
It has been argued234 that in a case of force majeure, the excused 
party is obliged, under the principle of good faith,235 to inform the other party 
of the situation in order to prevent him incurring extra costs. Failure to do so 
will result in the excused party being liable in damages.236 In English law, the 
party whose performance becomes impossible is under no duty to inform the
228 Cf. Appleby v. Myers (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651.
229 Cf Weil, 1971, op. cit., at 519.
230 See generally pp. 152 etseq.
231. Weil, op. cit., at 522-23; Mazeaud, L. Lecons, Tome. 3, Vol. 2, Principaux Contrats, 1968, at 
544.
232 See P. B. Mignault, La Frutration d'un Contrat, La Revue de Barreau, 387,1942, at 402.
233. See generally pp. 152 etseq.
234 E.g., see Fiat, at 18.
235. Art. 1134 French Civil Code.
236 Fiat, op. cit., at 20.
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other party of the situation., since frustration causes the cessation of the 
obligation to perform the contract ipso facto.
1.1.2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
The general rule that a contract is totally discharged because of force 
majeure, has the following exceptions: -
1. Contractual237 and legal238 risks;
2. If the debtor has been in mis en demeur; this means that if he delays in 
delivering a specific thing - which is the subject of the obligation - and the 
thing is destroyed by force majeure, he will be responsible for such 
destruction;239
3. Partial exoneration where the damage has two distinct causes, viz., force 
majeure and fault of the defendant. In this case, partial exoneration might be 
admitted by French jurisprudence;240
4. Partial impossibility, which will be discussed later;241
5. Temporary impossibility. Although this is not to be found in the French Civil 
Code, in a case of temporary impossibility the courts do not permit total 
exoneration but suspend the contract,242 until the obstacle has 
disappeared.243 Although this is also the case in American law,244 in English 
law the delay in performance is simply excused with the consequence that 
the non-performing party will not be liable in damages for delay.245 
Nevertheless, he is bound to perform his obligation in the future. If time 
appears to be of the essence of the contract, in that case temporary non­
performance will justify the other party in rescinding the contract.246 But what
237 See Arts. 1772,1773, and 1811.
238 Arts. 1881 and 1882.
239 Arts. 1302 and 1929. See also Req. 4 Juill. 1882, D. P. 82. 1. 353; Req. 19 Nov. 1872, D. P. 73. 
1. 215; 20 Mai 1874, D. P. 76. 1. 35; Civ. 7 Avr. 1945, 385.
240. See Transport Maritime de I'Etatv. Brosset etc., Civ. Com. june 19th. 1951 (2 arrets), D. 1951. 
1717. However, recent cases indicate that this tendency has been abandoned., see Mazeaud, 
Responsibilite, op. cit., at 737.
241. Infra, pp. 234 et. seq.
242 Cass. Civ. 15 Feb. 1888, D. 1888,1, 203; Cass. Req. 15 Nov. 1921, D. 1922, v, 14,; Req. Oct. 
24th. 1922. D. 1924. 1. 8. C. Cass.
243. Dame Saurin v. Dame Bonnafous, Civ. lere. Feb. 24th. 1981. D. 1982. 479.
244 Village ofMinneota v. Fair Banks, Morse and Co., 226 Minn. 1, 31 N.W.2d 920 (1948); Autry v. 
Republic Prods., 30 Cal.2d 144, 180 P.2d 888 (1947). See also Patterson, Temporary Impossibility 
of performance of Contract, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1961; Restatement of Contracts (Second), Sec. 269.
245. Supra, at 43. For Frustrating Delay, see J. E. Stannard, 46 Mod. L. Rev., 1983, 738.
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if time is not of the essence of the contract but the party seeking relief will be 
prejudiced by the delay? In French law, the judge has to ascertain what the 
parties' intentions were at the time of the formation of the contract. What is 
important is that the performance of the contract after delay should not be 
useless247 and still conform to the intentions of both parties.248 In English law, 
the criterion is that the contract is discharged if the delayed performance 
frustrates the contract.249 This means that the claimant has to prove that the 
delay will cause such a change of circumstances that performance will be a 
thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract.
It should be added that advance payments are recoverable if the 
payer does not receive an equivalent during the period of suspension.250 
French jurisprudence does not admit any modification in the contract after 
performance has become possible.251
Suspension is automatic and does not require a court order. For 
example, where an employment contract is suspended, the employer will not 
pay the employee and the employee will not work for the employer: This 
arises automatically.252
246. In French law, see e. g., Bour v. Hertz et coquelin, Trib. Sein, Dec. 14, 1916, Gaz. Trib. 1916 II. 
4; Levy v. Despretz, Cass. Civ., June 3, 1929, S. 1929 I. 365; Jonat v. Societe du Jardin 
d'Acclimation, Cass. Civ., June 10, 1929, S. 1929 I. 267. In English law see Parkin v. Thorold (1852) 
16 Beav. 59; United Scientific Holdings v. Burnley B.C. [1977] 2 W.L.R. 806. In American law see 
Allanwilde Transport Co. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 284 U.S. 377, 39 S.Ct. 147, 63 L.Ed. 312, 3 A.L.R. 15; 
Leopold v. Salkey, 89 ill. 412, 31 Am. Rep. 93; Hong v. Independant School Dist., 181 Minn. 309, 
232 N.W. 329, 72 A.L.R. 280; Horwitzv. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 45 S.Ct. 344, 69 L.Ed. 736.
247. Devaux, Pichetty v. Salmon et Forges etAcieries de la marine, Trib. Sein, March 16, 1917, Gaz. 
Pal. Dec. 31, 1917. (If in sale contract, price of a commodity fluctuates greately, in that case, 
suspension might not be allowed).
248 Cass. Req. 28 November 1934, S. 1935, I. 105; See also Weil, 1971, op. cit., at 441. Cf. 
Rungeard etc. v. Giallard. Ch. des Requetes, Feb. 13th. 1872 D. 1871. 2. 177 (The court should 
examine whether or not the time limit in contract is essential, since further performance after the 
time limit will be useless).
249 Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 26; Price v. 
Milner [1968] E.G.D. 234; Wrong Lai Chingv. Chinachem (1979) 13 Build.L.Rev. 86; Marshall v. 
Harland and Wolff [1972] I.C.R. 101; Kidston v. Monceau Ironworks (1902) 7 Com. Cas. 82; The 
Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 103.
250 See Bassotv. Basset, Cour de Paris, Oct. 19, 1916, Gaz. Trib. 1916 II. 530.
251. Fiat, op. cit., at 142 and cases cited.
252 See Raduant, op. cit., at 274. In American law, see Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558 (7th 
Cir.), cert, denied 326 U.S. 741, 66 S.Ct. 53, 90 L.Ed. 442 (1945) (Patent licence could not be 
utilized during wartime; frustration is not total, since usable after end of war, duty to pay royalty 
suspended).
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1.1.3. SPECIAL SOLUTION IN CONTRACTS INVOLVING THE 
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF A SPECIAL THING - ARTICLE 
1138
According to Article 1138 of French Civil Code, in a contract of sale of 
a specific thing, as soon as the contract is formed, the buyer bears the risk of 
the destruction of the thing as a result of force majeure, even if it has not 
been delivered to him.253 This rule is not mandatory. Accordingly the parties 
are allowed to stipulate in their contract that the seller will be liable until the 
thing is delivered. Moreover, the seller will bear the risk, even though 
ownership has passed to the buyer, if the buyer has given notice to the seller 
to deliver. On notification, the risk of any damage or destruction by force 
majeure falls upon the seller. These rules also apply to other contracts, such 
as a contract of loan for use254 (pret a usage), and contract of hire of work 
and skill255 (louge de service). Thus, for example, in a contract of hire of 
work, the owner of the thing upon which work or service is being carried out, 
for example, repair of a machine, is not obliged to pay for that work or service 
unless he has benefited from the work done.256
1.2. EFFECTS OF IMPREVISION
As we have seen,257 the theory of imprevision has not been accepted 
in civil or commercial case law. In applying the theory, the Tribunaux 
Administratifs of France, especially the Conseil d'Etat, generally take the 
following steps: First, the parties are invited by the judge to renegotiate in 
good faith so as to agree to certain conditions.258 Secondly, if amicable 
adjustment by the parties fails, the court may grant what is called an 
"indemnite d'imprevision" which in fact would most probably cover at least 
part of the increased cost of the claimant's performance.259 In measuring 
indemnite, the courts take into account all the circumstances, such as the 
economic situation of the claimant, profits and advantages expected.
253. Weil, 1971, at 522-523.
254 Art. 1877 of French Civil Code.
255. Arts. 1788-90 of French Civil Code.
256 Art. 1790. Cf. Appleby v. Meyers (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651.
257. Supra pp. 15-17.
258. Compagni General d'Eclairage de Bordeaux v. Vi 11 de Bordeaux, Conseil d'Etat, March 30, 
1916, D. 1916. 3. 25; S. 1916. 3. 17.
259. Loc. cit. See also Conseil e'Etat, 27 Mars 1926, D. 1927. 3. 17; Conseil d'Etat 9 Decembre 1932, 
D. 1933. 1. 17; S. 1933. 3. 9.
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However, in practice the administration bears most of the actual losses (from 
80 to 90 per cent).
It is believed that the court should not fix the terms of the contract for 
future,260 as it is only the parties who can adjust the contract and it is not 
open to the court to do so.261 However, it is rather difficult to avoid this, 
because future losses and gains should also be taken into account in order to 
determine how the losses should be equitably shared.262
In summary, if the parties are not able to agree between themselves 
on the special conditions in which the plaintiff will be able to continue to 
perform the contract, the judge, taking all the facts into account, will have to 
determine the amount of indemnity so as to enable the plaintiff to perform his 
obligation under the contract with a reasonable margin of profit in the new 
circumstances which have arisen.263 In the leading case, Gaz de 
Bordeaux,264 the plaintiff suffered considerable loss as a result of the rise in 
coal prices. The Conseil d'Etat came to the conclusion that without an 
adjustment, the plaintiff would face financial ruin. Accordingly, it decided that 
the administration had to share with the plaintiff the additional burden by 
granting an adequate indemnity.
It should be noted that the remedy in this case was granted where the
change of circumstances was merely temporary. If the situation becomes
permanent, imprevision becomes force majeure and the court may grant
recession of the contract. For example, C/e. des Tramways de
Cherbourg265 involved a tramcar concession. Because of high rates, the
company lost its customers. On the verge of bankruptcy, the company
petitioned for financial assistance from the Administration. The petition was
rejected by the administration and this decision was affirmed by the lower
administrative court. However, the Conseil d'Etat held:
'The new situation thus created constitutes a case of force majeure and 
authorises either party, in the absence of a mutually satisfactory agreement, 
to claim for termination of the contract with compensation if due, taking into 
consideration the provision of the contract as well as all circumstances."
260 6 Planiol and Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil (2nd ed. 1952), Sec. 398, p. 538.
261. M. Walline, Droit Administratif, (9eme ed., Edition Sirey, 1963), p. 734.
262 Closset, Note, in D. 1927. III. 17.
263. See Conseil d'Etat, 30 Mars 1916, D. 1916. 3. 25.
264. op. cit.
265. Cons. d'Etat. Decembre 9, 1932, S. 1933. 3. 9., 1933 D. III. 17.
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1.3. SPECIAL SITUATIONS ON THE MODIFICATION OF THE 
CONTRACTS IN CIVIL LAW
The rigor of French civil jurisprudence resulted in intervention by the 
legislature. A series of laws were enacted after the First World War. As a 
result, performance of certain contracts which had become so burdensome 
for the obligor that he would become totally ruined, were not to be upheld. 
The most celebrated law, Loi Faillot266 allowed the debtor to demand the 
resolution of a contract entered into before the war. The judge was not 
authorised to revise the contract, but he might upon the request of one of the 
parties, order the suspension of the contract, with or without indemnity.267 
Similar laws were enacted after the Second World War. The law of 22 April 
1949, allowed judges to declare the cancellation of such contracts. The 
legislature then took further steps and authorised the courts to modify the 
contract where the performance of the contract had become burdensome. 
This was particularly marked in the case of apartment and farm leases.268 
More recently, the law of 18 April 1946 (Art. 3) and the law of 25 August 1948 
again authorised the judges to modify certain leases.
2. GERMANY
2.1. EFFECTS OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
In cases of initial impossibility, the contract is void269 and the obligor is 
released from his obligation. However, this rule is not jus cogens. For 
example, in the sale of a non-existing right, the contract is not void and the 
seller is responsible for any damage unless the right is the one the creation 
of which is impossible.270
According to paragraph 275 of the BGB which relates to contracts in 
general, the promisor becomes free of his obligation as a result of 
impossibility of performance occurring after the conclusion of the contract. 
The BGB also contains a special provision on leases that permits the scaling 
down of rent when the asset leased becomes unfit for the purpose of the
266 Loi du 21 Janvier 1918. The most important of these laws are: Loi du 6 Juillet 1925; Loi du 9 
Jilin 1927; Loi du 21 Juillet 1927; Loi du 29 Juin 1935; Loi du 18 Avril 1966; Loi du 25 Aout 1948; 
Loi du 25 Mars 1949; Loi du 22 Avril 1949; Loi du 2 Aout 1949; Loi du 24 Mai 1951; Loi du 22 
Juillet 1952; Loi du 9 Avril 1953.
267 Cass. Req., 26 Dec. 1927, Gaz. Palais, 28 Feb.
268. Law of 6 July 1925; Law of 9 June 1927; law of April 1933; Law of 12 July 1933.
269 Para. 306 B.G.B.
270 R.G.Z. (Official collection: Entscheidungen des Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen, Vol. 90, p. 240.) 
(Cited in Gottchalk, p. 129).
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lease.271 Paragraph 275(1) BGB deals with objective impossibility, while 
paragraph 275(2) BGB deals with subjective impossibility. However, 
paragraph 279 BGB makes a significant exception to the principle in 
paragraph 275(2). Under paragraph 279, if an object that the promisor has 
undertaken to deliver is defined generically, he is responsible for his 
subjective impossibility to deliver although no fault is imputable to him, 
provided delivery of a thing of that genus is objectively possible.272
In reciprocal contracts, where the performance becomes impossible 
for one party, neither he nor his partner remains responsible.273 In other 
words, this means that in this situation, impossibility cancels the contract and 
releases both parties from performance. In German law recession operates 
to bring the parties back to the status quo; while in English law, frustration 
merely frees them from future performance.274
Restitution in German law rests upon the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment.275 According to paragraph 812 BGB, a person who acquires 
something without legal ground, through the performance of another or 
otherwise at his expense, is obliged to return it to him. Thus, any down 
payments, benefits conferred and partial performance may be subject to 
restitution.
While there is doubt whether unjust enrichment is completely 
recognised in English law,276 the doctrine is very important in German law. As 
we have seen, the doctrine is not as well developed in France, because, 
unlike the BGB, no Articles in the Code expressly277 establish the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment: and in so far as it is applicable in French law, this has 
been through jurisprudence.278
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is, however, open to criticism. It only 
applies if a benefit is obtained to which the acquirer had no legal right. In 
excusable non-performance, it is presupposed that the contract expressly
271. Para. 537 B.G.B.
272 B. v. Bremer Rolandmuehle (Reichsgericht, Second Civil Senate), 23 Feb. 1904, 57 ERGZ 116. 
(Cited in Von Mehren and Gorderly, op. cit., p. 1067).
273. Para. 323 B.G.B.
274 Supra pp. 142-143.
275. See Paras. 812-822 B.G.B.
276. See A. M. Haycroft and D. M. Waksman, op. cit., at 208.
277. Art. 1377 refers to payment by mistake; Art. 1376 refers to money or property received without 
consideration, and Art. 1379 refers to the obligation to restore specific property in kind.
278 Req. 15 June 1892, D. 1892. 1. 596, S. 1893. 1. 281. (In this case, the Cour de Cassation laid 
down the rule that a person may not enrich himself unduly at another's expense).
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gives the party benefited a legal right to performance. Furthermore, the 
doctrine does not consider any minor benefit to be unjust enrichment and it is 
therefore difficult to determine when a benefit qualifies as unjust.279
Under paragraph 818 BGB, a party is not required to return benefits 
received when he is no longer enriched thereby. Thus, reliance expenditures 
incurred in preparation of the performance, will not be recoverable. This 
means in effect that apportionment for the reliance can not be sought.
In sale, the risk of accidental destruction or deterioration passes to the 
buyer on the delivery of the thing sold. Contrary to French Law, the risk is not 
transferred to the buyer on the conclusion of the contract and rests with the 
seller.280
2.2. EFFECTS OF WEGFALL DER GESCHAFTSGRUNDLAGE
In Germany, there has been more judicial involvement with the 
problem of changed circumstances than in the other countries studied. It is 
now well established that the courts, as a result of unexpected changed 
circumstances, may either terminate the contract or modify the terms of the 
contract by substituting new terms for those agreed by parties. In German 
law, adjustment is preferred to termination of the contract.
Within the scope of this research, it is, however, impossible to analyse 
the abundant case law and only one of the most important decisions of the 
Bundesgerichtshof (German high court) will be discussed.
2.2.1. THE VOLKSWAGEN CASE™
In this case, the plaintiffs (two buyers) had ordered Volkswagen cars 
very shortly prior to the war. They had also made payments on the cars. 
When the war occurred, the defendant's factory was promptly taken over by 
Hitler's government for war production and was then heavily bombed, with 
the destruction estimated at 65 percent. The money paid by the plaintiffs and 
other buyers was confiscated by the Russians when they reached Berlin. 
After the war, the defendant started producing cars. The plaintiffs sued the 
defendant for delivery of the automobiles they had ordered. The German 
intermediate court of appeal dismissed the action, declaring that the 
foundation of the contracts had been destroyed. The court argued that the
279 H. Smit, op. cit., at 292.
280 Para. 446 B.G.B.
281. 1952 JZ 145 (BGH Oct. 23, 1951) (Cited in Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: 
Germany, 6 B. Uni. L. Rev., 1983, 1039, at 1083-1088).
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sale price had risen from the agreed price of 990 marks to 4400 marks and it 
would be wrong to order the defendant to deliver a car at the original price. 
Moreover, the court said it did not have the power to bind both parties to new 
terms.
The Bundesgerichtshof disagreed holding that the collapse of the 
foundation of a contract does not necessarily lead to termination of the 
contract:
"In law one must start from the premise that the contracts are to be 
performed. The courts by virtue of [paragraph] 242 are authorised when the 
foundations of a transaction have been destroyed to intervene in a contract 
relation and extensively reshape it. The duties expressed in the contract can 
in such a case be very considerably changed to the extent this is needed in 
order to ensure that performance will serve those interests of both parties 
that deserve to be considered."
The Bundesgerichtshof added that the lower court had apparently 
been under the misconception that it must be able by its decree to alter the 
obligations of the other 336,000 buyers who had made their own separate 
contracts and were not parties to the action. While this was clearly 
impossible, it was not necessary. The contracts of the other buyers were 
relevant only for deciding what performance could fairly be demanded by 
these two plaintiffs from the defendant. It was for this reason that it was 
important to know how many other buyers had asserted claims under their 
contracts, how many were able to make the payments that were still due from 
them and how many did not want cars after all and merely their money back. 
With such claims for restitution, there would be the question whether they 
should be awarded the full amount paid or whether like other debts that had 
been incurred before 1948, it must be cut down to one-tenth of the original 
amount. The lower court had also to ascertain whether the defendant had 
used the money paid by the buyers to acquire other assets or profits. In order 
to determine what price the plaintiffs would be required to pay, the trial court 
would need to discover the actual cost of production of a Volkswagen car (in 
this regard, the parties has made contradictory assertions) and the present 
rate of production at the defendant's plant. Moreover, it was important that 
the defendant's plant be ordered to produce the maximum number of cars, 
since the trial court must set a deadline for the performance of the pre-war 
contracts so as to ensure that their performance would not be prolonged far 
into the distant future.
As this case shows, there were huge and unmanageable tasks to be 
taken by the lower court. The trial judge was ordered to find out what had 
happened to 336,000 buyers who had bought cars thirteen years before
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during which death and migration of Germans occurred on an enormous 
scale. The trial judge had to find out the defendant's current production costs, 
profits and financial situation. The trial judge was also ordered to consider 
whether the defendant should be given credit for any of the highly variable 
overhead costs it had incurred before, during and after the war and how 
much credit the buyers - who had to wait so long for their cars - should 
receive for the payments made before the war.
It is clear that in doing so the trial judge will encounter a lot of 
inaccessible facts and complex matters. Why then should the courts be given 
such authority? The present writer has argued that the remedy of 
modification can only be accepted in respect of revision of long-term 
contracts and even then only applied within a framework of limitations and 
conditions.282 He would certainly not allow the remedy in respect of the 
contracts in the Volkswagen case. Moreover, in cases such as Volkswagen, 
the question arises whether the judge is capable of managing the mass of 
evidence necessary for adjustment. What is the procedure to obtain the data 
required by the court to achieve a desirable result? Finally, what are the 
advantages of Volkswagen decision for future contracts? It is submitted that 
the approach in the Volkswagen case is unnecessary, of little utility, far from 
the main task of a court and, more importantly, is open to subjective 
manipulation. Finally it results in uncertainty as parties can not know what 
attitude a court will take in similar cases.
2.2.2. FORMS OF MODIFICATION
As we have seen, the consequence of the collapse of the basis of 
contract is usually adaptation of contract. This may take the following various 
forms:
It may be in the form of a limitation of demand or delay in the 
performance of the contract.283 The adjustment may result in an increase of 
performance so as to provide an equivalent for benefits already received.284 
In a long-term rental contract, for example, the plaintiff was bound to supply 
the defendant with steam at a fix price for heating purposes. The change in 
the value of money (because of the inflation of the early 1920s) rendered the 
rent a ridiculously inappropriate consideration for the value of the steam that
282 Supra, p. 181.
283. BGH. Monatsschrift Fur Deutsches Recht 1953, 282; NJW 1958, 758. (Cited in Hay, op. cit., at 
36).
284 BGH. DerBetrieb 1985, 1325 (Cited in Hay, op. cit.).
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had to be supplied. The judgement of Reichsgericht (1920) raised the price 
for the steam above what had been agreed in the contract since, otherwise, 
the situation would have been intolerable for the plaintiff and would have 
been against the principles of good faith and equity.285
Another form of modification may lead to a reduction in the obligation 
of the contacting party. For example, in one case, which involved a 
usufructuary lease of property for the purposes of construction, a subsequent 
regulation prohibited construction on that property. The lessee demanded a 
reduction of the rent and argued that he considered that the basis of the 
lease was that the land could be used for the erection of a building. Although 
the lessor stressed that the lessee had given up his plan to build, the court 
decided that the lessee was to be granted a reduction in the rent, since it 
would violate the principle of good faith expressed in paragraph 242 BGB, if 
no reduction was made.286
Sharing either the loss or the profit resulting from the contract287 or an 
internal change in the terms of performance are other illustrations of 
adjustment of contracts. In one case,288 two heirs of a family who owned a 
farm, gave their right of inheritance to another heir. He was expected to 
continue running the farm as a family concern. Because of his sudden death, 
his son sold the farm for DM1,000,000. One of the heirs demanded an 
increase in compensation, commensurate with this development. The BGH 
decided in her favour. The court held that a compensation arrangement 
would have to be found, to which reasonable parties would have agreed if 
they had contemplated at the time of contracting that the farm would be sold 
out of the family.
Other appropriate modification might be also required by the courts 
depending on particular facts and circumstances involved, for example, a 
requirement to produce alternating electric current might be substituted for an 
obligation to supply direct current.289
Termination of contract may be allowed if adaptation is not possible or 
can not reasonably be required.290 According to unjust enrichment theory,291
285. RGZ, Vol. 100, at 129,139. (Cited in Cohn, J. Comp. Leg. and Int'l. L., 1946, op. cit., at 19).
286 BGH NJW 58, 758. (Cited in Meinecke, op. cit., at 109).
287 Joachim Meinecke, op. cit.
288 Cf. BGH LM no.40 on Para. 242; BGHZ 40, 334 (338) (Cited in Meinecke, op. cit.).
289 BGH NJW 1954, 1323. (Cited in Hay, op. cit., at 364).
290 BGH (1959) JZ 482. (Cited in Rainer Geiger, The Unilateral Change of Economic Development 
Agreements, 23 Int'l. and Comp. L. Q., 1974, 73, at 95).
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each party must return to the other whatever he received in return for any 
obligations not performed. If restitution is not possible the party who has 
been unjustly enriched must pay compensation.
Before discussing other matters, the question arises whether contract 
modification can take the form of substituting a completely different physical 
subject matter for that promised but which can no longer be delivered. The 
answer is in the affirmative! However, the German courts rarely do so. In one 
case, a plaintiff contracted with a builder for the erection of a house on a tract 
of farm land leased by the plaintiff. The local housing officer refused a permit 
to erect a house on the land. The plaintiff claimed impossibility of 
performance and sought the return of his down payment. The defendant did 
not accept the plaintiffs claim, arguing that there was other land some 
distance away owned by a third party who was willing to lease it to the 
plaintiff at the same rent. Moreover, a building permit could be secured for a 
building on the new land which had the same features, such as fresh air and 
a good view, as the land the plaintiff had originally wanted. The German high 
court (Bundesgerichtshof) held that if the defendant proved these facts, the 
trial court would be required to accept his offer and the contract as thus 
revised would be enforced.292
It should be noted that like French imprevision, in the case of a 
transaction with speculative elements,293 or where the risk was foreseeable to 
the party and he could have protected himself by an appropriate clause,294 
the German courts will not accept modification.
Unlike English law, supervening events in Germany do not 
automatically lead to termination of the contract. The reason is that the policy 
of German courts is, under the principle of contractual loyalty and commercial 
security, to maintain the contractual relationship as far as possible. The result 
is that the courts are willing not only to supplement, but also to change, the 
contractual terms295 so as to allow modification according to standards of
291. Paras. 812-822 B.G.B.
292 1966 JZ 409 (BGH 1966). A different decision was held in 1972, JZ 120 (OLG Karlsruhe 1971), 
which involved a conract to deliver over a period of ten years a large quantity of coal (936,000 tons) 
to be produced in three designated mines in Ruhr. When the three mines were permanently closed 
because of their high production costs, the seller offered but was not allowed to deliver coal of the 
same quality produced at other mines. In dicta, the court added that similarly the buyer if  he had 
desired it, could not have demanded coal from other mines.(Cited in Dawson, at 1089).
293. Bundesgerichtshof, Der Betriebsberater (1964), p. 1397. (Cited in Wolfgang, op. cit.).
294 BGHZE, p. 293, at 295. (Cited in Wolfgang, op. cit.).
295. Cf. Volkswagen decision of the BGH (1952) NJW, 137
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good faith. As with imprevision,296 the parties are initially encouraged to 
attempt to renegotiate an adaptation in good faith.297
In Anglo-American and French law, the courts generally deny 
adjustment and in an appropriate case merely discharge the parties from 
liability to perform the contract. In German law, however, the courts are 
willing not only to supplement, but also to change express contractual 
terms298 to permit a modification according to the presumed intent of the 
parties or to objective standards of fair dealing and good faith. Thus, a variety 
of options are available due to completely open nature of the doctrine of 
wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage. German law leaves the determination of 
supervening events as well as its effects to the courts. While in English law, 
the 1943 Act limits itself to the effects of frustration and, as discussed 
before,299 it does not define a frustrating event; this is done by the courts.
In conclusion, it can be said that neither Civil law nor Common law 
have as yet achieved a comprehensive and acceptable solution to the 
problems we have been discussing. The Common law approach to frustration 
is too rigid, while the approach in German law is too liberal in that it gives a 
blanket power to the courts to revise a contract even if the changed 
circumstances are not very harmful and the contractual balance between the 
parties is not basically disrupted. Surprisingly, contractual revision has also 
been granted in the form of substituting a totally different subject matter for 
that promised! The German approach is therefore seriously open to 
subjective manipulation, which raises undesirable hopes for possible 
modification and reduces the stability and security of any agreement - 
especially in transnational commercial transactions. Accordingly, the present 
writer contends that the best way in order to avoid the defects in the domestic 
laws, is for the parties to protect themselves by a well-drafted force majeure 
clause. How easy is this solution? How should we draft a comprehensive 
force majeure clause? These are important issues which are discussed in 
final chapter of this thesis.
296 Conseil d'Etat, March 30. 1916. S. 1916. 3. 17.
297 Lesguillons, op. cit., at 532.
298 See Volkswagen case, at 194-196.
2" . Supra, p. 146.
CHAPTER FIVE: 
EFFECTS OF PARTIAL EXCUSABLE NON-PERFORMANCE
As will be discussed, partial excuse of non-performance does not 
ordinarily bring the contract to end. Generally, if the part of the obligor's 
performance that is excused is so minor that it is still practicable for him to 
render substantial performance, he is expected to perform the obligation 
which remains possible. The problem which is likely to arise is to determine 
what alteration is to be made in the other party's obligation to render counter 
performance? What proportion of the original consideration is the discharged 
party still entitled to receive? If a person is under two or more contractual 
obligations and due to an intervening event, can not perform them completely, 
what is he to do? To what extent is the seller relieved from liability to any 
particular buyer? Let us examine these issues from a comparative point of 
view.
A. COMMON LAW SYSTEMS 
1. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1.1. PARTIAL IMPRACTICABILITY
In a case of partial impracticability, under American law, if a party is still 
able to render substantial performance, it is his duty to do so.300 Moreover, if 
the other party is willing to accept less than substantial performance, the 
obligor is required to perform unless the partial impracticability renders the 
remainder of the performance more burdensome. In that case, the entire 
performance is discharged. If the obligor does all that is practicable, he may 
have a claim for excuse and restitution.301
For example, suppose A contracts to construct a restaurant for B for 
$100,000. The plan of the restaurant includes numerous lighted signs 
including one next to the street. Before performance of the contract, a local 
authority forbids the installation of such a sign, in these circumstances, 
performance of the entire contract is not excused since what is substantial is 
the construction of the restaurant. A's failure to install the sign next to the 
street would not be material. However, B will be under a duty to pay the 
agreed consideration subject to a claim for restitution based on A's failure to 
install the sign for which he has been paid.302
300. Restatement (Second) of Contract, Sec. 270, Comment b.
301. Loc. cit., Comment a.
302. Loc. cit., Sec. 272.
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It should be noted that partial excuse of non-performance, does not 
always preclude a total discharge of the contract. In Edward Maurer Co. v. 
Tubeless Tire Co.,303 the plaintiff agreed to sell certain tonnages of rubber to 
be delivered in monthly instalments between May and December. The 
agreement contained force majeure clause that discharged liability for non­
performance caused by government regulations. Shortly after the conclusion 
of the contract, the government issued regulations concerning the distribution 
of rubber and as a result the buyer qualified for only 180 pounds of rubber per 
month. No deliveries were made in June, July and August. In September, 
however, the seller delivered a quantity equal to a monthly instalment under 
the agreement. The buyer rejected delivery. When the war was over and the 
regulations had been lifted, the seller again tendered delivery and the buyer 
again refused to accept. The market price of rubber had fallen considerably, 
and the seller sold it at much less than the agreed price. He sued the buyer 
for the difference between that price and the contract price. The court held 
that:
"The applicable law seems to be well settled. If performance is made 
impossible by a subsequent valid act of law or governmental authority, both 
parties are discharged. If a contract is made subject in its entirety to a 
condition, and that condition happens, the rule is that both parties are 
discharged, and not that performance is suspended until the condition is 
overcome."304
The sixth circuit305 affirmed this decision arguing that it had been the parties' 
intention that in the event of government regulation, the performance of the 
contract would be excused, not merely suspended.
In another case,306 it was expressly agreed in a lease that the only 
business to be carried on in the premises was a saloon. During the term of the 
lease, the sale of alcoholic beverages became illegal. Although the premises 
could be used for other purposes, the court held that frustration was "nearly 
total". In other words where the principal use is completely frustrated, the 
frustration of the contract as a whole will be "nearly total". Conversely, where
303. 272 F. 990 (N.D.Ohio 1921), aff'd, 285 F. 713 (6th Cir. 1922).
304 272 F. at 993.
305. 285 F. 713 (6th Cir. 1922). See also Dant and Russell v. Grays Harbor Exportation Co., 26 
F.Supp. 784 (W.D.Wash.), aff'd, 106 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1939); Autry v. Republic Prod., 30 Cal.2d 
144, 180 P.2d 888 (1947); Monite Waterproof Gulf Co. v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 234 Minn. 89, 
48 N.W.2d 333 (1951); Village ofMinneota v. Fair Banks, Morse and Co., 226 Minn. 1, 31 N.W.2d 
920 ( 1948 ); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 20 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1927).
306. Doherty v. Monro Eckstien Co. 198 App.Div. 708, 191 N.Y.S. 59 (1st Dept. 1921).
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the principal use is not completely frustrated, the frustration will be merely 
"partial" and the defence of excuse of performance will not be available. Thus, 
in American law, the doctrines of frustration and impossibility will not apply 
unless the escape doctrines are "total or nearly total".307
When there is commercially reasonable substitute partial excuse will 
not lead to total excuse of performance. In Myer v. Sullivan,308 the sellers 
sold a quantity of wheat "f.o.b. Kosmos Steamer at Seattle". The outbreak of 
war resulted in Kosmos line ships being unavailable at Seattle; however, 
delivery at that line's loading dock remained possible. The sellers' duty to 
deliver was not excused., since a dock substitute was available at no 
additional expense. In another case,309 the seller's obligation was not affected 
under a contract to deliver milk at the buyer's address when quarantine 
restrictions made delivery there illegal. The court argued that "it does not 
follow that the contract could not be performed substantially if not literally."
Where the obligor's non-performance is material, it will lead to total 
excuse. Nevertheless, where the parties have exchanged promises the 
contract may be salvaged instead of being discharged. In effect, this can 
prevent the obligee from being relieved of his duties and the consequent 
discharge of the obligor's obligations. Such an agreement will also bar any 
claim for restitution in respect of the obligor's non-performance.310 For 
example, if the excused party is assured by the other party that he will perform 
completely within a reasonable time, the excused party ought to perform what 
he can. Apportionment will be unnecessary since the other party is willing to 
render his own performance in full and has accepted the situation.311 Thus - in 
order to be entitled to partial performance - the party whose performance is 
not discharged must be ready and willing to perform in full. If the contract is 
divisible, what will be the solution? When the excused party has rendered 
partial performance, the agreed exchange will be the relevant proportion of 
the total performance promised. Otherwise, the excused party will be unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the other party. In Mu Hen v. Wafer,312 the court
307 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d 48, 153 P. 2d 47, 1944.
308. 40 Cal.App. 723,181 P. 847 (1919); U.C.C., Sec. 2-614, Comment 1.
309. Whitman v. Anglum, 92 Conn. 392, 103 A. 114 (1918).
310. Restatement of Contracts (Second), Sec. 270, Comment c.
3U. Restatement, op. cit., Sec. 270 (b) and illustration 4, the facts of which are suggested by Van 
Dusen Aircraft Supplies o f New England v. Massachusetts Port Auth. 361 Mass. 131, 279 N.E.2d717 
(1972).
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found the contract divisible, the return performance was therefore apportioned 
and the excused party recovered accordingly. In this case, the seller of an 
accounting business died before he had performed his obligation to assist the 
buyer for two years; the court held that:
"the contract is severable and can be apportioned [ so that ] the sale of the 
physical assets for the separate contract price of $4,682.20 is enforceable."313
A fortiori, the same is true where the excused party has partially performed
the contract.
1.2. PRORATING IN AMERICAN COMMON LAW
According to section 2-615(b) of the UCC, when the impracticability 
affects only part of a seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate production 
and deliveries among his buyers in a "fair and reasonable" way. It seems that 
the subsection continues the general trend of American common law on this 
matter. Although commercial impracticability as a ground of discharge 
originated in the code, the duty to allocate is a feature of pre-code law. An 
examination of the related cases shows that sellers were expected to allocate 
in impracticable situations. In the earliest case, Oakman v. Boyce,314 a 
contract was concluded for delivery of 5000 tons of coal. Under the provisions 
of the contract and by trade usage, it was provided that delivery would take 
place from time to time at the buyer's request during the shipping season, 
which lasted to the end of the year. The seller shipped only a part of the 
agreed amount. The court accepted that he was discharged from his 
obligation to make subsequent deliveries, since the civil war prevented part 
shipment of the coal. In recognising the reasonableness of pro rata allocation, 
the court held that when civil war prevented part shipment of coal, the seller 
could satisfy the obligation by delivering a pro rata share of the total sales. 
The court permitted non-contract customers, to whom the seller was 
accustomed to deliver coal, to share in the pro rata distribution scheme. The 
court explicitly rejected the contention that one particular buyer should have 
priority and should receive one hundred per cent of his deliveries before other 
buyers had received any of their deliveries. A buyer who had a contract 
should not stand on any better footing than a customary spot buyer.
312. 252 Ark. 541, 480 S.W.2d 332 (1972). See also Kowal v. Sportswear by Revere, 351 Mass. 541, 
222 N.E.2d 778 (1967) (In this case again the contract was held divisible and the employer was held 
liable for commission on orders placed by salesman before his death); Gile v. Johnstown Lumber Co., 
151 Pa. 534, 25 A. 120 (1892) (It was held that lumber company was liable for logs driven to 
destination before Great Johnstown flood.).
313. Mullen v. Wafer, 480 S.W.2d, 332, at 334.
314. 100 Mass. 477 (1868).
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In Jessup and Moore Paper Co. v. Piper,315 the proration doctrine 
was applied when there was a shortage of coal cars. Judge McPherson stated 
that:
"It is at that point that we approach the question of fact that is to be submitted 
for your determination - that is, the allegation upon the part of the defendants 
that they did not have sufficient cars to enable them to fulfil their contracts, 
and therefore that they did the next best thing; that is to say, they apportioned 
their cars among all their customers, giving to each one his due and ratable 
share. If the facts were as averred by the defendants, I think that would be a 
fair, a reasonable, and proper thing to do. I do not think the defendants could 
be called upon to carry out one contract in full at the expense of all the other 
contracts for which they were equally bound, but that if there was a genuine 
scarcity of cars, so that it was impossible for them, for example, to carry out 
more than twenty-five per cent of each contract I think that would be perfectly 
fair and proper and lawful to do, under such a contract as lies before us."316
However, the court opined that the seller could not enter new contracts after
the shortage had arisen. It is not clear whether non-contract customers were
allowed to share in the pro rata distribution scheme. It would appear that
regular customers could be included in allocation scheme, while new buyers
could not. Likewise, in Acme Manufacturing v. Arminius Chemicai Co.,317
when performance of all related contracts became impossible, the court
applied the proration doctrine. Nevertheless, the court found that the seller in
this case had diverted its sulphur supply to higher-priced non-contract users.
The court held that the seller should not add new purchasers at the time when
the price of sulphur had radically increased.
In some other cases, the allocation is restricted to contract customers. 
In Haley v. Van Lierop,318 the pro rata doctrine was applied to the sale of 
flowers. In this case, partial performance was discharged when the gladiola 
crop failed and the seller had to make a just and equitable pro rata distribution 
among existing contracting customers.319
It will therefore be clear from these American pre-code cases that at 
common law, allocation in the form of pro rata distribution has been
315. 133 F. 108 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1902).
316. F. 108, 110 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1902).
317 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920). See also Davidson Chemical Co. v. Baugh Chemical Co. 133 Md. 203, 
104 A. 404 (1918).
318. 64 F.Supp. 114, 117 (W.D.Mich.). See also Diamond Alkali v. Henderson Coal Co., 278 Pa. 232, 
235, 134 A. 387, 388 (1926) (It was held that the seller must allocate product fairly among contract 
customers).
319 64 F.Supp. at 116.
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recognised for more than one hundred years,320 but that the courts are divided 
on whether or not to include customers who are not under existing contracts in 
the allocation scheme.
Let us now examine the point and related matters in the Uniform 
Commercial Code.
1.3. PRORATING IN THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Under section 2-615(b)321 of the UCC, when full performance becomes 
impracticable, the seller must offer partial performance and develop a fair and 
reasonable allocation plan. He must give notification of the delay and of the 
estimated quota that will be made available to the buyer.322 Failure to give 
notice prevents the seller from claiming excuse.323 Section 2-615(b) and 
comment 1 1324 to the section, specify that the seller must consider all buyers,
320. For example see McKeefrey v. Connellsville Coke and Iron, Co., 56 F. 212, 217 (3d Cir. 1893) 
(Prorating based on contract orders equitable apportionment); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Peninsular 
Portland Cement Co., 272 F. 625, 630-31 (6th Cir. 1921) (In this case, the court, like the most of the 
courts, enforced ratable distribution as a trade custom. The court held that custom to apportion 
available coal cars was a proper consideration in determining breach); Corona Coal Co. v. Robert P. 
Hyams Coal Co., 9 F.2d 361, 362 (5th Cir. 1952) (In this case, the court held that custom of proration 
during coal car shortage was factor in determining breach); Garfield and Proctor Coal Co. v. 
Pennsylvania Coal and Coke Co., 199 Mass. 22, 82 N.E. 1020 (1908) (One who had bought another's 
mine could not prorate to the old customers of that mine); Adsmen Lumber Co. v. Stanton, 132 Kan. 
91, 294 P. 853 (1931) (Proration was applied in sale of cement); Country o f Yuba v. Mattoon, 16 
Cal.App.2d 456, 325 P.2d 162 (1958) (The court required to prorate crop among lessors when crop 
limited by government orders); Akins v. Riverbank Canning Co., 80 Cal.App.2d 868, 183 P.2d 86 
(1947); Renny-Davis Mercantile Co. v. Shawano Canning Co., 11 Kan. 68, 206 P. 337 (1922). See 
also Restatement of Contracts (First), Sec. 464 (1).
321. The text of UCC Sec. 2-615(b) is:
"(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's capacity to perform, 
he must allocate production and deliveries among his customers but may at his option include regular 
customers not then under contract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so 
allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable."
322. The text of UCC Sec. 2-615(c) is:
"(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery and, when 
allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made available for the buyer."
323. U.C.C. Sec. 2-615(a).
324 Comment 11 reads: "An excused seller must fulfill his contract to the extent which the 
supervening contingency permits, and if the situation is such that his customers are generally affected 
he must take account of all in supplying one. Subsections (a) and (b), therefore, explicitly permit in 
any proration a fair and reasonable attention to the needs of regular customers who are probably 
relying on spot orders for supplies. Customers at different stages of the manufacturing process may be 
fairly treated by including the seller's manufacturing requirements. A fortiori, the seller may also take 
account of contracts later in date than the one in question. The fact that such spot orders may be 
closed at an advanced price causes no difficulty, since any allocation which exceeds normal past 
requirements will not be reasonable. However, good faith requires, when prices have advanced, that 
the seller exercise real care in making his allocation, and in case of doubt his contract customers 
should be favoured and supplies prorated evenly among them regardless of price. Save for the extra
/
/
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including contract customers and regular non-contract customers. It is implicit 
in the comment that the seller may not add new customers, although no such 
prohibition is expressly stated. The inclusion of regular customers not then 
under the contract, is at the seller's option. Moreover, the seller is advised that 
in a case of doubt, contract customers should be favoured and the goods 
prorated evenly among them regardless of price. Accordingly, the seller is 
prohibited from favouring one buyer over another if one or more buyers offer a 
higher price. A fortiori, a large allocation to a spot customer who is not under 
contract but who is prepared to offer a higher price than contract customers 
will not fall within the framework of a "fair and reasonable" allocation. This 
means that the seller is not permitted to make a profit by selling the scarce 
goods at the higher rates, thus reducing the share which must be allocated to 
lower-priced contracts. To do so would be contrary to the general doctrine of 
good faith in the performance of the contracts.325 In L. R. Foy Const. Co., !nc. 
v. South Dakota State Cement Plant Commission,326 the defendant - seller, 
a state cement plant, after pleading to serve the needs of local customers first, 
knowingly oversold its cement production capacity; the defendant 
misrepresented to the local customers that it was allocating the cement fairly 
while it was in fact giving preferential treatment to new out-of-state customers. 
The court held that the contract was breached because the seller had not 
been acting in good faith.
A seller may treat himself as a customer and include himself in the 
general pro rata allocation. It seems that inclusion of the seller in an allocation 
plan originated in the code.327 Nevertheless, again under the doctrine of good 
faith, the seller may not deviate too far from the allocation scheme in order to 
increase his quota.
The subsection therefore affirms the proration method as the basic 
allocation scheme. But it does not always require it to be strictly pro rata 
because an allocation system needs only to be "fair and reasonable". In 
effect, if one of the buyers will suffer particularly great injury or loss, the seller 
is authorised, in order to achieve a "fair and reasonable" allocation, to allocate 
a greater than pro rata share to that buyer. Thus, the code does not rule out
care thus required by changes in the market, this section seeks to leave every reasonable business 
leeway to the seller."
325. U.C.C. Sec. 1-203.
326. 3UCC Rep. Serv.2d 630; 399 N.W.2d 340 (S.D. 1987).
327. See Haley v. Van Lierop, 64 F.Supp. 114, 116 (W.D.Mich.) (Seller not justified in allocating to 
its partners or employees), affd, 153 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1945) (per curiam).
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substantial deviations from a pro rata scheme in appropriate cases. This is 
perhaps the most important difference between the provisions of the code and 
the pre-code law. To sum up, it should be said that none of the post-code 
cases add much to the pre-code authorities as they merely continue the policy 
set out in the earlier case law. Every one of the cases recognises some form 
of proration, but several of them recognise that there may be certain priority 
rules,328 viz., the basis of the allocation in good faith requirement as opposed 
to past order quantities. Another important conclusion is that if the seller has 
not any contracts with any of the buyers but was simply a routine supplier to 
them then the provisions of section 2-615 (b) will not apply.
From a drafting point of view, it should be noted that in order for there 
to be an exception from the rule of allocation provided in the subsection, the 
contract must specifically contain an affirmative provision that the seller will 
perform even though events which would allow allocation might occur.329
If a seller claims the allocation is fair, but the buyer disagrees, where 
does the burden of proof lie? In Chemerton Corp. v. McLouth Steel 
Corp.,330 the court held that where a seller's performance of a contract 
became impracticable, in part because of explosions in one of its 
compressors, the burden was on the seller to prove the fairness of the 
allocation between the plaintiff and its other customer.
Under section 2-15 UCC, the seller must notify the buyer seasonably 
that there will be a delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is required, give 
him details of the estimated quota being made available to the buyer. The 
consequence of failure to notify is well illustrated by Bunge Corp. v. M iller331 
Here the court held that a failure to give prompt notice prevented the party 
asserting excuse from relying on the defence. This view is also supported by 
the language of the section, which uses the word "must" in referring to notice 
and allocation requirements. The choice of the word "must" suggests that
328. See McKeefrey v. Connellsville Coke and Iron co., 56 F. 212 (3rd Cir. 1983) (In this case the 
court held that blast furnaces could have first priority). The Atlantic Richfield cases recognise and 
approve the appropriateness of deviation from pro rata in certain customers, as when the allocatee is 
not in operation during the historic allocation period. Intermar, Inc., v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 
F.Supp. 82 (E.D.Pa. 1973); Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal.App.2d 962, 140 Cal.Rptr. 510, 22 
U.C.C.Rep. 669 (1977).
329. Mansfield Propane Gas Co., Inc. v. Folger Gas Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 953; 231 Ga. 868, 204 
S.E.2d 625 (1974).
330. 15 U.C.C. Rep. 383; 381 F.Supp. 245 (DCND ill. 1974), affd  on other grounds 17 U.C.C. Rep. 
772; 522 F.2d 469 (C.A. 7th, 1975).
331. 381 F.Supp. 176 (W.D.Tenn. 1974).
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satisfaction of these requirements is a condition precedent to a successful 
claim of excuse.332
However, the question arises in what situations will the seller's 
notification be regarded as seasonable? It seems that if the seller notifies 
within a reasonable time, it can be said that he acted seasonably. The 
reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose and 
circumstances of the action.333 It is a question of fact whether or not there is 
seasonable notice. In Selland Pontiac - GMC, Inc. v. King,334 the seller 
became aware of its supplier's receivership on July 8, informed the buyer on 
August 12, and thereafter kept the buyer advised of the situation. Although the 
seller did not ultimately advise the buyer of non-delivery, nevertheless the 
seller's notification constituted seasonable notice of both delay and non­
delivery.
According to section 2-615(c), a seller who is not able to fill all its 
orders must seasonably notify its customers both of its need to allocate and of 
the amount each will receive. If the seller is not able to provide the notice of 
amount immediately, does it follow that the seller's notification is 
unseasonable? In interpreting the subsection, it is submitted that the courts 
must be flexible. In Cliffstar Corp. v. Riverbend Products, Inc.,335 for 
example, the seller notified the buyer in September that a crop shortage was 
forcing it to re-evaluate all contracts; the seller remained in regular contact 
with buyer thereafter, but did not inform the buyer until November of the 
amount it would receive. The court did not take the view that the defendant's 
notification was unreasonable.
Does the notice have to be in writing? Consider the following case.336 A 
seller agreed to grow and deliver 250,000 pounds of sunflower to a buyer. The 
contract expressly discharged the seller's performance due to acts of God, as 
long as the seller notified the buyer by certified mail within 10 days of any 
such event. Instead of mailing a written notice of the effect of a drought on his
332 See George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial Frustration of the 
UCC Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 Notre Dame Lawyer, 1979, 
203, at 225.
333 Cf. Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cargill, Inc,  7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 1100; 86 F.2d 650 (CA 11, 
1988).
334. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 463; 384 N.W.2d 490 (Minn.App. 1986).
335. 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 392; 750 F.Supp. 81 (WD NY 1990).
336. Red River Commodities, Inc. v. Eidsness, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 1076; 459 N.W.2d 805 (ND 
1990).
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harvest, the seller orally notified the buyer's agent of the effect of the drought. 
Subsequently, he delivered only 75,000 pounds of sunflower. Although the 
buyer had actual knowledge of the reduced harvest through a report from his 
agent, it sued, claiming that as it had not received notice by certified mail, the 
defendant was not discharged from performance. The trial court decided in 
favour of the plaintiff, excluding evidence relating to the buyer's actual 
knowledge of the reduced harvest. This decision is open to criticism. First, by 
delivering all the sunflowers that he had produced, the seller fulfilled his 
contract insofar as the contingency permitted. Secondly, the plaintiff actually 
and seasonably was informed that the deliveries would be reduced. Thus, the 
buyer was not harmed or prejudiced by the lack of certified mail notice. The 
trial court went wrong by hot considering the evidence of actual knowledge of 
the reduced crop as communicated through the agent. Moreover, according to 
section 1-201(25) UCC, a person has "notice" of a fact when he has "actual 
knowledge" of it. Thirdly, although the parties' contract expressly provided that 
the seller should send a notice in writing by certified mail, the seller's failure to 
do so was not material, because the buyer had actual knowledge of the event. 
For these reasons, the present writer approves the approach of the Appeal 
Court which reversed the decision and remanded the case back for a 
determination of whether the buyer had actual knowledge.
Section 2-615(b) does not apply to the termination of a contract by 
either party. However, it covers the situation where it has become 
impracticable for a seller to perform during the existence of his contract. This 
means that the section can be used as a defence by a seller who was unable 
to deliver due to unforeseen contingencies and as a result is sued by the 
buyer for breach of contract.337 When a buyer receives the notification of 
allocation, if he is dissatisfied with the seller's allocation he should give timely 
notice of that fact to the seller. He may by giving written notification to the 
seller, modify the contract by agreeing to take the quota allocated by the 
seller. He may also terminate the contract or permit to lapse by inaction or 
silence.338 In other words, the code does not require a buyer to take the 
allocated goods: the buyer has the choice to terminate the contract or accept 
the share. Since the seller's tender of partial non-performance may be justified
337. American Oil Co., v. Columbia Oil Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. 440; 88 Wash.App. 835, 567 P.2d 637 
(1077).
338. U.C.C. Sec. 2-616. Under Sec. 2-613(b), if the loss of identified goods is partial, buyer has option 
either to treat the contract avoided or to accept partial performance with due allowance from the 
contract.
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as an excuse for his partial non-performance, when the buyer accepts the 
share, he must be careful not to waive his rights against the seller by 
acknowledging the seller's right of excuse. The buyer when accepting the 
quota, is entitled to reserve the right to claim for a fair and reasonable 
allocation or seek damages for breach on the basis of unfair or unreasonable 
allocation. However, it should be noted that only contract customers have this 
right.339
The code does not suggest how the seller is to allocate the goods 
among his customers; it simply requires that the allocation must be "fair and 
reasonable". What then is a "fair and reasonable" allocation and how is it to be 
achieved? In Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,340 the plaintiff (a gas station 
operator), challenged the Atlantic Riechfield Co. allocation scheme, claiming 
that it was not getting a fair share of the seller's available gasoline supply. The 
court held:
'The statutory demand for a fair and reasonable allocation of short supplies 
denotes a collective quality characterizing the supplier's treatment of his 
customers as a group. An individualised approach, geared solely to the needs 
of particular customers, may provide adequacy to some, insufficiency to 
others. A fair and reasonable allocation distributes benefit and hardship 
equably . . . .  Plaintiffs' demand for treatment shaped to their unique 
circumstances runs counter to statutory insistence upon collective fairness . . .
. The fact that some other formula might have increased plaintiffs' allocation 
does not require rejection of the formula actually adopted."341
In Roth Steel Product v. Sharon Steel Corp.,342 the seller was not 
able to make timely steel deliveries to buyer in accordance with the contract. 
Since the seller diverted production to a wholly owned subsidiary and failed to 
prove that this subsidiary fell within the scope of permissible customers, the 
court held that the seller had not allocated its production and deliveries in a 
fair and reasonable manner.
In another case,343 the buyer, in a breach of contract action, sought 
summary judgement claiming that seller had failed to allocate equally. The 
plaintiff maintained that while some customers received 85% or more of their
339. Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451, 458-59 (9th Cir. 1979) (In this case the 
court held that customer not under contract can not allege unfair allocation under Sec. 2-615 (b)).
340. 72 Cal.App.3d 962, 140 Cal.Rptr. 510 (1977).
341. Loc. cit., at 968-69,140 Cal.Rptr. at 513.
342. 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1435; 705 F.2d 134 (CA, 1983).
343. Cliffstar Corp. v. Riverbend Products, Inc., 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 392; 750 F.Supp. 81 (WD 
NY 1990).
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orders, he had received only 31 % of the tomato paste he had ordered. The 
court held that section 2-615(b) does not require equal allocation, but only a 
"reasonable" allocation: since reasonableness is a question of fact, this issue 
had to be decided by a jury. Therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to 
summary judgement.
If the allocation is unfair, the seller will be liable in damages for breach 
of that portion of the contract which has not been performed. The measure of 
damages will be the difference between what the buyer should have received 
under a "fair and reasonable" allocation and the quota actually received.344 For 
example, in Ranney-Davis Merc. Co. v. Shawano Canning Co.,345 the court 
decided that the buyer was entitled to the difference between the share 
received and a fair and reasonable allocation. However, it should be noted 
that specific performance should also be allowed to the buyer, if seller is able 
to perform.346
1.3.1. CRITICISMS OF THE UCC APPROACH OF PRORATING
There are some points in section 2-615(b) and its comment 11, that are 
vague and unclear. The vagueness of the law, combined with the complexity 
of the facts which can arise means that even eminent lawyers and judges will 
make mistakes. For example, the code states that the allocation must be 
made in a "fair and reasonable" manner. But it does not specify in detail the 
way in which such an allocation should be made. Detailed guidelines are 
required. In a number of cases, the fairness and reasonableness of allocation 
plans adopted by the seller, have been challenged by buyers.347 Perhaps this 
is because the current provisions are so vague. Moreover, the courts have not 
established any guidelines for meeting the "fair and reasonable" standard. 
The "fair and reasonable" criterion gives judges great discretion. Thus parties
344 Cfi Consolidation Coal Co. v. Peninsular Portland Cement Co., 272 F. 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1921); 
Haley v. Van Lierop, 64 F.Supp.114, 117 (W.D.Mich.), affd, 153 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1945).
345. I l l  Kan. 68, 71-72, 206 P. 337, 339-40 (1922).
346. Schmitt and Pasterczyk, Specific Performance Under U.C.C. W ill Liberalism Prevail? 26 De Paul 
L. Rev., 54, 67 (1976). See also Continental Oil Co. v. P.P.G. Indus., 504 S.W.2d 616, 625 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1973).
347 See for example, Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal.App.3d 962, 140 Cal.Rptr. 510 (1977); 
Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979); Chemerton Corp. v. 
McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F.Supp. 245, 257 (N.D.ill. 1974); Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Riechfield Co., 
364 F.Supp. 82, 98 ( E.D.Pa. 1973 ); Mansfield Propane Gas Co., Inc. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 
868, 204 S.E.2d 625 (1974); Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1435; 705 
F.2d 134 (CA, 1983).
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are always unsure whether or not the court will accept or reject the suggested 
allocation scheme.
Another shortcoming is that the subsection and comment 11 do not list 
the priorities which a seller should give in his allocation plan so that it will be 
fair and reasonable. Should, for example, a seller prefer one buyer over 
another? The criteria are unclear.
Moreover, section 2-615(b) and comment 11 favour the seller by 
allowing the seller to include regular customers - not under the contract - in 
the allocation plan. Indeed, the seller is permitted not only to keep existing 
relationships but also to gain more customers in the future. By having this 
authorisation, the seller can keep regular customers happy and increase his 
credibility among them. In such a situation, the spot prices will be higher so 
that the seller will have an incentive to allocate a large percentage of his 
product to those customers whom he can charge the higher price. Although 
comment 11 recognises this problem and purports to prohibit the seller from 
doing so, a buyer is faced with the difficult task of proving the unfairness of the 
allocation scheme. Moreover, the costs which the buyer will incur in such 
litigation and the likely disruption of the business ties are other factors which 
will discourage from litigation. Thus, a seller can establish an allocation plan 
that might give 100% to one and a lesser percentage to another and yet fall 
within a fair and reasonable scheme. The following example illustrates the 
situation where a seller might favour one customer over another one. 
Suppose a seller has two contracts with A and B to deliver to each 1000 
tonnes of wheat, time of delivery for A one month and time of delivery for B 
two weeks after the conclusion of the contracts. Instead of exactly 2000 
tonnes, he only produces 1500 tonnes. If the seller notifies both buyers that 
due to partial impracticability he is not able to fulfil the contracts, then A and B 
will receive their related quota. However, if before A's shipment is due, the 
seller postpones notification to A until he has met B's order in full, how is A to 
prove that the seller acted unfairly?
The seller is not likely to be wholly impartial. The question is why 
should the seller be given the authority to make judgments concerning the 
relative priorities of different customers' need? Is he actually in the best 
position to make judgments of this kind?
Another issue giving rise to uncertainty is related to the concept of 
regular customer. What is a regular customer? What is the criterion for a 
person to be a regular customer? Length of dealing, quantity of purchases, 
frequency, etc., could all be relevant factors. Once again, the seller can select
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regular customers for inclusion in the allocation according to the seller's notion 
of the relevant criteria and the opportunity is open for an unscrupulous seller 
to take as much advantage of the situation as he can. Moreover, how can the 
addition of new customers in what is ex hypothesi time of shortage be 
justified? And more important, why the seller be allowed to include himself in 
the allocation scheme? Perhaps the rationale for the right to include the seller 
is that commercial reasonableness supports the idea that a seller who is 
bound to supply customers' needs during a shortage, must not be 
economically crippled. But this argument is not acceptable because it leaves 
the seller with a great deal of flexibility and can enable him to manipulate the 
shortage situation to his own advantage.
"Fair and reasonable attention to the needs of regular customers who 
are properly relying on spot orders for supply" is the rationale given by 
comment 11 for the right to include non-contract buyers in any allocation plan. 
This is also unjustifiable, since these customers strongly required the product, 
they should have entered into contracts with the seller. To allow them the 
benefit of the allocation scheme, while avoiding the burden of potential 
contractual liability is unfair. Given that a buyer who commits himself to a 
contract and accepts the related risks, should obtain a priority in the allocation 
scheme, why should a non-contract buyer who does not undertake any 
contractual risks be treated in the same way? Furthermore, inclusion of non­
contractual customers in an allocation scheme leads to an anomalous 
situation.348 Suppose, for example, a seller has ten contracts with buyers to 
deliver to each 1000 tonnes of rice. However, as the seller usually produces 
twice that amount, it is his practice to sell the surplus to 10 regular other 
customers. If due to partial crop failure, the seller only produces 10,000 tones 
of rice to sell, that is exactly enough rice to perform his obligations under his 
existing contracts. Section 2-615 UCC does not apply and there will be no 
allocation. However, if the seller only produces 9000 tones, partial 
impracticability occurs in respect of his contracts and the seller has the right to 
allocate under section 2-615(b). In this allocation, he may include not only the 
10 buyers under the original contracts but also his 10 non contractual regular 
customers. Although the shortfall only amounts to ten per cent, the seller has 
the right to include non-contract customers in his allocation scheme. If the 
seller allocates the rice among all the customers each will only receive 450
348. Thomas R. Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of 
Contractual Risks under UCC Section 2-615, 54 North Carolina L. Rev., (1976), 545, 581.
214
tonnes of rice. Thus, a ten per cent shortfall gives the seller the right to reduce 
sales to contractual customers by fifty-five per cent. Such a result is irrational.
It is submitted that it would make sense to delete the seller's power to 
include himself and regular customers in the allocation plan. At present, the 
rules for allocating in a fair and reasonable manner, in accordance with good 
faith while being impartial in making a judgment regarding the relative 
priorities of customers' needs, are simply not workable. A "fair and 
reasonable" alternative is an allocation in a ratio based on the physical volume 
of goods ordered. In this alternative, proportional distribution provides equal 
treatment among contract buyers and each buyer receives a uniform pro rata 
of the supply for which he contracted. Ratable distribution on the basis of the 
amount of the supply which the buyers have bought, also limits the 
opportunity for abuse by the seller. Although some commentators have 
argued that proration is not the only fair and reasonable way of allocation, 
they have not given details.349 Most American courts favour pro rata 
distribution.350
Although a pro rata allocation is the method defended in this thesis, 
there might be some exceptional situations where deviation would be 
justifiable. Common examples where a seller would be justified in allocating 
more than a pro rata share would be when it would be in the public interest to 
do so or help a buyer who would otherwise suffer extraordinary economic 
injury or social costs if ratable allocation only applied.
Pro rata allocation among buyers under contracts, is the fairest method 
of allocating the loss caused by partial impracticability. In order to avoid the 
unsatisfactory effects of the UCC, the parties to a contract especially at 
international level, should expressly agree proration in the force majeure 
clause in their contract. The seller will, of course, benefit if the contractual 
clause gives him greater discretion than the UCC, for example if the clause 
leaves the seller free to distribute the scarce goods in any manner he deems 
fit. On the other hand, the buyer will benefit if the clause gives him the 
opportunity to control the method of distribution which he lacks under the 
provisions of the code. The buyer will be in a strong bargaining position if he is 
authorised by the clause to place limits on the seller's allocation plan. If the 
parties were to agree on a contractual clause indicating that the seller has the
349. White, Allocation of Scarce Goods under Section 2-615 of the UCC: A Comparison of Some 
Rival Models, 12 Uni. Mich. J. L. Rev., (1979), 503 at 528; 3 A. R. Duesenberg and L. King, Sales 
and Bulk Transfers under the UCC Section 14. 13 (3), at 14-100., (1975).
350. See generally pp. 203 etseq.
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right to allocate in any method he likes, without regard to prior buyers or any 
pro rata plan, would American courts refuse to give it effect? It would appear 
that such a clause would be enforced because several courts have held that 
the parties to a contract are free to modify the provisions of section 2- 
615(b).351 Moreover, there is authority that a seller can contractually commit 
himself to deliver all his output to one of several buyers.352
Sections 2-615 and 2-616 UCC are silent on how the buyer's obligation 
is to be altered or what relief is available to the buyer when the contract of 
sale is excused. The code has no provisions on whether the buyer can 
demand restitution or reliance damages. Nor is it clear under the code 
whether the buyer has an obligation to pay for performance rendered by the 
seller before the time of excuse. Resort will have to be made to the common 
law for a solution to these problems. Only section 2-613 expressly provides 
that in a case of total loss, the buyer is discharged and in the case of partial 
impossibility, he has the choice of avoiding the contract or accepting the 
partial performance with allowance being made from the contract price for the 
deficiency in quantity.353
2. ENGLAND
2.1. PROBLEM OF PARTIAL FRUSTRATION
English law has difficulty in accommodating the problems raised by 
partial frustration. Indeed, it might be said that partial frustration is unknown to 
English law as there is virtually no authority on the subject. As Kerr J. 
observed in the Zuiho M aro354 a plea of partial frustration "will not do". Little 
guidance is to be found in the textbooks which either do not discuss the issue 
at all or doubt whether it is truly an aspect of frustration.355 The reason for this 
is clear. In English law, if a contract is frustrated, the parties are automatically 
excused from further performance. As we have seen,356 partial excuse is
351. Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F.Supp. 82 (E.D.Pa. 1973) (In this case, the court 
held that seller was not under any duty to allocate when contract contains provisions expressly 
excusing seller from duty of performance because of impossibility); North Pen Oil and Tire Co., v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 358 F.Supp. 908 (E.D.Pa. 1973). Cf. Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger 
Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 625 (1974).
352. Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 625 (1974).
353. U.C.C., Sec. 2-613(b).
354. Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Sardoil S.P.A. (The Zuiho Maru) [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 552, at 555.
355. Chitty on Contracts, Sec. 1414, 24th ed. 1977; Loc. cit., at Sec. 1643, vol. 1, 26th ed. 1989; 
Treitel, at 587, 4th ed. 1975.
356 Supra, pp. 200 et seq.
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recognised in American law where it is considered as an aspect of the 
doctrine of impracticability. In American law, automatic discharge is not always 
the case and most of the time discharge depends on the intention or election 
of either or both parties.
In order to avoid facing the issue directly English courts resolve the 
problem by recourse to the common law device of interpreting the contract. 
That said, Lord Denning has observed:
"It seems to me that although illegality which completely forbids the 
performance of a contract may give rise to frustration in some cases, illegality 
as to the performance of one clause which does not amount to frustration in 
any sense of the word does not carry with it the necessary consequences that 
the party is absolved from paying damages."357
This approach has not however been followed.358 Let us examine the relevant 
case law.
2.1.1. MOORGATE ESTATES, LTD. V. TROWER AND
ANOTHER359
In this case, mortgagors of land and buildings (plaintiffs) contracted a 
mortgage executed in March 1936. In this contract, the plaintiffs were under 
an obligation to insure against war risks. After October 1936, it became 
impossible to insure against such risks. According to the provisions of the 
contract, the mortgagees (defendants) were entitled to exercise their power of 
sale without notice if the plaintiffs failed to comply with their commitments. On 
the other hand, if the plaintiffs complied with their commitments, the 
defendants could not call in the mortgage before March 25, 1946. The 
plaintiffs failed to insure against war risks at any time. For that reason, in 
January, 1939 the defendants demanded immediate repayment of the 
mortgage loan. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that performance was 
impossible and therefore the mortgagees were not entitled to repayment of 
the monies.
If this case had been considered by an American court, it would have 
been a case of partial impossibility under which the plaintiffs would have been 
released from performance of the obligation. However, Farwell J. held that this 
was not a case of frustration;
357. Eyre v. Johnson [1946] 1 K.B. 481, at 484.
358. See for example H. R. S. Sainsbury Ltd. v. Street [1972] 1 W.L.R. 834.
359. [1940] Ch. 206.
217
"The contract itself remains, but, according, to the plaintiffs, one term of it has 
ceased to be enforceable. They say, in the first place, that it was an implied 
term of the contract when it was entered into, that if such an insurance policy 
were ever an impossibility, neither side should be entitled to rely upon the 
failure to comply with that covenant."360
On the facts, the learned judge refused to imply such a term. Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs were in breach of their obligation to insure and the defendants were 
entitled to foreclose.
2.1.2. DENNY, MOTT AND DICKSON, LTD. V. JAMES B. 
FRASER AND CO. LTD.™
In this case, a long-term agreement for the sale of timber provided that 
the defendants should purchase all their supplies of certain wood from the 
plaintiffs: moreover the defendants agreed to lease a timber yard to the 
plaintiffs with an option to purchase. When dealing in timber was prohibited, 
the plaintiffs continued to occupy the timber yard: they sent a letter to the 
respondents purporting to give notice to terminate the contract and also of 
their intention to exercise the option of purchase. The court held that the 
agreement was not composite but was an entire contract: as the main object 
of the contract, viz., trading in timber, had become illegal, the whole contract 
was frustrated. In this regard, Lord Mcmillan said:
"in judging whether a contract has been frustrated, the contract must be 
looked at as a whole. The question is whether its purpose as gathered from its 
terms has been defeated. A contract whose purpose has been defeated may 
contain subsidiary stipulations which it would still be possible and lawful to 
fulfil, but to segregate and enforce such a stipulation would be to do 
something which the parties never intended."362
Accordingly, when the frustrating event undermines the principal part of 
a contract, the parties are excused from performing other parts which are 
nevertheless possible. Unlike American law, English law does not approach 
these difficulties from the standpoint of partial frustration but according to the 
doctrine of total frustration. If a frustrating event radically affects the 
substantial purpose of the contract, in English law the contract is frustrated 
even though performance of some provisions of the contract remains
360 [1940] Ch. 206, at 211.
361. [1944] A.C. 265.
362. James B. Fraser and Co. v. Denny, Mott and Dickson, 1944, S.C. (H.L.), 35, at pp. 41, 42; see 
also at p. 40 per Viscount Simon; at p. 49, per  Lord Wright. See also James B. Fraser and Co. v. 
Denny, Mott and Dickson, 1943 S. C. 293, at p. 315, per Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper.
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possible. Nevertheless, in both legal systems the result is the same provided 
the substantial purpose of the contract is radically affected.
If partial destruction of the subject matter defeats the main purpose of the 
contract, the contract shall be frustrated. That is what happened in Taylor v. 
Caldwell,363 where the lease related to "the Surrey gardens and music hall". 
The contract was frustrated even though only the hall was destroyed and the 
gardens remained. The court resolved the issue not in terms of partial 
impossibility but under the doctrine of frustration.
If that part of the performance of the contract which has become 
impossible is so minor that substantial performance is practicable then those 
obligations which remain possible must be performed. In Leiston Gas 
Company v. Leiston-Cum-Sizewell Urban District Council,364 for example, 
the plaintiffs contracted with the defendants to light their district for five years 
from August 1911. The plaintiffs had to provide gas standards, lamps, and 
other plant, to connect the same with their mains in the district, to supply gas 
and to light, extinguish, clean, and repair the lamps, and maintain the plant 
during the term of the contract. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs 
quarterly, a certain sum per lamp. In January 1915, an order was made which 
prohibited the lighting of lamps within the defendants' district. The defendants 
contended that the agreement was at an end and that they were absolved 
from making any further payments. The plaintiffs sued for the three quarterly 
instalments that had fallen due after the date of the order. The defendants 
denied their liability on the basis of illegality and impossibility of performance. 
The court held that:
"While part of performance of the contract had become illegal, other 
substantial parts of it, for example, the maintenance of the lamps and other 
plant, were lawful and the plaintiffs were bound to perform them and had 
performed them; for three and half years the defendants had had the benefit 
of the entire services contracted for, including expenditure by the plaintiffs in 
providing the plant; and it could not be said that the contract was frustrated by 
the prohibition against street lighting, and the defendants were justified in 
treating it at an end and refusing to make the payments provided by it."365
It was also added that the consideration for the plaintiffs services could not be
apportioned. The better view, however, is that the consideration for the
plaintiffs services should have been apportioned. In Eyre v. Johnson,366 a
363. (1863) 3 B. and S. 826; 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
364. [1916] 2 K. B. 428.
365. Loc. cit. [1916] C. A. 329.
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tenant was held liable in damages for breach of his obligation to repair even
though wartime regulations made it illegal or impossible. Again it would have
been better to agree that the tenant was not liable for refusing to do an illegal
act.367 Nevertheless, the court held that:
. . the fact that it [to keep in repair] had become difficult or even impossible 
for the tenant to perform certain of his obligations under the lease, did not 
amount in any sense of the word to frustration and did not relieve the tenant 
from the payment of damages for his breaches of covenant."368
2.1.3. HOWELL V. COUPLAND369
In this case, the defendant agreed to sell 200 tons of potatoes grown 
on particular land belonging to the defendant. After the conclusion of the 
contract, the crop was ruined by blight, so that the defendant was only able to 
deliver 80 tons. The plaintiff claimed for non-delivery of the other 120 tons. 
The defendant answered that he had duly delivered all that it was possible for 
him to deliver and that he was excused from delivering the remainder. The 
court held that the contract was an agreement to sell what may be called 
specific things and therefore fell within the principle of Taylor v. Caldwell, 
viz., that the contract must be taken to be subject to an implied condition that 
the parties should be discharged, if performance becomes impossible from 
the perishing of a thing without default of a party.
However, in spite of the use of the words "specific things" by Mellish 
L.J.370 and the opinion of Sir McKenzie Chalmers that section 7 of the Sale of 
Goods Act applies to specifically described goods, whether or not in existence 
at the time the contract was made;371 it is clear that the potatoes were not 
"specific goods" within the definition of "specific goods" in section 61(1) of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979.372 In Re Wait,373 it was held that a contract for a 
specific quantity of goods out of particular mass was not a contract for the 
sale of specific goods. The plain language of the Act prevents too wide a
366 [1946] 1 K.B. 481. CfMattheyv. Curling [1922] 2 A. C.
367 See also G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 1983, at 670.
368. Loc. cit., at 482.
369. (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 462; affd. (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258.
37°. Howell v. Coupland (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258, at 262.
371. Chalmer's Sale of Goods Act 1893,18th ed., p. 100.
372. Sec. 61 (1) reads: "specific goods" means goods identified and agreed on at the time a contract of 
sale is made.
373. [1927] 1 Ch. 606, 631.
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meaning being given to "specific goods".374 Accordingly, it is submitted that in 
the Howell case it was not a contract for specific goods. Thus, it can not be 
covered by section 7 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.
There are some authorities375 that have suggested that the case might 
be covered by section 5(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (now section 5(2) of 
Sale of Goods Act 1979). This section provides: 'There may be a contract for 
the sale of goods, the acquisition of which by the seller depends on a 
contingency which may or may not happen." In Re Wait,376 Atkin L.J., 
observed that the application in Howell of the doctrine of implied condition in 
Taylor v. CaldwelP77 might be justified by regarding it as section 5(2) case. 
However, to treat section 5(2) as covering the doctrine of implied condition in 
Taylor v. Caldwell involves an unwarranted extension of the section.378 
Secondly, growing a crop can not be considered as the "acquisition" of goods 
within the meaning of section 5(2). Thirdly, the section only covers a contract 
of the type described in the section: it does not expressly say anything about 
the partial failure of such a contract.
There therefore appears to be no option but to regard the rule in 
Howell as a matter of common law which is still applicable as a result of 
section 62(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.379 This view is supported by Atkin 
L.J.'s suggestion that: 'The case of Howell v. Coupland would now be 
covered either by section 5(2) of the code or, as suggested by the learned 
authors of the last two editions of Benjamin on sale, . . . section 61 (2) [now 
section 62(2) Act 1979] of the code."380
Because the agreement in Howell was for the sale of unidentified 
goods, the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 will now govern the 
situation where a buyer pays the purchase price in advance but the crop fails. 
In that case, the seller is able to set off his expenses of cultivating the crop
374 Loc. cit., at 631. See also Kursell v. Timber Operators and Contractors Ltd., [1927] 1 K.B. 298.
375. H. R. S. SainsburyLtd v. Street [1972] 3 All E.R. 1127; [1927] 1 W.L.R. 834. Cf. Re Wait [1927] 
1 Ch. 606, at 630, C.A.
376. [1927] 1 Ch. 606, at 631.
377. (1863) 3 B. & S. 826; 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
378. See Glanville L. Williams, The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, op. cit., at 87.
379. Sec. 62(2) reads:" The rules of the common law, including the law of merchant, except in so far 
as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and in particular the rules relating to the law of 
principal and agent and the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake, or other 
invalidating cause, apply to contracts for the sale of goods."
380 p e Wait, [1927] 1 Ch. 606, at 631. See also Benjamin's Sale of Goods, (1992), at 270.
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against any down payment made by the buyer. If we accept that 1943 Act 
applies to cases such as Howell, it means that the case was a truly case of 
frustration. The court in Howell clearly relied on Taylor v. Caldwell,3*1 a 
leading frustration case. Moreover, it was suggested that the contract was 
frustrated as a result of an implied term that the parties will be excused 
performance if the potatoes perished. But it is difficult to accept that Howell is 
an example of frustration because, as discussed before,382 frustration 
operates automatically. Yet in H.R. and S. Sainsbury Ltd., v. Street,3*3 it was 
observed that in Howell the defendant remained under an obligation to deliver 
80 tons of potatoes. The result is that the obligation to deliver 120 tons of 
potatoes was excused while the obligation to deliver 80 tons was not. The 
buyer had the option to accept or reject the remainder.384 If so, the contract 
did not automatically come to an end since the excuse of the entire 
performance depends on the election of the buyer. This is inconsistent with 
the principle that frustration is automatic. If we accept that Howell v. 
Coupland is truly a case of frustration, we must also be prepared to argue 
that frustration is not automatic.
The problem can, of course, be solved by arguing that Howell is a case 
of partial frustration., viz., the delivery of 120 tons was excused automatically, 
but the obligation to deliver the remaining 80 tons was not frustrated. But it is 
generally accepted that English law does not recognise partial frustration. 
Thus the case of Howell remains problematic. A fortiori, in English law, the 
court can not alter or modify the terms of a contract or adjust the rights of the 
parties.
From a comparative point of view, American law385 does allow partial 
impracticability in cases such as Howell. It permits the buyer in cases of 
deterioration or partial destruction of the subject matter of a sale or contract to 
sell, to demand such performance as remains possible.
In the Howell case,386 the 80 tons actually produced were tendered and 
accepted in part performance of the contract. Thus, no question arose in that 
case concerning the seller's obligation to deliver what he could. The question
381. (1863) 3 B. & S. 826; 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
382. Supra, pp. 142 et seq.
3*3. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 834.
384 Sale of Goods Act 1979, 30 (1).
385. See generally pp. 200 et seq.
386. (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 462; affd. (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258.
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therefore remains whether the seller was obliged to deliver the part that was 
produced and whether the buyer was bound to accept partial performance. 
Moreover, would the buyer have been bound to pay the whole contract price 
or only an apportioned part of it? Although the judgments of Blackburn and 
Quain J. J. at first instance implied that the seller was obliged to deliver what 
he could, in Sainsbury v. Street, these problems were considered in detail.
2.1.4. H. R. AND S. SAINSBURY LTD. V. STREEP*1
The facts of this case are very similar to those in Howell.3** On 1 July 
1970, the seller agreed to sell 275 tons of barley from a crop growing on a 
farm. Through no fault of the seller, the crop turned out to be only 140 tons. 
That year the harvest in England was poor and the price of barley was rising 
rapidly. The seller sold the barley to a third party and claimed that he was 
discharged from delivering to his buyers any barley at all. The buyers 
accepted that the defendant was not liable for the non-delivery of the barley 
which the crop did not yield, but claimed damages for the failure to supply the 
tonnage actually produced. The seller's contention was that the contract of 
sale had been totally frustrated: In these circumstances, Mackenna J. held 
that "that there was no implied term in the contract that the seller need not 
deliver to the buyers the actual tonnage harvested in the event of his inability 
through no fault of his own to produce the whole amount."389 In other words, 
the court implied a term in the contract that the seller was obliged to deliver 
the tonnage actually produced, provided that the buyers so requested. It is 
important to note that the buyers are under no obligation to accept the barley 
actually produced: if they request to receive the amount produced, the price 
will be reduced pro rata.390
Once again, the case is not analysed as one of partial frustration; 
instead, the court implies a term, which gives an option to the buyer. As a 
result, neither party will be liable on partial failure if the buyer elects not to 
take the part which can be delivered: in these circumstances, both parties 
would presumably also be released from their obligations in respect of the 
whole contract. In this situation, the contracts do not come automatically to an
387. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 834.
388. (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 462; affd. (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258.
389. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 834.
390. See also the Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 30(1). The provisions of the section is not limited to 
cases where the seller's failure to deliver part is in breach of contract.
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end and their discharge depends on the election of the buyer. Although 
Mackenna J. does not expressly make the point, by accepting that the seller in 
Howell v. Coupland391 was not liable for failing to deliver the 120 tons 
harvested, he is implicitly acknowledging that the contract was frustrated in 
the present case. If this is so, doubt must be cast on the accuracy of the view 
that frustration operates automatically.392
Apart from this difficulty we can conclude that when the source from 
which the goods are to be taken fails in part, the partial failure has three 
consequences: (i) the seller is discharged to the extent of deficiency; (ii) he 
remains under an obligation to deliver the amount actually produced if the 
buyer so elects; (iii) the buyer is under no obligation to accept the quantity 
produced if he elects not do so.
In American law, while these cases fall under the doctrine of partial 
impossibility or partial impracticability: the results are similar.393 However, it 
should be noted that if the crops are not identified at time of contracting, i.e., 
not planted,394 the excuse question is governed by section 2-615(b) UCC. If 
the crops are identified at the time of contracting the relevant provision is 
section 2-613(b) UCC. Unlike American law, section 7 of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979, does not deal with partial destruction of the subject matter of the 
contract. This means that if only part of the goods perish the position in 
English law is uncertain. It might probably be treated as a question of degree, 
i.e., if the contract of sale is an indivisible contract, the buyer is not obliged to 
accept the remaining goods. The whole contract will be frustrated. In Barrow, 
Lane and Ballard Ltd. v. Phillip Phillips and Co.395 for example, the seller 
sold 700 bags, marked E.C.P. and known as lot 7, of Chinese groundnuts in 
shell then lying at the National Wharves in London. At the time of contracting 
the parties did not know that 109 bags had been stolen. The court held that a 
contract for a parcel of 700 bags is an indivisible contract and is different from 
a contract for 591 bags. The position was no different from what would have 
happened if the all 700 bags had ceased to exist. The court added that the 
case fell within section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the whole 
contract was consequently void. Although this case was decided under
391. (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 462; affd. (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258.
392. See also G. D. Goldberg, Is Frustration Invariably Automatic? 88 L. Q. Rev. (1972), 464.
393. See U.C.C. Secs. 2-613(b) and 2-615(b).
394 U.C.C. Sec. 2-501(l)(c).
395. [1929] 1 K. B. 574.
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section 6, if the case fell within the circumstances of section 7, the result 
would have been the same. Sections 6 and 7 deal with cases which 
superficially, at least, have much in common. The major difference between 
them is that section 6 deals with case of common mistake, while section 7 is 
concerned with frustration.
It has to be added that the position is the same at common law. In 
Giepel v. Smith,396 for example, a ship was to go to A and take in coals, and 
then deliver the coals to H. Delivery at H was impossible by reason of an 
expected peril and the ship owner refused to load at A. The plaintiff charterer 
argued that the contract was divisible, but the court held that the contract was 
entire, and anything that happened to make the performance at one port 
impossible must be taken to apply to the whole.397 The ship owner, therefore, 
was excused.
In contrast, if the obligation to deliver is divisible and part of the goods 
perish, the seller is absolved from his duty to deliver that part and the buyer is 
excused from paying for those goods. However, if the buyer demands part 
delivery the seller remains liable to deliver the remainder of the goods and the 
buyer is also liable to pay for them.398
2.2. PRORATING IN THE ENGLISH LAW OF FRUSTRATED 
CONTRACTS
As a result of partial failure of supply, a seller, who has contracted with 
a number of buyers, may be unable to meet all his obligations. The solutions 
provided under American law have already been discussed.399 As we have 
seen under American law, the contracts are not frustrated completely and 
each buyer receives a quota under a reasonable allocation. The contracts are 
modified rather than excused. This solution can not easily be adopted in 
English law because the doctrine of frustration automatically leads to a total 
excuse of performance. Moreover, modification of contracts in such situations 
has been rejected by the English courts.400 However, a solution can be found 
by reference to special clauses in the contracts.401 Support for the principle of
396. (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 404.
397. Loc. cit., at 411.
398. Cf. R.M. Goode, Commercial Law, 1982, at 198.
399. Supra, pp. 203 et seq.
40°. Supra, pp. 22 et seq.
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pro rata division can be found in cases where the seller has an express 
provision in the contract, such as a force majeure clause. But here, of course, 
the parties are simply relying on an expressly agreed clause in the contract - 
not on the doctrine of frustration. In the absence of such clauses, the position 
in English law is not clear.
In Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd. v. C. S. Wilson and Co. Ltd.,402 the
defendants, suppliers of magnesium chloride discovered that the outbreak of
war in 1914 had the effect of reducing the quantity of chemicals available to
them since the greater part of the supply of magnesium chloride came from
Germany. A shortage in the supply led to a consequent rise in price. The
defendants claimed to be released from their contract with the plaintiff by
virtue of an exemption clause which provided that "deliveries may be
suspended pending any contingencies beyond the control of sellers or buyers
. . . causing a short supply of labour, fuel, raw material, or manufactured
produce or otherwise preventing or hindering the manufacture or delivery of
the article." The House of Lords held that, apart from the rises in price, a
shortage had occurred which hindered delivery within the meaning of the
above clause; the defendants were therefore justified in suspending delivery
to the plaintiffs. Moreover, the House rejected the contention that if the
defendants had ignored their other contract buyers and had concentrated all
their supplies to carry out the contract with the plaintiff they would have been
able to perform the contract completely. Lord Atkinson opined:
'The whole argument of the respondents has been directed to show that the 
appellants could have obtained the 240 tons necessary to fulfil their particular 
contract, and that the appellants were bound to supply them in preference to 
all others. The respondents were to get what they contracted for, and, if their 
contention be sound, the other customers were to be left with a cause of 
action. But the delivery, which might be prevented or hindered, was not the 
mere delivery to one purchaser amongst many of the quantity purchased by 
him, but delivery under the normal engagements of the appellants' trade to the 
whole body of the customers to whom they were bound to deliver in the year
1914 "4°3
Lord Haldlane said:
". . . I do not see how the appellants could have lawfully delivered to the 
respondents without also delivering proportionately to the other firms with
401. Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd. v. C.S. Wilson and Co. Ltd. [1917] A. C. 495; Pool Shipping Co. Ltd. 
v. London Coal Co. of Gibraltar Ltd. [1939] 2 All E.R. 432; Intertradex Ltd. v. Lesieur-Tourteaux Ltd. 
[1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 146; [1978] 2 Lloyd’aRep. 509 (C.A.).
402. [1917] A.C. 495.
403. Loc. cit., at 520.
226
whom they had entered into similar contracts. They were either bound to all 
their customers equally or they were not bound to any of them."404
It will be noticed that because there was an exemption clause in the
contract, the court felt entitled to look beyond the buyer and seller and to
consider the seller's obligations with other contract buyers. The House agreed
that in such a situation the totality of the seller's obligations should be taken
into account in judging his responsibilities. Moreover, two members of the
House expressly suggested that a pro rata share was an appropriate solution
in this kind of situation.405
In Pool Shipping Co., Ltd. v. London Coal Co. o f Gibraltar Ltd.,406
the contract contained an exemption clause in similar wide terms. Again the
court looked beyond the contract between the buyer and seller and took
account of the seller's commitments to other purchasers. In this case, the
court used prorating as an aid to the construction of force majeure clause.
If during the period of reduced supply, the seller wishes to be obliged to
deliver only a percentage of the available supply, or, if he wants to favour one
purchaser over others, he should expressly so provide in his contracts. In
order to avoid any doubts on how the seller should act in this type of case, the
exemption or force majeure clause must be appropriately drafted, clearly
stating what the seller is required to do and what the purchaser is entitled to
expect in these circumstances. Nevertheless, it seems that no single
purchaser will be able to complain if the seller divides the available goods pro
rata among the contract buyers, if the exact method of division is left open.407
Moreover, it has also been suggested that the seller is obliged to allocate the
available goods, so that each contract buyer is entitled to his pro rata share.408
In other words, no buyer is entitled to delivery in full but each is entitled to his
pro rata share. If a buyer does not receive this share, he would be entitled to
damages.409 However, it should be added that there is also authority that
allocation of the supplies to earlier buyers is proper, even if as a result the
seller delivers nothing to later buyers.410
404 Loc. cit., at 511-512.
405. Loc. cit., at 508 (per Lord Finlay); at 511-512 (per Lord Haldlane).
406. [1939] 2 All E.R. 432.
407 Bremer Hcmdelsgesellschaft m. b. H. v. Vanden Avenne-Izegem P. V B. A. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
109, 115, 128, 131. Cf Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd. v. C. S. Wilson and Co. Ltd. [1917] A.C. 495, 511- 
512.
408. Bremer HandeslsgeseIIschaft m. b. H. v. MackprangJr. [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 221, 224.
409. Loc. cit.
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Like American law, the English courts have not specified any particular 
method by which the seller is to divide the available goods among his buyers. 
For example, in Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H. v. Continental Grain 
Co.,411 the Court of Appeal approved "the principle of reasonable 
distribution".412 In this regard, the court held that:
". . . This is because, in the absence of any contractual terms to the contrary, 
the buyer under a contract containing such a clause must contemplate that 
the seller has other customers besides himself, and must also contemplate 
that the seller will take reasonable steps to fulfil the needs of other customers; 
and the reasonable action so taken by the seller should not in these 
circumstances be regarded as a cause or shortage independent of the 
expected peril."413
In this case, the court again emphasises the principle that no single buyer is 
entitled to insist on delivery in full. In distributing the available supplies the 
court believes that it should be done in a reasonable manner. But what is a 
reasonable manner? This is not specified. In Intertadex v. Lesieur,414 Lord 
Denning M.R. said that the allocation of available supplies should be "in a way 
which the trade would consider to be proper and reasonable - whether the 
basis of appropriation is pro rata, chronological order of contracts, or some 
other basis."415
From these cases it could be argued that if a seller distributes the available 
supplies in a fair and reasonable manner, he might plead excuse of non­
performance of the contract in so far as he can not perform all contracts. 
Thus, the unsatisfactory consequence of self-induced frustration,416 viz., that 
the contract is not discharged, can be sidestepped. Accordingly, if the seller 
apportions the goods in a way that is proper and reasonable, the effective 
cause is not the seller's apportionment, but whatever caused the shortage.
In comparing the American law with English law, these points should be 
taken into account. The problem has attracted more attention in the U.S. than 
in England. In America, the principle of 'Tair and reasonable allocation" is
410. Intertradex S. A. v. Lesieur Torteaux S. A. R. L. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509. C f Continental Grain
Export Corp. v. S. T. M. Grain Ltd., [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 460, at 473.
41L [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 269.
412 Loc. cit., at 292 (per Ackner, L.J.).
413. Loc. cit.
414 [1978] 2Lloyd's Rep. 509.
415. Loc. cit., at 513.
416. See Maritime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers Ltd. [1953] A.C. 524; The Eugenia [1964] 2
Q.B.226. See also Chapter three of this thesis, pp. 132 et seq.
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applied by the courts whether or not an exemption clause has been included 
in the contract. The English common law, unlike American law, does not 
confer on a seller any rights or duties to allocate the available supply in a way 
that he thinks fair and reasonable. In English law where a legal commitment to 
one customer conflicts with a moral commitment to another, the seller is not 
allowed to take into account any moral commitments to his regular but not 
contracted customers.417 In America, the seller is allowed to honour moral 
commitments to his regular customers.418 In English law, where a seller has a 
binding contract with only one purchaser and a non-contractual arrangement 
with another one, if the whole amount of the supply is enough to satisfy the 
contract buyer, it must be allocated to that buyer. If a seller wishes to be 
allowed to take into account his moral commitments to regular customers, he 
must use an appropriately drafted force majeure clause .
The question arises whether a seller is allowed to include his own 
requirements in the apportionment. Although there is as yet no English 
authority, it is doubtful that the seller would be allowed to do so. This result, as 
the present writer has argued419 is more desirable than American approach 
which does allow the seller to include his own requirements in the 
apportionment.
If a seller wants to be allowed to take account of his commitments 
under other contracts, he should ensure that an appropriate exemption clause 
is included in those contracts as well. In Hong Guan and Co., Ltd. v. R. 
Jumabhoy and sons Ltd.,420 a contract for the supply of cloves was 
expressed to be "subject to force majeure and shipment". The available 
supply which was enough to satisfy the appellants, was allocated to third 
parties under other contracts who had "definite" contracts not expressed to be 
subject to force majeure clauses. The argument in the case centred on the 
"subject to shipment" clause. The respondents claimed that the effect of 
clause was to give them a free choice whether or not to ship. The Privy 
Council held that the words in the clause were not sufficient to enable the 
suppliers to excuse their failure to deliver by reference to their other 
commitments. It was added that in the absence of express provision to the 
contrary, the fact that the respondents had other contracts to fulfil was
417. Pancommerce S. A. v. Veecheema B. V [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 304, 307.
418. Supra, pp. 205 et seq.
419. Supra, pp. 211 et seq.
420. [1960] A. C. 684; [1960] 2 All E.R. 100.
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irrelevant. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, distinguished Tennants v. Wilson421 
and Pool Shipping v. London Coal C o .422 on the basis that it was the 
exemption clauses in these cases that enabled the courts to take account of 
seller's other commitments.423
What solutions are provided by English law if a seller who because of 
an embargo, is able to satisfy some but not all of his existing contracts where 
there are rio exemption clauses? It seems that the seller can not rely on the 
embargo as an excuse for non-performance of any particular contract.424 The 
only solution which remains is that he should perform in full any of the 
contracts for which he has enough supplies, but will be liable in damages for 
breach of the other contracts that are not performed. Because it is his own act 
or election which prevents performance, this is a case of self-induced 
frustration which means that whatever he did, he could not escape liability.425
Another significant difference between English and American laws is 
therefore apparent. However, it has been argued that English law should 
follow the American approach.426 It is also the present writer's contention that 
English law should allow prorating whether or not the contracts contain 
exemption clauses. The solution can be justified by finding an implied term in 
the contracts - like the implied term approach which was used in the 
Sainsbury v. Street case.427 However as argued before,428 the adoption of 
prorating should not give the seller a wide discretion. The seller should not be 
authorised to include himself and regular customers in the allocation plan. In 
distributing the available goods, allocation in ratio to the physical volume of 
goods will be fair and reasonable.429
421. [1917] A.C. 495.
422 [1939] 2 All E.R. 432.
423. Loc. cit., A.C. at 700 and 2 All E.Rep. at 106.
424 See Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Sardoil S. P. A. [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 552, 555 (No partial 
frustration). C f Hong Guan and Co. Ltd. v. R. Jumabhoy and Sons Ltd. [1960] A.C. 684, 701-702.
425. Supra, pp. 132 et seq.
426 McElroy and Williams, Impossibility of Performance (1941), at 240-242; Hudson, Prorating in 
English Law of Frustrated Law of Contracts, 31 Mod. L. R. at 535 et seq; Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 
3rd ed. Secs. 450, 1596. See also Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H. v. Mackprang Jr. [1979] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 221, 224.
427 [1972] 1 W.L.R. 834.
428. Supra, pp. 211 et seq.
429 Supra, pp. 214, 215.
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2.3. THE DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATED ELECTION
Where a contract gives a party the right to elect one of several modes 
of performance, if one method of performance becomes impossible due to a 
supervening event, must the party elect to perform the contract in one of the 
remaining modes? It seems to be well established that where one mode of 
performance has become impossible, the contract is not frustrated so long as 
at least another mode remains possible.430 If a party has already elected one 
of several modes of performance, if that method becomes impossible, is he 
discharged from the performance of the contract? Or must he make a fresh 
election? Or is he absolutely bound by his choice even though the chosen 
mode of performance becomes impossible to perform? The questions are the 
subject of controversy in English law. Let us examine the problem case by 
case.
In Alchorne v. Favill,431 an insurer had the option under a policy either 
to pay money or rebuild a house if damaged by fire. When the house was 
destroyed by fire, they elected to rebuild it. However, by reason of a statutory 
provision, they were prevented from reconstructing the house on its old site. It 
was held that they had no option: they had to pay the money. In Hindley and  
Company, Ltd. v. General Fibre Company, Ltd .,432 250 bales of jute were 
sold to be shipped from Calcutta for Hamburg, Antwerp, Rotterdam, and 
Bremen. The buyers had to declare the port of destination. When the buyers 
declared Bremen, the sellers thereupon claimed that the contract must be 
regarded as cancelled because the war had recently broken out. The buyers 
withdrew their declaration of Bremen and declared Antwerp instead. The court 
held that the performance of contract was not impossible because it was still 
lawful to deliver in some of the other ports. As the seller had not delivered the 
jute, the buyers were entitled to damages for the seller's breach of contract.
On the other hand, in Brown v. Royal Insurance Company,433 
insurers had the option to pay money or reinstate premises. They pleaded that
430 Waugh v Morris (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 202; Hindly and Co. Ltd. v. General Fibre Co. Ltd. [1940] 2 
K.B. 517; The Furness Bridge [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 367; Cf. Warico A. G. v. Fritz Mautner [1978] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 151.
431. (1825) 4 L.J. (O.S.) 47. See also Barkworth v. Young, (1856) 26 L.J.Ch. 153.
432. [1940] 2 K.B. 517. See also Ross T. Smyth and Co. Ltd. (Liverpool) v. W. N. Lindsay Ltd. 
(Leith)[l953] 1 W.L.R. 1280; Pound v. Hardy [1956] A.C. 588, 612.
433. (1859) 1 El.and El. 853.
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they had elected to reinstate premises damaged by fire, but that the premises 
had been taken down under an administrative order as a result of their 
dangerous condition not caused by the fire. Lord Campbell C.J. maintained 
that "The fact that performance has become impossible is no legal excuse for 
their not performing it; and they are liable for damages". Crompton J. said that 
the insurers were bound by their election while Hill J. was of the opinion that 
the insurers' claim that they were not bound to do anything under the contract 
had no merit.
We can conclude that when chosen mode of performance becomes
impossible to carry out, the promisor is normally bound to perform another
alternative,434 unless this rule is excluded by the terms of the contract.435
However, where it becomes impossible to carry out one alternative, it depends
on the construction of the contract whether the promisor is still bound to carry
out the remaining alternative, or whether he is completely excused from his
obligation. In Barkworth v. Young,436 Kindersley V.C. said that it would hardly
admit of contradiction that if a promisor was allowed at his option to do a thing
in one or other of two modes and one of those modes became impossible by
act of God, he was still bound to perform the other mode. He added:
"if the court is satisfied that the clear intention of the parties was, that one of 
them should do a certain thing, but he is allowed at his option to do it in one or 
other of two modes, and one of the modes becomes impossible by act of God, 
he is still bound to perform it in other mode."437
In Anderson v. Commercial Union,43S the question of construction of the 
contract was again emphasised. In this case, an insurance policy contained a 
condition which gave the insurers the option to reinstate or replace property 
damaged or destroyed, instead of paying the amount of loss or damage. The 
insurers elected to reinstate, but argued that it had become impossible. Lord 
Esher M.R., said that "It is idle for the company to contend th a t. . . they may 
elect to reinstate . . .  or pay the amount of the loss, and then do neither." 
While Bowen L.J. declared that "It is clear law that if one of two things which 
have been contracted for subsequently becomes impossible, it becomes a
434. See Barkworth v. Young (1856) 26 L.J.Ch. 153, 163; Brightman and Co. v. Bunge Y Bom 
Limitada Sociedad [1924] 2 K.B. 619; Anderson v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. (1885) 55 
L.J.Q.B. 146.
435. SociedadIberica de Molturacion S. A. v. Tradax Export S. A. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 545.
436. (1856) 26 LJ.Ch. 153, 163.
437 Loc. cit., at 163.
438. (1885) 55 L.J.Q.B. 146.
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question of construction whether, according to the true intention of the 
documents, the obligor is bound to perform the alternative or is discharged 
altogether."439
It may be necessary to imply a term into the contract to decide whether 
the promisor is still obliged to perform the remaining alternative or whether he 
is excused from his obligation.440 Lord Campbell's dictum in Brown v. Royal 
Insurance Co.,441 that "The fact that performance has become impossible is 
no legal excuse for their not performing it; and they are liable for damages.", 
may no longer be sound. The implication of such a term into the contract 
seems to be well established in English law. In Reardon Smith Line v. 
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,442 charterers had the right to 
nominate the loading port from a named range of ports. When the charterers 
nominated a port which had been threatened by strike action, the question 
arose whether they were bound to nominate a suitable substitute port. McNair 
J. concluded that it was not possible to imply into the charterparties an 
obligation upon the charterers to make a fresh nomination in such 
situations.443 However, it appears that this conclusion has not been taken as 
having general application.444
From a comparative point of view, it should be pointed out that this 
approach is approximately similar to the provisions of section 2-614 UCC.445 
This section allows a seller to substitute a "commercially reasonable" means 
of delivery for the one agreed upon if it has become unavailable or 
commercially impracticable. Again the section allows the buyer to modify the 
means or manner of payment to any "commercially substitute equivalent" if 
the agreed means or manner fails because of a government law or 
regulation.446
The cases we have been discussing give a party a "performance 
option" which must be distinguished from a "contract option". According to the
439. Loc. cit. at 150.
440. Da Costa v. Davis (1798) 1 B. and P. 242; Stevens v. Webb (1835) 7 C. and P. 60; Bute (Marquis 
oj) v. Thompson (1844) 13 M. and W. 487.
441. 1 E. & E . 853.
442. [1959] 3 W.L.R. 665-718.
443. Loc. cit. at 694, 695.
444 Paoul P. Colinvaux, Doctrine of Frustrated Election, J. Bus. L. (1960), 236.
445. Meyer v. Sullivan, 181 P. 847 (1919).
446. See Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 64-68.
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latter, the contract entitles one of the parties to choose which of two or more 
things must be carried out. The option is related to what should be done and 
not how it should be done.447 For example, suppose that a contract provides 
for the delivery of A or B at seller's option. If A is destroyed, the seller has to 
deliver B. However, if the seller notifies the buyer of his choice to deliver B 
and B is then destroyed, performance of the whole contract will be excused.448
If the stipulated method of performance is regarded as exclusive, and it 
becomes impossible to perform, then performance of other alternatives 
becomes irrelevant and the contract is frustrated. That is what happened in 
Nicholl and Knight v. Ashton Edridge and Co.449 According to the contract 
of sale, cottonseeds were to be shipped by the steamship, Orlando. When the 
Orlando went aground, the court held that the contract was frustrated. Since 
as a matter of construction the contract had expressly and exclusively 
stipulated the manner of performance viz., that the goods were to be shipped 
in the Orlando.
The Suez canal cases arose as a consequence of hostilities in the 
Middle East in 1956 and again in 1967. In some of these cases, the parties 
had not expressly stipulated for a particular method of performance. The 
contracts involved neither expressly nor impliedly provided that shipment 
would be via the Suez canal. When the canal was closed, the question to be 
decided was whether the seller was obliged to ship the goods via the Cape of 
Hope? In Tsakirogiou and Co. Ltd. v. Nobiee Thori GmbH,450 a C.I.F. 
contract was made for the sale of Sudanese groundnuts to be shipped to 
Hamburg. At the time the contract was made, the parties expected that 
shipment would be via Suez. However, after the closure of the canal, the 
House of Lords held that the contract was not frustrated and that the seller 
ought to have shipped the goods via the Cape of Good Hope. Although this 
would cause extra length and expense, this was not sufficiently serious to 
frustrate the contract. Accordingly, if the contract has not expressly or 
impliedly provided the method of performance, the contract must be 
performed if an alternative route is available even although the anticipated 
method of performance had become impossible.
447 G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 8th ed. 1991, at 778.
448. See The Didymi and Leon [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
449 [1901] 2 K.B. 126.
450. [1962] A.C. 93.
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B. CIVIL LAW
1. FRANCE
Unlike English law, French law does not have difficulty in recognising 
partial impossibility. Thus, the exemption is available when a party, because of 
force majeure, is unable to perform one of his obligations. Most of the time a 
contract contains a number of obligations and duties and failure to perform 
one of them may give rise to the question of excuse. This approach in terms 
of obligations is adopted in Civil law. To a common lawyer this approach is 
uncomfortable, for he does not usually think in terms of obligations per se but 
rather in express or implied terms451 of the contract. While section 27 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 speaks of the obligations of the seller and buyer in 
regard to delivery, this constitutes the minimum content without which a 
contract of sale can not exist at all. The remainder of the content is seen as 
deriving from express or implied terms. It is also difficult for a common lawyer 
to envisage frustration of single obligation, since, as discussed before,452 the 
doctrine of frustration automatically applies to performance of the whole 
contract. Because in French law, force majeure is regarded as non­
performance of one or more of the party's obligations, it is able easily to 
accommodate the concept of partial impossibility.
When force majeure prevents partial performance of a contract, 
termination of the contract can be denied, with a proportional diminution in the 
performance of the counter promise.453 The court will consider whether the 
partial performance is in the interest of the creditor or whether it is in 
accordance with the intentions of the contracting parties. If partial 
performance has no utility for the creditor, he has the right to demand the 
termination of the contract. Nor can he be forced to keep what he has 
received. But where in divisible contracts, partial performance has already 
given a substantial benefit to the creditor, the court has a discretionary power 
to decide whether termination should be pronounced. If the court upholds the 
contract, it can only give an indemnity for the unperformed portion of the 
obligation.454
451. See Nicholas, Rules and Terms, Civil Law and Common Law, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1974, 946, 955 et 
seq.
452 Supra, pp. 142, 143.
453 See notes by Planiol, D. 1891 1. 329 and D. 1892 II. 137.
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However, the contract will be terminated when partial impossibility affects an 
essential element of the contract without which the parties would not have 
contracted. This is, of course, similar to the court's approach in Denny, Mott, 
and Dickson, Ltd. v. Janies B. Fraser and Co. Ltd.455 In Ceccaldi v. 
Albertini,456 the Cour de Cassation declared that in cases of partial 
impossibility, it is the duty of the court to decide whether, in the particular 
circumstances, such non-performance is sufficiently material for immediate 
cancellation to be decreed. Thus, partial extinction of a contract normally 
occurs if the effects of force majeure is insignificant, in the sense that it does 
not affect the essential purpose of the contract. For example, if after the 
conclusion of a contract of sale, the seller can not send the goods because 
their carriage is impossible, the partial impossibility (viz. sending of goods) is 
insignificant, in the sense that it does not affect the original purpose of the 
contract (viz. transfer of property). Nevertheless, if it is proved that the delivery 
of the goods is an essential element of the particular contract, then the 
contract will be terminated completely.457 In such circumstances, the contract 
has changed fundamentally as the principal part of the contract has altered.458 
Although the result of these kinds of cases in English law is the same (i.e., 
frustration of contract with its own particular effects), the solution is based on 
the doctrine of frustration rather than partial impossibility.459
It should be emphasised that the intentions of the parties also play an 
important role. For example, in a case of partial impossibility in a contract of 
sale, the contract must be examined to discover whether it was the intention 
of the parties that the contract is divisible. This arises where the goods sold 
are to be delivered in instalments over a period so that each delivery can 
possibly be considered as a separate obligation.460 Thus, each obligation will 
have its own price.
Article 1184461 of the French Civil Code introduces a valuable element 
of flexibility. Under the Article, the courts have discretion and need not grant
454 Cf. Cass., 26 May 1868, D. 1869. 1. 365, S. 1868. 1. 336; Cass., 14 April 1891, D. 1891. 1. 329; 
Cass., 5 Nov. 1895, D. 1896. 1. 8; Cass., Req., 9 March 1925, D. H. 1925, 266; 21 Dec. 1927, D. H. 
1928, 82.
455. [1944] A.C. 265.
456 Cass. Civ., April 14, 1891, D. P. 1891. 1. 329.
457 Raduant, op. cit., at 335.
458. Loc. cit. See also Fiatte, op. cit., at 53.
459 See generally, 215 et seq.
460. Fiatte, op. cit., at 42.
236
rescission if non-performance is partial. They may take other measures such 
as reducing or varying the obligations. In one case,462 under a long-term 
contract, the plaintiff had taken advertising space on an illuminated pillar 
located in a station. Because of the outbreak of war in 1939, blackout 
regulations were imposed for the duration of hostilities and prohibited the 
illumination of advertising displays at night. While the contract did not provide 
for allocation of the payments due in such circumstances, the Cour d'Appel of 
Paris held that its performance had become partially impossible owing to force 
majeure and ordered a 20 per cent reduction of the hire due by plaintiff. The 
case is not an example of partial exoneration of a divisible contract but of a 
judicial rewriting of an entire contract in the event of partial impossibility. In 
another case,463 due to the force majeure event, the proprietor was not able to 
fulfil his obligation to heat the hired premises; the court ordered an 
appropriated reduction of the hire charges.
Partial impossibility is expressly considered by the Civil Code in cases 
of leases of property. According to Article1772, if the property leased is wholly 
destroyed by force majeure, the lease is terminated. However, if it is only 
destroyed in part, the lessee has the choice either of claiming a reduction in 
the rent or terminating the lease. As the jurisprudence has not given any 
solutions in the context of other contracts, it seems that the provisions in 
respect of leases may be given general application. This would mean that in 
cases of partial impossibility, the party who receives partial performance, can 
either ask for a diminution of the price or termination of the contract. It will, of 
course, ultimately be for the court to decide whether to reduce the price or 
terminate the contract.464 We can therefore say that when the debtor, under 
partial impossibility, is excused in part, the other party is also released in part 
of his obligations: the unaffected part of the contract will survive and the 
counter-obligation will be either reduced or modified accordingly.
461. The Article reads: "A resolutory conditon is always understood in synallagmatic contracts for the 
case where one of the two parties does not satisfy his engagement
In such case, the contract is not rescinded as a matter of law. The party toward whom the 
engagement has not been executed has the choice either to force the other to execution of the 
engagement when it is possible or to ask the rescission of it with damages.
Rescission must be requested at law, and the defendant may be granted a delay according to 
the circumstances."
462 C. A. Paris 13. 11. 1943, GazPal. 1943. 2. 260.
463. Trib. Civ. Sein, 23 Dec. 1940, Gaz. Pal., 1941,1, 19.
464 Fiatte, op. cit., at 45, 46.
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In contracts of sale, if non-performance is due to force majeure which 
prevents a seller from performing a part of the contract, he is released from 
his performance of that part. However, it should be noted that where there is a 
contract of sale of a specific thing and the property has passed to the buyer, 
the risk of partial destruction of the thing will be borne by the buyer. In 
contrast, if the seller remains owner, the risk of partial destruction rests on 
him. The seller will not be liable for damages, but he can no longer claim the 
price from the purchaser and the contract is simply void.
Again, in case of partial destruction of a specific thing, where the ownership 
has not passed to the buyer, he has the option either of accepting a part only 
of that thing and paying the equivalent of what he receives, or he has the right 
to demand the termination of the contract completely.465 There is, however an 
exception in Article 1182, paragraph 3. According to this Article, which is 
concerned with obligations subject to a suspensive condition, "If the thing 
deteriorates without the fault of the debtor, the creditor has the choice either to 
rescind the obligation or to demand the thing in the state in which it is found, 
without diminution of the price." This Article only applies in cases of partial 
loss, because the word "deterioration" used therein, seems to be contrary to 
the idea of total loss provision for which is to be found in the preceding 
paragraph. However, it is hoped that the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 
1182 will not be used by analogy in the context of other contracts.466
In cases of sale of a "chose de genre", the question of the risk of either 
partial or total destruction does not arise: the seller bears the risk. So, if the 
things sold perish in part and buyer accepts partial performance, he will pay 
the equivalent of what he receives.467 This provides a similar solution to that 
reached by English law in Howell468 and Sainsbury469 which were, of course, 
based on frustration rather than partial impossibility.
2. GERMANY
While in English law, partial impossibility has not been recognised, the 
BGB mentions it specifically in paragraph 323. According to this provision, in a
465. Loc. cit., at 115.
466. Ripert, Obligations, 1952, at 568.
467. Fiatte, op. cit., at 111-114.
468 Howell v. Coupland, (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 462; affd. (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258.
469. Sainsbury (H&R.S.) Ltd. v. Street [1972] 1 W.L.R. 834; [1972] 3 A11E.R. 1127.
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case of partial impossibility, the counter-performance is reduced in 
accordance with paragraphs 472 and 473.
Paragraph 472 requires that:
"(1) In case of reduction, the purchase price shall be reduced in the proportion 
which at the time of sale the value of the thing in a condition free from defect 
would have borne to the actual value.
(2)If, in the case of a sale of several things for an aggregate price, reduction is 
effected only in respect of some of them, then in reducing the price the 
aggregate value of all the things shall be taken as a basis."
Paragraph 473 in this regard adds that:
"If there is provision, besides the purchase price fixed in money, for a 
performance by the purchaser which involves non-fungible things, then such 
performance, . . ., shall be estimated in money according to its value at the 
time of sale. The reduction of the purchaser's counter-performance is made 
out of the price fixed in money; if this is less than the amount to be deducted, 
the seller shall make good the balance to the purchaser."
In one case,470 the parties entered into a lease. The property was hired 
for the purpose of establishing and carrying on a restaurant during an 
international exhibition to be held in Leipzig in 1914. Due to the outbreak of 
war, the exhibition had to be reduced in soope. Accordingly, the attendance at 
the exhibition was sharply reduced. The innkeeper asked for a corresponding 
reduction in the rent payable by him. The German Supreme Court accepted 
the claim and held that this demand was justified because, according to the 
contract, it was promised to hold an exhibition of a certain size. The promise 
could not therefore be completely performed. The performance had become 
partly impossible and this justified an appropriate reduction of rent.
In another case,471 the parties entered into a contract of sale of English 
tin in 1914. It was agreed that 5000 Kg. of the tin bought was to be delivered 
in five instalments of 1000 Kg., between the months of August and December. 
Owing to the outbreak of war, the price of the tin increased sharply. The 
defendant delivered in August and September, but later refused to deliver the 
remaining three instalments. The plaintiff sued the seller for damages of 
9,244.95 mark for non-performance. The court did not accept the defendant's 
claim of partial impossibility of the contract and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
If because of partial failure of supply, a seller who has contracted with a 
number of buyers is unable to meet all his obligations, is he released from all 
the contracts concluded, or should he allocate the available supply among his
47°. RGZ, Vol. 88, p. 108. (Cited in Cohen, Frustration of Contract in German law, op. cit., at 18).
471. 21 March 1916, 88 ERG (Z) 172. (Cited in Mehren, op. cit., at 279 et seq.).
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buyers? The German courts have solved this problem through the principle of 
good faith.472 In one case,473 a seller had contracted to deliver a special type of 
rape-seed, grown only by him. After the conclusion of the contract, as a result 
of an unusual drought, smaller quantities of the crop were available than could 
have been expected. The question was whether the seller had to satisfy the 
buyers who had brought claims, or whether he had to allocate the available 
supplies in proportion among the buyers. The court argued that the buyers 
formed a community of risk and that consequently, proportional allocation had 
to take place.
In cases where the basis of the contract has only partly lapsed, in 
addition to recession, the German courts are authorised to vary the terms of 
the contracts in order to adjust them to the changed circumstances.474 This 
power is based on paragraph 242 BGB. However, English law does not give 
courts the power to adjust the contracts.475
472. Para. 242 German Civil Code.
473. RGZ, vol. 84, p. 125. (Cited in Cohn, Frustration of Contract in German Law, op. cit., at 18). See 
also RGZ, vol. 95, p. 264; RGZ, vol. 100, pp. 134 et seq.
474 See e.g., RGZ, vol. 107, p. 124. (Cited in Cohn, op. cit., at 21). See also Dawson, op. cit., at 1066- 
1070.
475. Sqg  British Moveitonews v. London District Cinemas Ltd., [1952] A.C. 166.
PART THREE - THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT
OF EXCUSE OF NON-PERFORMANCE
We have considered the concept of excuse doctrines and their effects 
in different legal systems. As we have seen, the various national laws respond 
in different ways to the problems arising from excuse of non-performance. It is 
now appropriate to examine and analyse the problem on an international 
level. For this purpose, solutions given by international conventions, standard 
form contracts and what is perhaps more important, theoretical solutions 
proposed by scholars will be examined.
CHAPTER SIX: 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
A. HAGUE CONVENTION (ULIS)
In order to unify the law relating to international sales, the Uniform Law 
on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) was adopted at Hague conference 
in 1964 and was ratified by eight countries. While the United Kingdom also 
adhered to the convention,1 her ratification was subject to the reservation that 
ULIS would be applicable only to contracts in which the parties choose it as 
the law of the contract. It should be added that there is no reported case in 
British courts which involves the convention.2
The doctrine of excusable non-performance is dealt with under the
heading of "exemption" in Article 74 of the convention. This provides:
"1. Where one of the parties has not performed one of his obligations, he shall 
not be liable for such non-performance if he can prove that it was due to 
circumstances which, according to the intention of the parties at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract, he was not bound to take into account or to 
avoid or to overcome; in the absence of any expression of the intention of the 
parties, regard shall be had to what reasonable persons in the same situation 
would have intended.
2. Where the circumstances which gave rise to the non-performance of the 
obligation constituted only a temporary impediment to performance, the party 
in default shall nevertheless be permanently relieved of his obligation if, by 
reason of the delay, performance would be so radically changed as to amount 
to the performance of an obligation quite different from that contemplated by 
the contract.
3. The relief provided by this Article for one of the parties shall not exclude the 
avoidance of the contract under some other provision of the present law or
1. The Uniform Laws on International Sales Act which came into force in 1972.
2. Barry Nicholas, The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law, 105 L. Q . REV. 1989, 201, 
202.
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deprive the other party of any right which he has under the present law to 
reduce the price, unless the circumstances which entitled the first party to 
relief were caused by the act of the other party or of some person for whose 
conduct he was responsible."
As extracted from the wording of the provision, the intention of the 
parties is considered decisive (subjective standard), but in the absence of any 
expression of the intention of the parties, the problem becomes a question of 
interpretation. This means that the test will have a more objective character 
taking into account the reasonable person's intention in an identical situation.
"Intention of the parties" must be ascertained in order to establish that 
the circumstances were not foreseen and that the party seeking relief could 
not avoid or overcome them. However, where intention can not be ascertained 
from the contract, the Article substitutes the objective test, viz., the 
"reasonable man test" according to which the party seeking relief will either 
be liable for not having avoided or overcome events which an ordinary 
contracting party would have foreseen that he ought to avoid or overcome or 
he will not be liable, because an ordinary contracting party would not have 
foreseen that he would have to avoid or overcome them. It will be clear that 
convention's approach concerning the foresight test is very similar to 
"concrete abstract test" advocated by the present writer in chapter 3.3
Some commentators believe that the approach adopted in the above 
Article owes much to the Common law, particularly where the problem is 
solved by reducing it to a question of interpreting the intentions of the parties.4 
At the Hague conference in 1964, in a comment the United Kingdom also 
expressed the view that Article 74 of ULIS resembled the English law of 
frustration of contract.5 However, it is difficult to accept the idea that Article 74 
is identical with English law. There are some points which are familiar in 
English law but not all. For example, while foreseeability is a matter of 
controversy in English law, the approach adopted in the first paragraph of the 
Article - viz., if the intention is not clear it will be discovered objectively - 
reflects the Common law method of dealing with the problem of frustration in 
terms of interpretation of the contract. However, it appears that the Article is a 
mixture of Common law and Civil law approaches to the problem of excusable
3. Supra, at 127, 128.
4. R. H. Graveson, E. J. Cohn and Diana Graveson, The Uniform Law on International Sales Act 
1967: A Commentary (London, 1968), at 95.
5. Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law Governing the International Sale of Goods, The 
Hague, 2-25 April 1964, vol. II, Documents 167 (1966).
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non-performance. It seems that the test of "intention of the parties" was used 
so as to avoid incompatibility with unique national law formulations.6 
Another point which corresponds to English law is the formula adopted at the 
end of paragraph 2: ". . . so radically changed as to amount to the 
performance of an obligation quite different from that contemplated by the 
contract".7
According to the Article, the excuse is available when a party has not
performed "one of his obligations". This is inconsistent with English law,
because frustration in English law covers the whole performance of the
contract and not one or more obligations of the contract, which is, of course,
the Civil law approach.8 However the second paragraph of the Article
confusingly speaks in terms of release from an obligation. Can we equate the
paragraph with the English approach by arguing that when there is a change
in obligation, is simply another way of saying that there is a change in the
contract. In this regard, even Common law writers9 and judges sometimes use
the word, obligation, instead of the word, contract. For example, in Marshal v.
Harland,10 Sir John Donaldson in defining the doctrine of frustration stated:
" . . all that the lawyer means by frustration of contract . . .  [is a case] in 
which a contractual obligation becomes impossible of performance or in which 
performance of the obligation would be rendered a thing radically different 
from that which was undertaken by the contract."
The crucial part of this Article is paragraph 1, where it is stated: "due to 
circumstances which . . .  he was not bound to take into account . . . ". This 
shows the influence of the Civil law which has adopted the principle that 
contractual liability is based on fault. Accordingly, the non-performing party 
must prove that the contingency was beyond his control and foresight. The 
burden of proof is clearly on the non-performing party to show that he was not 
at fault (Para. 1 : " . . .  if he can prove. .."). This approach is quite different from 
English law because, as discussed before,11 the non-performing party must 
prove that performance of his contract is rendered impossible or its purpose 
has been frustrated. Moreover, in English law the burden of proof that the
6. Gunnar Lagergren, A Uniform Law of International Sales of Goods, J. Bus. L. 1958,131, 139.
7 See Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractors v. Fareham U. D. C., [1956] A.C. 696, 728.
8. See B. Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 1979, 231, 233-234.
9. See e.g., Chitty on Contracts, vol. I, 25th ed., 1983, at Para. 1526-1527; Clive M. Schmitthoff, 
Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 128.
10. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 899, at 904.
1L. Supra, pp. 137, 138.
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event was caused by the fault of one of the parties rests on the party denying 
frustration. In this regard, American law is like French and German law., 
namely, the burden of proof rests on the party relying on the doctrine of 
excuse.12
Paragraph 1 of Article 74 gives no right to claim damages, no matter 
what the nature of the non-performance might be. This approach will still be 
taken even where the goods do not conform to contract, unless the parties 
agreed to the contrary.13
It should be added that paragraph 3 of the Article governs the extent of 
consequences of supervening events. It deals with the remedies for the 
aggrieved party in case of non-performance. Under the paragraph, the 
remedies available are: reduction of the price14 and avoidance of the contract 
with the consequence15 that restitution must be made by both parties for any 
performance received. Finally, the obligee may not sue the obligor for specific 
performance.
1. CRITICISMS OF ARTICLE 74 OF ULIS
The main object of the draftsmen was to produce a formula to define 
the circumstances in which excuse of non-performance would occur. In 
attempting to countenance different legal doctrines, the formula has created 
too many areas of doubt. The language of the Article is abstract, artificial and 
sometimes vague. This is because the Article does not provide accurate and 
comprehensive definitions for various terms used. Thus, the application of the 
provisions of the Article to particular facts will obviously be difficult. For 
example, paragraph 1 speaks in terms of exemption from liability which 
echoes French law, whereas like German law paragraph 2 speaks in terms of 
release from the obligation.16 Paragraph 1 talks of "one of his obligations", this 
means that where a contract creates a lot of obligations, one of them might be 
excused. While contrary to the English law of frustration,17 it is in accord with 
the French law of force majeure. Moreover, excuse of non-performance of one 
of the obligations of the contract amounts to partial frustration, which is not
12. Supra, at 140.
13. Gravson and the others, op. cit., at 96.
14 Art. 46.
15. Art. 78.
16. B. Nicholas, op. cit., at 234.
17. Supra, pp. 215 et seq. & 234 et seq.
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recognised in English law where the entire contract is terminated by 
frustration.
In describing the relationship between the seller and the buyer, the 
Article states that the non-performance must be "due to" the unforeseen 
"circumstances". It does not use the words, "prevented", "precluded" or 
"rendered impossible". Accordingly, it can be said that the provision favours 
sellers in that the drafting commission of the ULIS voted in favour of the idea 
that a mere rise in price will satisfy the criteria for excusing the seller's non­
performance.18 Accordingly, Tunc19 argues that the adoption of the word 
"circumstances" in paragraph 1, include cases in which non-performance was 
due to an unforeseen rise in prices, a possibility which is in accord with 
German doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage. The use of the elastic 
words, "due to" and "circumstances", may excuse the party seeking relief in 
many more circumstances than the English doctrine of frustration, or, though 
less markedly, the UCC concept of impracticability. Given these points, Article 
74 of the ULIS is clearly not entirely in accord with English law. As Nicholas 
has argued, those who suggested otherwise were misled by their own 
conceptual presuppositions.20
It should be added that the ULIS also does not impose any duties of 
notification or alternative performance. It also does not permit adjustment of 
the contractual obligations. Thus, these rules might operate harshly. However, 
the parties can expressly exclude the application of the Article from their 
contract21 and provide for excusable non-performance enabling the courts to 
effect an equitable adjustment of their rights.
Expenses incurred in performance of the contract which result in a 
benefit to the other party, can be the subject of restitution; but if the expenses 
incurred do not result in any benefit to the other party it appears, from the 
provisions, that there is no basis for restitution.
Avoidance of the contract under Article 78 (which is also applicable in 
case of breach of contract) has been criticised on the ground that it might be 
too drastic a remedy where the non-performance is not due to the fault of a
18. Zweigert, Aspects of the German Law of Sale, Int'l. & Comp. L. Q. Special Pub. No. 9, 
Symposium on Some Comparative Aspects of the Law Relating to the Sale of Goods, 1964, 8, at 48.
19. See Records and Documents of the Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law Governing 
the International Sale of Goods, The Hague 1964. (The Hague 1966), vol. I, p. 384.
20. B. Nichlas, op. cit., at 239.
21. Art. 8.
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party.22 The argument has been illustrated by the case of an F.O.B. buyer who 
is not able to give effective shipping instructions. The buyer will be exempted 
from damages for his non-performance and the seller will be excused of his 
obligation to deliver the goods. The problem here is that it is not clear whether 
the seller can avoid the contract, since this will give him the right of restitution 
of any part-performance he has rendered, subject to the restoration of the 
price. This could lead to injustice to both parties where there is a rise or fall in 
the market.
Although in theory the ULIS can be welcomed as a compromise 
between different legal systems in defining excusable non-performance, in 
practice there will be serious difficulties in its application. For example, those 
words and terms of the Article which are vague or elastic will result in different 
interpretations in different legal systems. This is contrary to the purpose of 
uniform code of law. It illustrates that the creation of an accurate and 
comprehensive uniform law which at the same time countenances different 
legal doctrines, is a very difficult task.
B. VIENNA CONVENTION (CISG)
Because of various inherent defects in the provisions of the ULIS, few 
countries accepted it. Accordingly, another Convention under the title of the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
was prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) and issued for signature through a United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference in Vienna in 1980.23 This convention (hereinafter CISG) came into 
force on 1 January, 1988. Until 7 December, 1993, thirty six countries 
including the United States of America, France and Germany adopted and 
ratified the new convention. The United Kingdom has not yet ratified.
In this Convention, the question of excusable non-performance is 
regulated by Article 79 under the title of "exemptions". It is one of the longest 
in the Convention. Although drafting of Article took up a great deal of time, the 
result is not satisfactory. Let us examine the first, and key, paragraph of Article 
79 and paragraph 5, which provide the general rule of exemptions.
1. GENERAL RULE ON EXEMPTIONS (PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 5)
22. B. Nicholas, op. cit., at 239.
23. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U. N. Doc. A/ Conf. 
97/ 18 Annex I (1980).
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1.1. PARAGRAPH 1
The paragraph reads:
"(1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he 
proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that 
he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into 
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or 
overcome it or its consequences."
According to the language of the paragraph, a party seeking relief from
liability for damages, has to prove that:
(i) the non-performance was "due to an impediment beyond his control";
(ii) at the time of the conclusion of the contract, he or she could not 
reasonably have been expected to have taken the impediment into account; 
and
(iii) subsequent to the contract, he or she could not reasonably be expected to 
have avoided or overcome the impediment or its consequences.
1.1.1. IMPEDIMENT
The substantial change in the formulation between ULIS and CISG is 
that whilst the former (Article 74(1)) refers to "circumstances", the latter 
speaks of "impediment", although the expression "temporary impediment" also 
appeared in Article 74 (2) of the ULIS.
According to the legislative history of the Convention,24 this change - 
the substitution of the word "impediment" for "circumstances" - was intended 
to ensure that excuse from liability did not include defective performance and, 
in particular, the supply of goods which did not conform to contract. The word 
"circumstances" was regarded as having a wider scope that extends 
exemption to include delivery of defective goods where the defect is not due to 
the seller's fault.25 By using the word "impediment", it was envisaged that it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for the seller to escape liability for 
defective goods.26 Some commentators doubt whether this objective was 
achieved. Nicholas illustrates his doubt by considering the case where a 
defect has been fraudulently concealed by a third supplier. At least in a fault- 
oriented system, this could be regarded as an "impediment" to the 
performance by the seller of his duty to supply goods which conform to
24 5 UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1974, 39-40; 6 UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1975, 60-61.
25. Records and Documents of the Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law Governing the 
International Sale of Goods, The Hague 1964, The Netherland Ministry of Justice (The Hague 1966), 
vol. I, pp. 121-122; vol. II, pp. 21, 351.
26 5 and 6 UNCITRAL YEARBOOK, 1975, 60-61.
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contract.27 Moreover, Huber also firmly believes that the change in wording, 
though subject to so much argument, is without significance. In his view, a 
defect present in the goods at the time of contracting, could be an impediment 
to the performance of the seller's obligation to deliver conforming goods.28
It is surprising for a common lawyer to envisage that frustration could 
ever be relied upon as an excuse for breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability. While the Civil law, for example, Germany,29 bases 
contractual liability on fault, in Anglo-American law, there is no place for fault 
in contractual liability. At Common law, contractual obligations have been 
traditionally thought to be absolute.
In the present writer's view, the word "impediment" presupposes the 
absence of fault before there is a ground of excuse, and accordingly the seller 
will not be allowed to escape liability for defective performance. The following 
reasons support the contention:
First, the intention of the draftsman in replacing the word "circumstances" by 
"impediment" is clear enough: exemption does not apply to defective 
performance such as the supply of non-conforming goods.30 Secondly, 
according to the CISG, if the seller fails to perform any of his obligations31 
including his obligation to supply conforming goods, the buyer may claim 
damages.32 Similar provisions on breach by the buyer are to be found in the 
Convention.33 The Convention is based on the fundamental principle of a 
contractual obligation to perform the terms of the contract. If excuse was 
available where performance was defective, this would undermine the 
Convention's contractual approach to performance of the parties' obligations 
and its unitary approach to the remedies for breach.34 Thirdly, comparative
27. B. Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration, op. cit., at 240.
28. Die UNCITRAL - Entwurf eines Ubereinkommens Uber International Warenkaufvertrage, 43 
RabelsZ 413, 165 (1979). (Cited in B. Nicholas, "Impracticabiity and Impossibility in the U. N. 
Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods", 5-1, at 5-11, (In International Sales: The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Edited by N. Galston and 
H. Smit, New York, 1984).
29. Supra, at 128 et seq. & 132 et seq.
30. John O. Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales, Deventer, 
1989, at 631.
31. Art. 45.
32. Art. 35.
33. Art. 61 (l)(b).
34 John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
Deventer, 1982, at 435.
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analysis of excusable non-performance,35 indicates that relief is generally 
based on events such as war, embargo, flood, fire, storm, crop failure and the 
like, i.e., which are not the result of a party's breach. Fourthly, exemption 
based on absence of fault might call for inquiry into the manufacturing 
processes of the seller and more remote suppliers. This inquiry might require 
long, uncertain and expensive investigations.36 Fifthly, the words "beyond 
control" also emphasise that a party is not allowed to be excused for merely 
defective performance, such as non-conformity. Finally, for the sake of equity, 
the seller or manufacturer should bear the risk in such a case, otherwise, the 
buyer may suffer serious losses.
1.1.2. OPERATION OF THE IMPEDIMENT
For the impediment to be operative, the party seeking relief must prove 
that the impediment was "beyond control". Owing to the differences that exist 
between Civil law and Common law, this condition is not easy to explain. It 
can be argued that the issue of fault is involved. But this argument is unsound 
since an early draft of the Convention which had required that the impediment 
should have occurred without the fault of the party seeking exemption was 
abandoned.37 If we accept that "beyond control" reflects the French doctrine of 
force majeure according to which the contingency must be unforeseeable, 
insurmountable and irresistible, the Article will not cover other situations such 
as change of circumstances, commercial impracticability and wegfall der 
geschaftsgrundlage. But as we shall see,38 comparative analysis of the text of 
the paragraph reveals that the Convention could be capable of covering both 
Civil and Common law doctrines.
Other questions arise. Would the insolvency of the buyer per se 
constitute an impediment beyond the buyer's control? What happens if an 
unanticipated exchange control is imposed? It has been argued that the 
insolvency of the buyer by itself should not be considered an impediment 
beyond control,39 but the imposition of exchange control appears to be an
35. See generally chapter two.
36. Loc. cit.
37. 6 UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1975, 68; 8 UNCITRAL Yearbook, 1977, 56.
38. Infra, 250 et seq.
39. See United Nations Secretariat's Commentary to the UNCITRAL Draft Convention (A/ Conf./ 97/ 
5), 1979, at 172.
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impediment beyond control so that the buyer can exempt himself from liability 
for damages for non-payment.40
Another important condition before the impediment operates concerns 
the foreseeability of the impediment. This is the most difficult issue facing the 
party seeking relief. According to the Secretariat's commentary41 and 
paragraph 4 of Article 79,42 the concept of foreseeability in the text of the 
Article does not differ from that in Article 74 of the ULIS. In other words, 
paragraph 1 of Article 79 by providing ". . . that he could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken the impediment into account. . .", considers the actual 
foresight of the parties (subjective test) before considering foreseeability 
(objective test). The Vienna Convention's foresight test is therefore different 
from that in French law. However, as discussed before,43 it is thought that the 
two-stage approach adopted in the ULIS and CISG is much preferable than 
the one-stage, objective criterion adopted by French law. The former is a 
comprehensive solution similar to the "concrete, abstract foresight test" 
suggested by the present author.44 Under this test, it is only when express and 
implied terms of the contract and the circumstances surrounding do not 
indicate that the occurrence of a particular event was actually foreseen by the 
party seeking relief that it is necessary to determine objectively whether the 
non-performing party could reasonably have been expected to take the event 
into account at the time of contracting.
Again a party seeking relief must prove that he has been unable to 
avoid or overcome the impediment or its consequences. The word 
"consequences" is a new addition in the CISG, in comparison with the ULIS. 
The reason for the addition of this word is that sometimes the impediment 
itself is foreseen or foreseeable, whereas its consequences are not. However, 
avoiding or overcoming the impediment or its consequences will, in most
40. See also Albert H. Kritzer, Guide to Practical Applications of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Deventer, 1989, at 508.
41. "However, where neither the explicit nor the implicit terms of the contract show that the 
occurrence of the particular impediment was envisaged, it is necessary to determine whether the non­
performing party could reasonably have been expected to take it into account at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract. In the final analysis this determination can only be made by a court or 
arbitral tribunal on a case-by-case basis." (United Nations Secretariat's Commentary to the 
UNCITRAL Draft Convention (A/ Conf ./ 97/ 5), 1979, at 170).
42. " . . .  after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is 
liable..."
43. Supra, pp. 127, 128.
44 Supra, pp. 127, 128. See also infra, pp. 322 et seq.
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cases, overlap with the concept of beyond control. The behaviour of the 
defaulting party should be taken into account. This rule also indicates that the 
obligor must do all in his power to perform his obligation and may not await 
impediments that might later justify non-performance. Thus, the obligor may 
not be liable for damages if he provides a commercially reasonable substitute 
for the performance which was required under the contract.45 For example, a 
particular vessel is delayed because of contingencies beyond control, the 
obligor must attempt to overcome the impediment by providing an alternative 
vessel. An example in the Secretariat's commentary46 is, however, open to 
criticism. The example concerns a contract requiring goods to be packed in a 
specific type of container: if the container happened to be unavailable, it is 
suggested in the comment that the seller would not be liable if he provided 
"commercially reasonable substitute packing material". However, this can be 
criticised on the following grounds:
Article 79 does not expressly stipulate such a solution and it is difficult to 
accept that such a result is implicit in the provision. Secondly, the solution 
conflicts with the provisions of Article 35(1) of CISG, according to which the 
seller must deliver goods which are contained or packed in the manner 
provided in the contract. Thirdly, this interpretation opens the way for 
modification of contract leaving it open to subjective manipulation with 
undesirable results. Fourthly, if the buyer does not accept the alternative 
performance, the seller might claim damages. In that case, it would be 
irrational to speak of non-performance and exemption where the only question 
is whether the contract has been performed.47
1.1.3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PARAGRAPH 1
Nicholas believes that the above formula used in paragraph 1 echoes 
the French requirement that force majeure must be unforeseeable, 
insurmountable and irresistible. He argues that a proposal was made at 
Vienna that the non-performing party should be permanently excused if at the 
end of a temporary impediment, "circumstances had so radically changed that 
it would be manifestly unreasonable to hold him liable." This proposal was 
rejected on the ground of reluctance to discuss frustration and imprevision.48 If
45. Secratararit's Commentary, op. cit., at 172.
46. Loc. cit.
47 See also C. M. Bianca, M. J. Bonnell and D. Tallon, Commentary on the International Sales Law, 
the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, 1987, at 582.
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we accept this argument, the result is that the paragraph is not the language 
of the Common law. The Article will not therefore apply to cases which would 
be frustrated in English law, when performance is discharged by a radical 
change of circumstances: nor will it cover French imprevision.
It is, however, difficult to accept this argument. The fact that there are 
some similarities between the text of the paragraph and force majeure in 
French law does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the Article has the 
same scope as the national law doctrine. The reason for this is that Article 7 of 
CISG emphasises the international character of the Convention which has 
developed a system of its own, resulting from a process that started with 
ULIS. Any interpretation of the provisions of the Convention should take into 
account its international character and the need to promote uniformity in its 
application. This goal can be achieved if, as Honnold argues,49 we clean our 
minds of ideas derived from national laws and read the paragraph in the 
context of the Convention as a whole and in the light of the practices and 
needs of international trade. In practice this is very difficult, since in order to 
avoid referring to their domestic law concepts and achieve uniformity, the 
courts will have to refer to international cases where the Convention has been 
discussed. Moreover, the interpretation of the Convention by scholars will also 
have an important part to play. But how many cases have been concerned 
with the provisions of the Convention and how uniform is the interpretation of 
the Convention among commentators? The answers are clear. In regard to 
the first question, there is little case law. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
there is no reported case in relation to ULIS.50 If a court can find decisions in 
other jurisdictions, they may be limited and unreliable. In regard to the second 
question, the situation is even worse. The commentators disagree on many 
issues. For example, some believe that "change of circumstances" may 
constitute an impediment;51 others take an opposite view.52 Why is there such 
divergence of opinion on the interpretation of Article 79 among the 
commentators? Nicholas53 maintains that the Article is "vague or imprecise"
48. B. Nicholas, The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law, op. cit., at 235-236.
49. John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
op. cit., at 429.
50. B. Nicholas, The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law, op. cit.
51. See e.g. John O. Honnold, op. cit., at 442-443; Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law, Vienna, 1986, at 
102.
52. B. Nicholas, op. cit., at 235-236.
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and adds that it contains "elastic words". The result is that the language can 
not give guidance to the courts and will be read in the context of the existing 
doctrines in the domestic legal system. Tallon54 emphasises that the general 
wording of the Article leaves too much room for judicial interpretation which, in 
turn, opens the way for the judges to refer to similar concepts in their own law. 
The present writer believes that the Convention was inevitably drafted as a 
multi-cultural compromise between different legal systems. The result of this is 
a lack of coherence and consistency, which leads to uncertainty in the scope 
and application of the Convention. That is why uniformity of interpretation of 
the Article is impossible. Because of the flexibility in its wording, the Article can 
be interpreted in such a way as to cover force majeure, frustration and even 
commercial impracticability. The flexible word, "impediment", in the paragraph 
has such potential. However, is the language of Article 79 so flexible that 
French imprevision and the German doctrine of wegfall der 
geschaftsgrundlage are included? It seems that the Article does not apply to 
such situations because, as will be seen, modification of the contract is not 
allowed in the CISG.
Two important points should be noted. The paragraph speaks of non­
performance of any obligation. Thus, it explicitly refers to all the obligations of 
the seller55 and all the obligations of the buyer56 which derive from the 
Convention or individual contracts. Moreover, Article 79 of CISG expressly 
refers to both parties in respect of any obligations. This contrasts with section 
2-615 of UCC which, read literally, provides excuse only for the seller in 
limited situations viz., non-delivery, delay in or partial delivery.57 Article 79 also 
covers both obligations de moyen and obligations de resultat of French law.58
The exemption in CISG from liability in relation to performance of "any 
of his obligations", is in accord with French but is contrary to English common 
law. As discussed before,59 in English law, frustration automatically releases 
both parties from performance of all their obligations, while according to Article
53. B. Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility in the U. N. Convention on Contracts For 
International Sale of Goods, op. cit., at pp. 5-4 et seq.
54. C. M. Bianca, M. J. Bonnel & D. Tallon, op. cit., at 594.
55. Art. 30 of the CISG.
56. Art. 53 of the CISG.
57. However, as discussed before, (Supra pp. 79 et seq.), the most American courts have extended the 
excuse also to buyers. See also comment 9 of Sec. 2-615 of UCC.
58. Tallon, op. cit., at 577.
59. Supra, pp. 215 et seq., & 234 et seq.
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79, exemption can be in respect of performance of only one obligation. 
Further, the Article only exempts the non-performing party.
By stating "failure to perform . . .", the Article does not express the 
nature of the non-performance. It therefore includes both total and partial non­
performance. By referring to non-performance of "any obligation", it again 
emphasises that partial excuse of non-performance is also recognised in the 
CISG.
Another important point is that the text of the Article is silent on the time 
the impediment arising. In particular, the Article does not deal with the 
situation where the impediment which may have existed at the time of 
conclusion of the contract. However, it would appear implicit from the phrase 
". . . have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion" 
that it does not apply to situations where the impediment existed at the time of 
contracting and was known to the party seeking exemption. But what of an 
impediment which is unknown to both parties at the time of contracting and is 
only revealed at a later time, for example, when the subject of the contract of 
sale are specific goods which have already perished at the time of 
contracting? The Convention itself is silent. From a comparative point of view, 
it should be said that in English law, it is possible to rely on theory of mistake 
in this situation, with the result that the contract is void. In Germany, this is a 
case of initial impossibility and the contract is null. In French law, the non­
existence of the subject matter of the contract invalidates the contract ab 
initio.60 It seems then that Article 79 should cover this situation provided that it 
was reasonable not to have expected such an impediment at the time the 
contract was formed.61
1.2. PARAGRAPH 5 (EFFECTS OF IMPEDIMENT)
Paragraph 5 states:
"Nothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right other 
than to claim damages under this Convention."
Paragraph 5 elaborates the meaning of the words, "is not liable", in 
paragraph 1. It confines the scope of the Article to an exemption from liability 
in damages. The word "damages" covers all damages including damages for 
over-due performance, interests on damages and direct or consequential 
damages etc.62 If a contract contains a penalty clause and liquidated damages
60. However, the problem of validity is not governed by CISG (Art. 4(a)).
61. The Secretariat's Commentary, op. cit., at 169. See also Tallon, op. cit., at 577.
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provisions the question whether the failure to perform excuses the defaulting 
party from paying the sum provided in the contract is a matter of national 
law.63 But apart from damages, all other remedies which are available on the 
occurrence of the impediment remain. The remedies in question are: 
avoidance of the contract, reduction of price in case of non-conformity and 
specific performance.64
1.2.1. AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT
The remedy of avoidance is available both to the buyer65 and the 
seller.66 The effects of avoidance are stipulated in Articles 81-84, according to 
which both parties are released from performance of their obligations. Under 
the Convention, the buyer retains the right to declare the contract avoided 
either in the case of a fundamental breach committed by the seller or failure of 
performance of the contract within a period of extra time fixed by the buyer.67 
The period of time fixed by the buyer must be of a "reasonable length".68
By Article 51 of the CISG, if a seller delivers only part of the goods or 
part of the goods fails to conform to contract, the buyer may either exercise 
his remedies concerning the missing part or avoid the contract as a whole, if 
the failure to perform fully amounts to a fundamental breach of the whole 
contract. This remedy will be useful for the buyer if the non-performance is 
partial and he refuses to accept partial performance where the failure amounts 
to fundamental breach. It should be added that the buyer will lose his right to 
declare the avoidance of the contract or demand substitute goods if he can 
not return the original goods in the condition they were in when he received 
them. But this provision does not apply if the alteration in goods is not due to 
the buyer's act or omission or if it is because of an examination required by 
Article 38 or if the goods have been sold in the normal course of business or 
have been consumed in the course of use.69
62. Tallon, op. cit., at 589.
63. Secretariat's Commentary, op. cit., at 170-171.
64 A. H. Hudson, Exemptions and Impossibility under the Vienna Convention, at 189-192 (In Force 
Majeure and Frustration of Contract, Edited by McKendrick, op. cit.).
65. Art. 49.
66 Art. 64.
67. Art. 49.
68. Art. 74 (1).
69 Art. 82.
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If in order to overcome the impediment, a seller furnishes a 
commercially reasonable substitute performance, then the buyer is still entitled 
to avoid the contract and reject the substitute performance if it is so imperfect 
in comparison with the original performance required in the contract that it 
constitutes a fundamental breach of contract. It should be added that the 
seller is also authorised to declare the avoidance of the contract if the failure 
of the buyer is regarded as a fundamental breach of contract or he does not 
perform his obligation within an additional period fixed by the seller. Where the 
buyer has paid the price, the seller loses his right to declare the contract 
avoided unless, in respect of late performance, he does so before he is aware 
that performance has been provided and, in other cases, unless he exercises 
his right within a reasonable time.70
In case of avoidance, the Convention requires71 the parties to make 
restitution of whatever they have received under the contract. The party who 
avoids the contract must also take into account the benefits that he has 
derived from the goods. He is bound to return such benefits to the seller and 
the seller is bound to refund the price with the interest thereon.72
1.2.2. REDUCTION OF THE PRICE
Under the Convention, the remedy of reduction of price is available if 
the goods do not conform with the contract. However, if the seller remedies 
any failure to perform his obligations according to Articles 37 and 48, or if the 
buyer refuses to accept performance by the seller under those Articles, the 
buyer may not reduce the price.73 The remedy of reduction of the price is also 
available in a case of partial destruction of the specific goods due to 
impediment. It can therefore be said that the buyer may declare the contract 
avoided or demand the delivery of the goods with an appropriate reduction in 
price. In any event, he can not claim damages arising from the impediment.
It should be noted that under the Convention, if the goods do not 
conform with the contract - whether or not non-conformity or an impediment 
causing lack of conformity comes within article 79 - the buyer may, instead of 
reduction of price, require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of 
conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of contract and a request for
70. Art. 64.
71. Art. 82 (2).
72 Art. 84.
73. Art. 50.
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substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice given under Article 
39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.74 The buyer may also require the 
seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair.75
1.2.3. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
According to CISG, the right to specific performance is available for 
both the buyer76 and the seller77 when the occurrence of impediment is of such 
a nature as to render the performance impracticable or impossible! According 
to paragraph 5, the exemption stated does not prevent either party from 
exercising any right other than damages. This provision has puzzling results. 
How can we accept that performance is impossible and yet parties can be 
compelled to carry it out? If so, it would permit the buyer to raise an action for 
specific performance in a case where specific goods have perished! It also 
allows the seller to bring an action for payment where the transfer of the 
buyer's funds are prohibited. Although an attempt was made completely to 
exclude specific performance as a remedy, this was rejected at Vienna.78
In the present writer's view when performance of the contract has 
become physically impossible, the courts will not award specific performance 
because it will not compel a defendant to attempt the impossible. Moreover, 
under Article 28 of the CISG, a court is not bound to grant a decree of specific 
performance unless it would have done so in a contract of sale which does not 
fall within the CISG. However, specific performance may be an appropriate 
remedy in the case of either temporary or partial impediment where, for 
example, part performance is available.
Another perplexing, indeed astonishing, problem arises in relation to 
impracticable cases. For example, a judge can impose penalties for non- 
compliance with an order for specific performance and those penalties can 
exceed the amount of damages in relation of which the seller is prima facie 
exempted. Schlechtriem states the problem in the following way: 'You are 
exempt from paying damages for your non-performance, but you are required 
to pay an even larger sum by way of penalty for the same non-performance".79
74 Art. 42 (2).
75. Art. 42 (3).
76. Art. 46 (1).
77. Art. 62.
78. United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records, at 
383-385.
257
In comparing the ULIS and CISG in this regard, it should be said that 
Article 74(3) of the ULIS merely preserves avoidance of the contract and 
reduction of the price, with the result that a party may not be sued for specific 
performance under the ULIS.
However, the remedies available under the CISG were drafted for the 
purposes of breach. Article 79 is not concerned with breach. It is dealing with 
the case of two innocent parties and raises problems of restitution, adjustment 
of the rights of the parties and reliance losses which are not remedies 
expressly recognised in the Convention.
1.3. PARAGRAPH 2 (THIRD PARTY)
Paragraph 2 of Article 79 provides:
"If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has 
engaged to perform the whole or a part of the contract, that party is exempt 
from liability only if:
(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and
(b) the person whom he has so engaged would be so exempt if the provisions 
of that paragraph were applied to him."
The paragraph deals with the special case of non-performance by a 
defaulting party due to the failure of a third party whom he engages to perform 
the whole or a part of the contract. In such a case, the defaulting party may be 
exempted from liability under the conditions provided in the paragraph. This 
provision in respect of responsibility for third parties is novel: it is not found in 
ULIS nor in the national laws that have been discussed, with the exception of 
German law.80 It constitutes a response to the increasing use made of third 
parties in contracts, especially in international level. In its initial draft 
Convention, the working party used the term "sub-contractor". However, as 
that term has close associations with building and engineering contracts in 
many legal systems, it was replaced by the term, "third person".81
According to the paragraph, a seller's non-performance due to the third 
party's failure is not in itself excused even if all the requirements laid down in 
paragraph 1 are met, unless the third party in his turn is similarly exempted by 
the impediment. The party seeking relief must not only prove that the
79. P. Schlechtriem, Einheitliches UN-Kaufrecht, 1981, at 97. (Cited in B. Nicholas, Impracticability 
and impossibility in the U. N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, op. cit., at 
5-19).
80. See Para. 278 BGB. See also infra, p. 334.
81. John O. Honnold, Docummentary history of the Uniform Law for International Sales, op. cit., at 
349-446, 631-634.
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requirements provided in paragraph 1 are met, but also must show that the 
failure of the third party could not have been expected to have been foreseen 
or overcome.82
What is clear is that the Convention in this regard has rigidified the 
limits of exemption. The rule will be harsh in cases where the sub-contractor is 
imposed upon the seller by the buyer. It seems that in this situation, the seller 
is authorised to rely on Article 80 of the CISG, according to which the buyer 
will not have rights if they arise from his own wrongful action. This would be 
satisfied if the seller can prove that the buyer should have foreseen the 
possibility of the third party's failure which caused the seller's failure to carry 
out the contract.83 What is clear is that the sub-contractor's non-performance 
will rarely lead to the excuse of the party seeking relief.
Would the bankruptcy of the third party give rise to exemption of the 
party to the main contract? It seems that the answer is negative because, as 
discussed before,84 insolvency of the parties is not considered an impediment. 
This should apply a fortiori to a third party's insolvency. Moreover, a person is 
generally responsible for his personnel including a third party, as long as he 
controls them. Thus, insolvency is not an impediment justifying exemption. 
This rule should also apply where deficiencies and poor performance are 
caused by individual workers.
There must be an organic link between the main party and third party in 
that the main party organises and controls the sub-contractor's work and the 
sub-contractor knows that this work is a means of performing the main 
contract. The commentary states that the "third party" in paragraph 2 does not 
include general suppliers of goods or raw materials, since a supplier is not 
described as a person engaged to carry out any part of the seller's contract.85 
However, it appears that there is no a reasonable justification why the failure 
of a supplier should not have exempting effect where the conditions of 
impediment are met.
1.4. PARAGRAPH 3 (EFFECTS OF TEMPORARY IMPEDIMENT)
According to paragraph 3 of Article 79:
82 Tallon, op. cit., at 586.
83. B. Nicholas, The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law, op. cit., at 237.
84 Supra, PP. 248-250.
85. United Nations Secretariat's Commentary to the UNCITRAL Draft Convention (A/ Conf./ 97/ 5), 
p. 172; Honnold, op. cit., at 349, Paras. 12, 446, 449.
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"The exemption provided by this article has effect for the period during which 
the impediment exists."
The text of the Article speaks of temporary non-performance. It does 
not expressly provide anything about partial excuse. Although the Article 
speaks of non-performance of one obligation, it remains silent regarding the 
effects of non-performance on the contract as a whole. However, paragraph 3 
has two important effects. First, the obligor is exempted of liability for delay in 
performing during the period during which the impediment exists. Secondly, 
the obligor is obliged to carry out his obligation when the impediment is 
removed.
Paragraph 5 also preserves the innocent party's right to avoid the 
contract, if the impediment amounts to a fundamental breach of contract. If the 
contract is not avoided, it continues in existence. The paragraph can be 
criticised on the ground that a similar right is not given to the party who fails to 
perform, viz., he can not avoid the contract in the case of a long-term 
impediment where the circumstances have so radically changed that it would 
be unrealistic to impose performance. For example, suppose a seller is faced 
with enormous cost increases. He can argue that the increase in costs is an 
impediment that excuses him from liability. Comparative analysis86 shows that 
he will probably not meet with success.
However, it seems that Article 74(2) of the ULIS is more practicable 
and preferable than the present Convention. According to the ULIS, the party 
in default will be permanently relieved of the obligation if by reason of delay 
performance of the obligation would be so radically changed as to amount to a 
performance quite different from that contemplated by the contract. At 
diplomatic conference, a similar provision was suggested for paragraph 3, but 
this was rejected because of a reluctance to enter into problems of frustration 
or imprevision.87 As an alternative, the word "only" in paragraph 3, which until 
then had remained in the text after "has effect", was deleted so as to allow the 
temporary impediment to become permanent when appropriate.88 However, 
without the assistance of the Convention's legislative history, it will be very 
difficult for the courts to support this interpretation. Moreover, even if the non­
performing party persuades the judge to come to this conclusion, he may
86. See generally chapter two, pp. 33 et seq.
87 Official Records, 1964 Conference, at 381-382.
88. Loc. cit.
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discover that though he is excused from liability in damages, he may still be 
compelled to carry out the contract.89
1.5. PARAGRAPH 4 (NOTIFICATION)
Article 79(4) reads:
"The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the 
impediment and its effects on his ability to perform. If the notice is not received 
by the other party within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform 
knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is liable for damages 
resulting from such non-receipt."
The defaulting party must notify the other party of the impediment and
its effects in order to enable him to take all the steps necessary to overcome
the effects of the non-performance.
This paragraph has no equivalent in the ULIS. A provision requiring
notice both of the commencement and the cessation of the obstacle to
performance was rejected by the committee which prepared the 1964 Hague
Diplomatic Conference, on the ground that it would raise difficult problems
when obstruction of performance was imminent. Moreover, consecutive
threats of disruption would give rise to a duty to give successive notifications.90
Some important points must be made concerning Article 79(4). From
the wording of the paragraph, it is clear that the party seeking relief must give
notice when he is convinced that the occurrence of the impediment is certain
and unavoidable. The notice should indicate whether the non-performance will
be total, partial or temporary. When the party intends to carry out the contract
by furnishing a commercially reasonable substitute, notice of his intention to
do so must be given.91
The notice must reach the other party within a reasonable time after the
party in default knew, or ought to have known, of the impediment. Otherwise,
he will be liable for damages resulting "from such non receipt". In this regard,
two important points should be noted. By requiring that the notice be
"received" within a reasonable time, the paragraph adopts the theory of
receipt. The risk that the notice will not be received by the other party within a
reasonable time is borne by the sender.92 Secondly, the party is only liable for
89. B. Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility in the U. N. Convention on Contracts for 
International Sale of Goods, op. cit., at p. 5-18.
90. Records and Documents of the Hague Conference 1964, vol. II, pp. 115, 202, 349-350. See also A. 
H. Hudson, op. cit., at 189.
91. Secretariat's Commentary, op. cit., at 174. See also Tallon, op. cit., at 587.
92. Cf. Arts. 15 and 18 (2) of the Convention relating to provisions of offer and acceptance.
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losses resulting from the failure of the other party to receive the notice: the 
defendant is not liable for losses resulting from non-performance of the 
contract. Thus there is an important difference between CISG and UCC, for in 
the latter ineffective notice vitiates the excuse.93
What happens if the impediment also prevents the notification? For 
example, if the impediment is a national strike which also paralyses the postal 
service, would the defaulting party be liable for the failure to give notice? It is 
thought that the defaulting party is not liable in such a case for any damages 
arising out of the failure to give notice, provided that the conditions required in 
paragraph 1 are met94 and no other means of communication is available 
because of the supervening event.
Another question is whether or not the notice must be in writing. If the other 
party has actual or constructive knowledge of the impediment, for example, by 
oral notification or through his agent, is it enough to say that requirements set 
forth in paragraph 4 are met? It appears that the answer should be positive. 
The reasons for that are as follows: First, according to Article 8 of the 
Convention, statements made by, and other conduct of, a party are to be 
interpreted in accordance with his intent or that of a reasonable person in his 
position in the light of custom and practice. There is no reason why Article 8 
should not apply to the issue under the discussion. Secondly, under Article 11 
of the Convention "a contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced 
by writing and is not subject to any other requirements as to form. It may be 
proved by any means, including witness". This applies a fortiori to notices 
under paragraph 4. Thirdly, Article 27 provides:
"unless otherwise expressly provided in this Part of the Convention, if any 
notice, request or other communication is given or made by a party in 
accordance with this Part and by means appropriate in the circumstances, a 
delay or error in the transmission of the communication or its failure to arrive 
does not deprive that party of the right to rely on the communication."
2. ARTICLE 80 (FAILURE OF PERFORMANCE CAUSED BY 
OTHER PARTY)
The provision of Article 80 of the Vienna Convention reads as follows:
"A party may not rely on failure of the other party to perform, to the extent that 
such failure was caused by the first party's act or omission."
93. See Sec. 2-615 (c) UCC; Bunge Corp. v. Miller, 381 F.Supp. 176 (W.D.Tenn. 1974). See also 
Supra, pp. 207, 208.
94 Tallon, op. cit., at 587.
262
This provision is very similar to the last sentence of Article 74(3) of the 
ULIS. However, in comparing Articles 79 and 80, it is clear that if the non­
performance is due to an impediment as provided by Article 79, the Article 
applies with all its consequences. But if the failure is caused by the other 
party's act or omission, Article 80 will be triggered. The result is that the party 
who caused the failure can not rely on the obligor's non-performance to claim 
the remedies that are normally available to the seller,95 to the buyer96 or to 
both97 since he is not permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, for 
example, if a party gives inadequate specifications for the goods to be 
manufactured or fails to supply delivery facilities.
At the Vienna conference, it was submitted that the situation specifically 
treated in Article 80, was already covered by general principles of the 
Convention such as the principle of good faith, therefore the Article was 
unnecessary. However, this view did not prevail and the Article was approved 
in order to remove any doubt as to the applicability of the general principle.98
If the non-performance is partly attributable to a seller and partly 
imputable to the buyer, what will then be the solution? It seems that in such a 
case, under the principle of good faith, the buyer will not be allowed to obtain 
total compensation when the non-performance is partly caused by him. Since 
the loss arises from two causes, the extent to which each party was liable for 
the non-performance should be taken into account by the court when 
determining damages.99
As discussed in the above, the failure to perform must be imputable to 
an act or omission of the party concerned. Although the matter is not 
expressly addressed in the CISG, it follows from the general wording of the 
text that the Article also covers tortious behaviour.100
95. Arts. 45 to 52.
96. Arts. 61 to 65.
97. Article 71 to 73.
98. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, op. cit., 
at 444.
" . Tallon, op. cit., at 598 et seq.
10°. Loc. cit., at 597-598.
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3. CONCLUSION
International draftsmen of Conventions have attempted to create a new 
concept of excusable non-performance by combining the different legal 
approaches in several domestic systems. In spite of these endeavours, as we 
have seen the results are unsatisfactory. The vagueness and the flexibility 
inherent in the wording of the Articles are, inevitably, the cause of different 
possible interpretations. This runs counter to the aim of the Conventions. 
Indeed, there is no uniformity of interpretation even among those 
commentators who themselves played important roles in drafting the ULIS and 
CISG. Moreover, the system of remedies is also not satisfactory. Once again it 
is submitted that for these reasons parties to international contracts of sale 
should exclude the application of the Convention in whole or in part,101 in 
favour of a well drafted force majeure clause.
101. Art. 6.
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS
It is intended in this chapter to give a brief analysis of the problem of 
excusable non-performance under the relevant clauses of standard form 
contracts for various types of transnational transactions which are provided by 
international agencies or trade associations. The principal purpose is to 
examine the potential contribution which standard conditions can make to the 
unification and harmonisation of the law of excuse of non-performance in 
international commercial transactions. It is also intended to discover whether 
standard contracts have been developed to facilitate the transnational 
transactions by avoiding or reducing the degree of uncertainty which has been 
shown to exist.
There are a number of contracts that expressly provide clauses on 
excusable non-performance. Of the various sets of standard conditions in 
common use, those which are most frequently encountered are contracts 
drafted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (E.C.E.), the 
Federation Internationale des Ingenieurs Conseils' (or F.I.D.I.C.'s) conditions 
for contract for work of civil engineering construction, and those laid down by 
the working group at the International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.) 
(clauses dealing with hardship and force majeure) and other independent 
bodies.
It should be noted that the most important difference between these 
standard form contracts is that while those provided by international agencies 
such as ECE and ICC, protect both parties, most of them are designed to 
protect the seller or just one party when an exempting event occurs. Let us 
examine the above mentioned clauses one by one.
(A) E. C. E.
The ECE general conditions of sale and model contracts are drafted 
under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
All of these contracts contain provisions relating to the circumstances that 
relieve the parties of their liability for non-performance of their obligations. The 
standard forms of relief clauses are as follows:
General conditions (ECE) No. 188102 provides:
"10. Reliefs
102. General Conditios for the Supply of Plant and Machinery for Export, 1953, E.C.E. Contract No. 
188; General Conditions for the Supply and Erection of Plant and Machinery for Import and Export, 
1957, E.C.E. Contract No. 188 A, Cl. 25.
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10.1. The following shall be considered as cases of relief if they intervene after 
the formation of the contract and impede its performance: industrial disputes 
and any other circumstances (e.g. fire mobilization, requisition, embargo, 
currency restrictions, insurrection, shortage of transport, general shortage of 
materials and restrictions in the use of power) when such other circumstances 
are beyond the control of the parties.
10.2. The party wishing to claim relief by reason of any of the said 
circumstances shall notify the other party in writing without delay on the 
intervention and on the cessation thereof.
10.3. The effects of the said circumstances, so far as they affect the timely 
performance of their obligations by the parties, are defined in clauses 7 and 8. 
Save as provided in paragraphs 7.5., 7.7., and 8.7., if, by reason of any of the 
said circumstances, the performance of the contract within a reasonable time 
becomes impossible, either party shall be entitled to terminate the contract by 
notice in writing to the other party without requiring the consent of any court.
10.4. If the contract is terminated in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof, the 
division of the expenses incurred in respect of the contract shall be 
determined by agreement between the parties.
10.5. In default of agreement it shall be determined by the arbitrator which 
party has been prevented from performing his obligations and that party shall 
bear the whole of the said expenses. Where the purchaser is required to bear 
the whole of the expenses and has before termination of the contract paid to 
the vendor more than the amount of the vendor's expenses, the purchaser 
shall be entitled to recover the excess.
If the arbitrator determines that both parties have been prevented from 
performing their obligations, he shall apportion the said expenses between the 
parties in such manner as to him seems fair and reasonable, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case.
10.6. For the purposes of this clause "expenses" means actual out-of-pocket 
expenses reasonably incurred, after both parties shall have mitigated their 
losses as far as possible. Provided that as respects plant delivered to the 
purchaser the vendor's expenses shall be deemed to be that part of the price 
payable under the contract which is properly attributable thereto."
General conditions (ECE) No. 574103 provides:
"10. Reliefs
10.1. Any circumstances beyond the control of the parties intervening after the 
formation of the contract and impeding its reasonable performance shall be 
considered as cases of relief. For the purposes of this clause circumstances 
not due to the fault of the party invoking them shall be deemed to be beyond 
the control of the parties."104
General conditions (ECE) No. 730105 provides:
103. General Conditions for the Supply of Plant and Machinery for Export, 1955, E. C. E. Contract 
No. 574; General Conditions for the Supply and Erection of Plant and Machinery for Import and 
Export, 1955, E. C. E. Contract No. 574 A. Cl. 25.
104 Paragraphs of 10.2-10.7 of contrat No. 574 are the same as in contract No. 188, op. cit.
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10. Reliefs
10.1. Any circumstances beyond the control of the parties intervening after the 
formation of the contract and impeding . . . "  (same as 574).106
General Conditions (ECE) No. 312107 and 410108 provide:
"Any circumstances beyond the control of the parties, which a diligent party 
could not have avoided and the consequences of which he could not have 
prevented, shall be considered as a case of relief where it intervenes after 
formation of the contract and prevents its fulfilment whether wholly or partly."
Contracts for the sale of cereals (ECE) No. 1 A109 provides:
"19. Reliefs
19.1. Where the fulfilment of the contract in whole or in part is rendered 
absolutely and permanently impossible by exceptional circumstances, beyond 
the control of the parties and arising after the conclusion of the contract, the 
contract or the unfulfilled part thereof shall be cancelled but neither party shall 
be liable to pay damages.
19.2. Where the fulfilment of the contract in whole or in part is, at any time 
within the last twenty-eight calendar days of the time allowed by the contract, 
temporarily prevented by circumstances beyond the control of the parties, 
their obligations shall be suspended.
19.3. If in case to which paragraph 19.2 applies the circumstances are other 
than ice, the contract shall be extended for that part of its term which 
remained when the said circumstances arose but for not more than twenty- 
eight calendar days, or, where the remainder of the term of the contract was 
twenty-one calendar days or less, then for at least twenty-one calendar days. 
Where a contract is thus extended, the date of default shall be postponed by a 
corresponding period. Where ice prevents shipment or access to port of 
shipment through the Sund, the Preveds or the Dardanelles during the term of 
the contract, the contract or the unfulfilled part thereof shall be fulfilled not 
later than three weeks after the official reopening of navigation . . .".
As these standard clauses show, the word "reliefs" is used in all of
them so as to avoid national concepts of excusable non-performance and to
present an independent definition.110 Although the draftsmen by using the
word "reliefs" desired to emphasise the international character of the contract,
105. General Conditions of Sale for the Import and Export of Durable Consumer Goods and of other 
Engineering Stock Articles, 1961, E. C. E. Contract No. 730.
106. Paragraphs 10.2 and 10.3 are similar to provisions of contract No. 188.
107. General Conditions for the International Sale of Citrus, E. C. E. Contract No. 312, Cl. 13.1.
108. General Conditions for Export and Impopt of Swan Softwood, E. C. E. Contract No. 410, Cl.
18.1.
109. Contract for the Sale of Cereals C. I. F. (Maritime) 1957.
uo. Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Unification or Harmonisation of Law by Means of Standard Contracts 
and General Condition, 17 Int'l. and Comp. L. Q. 1968, 552, 566.
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the word is flexible - like the word "exemption" in CISG - and might give rise to 
the same problems discussed in that context.111
It should be noted that the ambit of these clauses varies in terms of 
their scope and effect. The fundamental reason why relief clauses in ECE 
general conditions do so is that they reflect the different character and needs 
of each particular trade in which they are designed to operate.112 In the field of 
contracts for the supply of plant and machinery for export, for example, where 
considerable periods of time elapse between an order and performance, it is 
necessary to have a flexible relief clause so as to allow the parties to withdraw 
from the contract whenever exempting events occur. Moreover, in these kinds 
of transaction there is a wider variety of circumstances which might impede 
the performance of the contract. Location of the plant and machinery which 
may only be possible on a specified site, is a factor which might make 
performance illegal, for example, by a change in zoning regulations.113 In 
contracts such as trade in cereals which are highly speculative by nature since 
it is an extremely rapid trade which is subject to price fluctuations have 
obviously different requirements from the engineering trade. It is therefore 
necessary to draft a rigid and restrictive clause in order to preclude all 
possibility of manoeuvre by the interested party.114 An intermediate solution is 
found in other trades such as citrus fruit, sawn softwood, and solid fuels in the 
ECE general conditions since they reflect the fact that these trades, while not 
having speculative character, nevertheless, have different requirements from 
the contracts for the supply of plant and machinery.115
A comparison of the above standard clauses indicates that while they 
vary in terms of their scope and effect, they all refer to supervening 
"circumstances" that excuse non-performance of the party seeking relief. In 
some conditions, circumstances are defined in very general terms such as 
circumstances beyond the control impeding a reasonable performance.116 In
H1. See generally pp. 246 etseq.
112. Travaux du Colloque de L'Association Internationale des Sciences Juridique, in Some Problems 
of Non-performance and Force Majuere in International Contracts of Sale (hereinafter, Helsinki 
Discussions), 261 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, Helsinki, 1961) at 250 (P. Benjamin); Henry Comil, 
The ECE General Conditions of Sale, 3 J. W. T. L. 1969, 390, 394.
113. Richard J. Cuminns, Notes, The General Conditions and the Trading Form Contracts of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 38 N. Y. Uni. L. Rev. 1963, 548, 561.
114 Henri Comil, op. cit., at 103.
115. Schmitthoff, Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 251.
116. Contracts 574, 574A, 574D and 730.
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others, the method used is to list particular events where relief is allowed.117 
This enumerative method is not usually exclusive but merely indicative, viz., 
the clauses indicate a list of contingencies and then add the expression "and 
any other circumstances".118 It is thought that an enumerative method which is 
indicative is to be preferred to the exclusive.119 Contracts 188 and 188A pay 
particular attention to "industrial disputes" as a contingency. Reference to 
"industrial disputes" has been omitted in contracts 574 and 574A which are 
prepared for use in East-West trade. This is because a strike is not generally 
considered as a ground for relief in East-West transactions.120 It is thought that 
special treatment of strikes is unwarranted not only because of ideological 
attitudes which may no longer be relevant but also because strikes are not 
always beyond control of the parties. A strike should only be a cause of relief 
in exceptional and serious circumstances, for example, a political strike which 
can not be readily settled.121
The clauses do not make clear whether or not absence of foresight is a 
precondition for relief. It can however be argued from the language that the 
exempting event must be unforeseen or unforeseeable because the 
requirement that the impeding circumstances must intervene after the 
conclusion of the contract would appear to imply that this is the case. This 
implication therefore requires that the foresight test is a precondition for 
exemption, but does not make clear whether it is subjective or objective.122 
Thus, in one country a subjective test of foreseeability might be employed 
while an objective test is used in another. The possibility of different 
approaches is contrary to the harmonisation and unification of excusable non­
performance at an international level.
The "circumstances" must be "beyond control". Although the present 
writer has argued that the standard of "beyond control" is different from the 
standard of fault,123 "beyond control" has been interpreted to mean that a party 
has not been guilty of any form of fault, viz., intentional, culpa iata or cuipa
117 Contracts 188 and 188A.
118. Loc. cit.
119. See infra, pp. 325 et seq.
120. Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 237.
121. Affolter, Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 248.
122. See generally pp. 322 et seq.
123. Infra, pp. 319 et seq.
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levis.124 Contracts 410 and 312 refer to the "diligence" of the parties which 
implicitly requires the absence of any fault.
Almost all the contracts contain provisions relating to the effects of the 
supervening events. Some contracts, nevertheless, draw distinction between 
cases where performance is rendered totally or partially impossible and cases 
where performance is simply delayed. All general conditions require that 
where performance is absolutely impossible, the contract will be cancelled. 
Other formulations, such as contract 188, require that in a case of delay or 
temporary impossibility the contract will be suspended and the main 
consequence is that the period within which performance is to be effected is 
extended as far as is reasonable having regard to the all circumstances of the 
case.125 Thus, while the supervening event operates, no remedies are 
available. However, if after a reasonable time the performance becomes 
impossible, either party will be entitled to terminate the contract by notice to 
the other party. Both parties are entitled to declare the contract avoided; both 
of them therefore have the opportunity to escape from an unfavourable 
contract. In doing so, the draftsmen of the ECE contracts have clearly 
intended to reduce the effects of any difference in bargaining power between 
the parties. All the clauses refer to parties, rather than seller or buyer.
When the contract is terminated, special provisions apply to the 
allocation of expenses incurred in respect of the contract. Restitution must be 
made for a partial performance. For example, contract 188 provides that if the 
parties do not agree on division of the expenses, this will be determined by the 
arbitrator as provided in clause 10. In this regard, the ECE general conditions 
differ greatly from the regimes to be found in the Conventions. The present 
writer supports this development as he believes that there should be greater 
freedom in adjustment of the rights and duties of the parties in commercial 
transactions.
(B) F. I. D. I. C.
The deficiencies of traditional notions of excusable non-performance in 
the construction industry have led to a search for a better solution. For this 
purpose a number of standard clauses - such as clauses provided in JCT 
standard form of building contract,126 the ICE conditions of contract127 and the
124. Affolter, op. cit.
125. Contract 188, Cl. 7.2.
126. The Joint Contracts Tribunal, 1980 edition.
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international FIDIC conditions of contract128 - have been drafted. The FIDIC 
conditions,129 which are often used in international contract practice, deal with 
civil engineering construction works where the employer receives the 
contractor's services and skill in using labour and materials to produce the 
construction. This standard contract provides several clauses covering special 
risks and exempting events. We shall examine the FIDIC conditions in detail.
1. CLAUSE 12.2 (ADVERSE PHYSICAL OBSTRUCTIONS)
The clause provides as follow:
"If however, during the execution of the Works the Contractor encounters 
physical obstructions or physical conditions, other than climatic conditions on 
the site, which obstructions or conditions were, in his opinion, not foreseeable 
by an experienced Contractor, the Contractor shall forthwith give notice 
thereof to the Engineer, with a copy to the Employer. On receipt of such 
notice, the Engineer shall, if in his opinion such obstructions or conditions 
could not have been reasonably foreseen by an experienced Contractor, after 
due consultation with the Employer and the Contractor, determine:
(a) any extension of time to which the Contractor is entitled under clause 44, 
and
(b) the amount of any costs which may have been incurred by the Contractor 
by reason of such obstructions or conditions having been encountered, which 
shall be added to the contract price,
and shall notify the Contractor accordingly, with a copy to the Employer. Such 
determination shall take account of any instruction which the Engineer may 
issue to the Contractor in connection therewith, and any proper and 
reasonable measures acceptable to the Engineer which the Contractor may 
take in the absence of specific instructions from the Engineer."
Unlike the JCT conditions, the above mentioned clause does not 
expressly refer to force majeure, but the means employed are much the 
same. The wording of the clause refers only to adverse physical obstructions 
or conditions which could not have been foreseeable by an experienced 
contractor. What is understood from the expression "physical obstructions" is 
that it refers to a number of possibilities such as physical impossibility and 
legal impossibility. The expression "physical conditions" could be restricted to 
some continuing state such as physical conditions of the ground below the
127. 5th edition. This standard form contract is issued and approved by the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, the Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors and the Association of Cosulting 
Engineers, 1979.
128. The terms of the fouth edition (1987) of the conditions for works of civil engineering construction 
have been prepared and approved by the Federation Internationale des Ingenieurs Conseil (FIDIC).
129. These conditions are mainly found in ICE conditions which in turn drawn on expressions and 
principles of English law.
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surface such as landslide or flood130 rather than events. It is arguable whether 
or not the clause also covers artificial obstructions, such as obstructions 
caused by ancient mine working or unchartered sewers. The previous edition 
of the FIDIC conditions which used the expression ". . . or artificial 
obstructions . . . "  answered the question in affirmative,131 but the provisions of 
the new edition are silent on this point. However, the general expression 
"physical obstructions or physical conditions" has, it is thought, the potentiality 
to cover artificial obstructions, provided that the geological information 
provided by the employer and used by the contractor does not indicate that 
such obstructions exist.
Physical conditions or obstructions do not include weather or climatic 
conditions on site. This does not seem to be rational because weather 
conditions may be unusually severe for the time of year and greatly hinder the 
performance of the contract. For example, suppose a situation in which an 
unusually heavy rainfall supervenes and completely prevents the performance 
of a particular type of work. Although the contractor assumes the risk of 
normal local conditions such as rain, snow, high winds or unsettled weather, 
he should not bear the risks of exceptional and unusually severe weather. Of 
course, the contractor must be responsible if events such as tropical storms 
and hurricanes are the normal conditions during that time of year.132 Although 
the clause does not include climatic conditions on site, it must be read in 
conjunction with the exceptional risks clause, 20.4(h), which expressly refers 
to "any operation of the forces of nature against which an experienced 
contractor could not reasonably have been expected to take precautions". The 
general expression "any operation of the forces of nature" would include 
unusually severe weather conditions. Thus, while a claim in respect of the 
occurrence of unforeseeable climatic conditions will not be permitted under 
clause 12.2, it will be covered by clause 20.4(h).133
The phrase ". . . in his opinion, not foreseeable by an experienced 
contractor. . . "  suggests that an objective foresight test is to be used. In other 
words, a party must take into account all those things which are reasonably
130.1. N. Duncan Wallace, The ICE Conditions of Contract, a Commentary, London, 5th ed. 1978, at 
43.
131. See John G. Sawyer and C. Arthur Gillott, The FIDIC Conditions, Digest of Contractual 
Relationships and Resposibilities, London, 2d ed., at 48; I. N. Duncan Wallace, The International 
Civil Engineering Contract, London, 1974, at 42.
132. See generally Michael S. Simon, Construction Contracts and Claims, New York, 1979, at 158.
133. John G. Sawyer and C. Arthur Gillott, op. cit., at 47.
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foreseeable by an experienced contractor. He has also the obligation to do 
everything which, in his opinion, an experienced contractor can be expected to 
do to acquaint himself with the conditions of the site; otherwise, he will not be 
entitled to additional payments and extensions of time. As we have seen,134 
the "experienced contractor" criterion is open to criticism. What is understood 
from the criterion is that it only refers to an experienced contractor and not the 
actual contractor who presents a tender. Accordingly, if a contractor foresees 
a physical obstruction which is not foreseeable by an experienced contractor, 
it would follow that the clause applies! Moreover, the application of the test to 
a given set of circumstances is also very difficult and the result is likely to 
differ according to the particular views of the court determining the issue.
When a contractor encounters physical conditions or obstructions, he 
must elect to initiate the process of claiming additional payments and 
extensions of time. Nevertheless, his entitlement to these remedies is 
dependent upon the decision made by the engineer. To some extent, the 
powers of the engineer are discretionary. It is difficult to accept that his 
decision will always be correct and impartial.135 The better alternative might be 
to introduce a referee or expert.136 However, judgments made by the engineer 
are open to arbitration at the initiative of either the employer or the 
contractor.137
This clause can be criticised on the ground that it does not protect the 
employer. For example, suppose a situation in which the ground conditions 
are found to be much easier than expected at the time the engineer prepared 
the bills of quantities or at the time when the contractor examined the site. 
According to the provisions of the clause, the employer is not permitted to 
claim unforeseen physical conditions so as to seek a reduction in any rates or 
prices.
2. CLAUSE 20.4 (EMPLOYER'S RISKS)
The contents of clauses 20.1, 20.2 and 20.3 generally refer to the 
contractor's obligation to repair and make good any damage, loss or injury to
134. Supra, pp. 123 et seq.
135. J. J. Goudsmit, The FIDIC Conditions in Legal perspective, Int'l. Contract L. & Financial Rev. 
1980, 91, at 96, 106; Gotsa Westring, Construction and Management Contracts (In Transnational Law 
of International Commercial Transactions, edited by N. Horn and Clive M. SchmitthofF, Kluwer, 
1982, at 178).
136. J. J. Goudsmit, op. cit., at 96.
137 Clause 67.1 of FIDIC Conditions of Contract, 1987.
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the works owing to any event whatsoever that occurs prior to the completion
date. However, there are certain excepted risks whereby the contractor is
excused from his obligations if one of the risks occurs (clause 20.4). It should
be noted that in the event of loss or damage resulting from any of these risks,
while the contractor shall repair and make good any damage, or loss he does
so at the expense of the employer, not himself; clause 20.3. However, there is
no specific provision or machinery laid down for the determination of the
contractor's costs.
Clause 20.4 provides:
"The Employer's risks are:
(a) war, hostilities (whether war be declared or not), invasion, act of foreign 
enemies,
(b) rebellion, revolution, insurrection, or military or usurped power, or civil war,
(c) ionising radiations, or contamination by radio-activity from any nuclear fuel, 
or from any nuclear waste from the combustion of nuclear fuel, radio-active 
toxic explosive, or other hazardous properties of any explosive nuclear 
assembly or nuclear component thereof,
(d) pressure waves caused by aircraft or other aerial devices travelling at 
sonic or supersonic speeds,
(e) riot, commotion or disorder, unless solely restricted to employees of the 
Contractor or of his Subcontractors and arising from the conduct of the works,
(f) loss or damages due to the use or occupation by the Employer of any 
Section or part of the Permanent Works, except as may be provided for in the 
contract,
(g) loss or damage to the extent that it is due to the design of the Works, other 
than any part of the design provided by the Contractor or for which the 
Contractor is responsible,
(h) any operation of the forces of nature against which an experienced 
contractor could not reasonably have been expected to take precautions."
As the clause indicates, many of the above risks such as war, rebellion,
invasion are considered as force majeure, but the clause defines as precisely
as possible, the situations which are not to be the risks of the contractor.
Indeed, these events which are not expressly stipulated in the clause but
which would fall within a normal force majeure clause, will not be considered
excepted risks. It has therefore been contended that the clause should include
a general definition of circumstances in which the contractor is excused. This
would give the courts greater leeway to decide whether the event is within the
risk of the contractor or the risk of the employer.138 The method which is
currently used in the clause is enumerative and exclusive and might therefore
lead to disputes.139
138. J. J. Goudsmit, op. cit., at 97.
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If any of the above risks occurs, the contractor will be entitled to extend 
the time140 of performance and is released from any liability if the event is a 
special risk (clause 65).
3. CLAUSE 65 (SPECIAL RISKS)
According to the provisions of clause 65, the contractor is released 
from any liability whatsoever when he is faced with events which are 
categorised as "special risks".141 These special risks are the risks defined 
under paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (e) of sub-clause 20.4, and the risks defined 
under paragraph (b) of sub-clause 20.4 in so far as they relate to the country 
in which the works are to be executed. This clause enumerates the same risks 
provided in clause 20.4 of the FIDIC conditions, except that these risks in 
paragraphs (f) (use and occupation by the employer), (g) (design of works) 
and (h) (operation of the forces of nature). As discussed before, the effect of 
the above clause is that if physical damage happens from any of the risks 
defined in sub-clause 20.4, the contractor is not liable to repair and make 
good the same unless required to do so by the engineer at the cost of the 
employer.142 However, under the present clause, the contractor has much 
wider protection. The protection covers not only physical risks (for example, 
destruction of or damage to the works, destruction of or damage to property, 
whether that of the employer or third parties) but also physical injury or loss of 
life.143 It should be noted that the listing and allocation of the risks in clauses 
65.1 and 65.2, prevents the English doctrine of frustration arising in relation to 
the events included in the clause.144
Clause 65.5 also entitles the contractor to any increased costs of the 
execution of the works which are in any way connected with the special risks.
As to the risks, clause 65.6 gives a detailed definition of war to include 
a war whether declared or not, in any part of the world. There is a lack of 
balance between the events cited in clauses 24.4, 65.2 and 65.6. For 
example, war need not be within the country in which the contract is 
performed, while rebellion, revolution, etc.,145 are restricted to the country in
139. See infra, pp. 312 et seq.
140. Clause 44.1.
141. Clauses 65.1 and 65.2.
142 Supra, pp. 272-274.
143. Clause 65.1.
144. See The Euginia [1964] 2 Q.B. at 239, per Lord Denning.
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which the works are being carried out. Both contingencies might be 
unforeseeable and out of the contractors' control. The clause clearly favours 
the contractor. For example, a Greek contractor could claim from his 
Indonesian employer indemnification for the effects of a war that has broken 
out between Greece and Turkey. A more reasonable solution would be to 
restrict the contractor's right of indemnification to those risks which occur in 
the employer's country.146
In the case of occurrence of war, the contractor must continue to use 
his best endeavours to complete the execution of the works. The employer - 
not the contractor - is entitled at any time after the outbreak of war to 
terminate the contract.147 If this is done, the contractor will remove all his 
equipment from the site and will provide similar opportunities to his sub­
contractors to do so.148 The contractor will be paid for all amounts to which he 
is entitled to date in respect of all work executed prior to the date of 
termination, at the rates and prices provided in the contract.149 Moreover, he 
will be paid amounts in respect of any preliminary items referred to in the Bill 
of Quantities and services contained therein, either wholly or partly 
performed.150 The contractor will also recover the cost of materials, plant or 
goods reasonably ordered for the work, which have been delivered to the 
contractor or for which the contractor is legally bound to accept delivery, such 
materials, plant or goods becoming the property of the employer once he has 
made appropriate payments to the contractor.151 The contractor will also 
receive the amount of any expenditure reasonably incurred in the expectation 
of the completing the whole of the works, provided that such an amount is not 
covered by any other form of payments.152 It is not clear whether this includes 
loss of profit.153 The contractor will be paid the cost of removal of his 
equipment from the site to the country of registration or other destination 
provided this includes no greater cost. This will also apply to his sub­
145. Clause 20.4(b).
146.See W. Walter Oberreit, Turnkey Contracts and War: Whose Risk? (In Transnational Law of 
International Commercial Transacions, edited by N. Horn and C. M. Schmitthoff, 1982) at 196.
147 Clause 65.6.
148 Clause 65.7.
149 Clause 65.8.
15°. Clause 65.8(a).
151. Clause 65.8(b).
152. Clause 65.7(c).
153. Sawyer, op. cit., at 14.
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contractor's plant.154 The contractor will also receive the reasonable cost of 
repatriation of all his staff and workmen employed on or in connection with the 
works at the time of such termination.155 Finally, the employer is entitled to set 
off any sums due to him by the contractor in connection with advances for 
constructional plant and materials and for any other sums which at the date of 
termination were recoverable by the employer from the contractor under the 
terms of the contract. However under clause 65.7, any sums payable shall, 
after due consultation with the employer and the contractor, be determined by 
the engineer.
4. CLAUSE 66.1 (RELEASE FROM PERFORMANCE)
The clause reads as follows:
"Payment in the Event of Release from Performance
If any circumstances outside the control of both parties arises after the issue 
of the Letter of Acceptance which renders it impossible or unlawful for either 
party to fulfil his contractual obligations, or under the law governing the 
Contract the parties are released from further performance, then the sum 
payable by the Employer to the Contractor in respect of the work executed 
shall be the same as that which would have been payable under Clause 65 if 
the contract had been terminated under the provisions of Clause 65."
If the performance of the contract becomes impossible or illegal or if the 
parties are released from further performance under the applicable law, the 
contract will be terminated and the contractor will be paid exactly in the same 
manner as provided in clause 65. Although previous editions of FIDIC referred 
to the concept of frustration in this clause, it is the present writer's view that 
this concept should not be used at an international level. Apart from its 
inadequacies, the fact that it can be invoked in only a few very extreme 
situations is a reason why it should not be used in international construction 
contracts. By omitting the word "frustration" from the clause and replacing it 
with the expression "release from performance", suggests that draftsmen of 
the current FIDIC conditions did not want the doctrine to be applicable at 
international level. However, the current clause is open to criticism as it does 
not expressly provide for partial excuse of non-performance.
Instead of the rather arbitrary number of clauses of the FIDIC 
conditions, it remains the present writer's view that the parties should have a 
comprehensive and well drafted force majeure clause in their contract. In the
154 Clause 65.7 (e).
155. Clause 65.7(f).
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last chapter of this thesis, it will be explained why parties need such a clause 
in their contract and such a clause should be drafted so as to be compatible 
with the circumstances and the needs of commercial transactions.
(C) I. c. c.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has drawn up a force 
majeure (exemption) clause156 which aims to provide assistance for parties to 
international commercial transactions. This clause is the result of extensive 
consideration by a working group at the ICC. The parties who wish to 
incorporate the clause in their contract may either write it out in full in their 
contract or incorporate it by reference using the following words: 'The force 
majeure (exemption) clause of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC 
publication No. 421) is hereby incorporated in this contract".
This clause under the title o f "force majeure (exemption) clause" is as 
follows:
"Grounds of relief from liability
1. A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations in so far as 
he proves:
-that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control; and
-that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment and
its effects upon his ability to perform into account at the time of the conclusion
of the contract;
and
-that he could not reasonably have avoided or overcome it or at least its 
effects.
2. An impediment within paragraph (1) above, may result from events such as 
the following, this enumeration not being exhaustive:
(a) war, whether declared or not, civil war, riots and revolutions, acts of piracy, 
acts of sabotage;
(b) natural disasters such as violent storms, cyclones, earthquakes, tidal 
waves, floods, destruction by lightning;
(c) explosions, fires, destruction of machines, of factories and of any kind of 
installations;
(d) boycotts, strikes, and lock-outs of all kinds, go-slows, occupation of 
factories and premises, and work stoppages which occur in the enterprise of 
the party seeking relief;
(e) acts of authority, whether lawful or unlawful, apart from acts for which the 
party seeking relief has assumed the risk by virtue of other provisions of the 
contract; and apart from the matters mentioned in paragraph 3, below.
3. For the purposes of paragraph (1) above, and unless otherwise provided in 
the contract, impediment does not include lack of authorisations, of licences,
156. Force Majeure and Hardship, published in March 1985 by ICC, Publication No. 421.
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of entry or residence permits, or of approvals necessary for the performance 
of the contract and to be issued by a public authority of any kind whatsoever in 
the country of the party seeking relief.
Duty to notify
4. A party seeking relief shall as soon as practicable after the impediment and 
its effects upon his ability to perform became known to him give notice to the 
other party of such impediment and its effects on his ability to perform. Notice 
shall also be given when the ground of relief ceases.
5. The ground of relief takes effect from the time of the impediment or, if 
notice is not timely given, from the time of notice. Failure to give notice makes 
the failing party liable in damages for loss which otherwise could have been 
avoided.
Effects of grounds of relief
6. A ground of relief under this clause relieves the failing party from damages, 
penalties and other contractual sanctions, except from duty to pay interest on 
money owing as long as and to the extent that the ground subsists.
7. Further it postpones the time for performance, for such period as may be 
reasonable, thereby excluding the other party's right, if any, to terminate or 
rescind the contract. In determining what is a reasonable period, regard shall 
be had to the failing party's ability to resume performance, and the other 
party's interest in receiving performance despite the delay. Pending 
resumption of performance by the failing party the other party may suspend 
his own performance.
8. If the grounds of relief subsist for more than such period as the parties 
provide [the applicable period to be specified here by the parties], or in the 
absence of such provision for longer than a reasonable period, either party 
shall be entitled to terminate the contract with notice.
9. Each party may retain what he has received from the performance of the 
contract carried out prior to the termination. Each party must account to the 
other party for any unjust enrichment resulting from such performance. The 
payment of the final balance shall be made without delay."
On the whole, it should be said that this clause is laudable and
illustrates an interesting new development in the rule-making activities of
international agencies: it is undoubtedly capable of facilitating international
trade by the avoidance or reduction of some of the uncertainty that surrounds
transnational commercial transactions. In comparing the clause with other
individual standard clauses, it should be said that the clause by using the
expressions "a party. . .", "each party. . ." and "either party. . ." reflects
equalities in the bargaining power of the parties and protects both parties
against all contingencies beyond their control. Most standard contracts merely
protect one of the parties. For example, clause IV of Westinghouse Electric
Corporation general conditions of sale157 states that "Westinghouse shall not
157 Form 21436U, 8/1971, reprinted in International Private Law (by A. F. Lowenfield, 1981).
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be liable for loss or damage due to delay in manufacture, or shipment, or 
passage of title, resulting from any cause beyond Westinghouse's reasonable 
control. .
Again, in a typical standard form contract,158 only the seller is protected: "In 
the event of any delay in seller's performance due to fire, explosion,. . . or any 
cause beyond manufacturer's or seller's reasonable control, . . In another 
clause159 of this contract, any increased or additional expense because of war, 
hostilities etc., falls to the buyer's account. In addition, the seller is authorised 
to allocate the available goods in such a manner as the seller considers 
equitable.
There are a few individual standard contracts which give a slight 
degree of protection to the buyer, although the seller remains in a much more 
powerful position. The following standard clauses provide illustrations:
"Delivery shall be subject to and contingent upon strikes, labour difficulties, 
riot, war, . . .  In the event of such delay the seller shall have the option to 
extend the time for delivery for a period equal to the number of days of such 
delay, provided, however, that in the event that such delay shall exceed sixty 
days, then the buyer shall have the right to cancel this contract . . . .  Seller 
shall not be required to allocate among its customers in case of shortage."160 
Standard conditions of sale of the Super Electronic Company (seller) in clause 
V 161 provides that: ". . . If delay resulting from any of the foregoing cases 
extends for more than 60 days . . .  either party may terminate the order
However, in certain cases, because of the nationalist character162 of the 
contract, buyer may be in a more powerful position than the seller. For 
example, the former Soviet Union standard purchase contract163, defines the 
force majeure very narrowly and merely enumerates fire, flood, and 
earthquake. In addition, if the contract is cancelled, the seller must 
immediately reimburse the buyers for all the amounts received from the latter 
plus 4% per annum. Again, despite the express character of the contract
158. United States Steel International (New York), inc., conditions of sale, C. I. F. clause 7, reprinted 
in International Private Law, By A. F. Lowenfiel, op. cit.
159. Clause 3.
16°. Standard Contract Sale of International Fibre Inc.(seller), clause 8, reprinted in ibid.
161. See also Standard Contract of World-Wide Metals Sales Agreement, clause 3. Cf. Standard 
Contract of World-Wide Metals Purchase Agreement in which a contrary position, which favours the 
buyer, has been taken.
162. See Rapsomanikis, op. cit., at 580 et seq.
163. Form of V/O "Technopromimport", clause 12, reprinted in International Private Law, op. cit.
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being F.O.B., the foreign seller must take care of, and bear all the expenses 
connected with, obtaining the necessary export licence. If the seller is unable 
to obtain the licence, the Soviet buyer is entitled to cancel the contract and the 
seller must pay liquidated damages.164
Compared with these clauses, the ICC's force majeure clause is well- 
balanced, protecting both parties. Although the clause is drafted under the 
title, "force majeure clause", it is not intended to introduce the French concept 
of force majeure or, intended, any other domestic law doctrines into the 
contract.165 The first part of the clause is very similar to Article 79 of the 
Vienna Convention. While there is doubt whether the Article applies to 
defective goods,166 the comments made on the ICC force majeure clause 
express the view that it is applicable to defective goods.167 There is another 
important difference between Article 79 and the ICC force majeure clause. 
While the former is limited to sales, the latter is not limited to this type of 
contracts and is of general application. In this respect the ICC clause can be 
criticised. It is not practicable for a single clause to be suitable for all types of 
transactions and adequately cover every kind of failure of performance. The 
ambit of relief clauses should vary in terms of their scope and effect 
depending on the particular contract concerned. Moreover, force majeure 
clauses should reflect the different characteristics and needs of the particular 
trade for which they are designed. That is why the relief clauses in ECE 
general conditions are variable168 and why comments made on the ICC clause 
recommend that the parties check in every case whether or not the clause 
should be amended or modified in the light of the particular circumstances.169
Like the Vienna Convention, the ICC clause uses the word 
"impediment", but unlike the CISG, the word "impediment" in the present 
clause has not the same degree of elasticity. The comments to the ICC state 
that the expression does not refer to inconvenient or more onerous 
circumstances.170 Secondly, the ICC has drafted another clause to deal with
164 Standard Purchase Contract Form of V/O "Technopromimport" clauses 9, 11. (Reprinted in 
Internationa Private Law, by A. F. Lowenfeld op. cit.).
165. Force Majeure and Hardship, ICC Publication No. 421, at 10.
166. Supra, pp. 246-248.
167 ICC Pub. No. 421, op. cit., at 11.
168. Supra, pp. 264 et seq.
169. ICC Pub. No. 421, op. cit.
17°. Loc. cit.
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"hardship". Thirdly, paragraph two of the present clause expressly 
enumerates the events when a party is not liable for failure to perform.
According to the clause, the impediment must be beyond control, the 
same criterion as is used in Article 79 of the CISG. The foresight test used in 
the clause is notably similar to the test adopted by the Vienna Convention.171 
In order to be able to rely on the clause, the party seeking relief must also 
prove that he could not reasonably have avoided or overcome the impediment 
or, at least, its effects.
In paragraph 2, a number of events is listed as unforeseeable: 
however, this enumeration is not intended to be exclusive but merely 
indicative. Thus events which are not cited in the paragraph but qualify as 
unforeseeable under paragraph 1, constitute grounds of relief from liability. 
According to comments,172 violent storms or cyclones may qualify as force 
majeure, but bad weather alone does not. But if, for example, an unusually 
heavy rainfall supervenes and totally hinders performance will the clause be 
applied? The answer should be positive if the circumstances qualify under the 
conditions of paragraph 1 of the clause.
In comparing the present clause with Article 79 of the CISG, it should 
be noted that the clause does not define the seller's responsibility for failure to 
perform when this is attributable to a third party. In this regard, the Article is 
more valuable than the present clause.
According to the clause, acts of authority are other examples of force 
majeure which have been listed in the clause. Such events could take the 
form of restrictions on export, import, payments, building, labour, and various 
types of business activities.173 Parties to transnational commercial transactions 
are therefore recommended to stipulate which party has the responsibility of 
applying for such authorisation and which party, in the case of refusal or 
withdrawal of authorisation, should bear the risk. According to paragraph 3, if 
the contract does not specifically deal with this matter, the obligor bears the 
risk of refusal or withdrawal of authorisation, when such authorisation must be 
granted by authorities in his own country.
In order to minimise damages caused by a failure to perform, 
paragraphs four and five of the clause require the party to give notice to the 
other party of his intention to rely on force majeure. By stating that 'The
171. Supra, p. 249.
172 ICC Pub.No. 421, op. cit., at 13.
173. Loc. cit., at 14.
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ground of relief takes effect from the time of the impediment or, . . 
paragraph 5 makes it clear that failure to give such notice in time not only 
makes the defaulting party liable in damages but also deprives him of the right 
to rely on force majeure in respect of the period before the notice. As 
comment 11174 states, the latter consequence may have harsh and serious 
consequences in some situations. For in some contractual relations it may be 
difficult for a party immediately to appreciate that he needs to rely on the force 
majeure clause. The Vienna Convention specifies that the party seeking relief 
will only be liable for damages resulting from failure to give such notice: it 
does not deprive him of the right to rely on force majeure in respect of the time 
before the notice is given. If parties take the view that such a limitation on 
excusable performance is unfair, they are free to omit the first sentence of 
paragraph 5 in their clause.
By stating that, "A party . . .  as soon as practicable" paragraph 4 makes 
it clear that if the impediment also prevents notification, for example, a general 
strike which paralyses the postal service, then the defaulting party will not be 
liable for any damages. As we have seen, the Vienna Convention is silent on 
this point.175
Under paragraph 6, force majeure relives the defaulting party not only 
from liability for damages but also from any penalties or other sanctions 
stipulated in the contract. However, the paragraph specifies that it does not 
relieve the party from interest on any sum due. But the clause does not 
impose any duty to pay interest, for example, on a down payment on the 
purchase price which would not follow from other legal or contractual 
provisions. If restitution of the price is due, the clause does not relieve the 
obligor from any duty to pay interest on such a debt.176
Under paragraph 7, force majeure postpones the time for performance 
for such period as may be reasonable. Thus, contrary to Article 79 of the 
CISG and the position in many other legal systems the supervening event 
protect the defaulting party from rescission or termination of the contract. It 
seems that this provision may not provide a fair result in every transaction. As 
discussed before,177 circumstances may vary very much from case to case. 
For example, in the field of contracts for the supply of plant and machinery
174 Loc. cit., at 15.
175. Supra, pp. 260-261.
176 ICC , op. cit., at 15-16.
177. Supra, at 267.
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where considerable periods of time elapse between an order and 
performance, the provision will work well. However, in contracts which are 
highly speculative by nature (for example, where trade is extremely rapid or is 
subject to price fluctuations), cancellation of the contract rather than 
postponement may operate more fairly. In those contracts where 
postponement instead of cancellation is required, parties are advised 
expressly to fix the length of such period, otherwise, the "reasonable period" 
criterion which depends on the facts of the particular case will be applied.178 
However, if the grounds of relief subsist beyond that periods, under paragraph 
8, either party will be entitled to terminate the contract. While under the 
clause, the termination of the contract operates for both parties, this right 
under the CISG and most national laws is only available to the performing 
party and not the party in default. Moreover, according to the CISG and most 
domestic laws, in a case of termination each party must provide restitution. 
Under the present clause, restitution is not required and each party is allowed 
to retain what he has received, but he must account to the other party for any 
unjust enrichment resulting from the other party's performance. On this point, 
the clause is not comprehensive. It is silent on reliance losses and matters of 
the same nature. Secondly, it is a very general formulation which is not 
suitable for all commercial transactions: remedies suitable for contracts such 
as the supply and erection of plant and machinery are not applicable in 
contracts of sale.179
178. ICC, op. cit., at 16.
179. See also infra, pp. 325 et seq.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PROPOSED THEORIES OF EXCUSABLE NON-PERFORMANCE 
AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Legal scholars have considered and analysed the problem of 
excusable non-performance with a view to obtaining general doctrines which 
are applicable to contracts at international level. Berman has adopted the 
theory of enumerative test.180 According to this theory, in international trade 
transactions, party autonomy and security of contractual obligations are of 
primary importance. General doctrines of excusable non-performance should 
therefore yield to express contractual provisions for excuse and should not go 
beyond the terms of the contract. Thus, listing of specific types of 
circumstances in the contract means that those risks which are not specifically 
mentioned are borne by the obligor. A fortiori, no general doctrine that speaks 
in terms of catastrophic expense or changed circumstances should be 
applicable where the parties have themselves provided in the contract an 
express excusable non-performance clause which lists the discharging 
contingencies. He adds that examination of contract clauses at international 
level confirms the belief that the parties assume a limited rule of excuse for 
non-performance insofar as the contract so provides. In such a situation, there 
is no need for gap-filling principles of general contract law, since no 
appropriate contingency will have been omitted by open-eyed and profit 
seeking merchants. From Berman's point of view, liberalisation of excuse is a 
means of escape from contractual liability for the - usually more economically 
powerful - seller. It is the contract itself which reveals how the parties have 
allocated the various risks between them. The excuse clause must be read 
only with the other terms of the contract, and the interpretation of the excuse 
clause will therefore depend on a determination of the parties' understanding 
as to which of them will bear what risk. He illustrates the point181 by explaining 
a decision182 dealing with frustration of an international charterparty. During 
the preliminary negotiations the charterer asked the buyer to accept a clause 
discharging him from his obligation to perform if the Suez canal were closed; 
the buyer refused to agree. The contract therefore contained a typical force 
majeure clause in general terms. When the canal was closed, the charterer
18°. Harold J. Berman, Excuse for Non-Performance in the Light of Contract Practices in International 
Trades, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1963, 1413, at 1416 et seq.
181. Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 260.
182 Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960).
285
refused to ship the goods around the cape of Good Hope. When the United 
States Court of Appeal for second circuit examined the negotiations between 
the parties, it held that the charterer was not excused.
Berman comments that 'The basic question is not whether the closing 
of the Suez canal was foreseeable or unforeseeable. Nothing is 
unforeseeable. Nor is the basic question whether the closing of the canal 
made performance impossible. Very little is impossible. The basic question is 
how the parties allocated the particular risk involved, or, if they were silent with 
respect to it, what common understanding of people in the trade would be with 
respect to how it ought to be allocated."183. But this ignores the general 
conditions of excusable non-performance which are adopted by most legal 
systems, Conventions, standard form contracts etc. Instead, Berman supports 
a harsh criterion, viz., allocation of risks under the provisions of the contract 
which might impose unreasonable and excessive responsibility on the obligor, 
as in this case.
Berman states that the "force majeure clause is an extremely difficult 
branch of the law of international trade. It is necessarily difficult, for in drafting 
a contingency clause the parties are dealing with the future, an unknown 
future, which they nevertheless must explore tentatively."184 But how can we 
expect parties in international trade to appreciate all the risks that might arise 
and list them in their contract. Moreover, fearing that their contract might not 
be concluded they deliberately avoid to negotiate the question in detail, or 
sometimes they are unaware of the risks or unable to formulate the clause as 
precisely as Berman's theory requires.
A theory according to which the problem of excusable non-performance 
should only be solved through autonomous principles without taking into 
account the general contract law rules is not acceptable. Should parties be 
able arbitrarily to pass over certain fundamental general principles of contract 
law such as the rules of offer and acceptance, parties' capacity, etc., and still 
consider other general principles to be applicable? The lawyer should take 
into account not only the particular characteristics of a particular transnational 
commercial transaction as a supplementary tool of interpretation, but must 
also pay attention to general principles of contract law.185
183. Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 261.
184 Loc. cit.,at 264.
185. See Rapsomanikis, op. cit., at 563.
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In practice, the failure of parties to international commercial 
transactions to manifest their will clearly in a force majeure clause, has the 
result that they will be subject to the applicable national law, if controversy 
arises over excuse for non-performance. This runs counter to Berman's theory 
under which the general doctrines of excusable non-performance should yield 
to express contractual provisions. Thus, his theory is not workable in practice 
and instead of solving, creates problems. Considerations of fairness require 
that where the terms of the contract give no guidance, the court should 
consider what the parties would have provided if they had addressed the 
question.
Berman's suggested solution would tempt a party who has the 
bargaining power to minimise his liability by listing specifically all the likely 
contingencies that will release him from performance.186 Indeed, if he is in a 
strong enough economic position, he will force the other party to "accept all 
the risks, otherwise I will not sell my products."
Moreover, the majority of standard form contracts employ an indicative 
list of events and add the phrases such as "and any other causes beyond 
control", or "this enumeration is not to be exhaustive".187 Some of them use 
another standard, for example, "qualitative test" or general definition of force 
rnajeure.m  These methods of drafting run counter to Berman's theory.
Tunc rightly states189 that the consequences of the listing method will 
differ from one situation to another one. For example, an outbreak of war 
might have different effects on a contract, viz., dissolution of the contract from 
the time of the occurrence, suspension of the performance until the end of the 
war or no effect. While disagreeing with Berman's theory, Tunc introduces his 
own criterion, viz., the "diligence suffisante" test.190 According to this test, an 
obligor is expected to take ordinary efforts to overcome whatever adverse 
circumstances may interfere with his performance. He adds that adequate 
diligence and force majeure are two complementary concepts in the sense 
that force majeure occurs when diligence is overtaken by events.191
186. Loc. cit.
187 See generally chapter seven, pp. 264-283.
188. See pp. 312 et seq.
189. Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 255-256.
190. Loc. cit., at 256. See also M. Andre Tunc, Force Majuere et Absence de Faute en Matiere 
Contractuelle, 43 Revue Trimestrielle Civil, 1945, 235, at 243.
191. M. Andre Tunc, op. cit.
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The standard suggested by Tunc is subject to an important criticism. It 
overlooks or does not pay attention to the nature of the supervening events 
and the foresight test. The diligence of the obligor is the centre of 
concentration (subjective test). Moreover, if we accept that the obligor has 
exercised normal care in fulfilling his contractual duty then talking about 
unforeseeability and irresistibility of the contingency is useless or absurd.
The enumerative method was also rejected by Schmitthoff at the 
Helsinki conference. He said that this method which is an illustration of a 
"normative test" is old fashioned and has been abandoned in many countries. 
A "qualitative test", is more modern, more widely accepted and more 
practicable and therefore preferable.192 The English doctrine of the 
"fundamental change in the obligation" falls into Schmitthoffs "qualitative test" 
and he maintains that it might well serve as a basis of a uniform international 
standard. This theory which pays no attention at all to "diligence suffisante", is 
too objective. However, Schmitthoff believes that if used as an international 
standard, it will serve as a practical guide for the judges and arbitrators who 
have to decide the related questions.193
Bluntly, it is very difficult to accept Schmitthoffs theory as an 
international test. After more than a century, the English doctrine of frustration 
generally and the theory of fundamental change in the obligation in particular, 
have not acquired much precision or clarity of meaning.194 Today, the 
doctrines are unsatisfactory. Inconsistent approaches of the courts concerning 
the pre-condition of the foresight test,195 the scope of fault196 and, most 
importantly, the difficulty in applying the doctrine in actual cases, with the 
consequence of different results in similar cases,197 are some of the reasons 
why Schmitthoffs suggested solution is not capable of serving as a uniform 
international standard.
Another theory has been suggested by Schlegel.198 Criticising the 
doctrine of frustration, he concludes that while it is good that contracts should
192. Clive M. Schmitthoff, Frustration of International Contracts of Sale in English and Comparative 
Law, (International Association of Legal Science, Helsinki, 1961), 127, at 146-147.
193. Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 252.
194 See chapter two, pp. 33-51, and chapter four, pp. 142-165.
195. See chapter three, pp. 111-116.
196. See chapter three, pp. 132-138.
197 For a discussion of the varying results in the Suez Canal cases, see Ropsomanikis, op. cit., at 582- 
600.
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be performed economically and socially, it does not follow that all contracts 
should be kept. It is time for English law to accept the fact that courts can, do, 
and should revise the contracts for the parties. He believes that contracts 
should be performed for only as long as it is reasonable that they should be 
enforced. He adds that "where an unusual event occurs and frustration is 
alleged, contracts should be enforced only when the contract in question is 
essentially similar to the archetypical contract situation: the contract between 
brokers, each essentially speculating on a narrowly fluctuating market. To the 
extent that the contract deviates from this model, it should be held frustrated 
and essential reliance damages - those resources consumed - as well as the 
cost of any partial performance, should be split between the parties. Thus, an 
event should be held frustrating when it is not one within that narrow range of 
events normally incidental to the average broker's or wholesaler's contract - 
slight delay and small market fluctuations."199 Schlegel considers that "more 
like the archetypical transaction is the international sales pattern. Yet, the 
likelihood that differences in delivery routes will make a difference in the 
archetypical transaction are small; in the sales pattern, on the other hand, 
such differences can be large, as the Suez cases show. Further, the chance 
of disruptive events is far greater in the international pattern than in the 
domestic."200 Finally, Schlegel concludes that at the international level, in 
cases of sale contract and charterparty, the buyer in the former and the 
charterer in the latter, are the better loss-bearers. However, the loss should be 
split only when the contract deviates from the "archetypical" model.201
For the following reasons, the above solution is not acceptable. The 
theory fails to provide the courts with a comprehensive and practical criterion 
with which to decide the cases. Secondly, the lack of a comprehensive 
standard means that questions of frustrating and non-frustrating events, 
identification of losses, whether they should be split between parties and the 
identification of better loss-bearer, would have to be examined and decided by 
the courts. This means arbitrariness, subjectivity and inconsistency. Thirdly, 
the equal division of loss is not always appropriate, for example, where a party 
incurs unusually high reliance losses, it is unfair to make the other party share 
the loss. Fourthly, in some cases, the theory seems to be too strict while in
198. Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things - The doctrice of 
Impossibility of Performance, 23 Rutgers L. Rev. 1969, 419, at 446 et seq.
199. Loc. cit., at 447.
200. Loc. cit., at 448.
201. Loc. cit.
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others it is too liberal. For example, where a contract exists between 
speculative dealers performance should not be excused even if the 
contingency is extraordinary and varies the performance from Schlegel's 
suggested "archetypical" model. Conversely, there are other contracts where 
the contingency is not so abnormal but the performance varies from the 
"archetypical" model that it should be excused.202 Fifthly, another problem with 
the theory relates to its presumption that the buyer or charterer are "the better 
loss bearers", because they can spread the loss among their customers. In 
this regard, it has been rightly criticised.203 Merchants in international level 
very rarely enter into one contract at a time but, rather, they only purchase 
when they have already agreed to sell to another one. Accordingly, a series of 
simultaneous transactions take place. Thus, in most cases, the buyer or 
charterer is not able to increase the agreed price so as to spread the loss 
among the customers. In short, the theory of "better loss-bearer" is not always 
operative and practical.
202. Rapsomanikis, op. cit., at 567.
203. Loc. cit.
PART FOUR - FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSES 
CHAPTER NINE: 
THE USE OF FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE IN CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONSHIP
1.GENERAL REMARKS
From this comparative study of different legal systems, it is clear that 
there exists no uniform set of rules regarding excusable non-performance. 
Each legal system has its own unique set of regulations. These rules on 
supervening events are not entirely satisfactory and reliance on them may 
lead to unpredictable results. The situation becomes more critical when 
parties are involved in international as opposed to domestic contracts. Here 
the national rules are often ill-adapted to cope with the needs of modern, 
transnational commercial transactions. The traditional excuse doctrines may 
not therefore be particularly valuable in the case of, for example, construction 
contracts being carried out in other countries. While the idea that when a 
supervening event occurs each party must bear its own loss is relatively 
simple and may provide an acceptable solution in some contracts, it is too 
simplistic to deal with contracts such as turnkey projects and other long-term 
contracts. In these contracts, the risks are much greater than in a simple 
contract of sale. Consequently, if the parties rely on national laws, when a 
supervening event occurs, their positions in respect of excusable performance 
may be left in doubt and not capable of a precise solution.
On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that there is no 
acceptable universal standard of excusable non-performance (autonomous 
lex mercatoria) embodying its own practices and customs which is respected 
by all nations.204 As we have seen, the 1980 Convention on International Sale 
of Goods, just as 1964 Hague Convention, contains certain important 
deficiencies. Although the draftsmen of the Conventions attempted to advance 
a new concept of excusable non-performance by combining different national 
approaches, no satisfactory result has been achieved.205 Moreover, the 
solutions advocated by scholars are neither clear nor comprehensive and are 
difficult to apply in actual situations.206
204 See generally E. Langen, Transnational Commercial Law, 1970, 2-12, 20-22 (Denying the 
autonomy and clearness of the international trade rules. For different view, see Berman and Kaufman, 
The Law of International Commercial Transactions {Lex Mercatoria), 19 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 1978, 265, 
at 272-277.
205. See chapter six, pp. 240-263.
206. See chapter eight, pp. 284-289.
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Notwithstanding some of the useful practical effects of the ICC 
recommendations and ECE exemption clauses,207 the problems arising from 
excusable non-performance remain, in particular in regard to drafting clauses. 
Other standard form contracts have not introduced an acceptable force 
majeure clause which would unify and harmonise the law of excuse of non­
performance in international, commercial transactions. They do not treat both 
parties impartially and employ different models which reflect relative strength 
of the parties' bargaining positions.208
Given their uncertainties, it will often be imprudent for lawyers to leave 
the parties' fate in the hands of so-called "rules". Rather, the good lawyer 
should consider alternative method of protecting the parties' expectations in 
the event of supervening occurrences.
What is this alternative solution? It is the present writer's contention that 
the only possible alternative is to rely more heavily upon the terms of the 
contract itself by drafting a comprehensive force majeure clause. The parties 
can thus make their own applicable law rather than allow their position to be 
regulated by national law doctrines.
Force majeure clauses are common but have not been the subject of 
extensive research either in domestic or international law contexts. Although 
some theoretical analysis can be found,209 this is basically a summary of 
practical experience, and while constituting a positive step towards solving the 
problems of excusable non-performance, much remains to be written on the 
difficulties which arise from typical force majeure clause.
This thesis purports to contribute to this issue by discussing some 
specific problems concerning force majeure provisions. For this purpose, this 
chapter will examine drafting techniques and provide suggestions for the 
formulation of the clause and its elements. It is hoped that this will help to 
introduce the clause as a means of contract security and a method of avoiding 
potential conflicts. Contrary to the ICC approach, it is submitted that the 
introduction of a single clause to fit all types of transactions will not always
207. Supra, pp. 264-269 & 277-283.
208 Supra, pp. 278-280.
209. See for example, B. J. Cartoon, Drafting an Acceptable Force Majeure Clause, J. Bus. L. 1978. 
230; David Yates, Drafting Force Majeure and Related Clauses, J. C. L. 1991, 186; H. O. Hunter, 
Commentary on "Pitfalls of Force Majeure Clauses", J. C. L. 1991, 214; Thomas R. Hurst, Drafting 
Contracts in an Inflationary Era, 28 Uni. Fla. L. Rev. (1975-76), 879; N. Sokolov, Force Majeure dans 
les Contrats entre Societes Occidentales et Centrales Commerciales Sovietiques, D. P. C. I. 1978, 323; 
H. Strohbach, Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses in International Commercial Contracts and 
Arbitration, J. Int'l. Arb. 1984; W. Melis, Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses in International 
Contracts in View of the Practice of the ICC Court of Arbitration, J. Int'l. Arb. 1984, 213.
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cope adequately with every sort of failure in performance which can arise in 
different contracts. It is the present writer's view that the ambit of force 
majeure clauses must vary in terms of their scope and effect in different types 
of contracts.210 Accordingly, to attempt to devise a model force majeure clause 
is pointless: instead, the present writer will suggest some guidelines for 
drafting the clauses which will be suitable in particular contracts.
2. WHAT IS A FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE?
The words, force majeure, are alien to English law.211 Force majeure or 
its Latin equivalent is a Civil law concept which has derived from Roman 
law.212 While the English courts have not attempted to define the meaning of 
the term,213 the term has been translated by the United States Supreme Court 
as "superior force", "unforeseen event", "over-powering force", "fortuitous 
event or irresistible force" and a "fact or accident which human prudence can 
neither foresee nor prevent".214
While the history of the definition of a force majeure clause is far from clear, it 
is believed that the term was developed by the draftsmen of the French Civil 
Code.215 But it must be recognised that in an European context, the meaning 
of the term is open to different interpretations.216 Moreover, it is clear that the 
traditional definition of a force majeure provision as used on the Continent 
does not provide an adequate solution to the problems of parties faced by 
supervening events in their contracts.
In this thesis, force majeure is intended to be used as a broader and 
much more comprehensive concept than in European legal systems. The 
question arises that since a broader concept is intended, why does this thesis 
employ the term "force majeure", rather than, for example, "reliefs",
210. Infra, pp. 301 etseq.
211. Ewan Mckendrick, Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, 1991, at 27.
212. Neville Maryan Green, Force Majeure in International Construction Contracts, Int'l. Bus. L. 
1985, 505.
213. Matsoukis v. Priestman and Co., [1915] 1 K.B. 681.
214 Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707, 727-728 (1887). However, more recent cases have a 
tendency toward a broader definition of force majeure., see, e.g. Pacific Vegitable Oil Corp. v. C. S. 
T. Ltd., 29 Cal.2d 228, 238, 174 P.2d 441 (1946) (Holding war or governmental action provoked by 
the necessities of war constituted force majeure).
215. See Squillante and Congalton, Force Majeure, 80 Com. L. J. 1974, 4, at 5. See alse Matsokis v. 
Priestman and Co. [1915] 1 K.B. 681, at 685, 686, per Bailhache J.
216. Council of Europe, Certain, Aspects of Civil Liability, 1976, Paras. 26-36. For an English 
approach, see Lebeaupin v. Crispin [1920] 2 K.B. 714, per McCardle J. at 719; Zinc Corporation Ltd. 
v. Hirsch [1916] 1 K.B. 541 (War not force majeure).
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"exemptions", "exceptions", "excusable clause", "contingency clause", "cause 
d'exoneration", etc.? Moreover, it could be argued217 that the use of the same 
terminology as is to be found in French law to describe the clause leads to the 
damages that it will carry certain legal implications that may not be consistent 
with parties' intentions.
In spite of these observations, it is thought that it is justifiable to use the term 
force majeure for the following reasons. First, the term "force majeureu has 
assumed, both as a concept and in its consequences, a much broader 
meaning in modern legal practice.218 Secondly, force majeure may be 
incorporated into a contract not by reference to its narrow meaning in French 
law, but as having a much broader meaning within the context of the particular 
contract.219 Thirdly, many transnational commercial transactions220 including 
standard form contracts221 contain force majeure clauses: however, in 
international contracts these clauses are usually drafted more widely than the 
corresponding clause in a French domestic contract.222 Indeed, merely to use 
the term "force majeure" does not necessarily imply that such a clause 
incorporates the French doctrine in order to relieve the non-performing from 
responsibility in cases of supervening events. For example, in Matsoukis v. 
Priestman and Co.,223 after hearing evidence from a Belgian lawyer, 
Bailhache J., said that he was not sure whether he was bound or entitled to 
give the words the full meaning they had on the Continent. Fourthly, the term
217 UNCITRAL, Legal Guide on Drawing up International Contracts for the Construction of 
Industrial Works, United Nations, New York, 1988, at 235.
218. John S. Kirkham, Force Majuere - Does It Really Work? 30 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Institute, 1984, 6-1, at 6-3.
219. See pp. 306 et seq.
220. See G. R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts, Booklet 6, 1989, at 21 et seq\ Gregory P. Williams, 
Coping with Acts of God, Strikes, and Other Delights - The Use of Force Majeure Provisions in 
Mining Contracts, 22 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, 1977, at 433.
221. See, e.g., ICC Model Form of Fo.rce Majeure Clause, Pub. No. 421, op. cit, Article 34 of UNIDO 
Model Form Turnkey Lump Sum Contract for the Construction of a Fertilizer Plant (Prepared by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Oraganisation, hereinafter UNIDO), 1 June 1983; GAFTA 100 
(Now renumbered GAFTA 97), clause 23, (A c. i. f. Contrat issued by the Grain and Feed Trade 
Association, 1987); FOSFA (Federation of Oils , Seeds and Fats Association Ltd.) Forms; Standard 
Contract 2-A of the Cocoa Merchant's Association of America Inc., reprinted in E. Farnsworth, W. 
Young, and H. Jones, Cases and Materials on Contracts 270 (Supp. 1972); Standard Form Contract of 
Hide and Skin Seller's Association, 1973, Cl. 19, reprinted in A. F. Lowenfield, op. cit., at DS-23.
222. M. Fontain, Les Clauses de Force Majeure dans les Contrats Intemationaux, D. P. C. I. 1979, 
469; G. Delaume, Excuse for Non-performance and Force Majeure in Economic Development 
Agreements, 10 Colum. J. Trans'l. L. 1971; M. Bartel, Contractual Adaptation and Conflict 
Resolution, 1985, at 28 et seq.
223. [1915] 1 K.B. 681, 685.
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is used in EC law where force majeure is a specific defence to particular 
obligations being original both as a concept and in its effects.224 Finally, it has 
been argued that excusable non-performance at an international level is a 
general principle that does not depend on national law.225
3. ADVANTAGES OF A FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE (IMMUNITY 
CLAUSE)
The dictum in the English case of Paradine v. Jane,226 according to 
which the parties should protect themselves from destabilising influences of 
supervening events through express provisions in their contract, is to be 
supported to the extent that it draws the attention of the court to the specific 
contractual provisions. The purpose of these contractual provisions is to 
provide the parties with immunity from liability for non-performance so that 
they may take advantage of the provisions which they have in their contract to 
regulate their position. This case possibly explains why English and American 
contracts are detailed, leaving less latitude to a judge to impose the solution 
which would arise in the absence of specific contractual provisions. However, 
the most common of these contractual provisions are force majeure and 
hardship227 clauses: in this chapter, they will be designated as immunity 
clauses. There is no doubt that under the principles of "sanctity of contracts" 
and the "binding force of promises", most, if not all, jurisdictions permit parties 
to a contract to extend the implications and consequences of excusable non­
performance beyond the rules provided by the applicable law.228 By delegating 
law-making authority to the parties, they are permitted freely to agree on the
224 See Heather Comwell-Kelly, The Community Concept of Force Majeure, New L. J. 1979, 245; 
James Flynn, Force Majuere, Pleas in Proceedings before the European Court, 6 European L. Rev. 
1981, 102; Peter Gilsdorf, La Force Majeure dans le Driot de la CEE a la Lumiere de la Jurisprudence 
de la Cour de Justice, 18 Cahiers de Driot Europeen, 1982, 137; James E. Thomson, Force Majeure: 
The Contextual Approach of the Court of Justice, 24 Common Market L. Rev. 1987, 259; Konstantin 
D. Magliveras, Force Majeure in Community Law, 15 European L. Rev. 1990, 460; Michael Parker, 
Force Majuere in EC Law (In Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, edited by Ewan 
McKendrick, 1991, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd.), 213.
225. See John A. Westberg, Contract Excuse in International Business Transactions: Awards of the 
Iran - United States Claims Tribunal, ICSID Rev. 1989, 215, at 218, note 8; Crook, Applicable Law in 
International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Experience, 83 Am. J. Int'l. L. 1989, 278, 
293 and note 75.
226.82 Eng. Rep. at 897.
221. However, it should be pointed out that the issue of "hardship clause" is beyond the scope of this 
thesis and requires another research. Thus, this thesis will not not go into this matter in greater length.
228. For example, one of the American court in this regard stated that: "the parties were at liberty to 
define force majeure in whatever manner they desired." (Atlantic Richfield Company v. ANR Pipeline 
Co. 768 S.W.2d 111, 781 (Tex.App. 1989). See also chaprte 2 of this thesis, pp. 33-104.
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creation, substance, modification and termination of their own contractual 
relationship. The use of detailed and explicit immunity clauses in commercial 
contracts provides clarity of content and predictability of result. Through 
drafting techniques, the parties themselves determine the ambit and effects of 
their immunity clause. Each party knows the terms of his contracts as well as 
the binding nature of his own duties. Moreover, these clauses provide an 
excellent and unique opportunity for the parties to determine beforehand the 
nature and extent of performance required in the event of change of 
circumstances and force majeure events, without the need to resort to the 
courts. This can be achieved by providing detailed and comprehensive rules 
on the effects of supervening factors on their contractual obligations.
Moreover, immunity clauses are more flexible in their potential application 
when compared with the rules under domestic laws. If these clauses are 
drafted correctly, then the courts will be prevented from intruding into the 
parties' contractual realm via judicial construction. Immunity clauses subsume 
domestic laws under which many force majeure clauses are interpreted in an 
inflexible manner which does not, in fact, represent the wishes of the parties. 
When circumstances have fundamentally changed, many legal systems, for 
example, French law,229 do not assist the parties in adapting their contracts to 
the changed situation. In English law, as discussed before, the doctrine of 
frustration operates within very narrow confines and it is often difficult to 
persuade the courts to invoke the doctrine at all. Further, the judicial basis of 
the doctrine is unclear and, despite the intervention of statute, the 
consequences may be drastic for both parties.230 However, an immunity 
clause, in the form of force majeure offers the parties the opportunity to 
escape from the limitation of these doctrines: in the form of a hardship clause, 
it gives the parties a flexible device to deal with unforeseen circumstances and 
ensure the stability of their long-term contractual relationship.
The role of the immunity clauses in international commercial 
transaction is also important because the parties will usually be from different 
countries and are subjects of different systems of national law. As we have 
seen, different legal systems deal with excusable non-performance in different 
ways and the diversity of domestic rules is further aggravated by the vagaries 
of case law. Moreover, because of the physical distances between the parties, 
extraordinary obstacles of performance, such as war, governmental
229. Supra, pp. 82-89.
230. Supra, 33-37, 142-165. See also Ewan Mackendrick, The Consequences of Frustration - The Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (in Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract, op. cit.).
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intervention of various kinds, currency fluctuations and the like, present 
greater hazards in international contracts than in domestic transaction. In the 
context of an international contract, difficulties occur because of profound 
differences between domestic legal systems. The parties are not always 
aware of these differences assuming that the law relating to excusable non­
performance is basically the same everywhere. Sometimes this assumption 
may result in disaster for the party who agrees that a particular foreign law is 
applicable. To bring these matters into focus, consider the following 
hypothetical case:231
An Austrian company has a nuclear plant and contracts with an American 
seller of nuclear fuel. It is a long-term agreement, designed to cover the 
operation of the plant for some 25 years. Accordingly, a huge amount of 
money is involved. American law is the applicable law of the contract. After a 
few months, the Austrian people by referendum decide against the use of any 
form of nuclear energy. Consequently, the Austrian legislature prohibits the 
operation of nuclear power plants. Thereupon, the buyer-company sends a 
notice to the seller, declaring their performance of the contract is discharged 
on the basis of German doctrine of wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage232 which is 
acknowledged by the Austrian courts. The seller refuses to accept the buyer's 
notice and insists on the validity of the contract. Since American law is the 
applicable law, the seller can insist on performance because the doctrine is 
unknown to U.S. law and American courts are very reluctant to accept 
excusable non-performance.233 The result is at the very least, unfortunate for 
the Austrian company. It was clearly a mistake to have agreed that American 
law was the proper law of the contract. This could have been avoided if their 
lawyers had drafted a comprehensive force majeure clause so as to allow the 
buyer company to terminate the contract in the case of supervening legal 
prohibition of the operation of the nuclear plant.
This example makes it completely clear that carefully drafted immunity 
clause is highly desirable, if it is intended to exclude unpleasant surprises in 
the future.
231. This hypothetical case is cited in Willibald Poch, "On the Law of International Sale of Goods": 
An Introduction (In Survey of the International Sale of Goods, edited by Louis Lafili, Franklin 
Gevurtz and Deniss Campble, 1986, Kluwer, at 4).
232. For the concept and effects of the doctrine, see pp. 97-104, 194-199.
233. Supra, pp. 53-82.
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4. GENERAL POINTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR DRAFTING AN 
IMMUNITY CLAUSE (FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE)
As was discussed before,234 immunity clauses are often found in a 
number of different kinds of transactions. The clause usually appears towards 
the end of the contract and, as a result, its importance is not fully appreciated. 
Most of the forms currently in use are defective in one or more respects and 
are drafted with far less specificity than is desirable. When contracting, parties 
tend to turn a blind eye to any downside risk in their bargain and consequently 
deny themselves the opportunity to draft an acceptable and comprehensive 
immunity clause. This failure to make adequate provisions for force majeure 
events and changes in circumstances can cause the unpleasant 
consequences discussed in the example above. Any uncertainty of the 
applicability of immunity clauses can and should be reduced by including a 
carefully drafted clause that makes advance provisions for the occurrence of 
events which are unforeseen and beyond control. Here, the immunity clause 
acts as a preventative device aimed at solving in advance any problems which 
might arise if a supervening event occurs. It is submitted that draftsmen 
should take into account the following guidelines and suggestions when 
drafting force majeure clauses.
4.1. IMPORTANT FACTS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED 
BEFORE ANY FORCE MAJEURE IS DRAFTED
(i) Before any transnational contract is drafted, care should be taken to ensure 
that any force majeure clause does not conflict with any mandatory rules of 
the law of the contract,235 some legal systems, such as India, do not permit the 
parties to devise their own force majeure provisions.236
(ii) In transnational business transactions, before any clause is drafted, 
consideration should be given to the relevant country's political and economic 
situation; this would include such matters as the stability of the government, 
the rate of inflation and any existing or pending legislation that might affect the 
performance of the contract. The parties can then ensure that the force 
majeure or hardship clause can be drafted to take account of such
234 Supra, pp. 278-280.
235. ICC. op. cit., at 7.
236. R. Christou, A Comparison between the doctrines of Force Majeure and Frustration, 3 Int'l. 
Contract-Law and Finance Rev. 1982, 75, at 81. For Chinese approach, see Herve Leclerc, Force 
Majeure in Chinese Commercial Law, 7 Journal of Energy and Natural Resouces Law, 1989, 238-241.
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contingencies. This should be done regardless of the status of the country 
concerned i.e., whether or not it is developed or developing.237
4.2. THE CLAUSE MUST BE EXPLICIT AND CONTAIN MORE 
ELABORATE PROVISIONS THAN THE APPLICABLE LAW
Careful attention and great skill is needed to tailor force majeure 
clauses to the particular circumstances of the transaction. But by properly 
formulated provisions, the parties provide themselves with the means of 
avoiding deadlock and dissatisfaction over non-performance. If properly 
drafted, these clauses avoid many of the difficulties which would be imposed 
on the parties by the courts or statutory provisions under the applicable 
domestic law. The fact that some risks to each party will continue despite a 
well drafted contract, should not inhibit the parties from doing their best in 
drafting such clauses. Indeed, in their negotiations, the contracting parties 
can, at least, minimise these risks and their effects. What is more important, 
the parties will ensure that they are not left in doubt as to the nature and 
extent of their duties to perform and their respective responsibilities in the 
event of non-performance. To achieve these ends, the clause must be explicit 
and comprehensive. The parties should say what they actually mean to say 
and say it clearly.238 To ensure that the clause is not subject to more than one 
reasonable construction, it should be read by an independent lawyer to check 
whether or not there is any ambiguity.
However, it may be argued that any immunity clause, even if in general 
terms, such as "force majeure" or "act of God" is better than none. This 
argument is incorrect since such clauses are of little value to the courts. On 
the contrary, a carelessly drafted clause may create more problems than it 
solves. The vulnerability of less than comprehensive and detailed clauses lies 
in the unknown vagaries of the applicable domestic law and the long 
established rules of construction of documents.239 A review of force majeure 
cases at both international240 and domestic levels indicates that arbitrators and 
judges tend to construe a force majeure clause in a very restrictive way. For
237 Ved P. Nanda, The Law of Business Transnational Transactions, 1991, vol. 1, at 4-17.
238. John, H. Stroh, The Failure of Doctrice of Impracticability, 5 Corporation L. Rev. 1982, at 238.
239. David Green, Force Majeure Clauses and International Sale of Goods - Comparative Guidlines 
for the Common Lawyer, Australian Bus. L. Rev. 1980, 369, at 374.
240. Wener Melis, Force Majeure and Hardship clauses in International Commercial Contracts in 
View of the Practice of the ICC Court of Arbitration, 1 J. Int'l. Arb. 1984, 213, at 221. (See also the 
cases cited in, pp. 217 et seq.).
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example, under English law, a detailed and comprehensive clause is 
necessary, since English courts have refused to define the meaning of force 
majeure.241 Thus, if the clause is not drafted comprehensively, its meaning will 
be difficult to establish. In Thomas Borthwick (Glasgow) Ltd. v. Fairclough 
Ltd. 242 Donaldson J. stated that "the precise meaning of this term, if it has 
one, has eluded lawyers for years". Accordingly, because English courts are 
uneasy in dealing with an alien concept such as force majeure since they are 
unaware of its meaning they have interpreted force majeure clauses 
restrictively.243 In both England and the United States, the courts have warned 
that the use of a generic phrase such as "subject to force majeure" without 
any further detailed provisions, is limited in its scope by the words which 
precede or follow it. In Lebeaupin v. Richard Crispin and Co.,244 McCardie 
J. stated:
"I take it that a force majeure clause should be construed in each case with a 
close attention to the words which precede or follow it, and with due regard to 
the nature and general terms of the contract. If a seller desires to escape from 
liability in such a case as the present, he must take care to use words of 
adequate clearness and width . . . M.245
Thus, the use of generic words in a contract is fraught with danger. The point 
was cogently put by Lord Mcnaughten in Eldersiie Steamship Co. v. 
Borthwick246 when he said: "an ambiguous document is no protection."
By applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis American courts have also 
construed the term "force majeure" narrowly and have denied excusable non­
performance unless the supervening event is similar to those listed in a force 
majeure clause.247 In Wheeling Valley Coal Corp. v. M ead24* the court 
stated:
241. Matsoukis v. Priestman and Co. [1915] 1 K.B. 681.
242. [1968] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 16.
243. Edward, Veitch, Contracts - Frustration - Force Majeure Clauses - Non-availability of Market, 
Can. Bar Rev. 1976, 161, at 162.
244 [1920] 2K.B. 714, at 720.
245. Loc. cit., at 718. In this regard, there is also a dicta in Angelia, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 210, at 230.
246 [1905] A.C. 93, at 96. Cf. British Electrical Associated Industries (Cardiff), Ltd. v. Patly 
Pressengs, Ltd. [1953] 1A11E. R. 94 (A phrase in contract such as "subjective to force majeure" was 
considered too vague).
247. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 988 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Bumpusv. United States, 325 F.2d 264, 266-267 (toth Cir. 1963).
248. 186 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1950). See also Carnegie Steel Co. v. United States, 240 U.S. 156 (1916); 
Austin Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 518 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert, denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1965); New York 
Coal Co. v. New Pittsburgh Coal Co., 99 N.E. 198 (Ohio 1912). C f h ire  An Arbitration between the 
Podar Trading Co. Ltd., Bombay, & Francois Tagher Barcelona [1949] 2 K.B. 277, at 286.
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"Under familiar principles of interpretation, the general expressions 'acts of 
government' and 'causes beyond control of lessee' are limited to things of the 
same general sort as those specifically set forth in the same connection . . .
Apart from the fact that the courts are reluctant to grant relief when the 
clause is in general terms, the danger is that reference to force majeure in 
general will work to the advantage of the party who is acquainted with the 
substantive rules of the applicable law.249 The hypothetical case involving the 
fictitious Austrian merchant250 illustrates the nature of the problem.
Like other contractual provisions, force majeure clauses are not 
construed in isolation. The general rules governing the construction of 
contracts are applicable when interpreting of force majeure clauses.251 In 
order to determine the intention of the parties, the court construes the clause 
with due regard to the nature and general terms of the contract as well as the 
precise words of the clause itself.252 Thus before drafting a force majeure 
clause, the draftsman should consider the contract as a whole including the 
nature of the subject matter and the positions of the parties,253 in order to 
ensure that the provisions of the immunity clause do not conflict with other 
terms in the contract. Otherwise, a two edged sword situation could arise.254 
On one hand, the force majeure clause and its contents can be used to 
interpret other provisions in the contract: on other hand, other stipulations in 
the contract such as warranty clauses, can be used to interpret the force 
majeure clause. Thus, for example, a party who has assumed a risk by 
deliberately warranting something over which he has no control, will not be 
excused from the consequences of non-performance of that warranty as a 
result of a force majeure clause.
249. G. R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts, op. cit., at 2.08.
25°. Supra, at 296.
25 L See Silver v. White Star Coal Co., 190 Ky. 7, 226 S.W. 102 (1920); Bangor Peerless Slate Co. v. 
Bangor Vein Slate Co., 270 Pa. 161, 113 A. 790 (1920).
252. William Swalding, The Judicial Constracion of Force Majeure Clauses (in Force Majeure and 
Frustration of Contract, Edited by Ewan Mckendrick, op. cit. 3, at 5); Gregory P. Williams, Coping 
with Acts of God, Strikes, and other delights - The Use of Force Majeure in Mining Contracts, 22 
Rocky Mountain Mineral Institute, 1976, 433, at 435.
253. The courts may also look outside of the contract in order to cosider the facts known to the parties 
at the time of contracting so as to give effect to the intent of parties. (See Collins v. White Oak Fuel 
Co., 69 W.Va. 292, 71 S.E. 277 (1911).
254 John, S. Kirkham, op. cit., at p. 6-30.
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4.3. THE FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE MUST RELATE TO THE 
SUBSTANCE OF THE CONTRACT IN WHICH IT IS INCLUDED
The formulation of force majeure clause in respect to its effects and 
contingency list will vary in different commercial transactions. A force majeure 
clause should therefore not be regarded as a standard term to be included in 
any contract. It is important that force majeure provisions should not be 
drafted in the abstract. Before any drafting, the parties' salesmen, engineers 
and financial experts should engage in negotiations after which lawyers can 
draft a contract whose terms are clear and "tailor-made" so that little is left 
open to interpretation. There is no doubt that the type of the contract will have 
a direct impact upon the specific force majeure clause used. For example, 
different sale contracts such as the sale of coal, cereal, machinery, timber, 
etc., as well as related factors such as scarcity or abundance of the goods, 
are important elements that will affect the form of the clause. Moreover, 
international commerce no longer primarily consists of selling and buying 
goods. These newer transactions include a variety of arrangements and take 
many forms such as: -
(a) technology transfer agreements;
(b) design and construction of large plants, turnkey projects or construction 
and civil engineering contracts;
(c) joint ventures agreements;
(d) mining agreements such as mineral leases, operating agreements, joint 
venture agreements for mining or milling services, and agreements for the 
sale of mineral products;
(e) management contracts;
(f) long-term contracts for the sale of raw materials and manufactured goods 
(long-term supply contracts), contracts on patent licences or the use of 
industrial, or other know how;
(g) consultant's contracts;
(h) manufacturing and marketing agreements, etc.
The diversified character of these transactions affect both the scope 
and precision of a force majere clause. Thus, for example, a force majeure 
clause which is used in a 'spot sale' may not be particularly helpful in the case 
of long-term contracts such as sale of steel products or construction contracts. 
In long-term contracts such as turnkey projects,255 we are no longer
255. For more detailed features of these kinds of contracts see: United Nations, Guidelines for 
Contracting for Industrial Projects in Developing Countries, New York, 1975; United Nations, Guide 
on Drawing up International Contracts on Industrial Co-operation, New York, 1976; United Nations,
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concerned with the cash sale of a widget for future delivery, but with far more 
complex transactions in which the arrangements are not restricted to a single 
transaction or even a series of transactions. Rather they establish a continuing 
relationships. The capital investments in these contracts are usually much 
more than involved say, for example, trade in cereals. Other factors such as 
costs, imbalance between various parts of the world with respect to technical 
knowledge and material resources, often require joint business arrangements, 
many of which extend across national frontiers. In these contracts, there are 
much greater risks than in a short term contract. There are also other factors 
which threaten the stability of the contract, such as increase in costs of 
performing of contract. This will be discussed later.256 In the light of these 
factors, a broader coverage is required than that afforded by a typical force 
majeure clause included in, for example, a 'spot sale' contract, since a greater 
variety of circumstances may contribute to make performance impossible or 
highly undesirable. Thus, an ingenious draftsman in drafting a force majeure 
clause for such complex contracts should add other supervening events to the 
usual contingency list which is currently used in short term contracts. These 
additional events can be as follows: explosion, sabotage, machinery 
breakdown, failure of plant, collapse of structures, requisition of materials, 
inability to obtain suitable raw materials, equipment, fuel, power or 
components. Moreover, the party may add in the clause that it will not be 
liable for any loss and injury thereby suffered by the other party.257 The scope 
of the effects of force majeure clause can therefore exclude liability for loss or 
injury. Such additional provisions are not needed in, for example, on contract 
of sale.
In a joint venture agreement, the clause may be drafted in such a way 
that it can be exercised not only in the event of the traditional provisions of 
force majeure but also in the event of cessation of special conditions which 
are essential to the success of the project: these would include preferential
Features and Issues in Turnkey Contracts in Developing Countries: Technical Paper, New York, 1983; 
United Nations, Guide for Drawing up International Contracts on Consulting Engineers, Including 
Some Related Aspects of Technical Assistance, New York, 1983; United Nations, Analysis of 
Engineering and Technical Assistance Consultancy Contracts, Model Form of Conditions of Contract 
for Process Plants (Suitable for Lump Sum Contracts in the United Kingdom), 1968; United Nations, 
Guide on Drawing up International Contracts for Services Relating to Maintenance, Repair, and 
Operation of Industrial and Other Works, New York, Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva), 
1987. See also, UNIDO, op. cit, UNCITRAL, op. cit.
256. Infra, 306-309.
257. See the related clause in L. W. Melville, Forms and Agreements on Intellectual Property and 
International Licensing, 3rd ed. 1979, (revised 1986), at pp. 3A20, 4C32.
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access to raw materials, preferential local foreign exchange laws, tariff 
protection, tax incentives and price controls which ensure reasonable buying 
and selling prices.258 The clause may also provide for the excusable cessation 
of performance of the contract should the safety of the foreign partner's 
expatriate personnel be jeopardised and they must therefore be evacuated. 
The clause should also cover expropriation of the joint venture. A careful 
definition of expropriation should be contained in one of the paragraphs of the 
force majeure clause. Moreover, other events can be added to the force 
majeure contingency list, such as inconvertibility of currency and political strife 
which may interfere with the effective and profitable operation of the joint 
venture.259
Consider an agreement to construct a new chemical plant. The performance 
of this agreement is obviously only possible in a specified location. Complex 
events may render the performance undesirable or illegal (for example, a 
change in zoning regulations). Accordingly, the draftsman should ensure that 
the clause can cover such events. In the field of engineering or export of steel 
products, a considerable period of time may elapse between the formation of 
the contract and performance260. While in the trade of cereals, for example, 
this is not normally the case. It is therefore not surprising that force majeure 
provisions relating to excusable non-performance are quite different in these 
two types of transactions. In the former, it is necessary to provide a flexible 
excuse clause allowing the parties to suspend performance of the contract; 
while in the latter, which is speculative by nature and the parties usually 
anticipate fairly rapid price fluctuations, cancellation of performance of the 
contract is desirable. Thus it is necessary in the latter case, to draft the relief 
clause in a restrictive way so as to preclude any possibility of manoeuvre by 
either of the parties.261
In conclusion, it is submitted that the search for one single perfect force 
majeure clause will be elusive. However, it is unnecessary. There is and can 
not be uniformity. What is an appropriate force majeure clause in one contract 
may be completely inappropriate in another. The characteristics of the
258. Terrence F. McLaren, and Walter G. Marple, Jr., Licensing in Foreign and Domestic Operations, 
Joint Ventures, vol. 4, New York, 1985, Chapter 3, at 3.02[9], 3-23.
259. Loc. cit.
260. See Harold J. Berman, Excuse of Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in 
International Trade, op. cit., at 1431.
261. Peter Benjamin, The ECE General Conditions of Sale and Standard Forms Contract, op. cit.,at 
116.
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particular transaction influence the manner in which the clauses are drafted. 
The ICC suggestion262 of a model force majere clause for every different type 
of contracts can be criticised not only because of the extreme diversity of the 
types of transactions involved but also because different parties may want 
different results in similar situations.263 Moreover, factors such as the national 
law of the place where the contract is made or to which it refers, the 
characteristics of the parties (their nationality, whether such parties are private 
or public, etc.)264 and occurrences which may be relevant to the nature of the 
contract concerned, are important factors upon which the precise formulation 
of the clauses depends.
Because of all these factors, there is no doubt that force majeure 
clauses are difficult to draft.
4.4. AVOID THE USE OF A FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE 
CONTAINED IN STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS
For similar reasons, parties should be careful not to incorporate 
standard form force majeure clauses in their contract. Although there are 
many standard forms of force majeure clauses265 which parties may use, 
these should be modified or re-drafted very carefully. The automatic use of a 
standard "boilerplate" force majeure clause in a particular transaction, may 
cause more problems than it solves.266 To illustrate these difficulties, let us 
examine a hypothetical case:267 Take the case of trading house which both 
buys and sells commodities on world markets. It incorporates a standard force 
majeure clause in both its buying and selling contracts, which will discharge 
either party from performance due to circumstances beyond that party's 
control. The trading house then enters into a contract to buy chemicals from 
an Italian company for resale to a British company. If the Italian company's 
plant blows up as a result of an industrial accident, its obligation to deliver to
262. Supra, at 262.
263. Cf M. Fontain, Les Clauses de Force Majeure dans les Contrats Intemationaux, D.P.C.I. 1979, at 
504 et seq.
264. Karl-Heins Bockstiegel, Hardship, Force Majeure and Special Risks Claused in International 
Contracts (In Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in International Trade and Finance, edited by 
N. Horn, Kluwer, 1985), at 162, 163.
265. For example, see some of these standard clauses in David Yates, and A. J. Hawkins, Standard 
Business Contracts: Exclusions and Related Devices, Appendix 1, at 466-469. See also pp. 256-261.
266. See Bernard J. Cartoon, op. cit., at 233; Thoms R. Hurst, Drafting Contracts in an Inflationary 
Era, op. cit., at 900.
267’. Cited in Bernard J. Cartoon, op. cit.
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the trading house will be excused under the force majeure clause. However, 
the trading house will not be discharged from its obligation to deliver to the 
British company. The fact that the Italian company can not perform its 
obligation does not mean that the trading house can not deliver alternative 
goods to the British company. The British company would be entitled to insist 
on performance of the contract and the trading house would be obliged to look 
elsewhere for its source of supply.
Thus, copying of provisions of standard clauses and inserting them in a 
particular contract may be quite unsuitable for the transaction in question. 
Accordingly, the clause must be adapted in such a way as to fit the particular 
contract. For example, in mining contracts, attention should be focused on 
what specific events should be added to the standard list of occurrences so 
that the force majeure may address the types of problems that are most likely 
to occur and in respect of which the parties intend to allow excusable non­
performance. Attention should also be given to determining which obligations 
should be discharged, which are to be revised and which obligations should 
remain in full force during the continuance of the supervening event.268
Another problem is that in most standard contracts a force majeure 
clause is usually drafted in favour of only one of the parties i.e., the party who 
has greater bargaining power.269 For example, the force majeure clauses 
contained in GAFTA 100,270 merely refer to delays in, or prevention of, 
shipment, i.e. the seller's obligation. In these clauses, the buyer is not afforded 
force majeure protection.
Finally, most standard force majeure clauses are not clear and 
comprehensive. As discussed before,271 they might consequently be 
ineffective if, for example, the applicable law is English or American law, 
where the courts interpret these clauses very strictly. Given the variety of force 
majeure conditions, if parties do not make it clear what supervening events 
are relevant, the courts will be unable to discover the real intentions of the
268. Gregory P. Williams, op. cit., at 448.
269. See chapter 7 of this thesis under the title of "Standard Form Contracts".
270. For example, clause 23 provides: "Force majeure strikes, etc. - Sellers shall not be responsible for 
any delay in shipment of the goods . . . occasioned by any Act of God, strike, lockout, riot or civil 
commotion, combination of workmen, breakdown of machinery, fire or any cause comprehended in 
the terms of force majeure . . .". (Published by Grain and Feed Trade Association, effective 1 April
1987).
271. Supra, pp. 298-301.
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parties. A fortiori, if the contract merely refers to "subject of force majeure", 
this will exacerbate the situation.272
4.5. DO NOT INCLUDE FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP 
PROVISIONS IN THE SAME CLAUSE
Hardship clauses have a potential overlap with force majeure clauses. 
Although there is great confusion as to the use of these concepts, these 
clauses are frequently found in long-term international contracts of sale, even 
where the contracts are on a "take or pay" basis.273 Therefore, a general 
review of the concept of hardship and its place in the contract is needed. 
Issues related to the drafting of hardship clauses will not be analysed in detail.
Hardship and other clauses such as intervener clauses, have been said 
to be variations of force majeure provisions.274 Indeed, modern hardship 
provisions sometimes labelled force majeure.215 The inclusion of a hardship 
clause in a contract is valuable, particularly, as its existence is evidence that 
the parties intended some sort of adaptation of the contractual terms. The 
clause is very useful in long-term contracts where the parties need immunity 
against unforeseen events which may disrupt the initial economic and financial 
equilibrium of the contract. As discussed before,276 long-term agreements 
present a number of common features. In these contracts, such as gas or oil 
supply, coal sale and joint ventures, the performance is intended to go on for 
ten years or more, perhaps even twenty or thirty years.277 Every agreement, 
whatever its form or purpose, creates a significant close relationship between 
the parties. Another feature of these contracts is their complexity, since highly 
sophisticated industrial and scientific arrangements will often require 
multiparty collaboration.278 In these contracts we are no longer concerned with
272. See pp. 298-301. Cf. Bishop and Baxter Ltd. v. Anglo-Eastern Trading and Industrial Co. Ltd. 
[1944] K.B. 12, C.A. (Sale subject to "war clause" too uncertain).
273. E. J. Wright, Legal Framework of Coal Trade in the Region, IB A/ Law Asia Seminar, 'Energy 
Law in Asia and the Pacific' (Singapore 1982), 581, at 611; M. E. Wright, Effects of Changed 
Circumstances on Mineral and Petroleum Sales Contracts, AMPLA Yearbook, 1984, 331, at 347.
274 See Schmitthoff, Hardship and Intervener Clauses, J. Bus. L. 1980, 82.
275. Noibert Horn, Standard Clauses on Contract Adaptation in International Commerce, (In 
Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in International Trade and Finance, Edited by N. Horn, 
1985, 111, at 132).
276 Supra, pp. 172-3, 178.
211. E. J. Wright, op. cit., at 612; A. H. Peulinckx, Frustration, Hardship, Force Majeure, Imprevision, 
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, Unmoglichkeit, Changed Cicumstances, J. Int'l. Arb. 1986, 47, at 53.
278. Georgio Bernini, Techniques for Resolving Problems in Forming and Performing Long-term 
Contracts, New Delhi, 1975, 5th International Arbitration Congress, CIVal, at CIVa3.
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a simple contract of sale, but with complex transactions279 which are exposed 
to a wider range of risks than most other contracts. Under such 
circumstances, it is difficult initially to foresee and evaluate in advance all 
possible, future occurrences; thus, there is much greater likelihood of gaps 
occurring than in a simple international contract for the sale of goods.
During the performance of these contracts, events may occur which 
render the performance of contract difficult, hazardous or more onerous. The 
parties can not be sure whether or not unforeseen technological, economic or 
political developments may occur during the existence of the agreement which 
make it necessary to revise prices, royalty rates or other contractual terms.280 
Of course, the applicable law may not be able to provide appropriate solutions 
for these problems. The economic circumstances of these contracts may 
change and the initial values of assets vary. Currencies may also lose their 
value, yet the contract still remains operative. On the other hand, the contract 
is only meaningful as long as it provides for mutual economic benefits: nobody 
should be obliged to work for nothing.281 Therefore, there is a pressing need to 
provide some mechanism in the contract to deal with changing future 
circumstances so that performance of the contract remains economically 
sensible. Termination of the contract would be costly and destructive. There is 
no doubt that a force majeure clause may provide an adequate solution to the 
problems faced by a party as the result of an event which disturbs the 
contract's economic and financial equilibrium. It is the present writer's view 
that the attempt to solve these problems by a force majeure clause should be 
abandoned. It is better to deal with these problems in clauses specifically 
designed to allow adjustment in such circumstances,282 the so-called hardship 
clause.
Although the concepts of hardship and force majeure appear to be 
related to each other, particularly since they share some features, such as 
being exceptions to the basic rule of pacta sunt servanda and are concerned
279. See Victor P. Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 1976, 45, at 49 etseq.
280. Georgio Bernini, op. cit., at pp. CIVa 5, ClVa 6; Geogio Bernini, Adaptation of Contracts, ICC 
Congress Series No. 1 (Vllth International Arbitration Congress, Hamburg, June 7-11, 1982, Kluwer, 
at 193 et seq.); Georgio Bernini, Adaptation during the Progress of Long-term Contracts, 43 
Arbitration, 1977, 51, at 63, 67.
281. Oppetit, L'adaptation des Contrats Intemationaux aux Changement de Circonstances: La Clause 
de Hardship, 4 Journal de Droit International (Clunet) 1974, 784-814.
282. See Gregory P. Williams, op. cit., at 450; John Kelly, Commentary on Effects of Changed 
Circumstances on Mineral and Petroleum Sales Contracts, AMPL A Yearbook, 1984, 389, at 393.
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with unforeseen supervening events, the provisions should be drafted 
separately, under the titles of force majeure and hardship in the contract, for 
the following reasons.
It is important to appreciate the difference which exists between the two 
concepts. Hardship relates to unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of 
the party which render the performance of the contract not impossible but only 
more burdensome.283 A hardship clause can therefore be compared to the 
French concept of imprevision as well as the German concept of wegfall der 
geschaftsgrundlage.284 Obviously, a hardship clause has a wider scope than 
the general force majeure clause, which is only operative when performance 
by the party concerned has become impossible, even if only temporarily. The 
legal consequence of a hardship clause is the continuation of the contract, 
albeit on different terms. The aim of the clause is therefore the adaptation of 
the contract,285 rather than the termination of the contract which a force 
majeure clause generally provides. Thus, while force majeure clauses may be 
described as passive, hardship clauses are dynamic and seek to modify the 
provisions of the contract and allow performance to continue.286 The hardship 
clause also provides a complementary mechanism that distributes the costs of 
unexpected events among the parties and gives guidance for achieving a 
flexible response to particular events.287 It may provide that parties should 
solve their problems through renegotiation, or the necessary adaptation may 
be determined through the good offices of a trusted, distinguished third party 
who does not perform the function of an arbitrator, but rather encourages the 
parties to reach a settlement288 i.e., acts as a mediator or conciliator. A typical 
hardship clause should therefore have two aspects: a definition of hardship 
and a method of adapting the contract. Bruno Oppetit offers the following 
definition:
283. Clive M. Schmitthoff, Hardship and Intervener Clauses, op. cit., at 85.
284 Supra, pp. 89-104.
285. See B. Oppetit, L'adaptation des Contrats Intemationaux aux Changement de circonstances: la 
Clause de Hardship, 4 Journal de Droit International, 1974, 784; Van Ommeslaghe, Les Clauses de 
Force Majuere et d'imprevision (Hardship) dans les Contrats Intemationaux, Revue de Droit 
International et de Compare, 1980, 7; Lando, Renegotiation and Revision of International Contracts, 
German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 23,1983, 37.
286. Adrian A. Montague, Hardship Clauses, Int'l. Bus. L. 1985, 135.
287 N. Horn, op. cit., at 131.
288. Clive M. Schmitthoff, op. cit., D. Yates, Drafting Force Majeure and Related Clauses, op. cit., at 
188.
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"A hardship clause may be defined as a clause by which the parties will be 
able to modify the contract if an intervening change in the initial basis on 
which they obligated themselves changes the equilibrium of the contract to the 
point that one of the parties sustain a hardship."289
The draftsman has to consider two quite different situations: viz., 
supervening events which may make the performance impossible (force 
majeure) and those events which render the performance more difficult or 
onerous but not impossible (hardship). To prevent the confusion, which 
sometimes exists among the lawyers who regard the two different clauses as 
synonymous,290 he should not place the hardship clause in the force majeure 
clause. A force majeure clause which is too wide in its application may prove 
to be far less effective than the draftsman intended.
4.6. THE BENEFIT AND PROTECTION OF THE FORCE 
MAJEURE CLAUSE SHOULD BE PROVIDED FOR BOTH 
PARTIES
For reasons which will be discussed later, it is recommended that both 
parties should be enabled to invoke the force majeure clause. In other words, 
the clause should be for the benefit of both parties. Failure to extend the 
clause to each party may have harsh and unconscionable effects.
Why should both parties be protected? Why should, for example, a 
buyer in a contract of sale be afforded the same protection against the force 
majeure events as the seller? It can be argued that it is very difficult to 
conceive of circumstances where a buyer should be released from his 
performance. But while the performance of a seller in a sale contract or a 
contractor in a contract for the construction of industrial works is more likely to 
be affected by an event of force majeure than the performance of the buyer or 
purchaser, cases could arise in which the force majeure also affects the 
buyer's or purchaser's performance. For example, in construction contracts, 
the purchaser may be prevented by legal impediment from making a payment 
to the contractor., or, a physical impediment qualifying as force majeure may 
prevent him from performing any limited construction obligation he has 
undertaken.291 In a typical current of sale of goods, the obstacles to 
performance of the buyer's obligations could include financial embarrassment,
289. B. Oppetit, L'adaptation des Contrats Intemationaux aux Changements de Circonstances: la 
Clause de Hardship, Journal du Droit International, 1974, 794, at 797.
290. Melis, op. cit., at 215.
291. UNCITRAL, op. cit., at 234.
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price controls or some breakdown in the agreed method of delivery. In these 
situations, it may be vital for the buyer to have immunity against force majeure 
events. In an F.O.B. contract, for example, the buyer's obligation to present a 
vessel to take delivery may be affected by circumstances beyond his control. 
The vessel may be sunk by perils of the sea before reaching the port of 
shipment. According to the Common law, the buyer would not be able to 
invoke the doctrine of frustration to avoid liability attaching to him by virtue of 
the non-arrival of the vessel. The Common law would require him to charter 
another vessel.292
Another illustration is non-availability of market. A buyer who has 
agreed to buy 1000 units per year of a commodity for a period of ten years, 
may wish to invoke the immunity clause if, for example, because of the non­
availability of market or a downturn in his business in an economic recession, 
he needs only 600 units. Difficulties can arise in respect of the meaning of the 
phrase "non-availability of market". Does it mean actually available market as 
opposed to market which is advantageous or profitable to the purchaser? In 
Atlantic Paper Stock Ltd. v. St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp and Paper Co. 
Ltd.,293 the New Brunswick Court of Appeal decided that "available" does not 
mean "existing" but rather implies that the purchaser can take advantage of 
the market. However, whilst overturning the decision of the Appeal Court, the 
Supreme Court of Canada,294 stated that the meaning of "non-availability" was 
to be determined by the preceding words of the clause under scrutiny, so that 
the cause of non-availability of the market had to be one beyond the control of 
the purchaser. After stating that "available market" does not mean a market 
which is advantageous or profitable to the purchaser, the Supreme Court 
came to the conclusion that the lack of market was due to the ineffectiveness 
of the defendant's marketing plans and to the unreality of their appreciation of 
the demand for their product i.e., it was not beyond their control. Accordingly, 
the court held that the purchaser could not lawfully refuse to accept delivery 
owing to non-availability of market and was liable in the damages to the 
supplier. In the light of this decision, if a buyer wishes to take advantage of an 
immunity clause there are good reasons why he should define exactly what he 
means by "non-availability of market".
292. Cartoon, op. cit., at 233; D. Yates, (1991), op. cit., at 204.
293. (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 732. See also Edward Veitch, op. cit., at 168-169.
294 (1975), 56 D.L.R. (3d) 409 (S.C.C.).
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Apart from the above situations, there are other cases when extensive 
force majeure conditions could be used by the buyer. For example, in an 
uranium supply agreement reciprocal protection is required when the buyer is 
prevented from using the materials as specifically designated in the contract, 
i.e., as a result of delay, cancellation or licensing difficulties the buyer is 
unable to use the specific reactor for which the materials were intended.295
The above discussion indicates that force majeure clauses should be 
reciprocal protecting both parties; otherwise, if one of the parties is not 
specifically protected by the clause he will be left to rely on domestic laws 
such as the doctrine of frustration which, as we have seen, are rarely 
satisfactory. Thus, by using phrases such as "Neither party shall be liable toM 
or "Either party can assert force majeure”. both parties can benefit from the 
clause on the occurrence of supervening events.
There are other reasons for reciprocal protection. If the clause protects 
the buyer as well as the seller, the buyer will feel that he is benefiting from an 
equal bargain. Protecting the seller and leaving the buyer with no protection at 
all may be a factor inhibiting the buyer from entering into the contract.296 Such 
a clause will be an indication of the seller's good faith and will operate to 
encourage the parties' contractual relationship in the future.297 If a party can 
not rely upon the immunity clause and performance of the contract becomes 
extremely onerous or difficult due to unforeseen circumstances then that party 
may decide to break or, in an extreme case, repudiate the contract, because it 
may be financially or economically more advisable to do so rather than incur 
the additional expense which performance would involve. Any action by the 
other party to recover damages would also have an adverse effect on their 
future contractual relationship.298 Finally, if the immunity clause provides 
adequate protection for both parties, a court will be more likely to come to the 
conclusion that the clause is a correct and complete expression of the 
intentions of the parties.299
295. H. M. Donndorff, Uranium Supply Agreements, Int'l. Bus. L. (Special issue) 1979, 37, at 42.
296. Cartoon, op. cit., at 233.
297. David Green, op. cit., at 379; Dvid Yates, op. cit., at 204.
298. David Green, op. cit.
299. Gregory P. Williams, op. cit., at 449.
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5. POINTS AND SUGGESTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE 
CONTENTS OF A FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE
It is now appropriate to examine and analyse the contents of a force 
majeure clause from the drafting point of view. In order to have a 
comprehensive and a well drafted force majeure clause, it is possible to 
identify at least four main issues for which a force majeure should provide, viz:
(A) A definition and description of force majeure and the events which will 
excuse a party from performance of his obligations;
(B) Provisions on the consequences of these events on the contractual 
relationship;
(C) Machinery provisions, such as requirements as to notice;
(D) Specifying what restitutionary and other procedures should be applied so 
as to achieve justice and to minimise the loss between the parties.
5.1. CONTENTS OF DEFINITION OF FORCE MAJEURE AND ITS 
ELEMENTS
5.1.1. FORCE MAJEURE MUST BE PRECISELY AND 
CAREFULLY DEFINED
As regards the definition of force majeure, there seems to be at least 
four alternatives used in the contracts:
(i) A general reference to force majeure is quoted in the clause without any 
definition. In this case, the meaning of the force majeure clause is that 
expressly or impliedly to be found in the system of law which is the proper law 
of the contract. In both cases, questions of interpretation are not excluded. 
Examples300 of such a clause are as follows:
'The parties shall not be responsible for non-performance due to force 
majeure."; or,
"Les parties ne seront pas responsables des defauts d'execution de la present 
convention dus a un cas de force majeure."
The advantage of this approach - if the concept of force majeure is part
of the proper law - is that the parties know from the outset what system of law
will govern the problem of excusable non-performance. Some writers301 who
support this approach offer the following clauses:
"In the performance of their rights and obligations, the parties expressly 
reserve the case of force majeure."; or
300. All examples quoted were selected by the author from different types of contracts studied.
301. See, e.g., Jean-Flavien Lalive, International Commercial Contracts: Negotiations with American 
Lawyers - A Foreign Lawyer's View, 12 The Practical Lawyer, 1966, 71, at 84.
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"the case of force majeure is reserved."; or 
. . without prejudice to the case of force majeure"
This alternative is open to criticism. Where the concept of force 
majeure is not indigenous to the proper law, for example, in English law, there 
is uncertainty as to the meaning a court will give it.302 Such a clause in effect 
surrenders the problem to the proper law of the contract. The provision 
obviously adds little to the solution that would be obtained under the proper 
law in the absence of the stipulation. All that is accomplished in clauses of this 
kind is to make apparent the unity in legal status between the clause and the 
rest of the contract.303 The danger is that this approach may only work to the 
advantage of the party acquainted with the proper law. Such clauses should 
not be used as they may create more problems than they solve.304
(ii) An exhaustive list of exempting events is quoted in the clause without any 
definition. Here the parties simply enumerate in more or less detail, situations 
deemed to constitute valid excuses for non-performance of the contract,
without any further definition. Here are two examples:
"For the purpose of this contract, force majeure shall include war, riots, fire, 
storm, earthquake. . . ." ;  or
"The contractor shall be discharged from honouring its obligations under this 
agreement on the happening of any of the following contingencies: war, riots, 
fire, floods, earthquake, storm, explosion, strike, act of authority . . .."
The advantages of this method are various. The list of specific 
contingencies is not restricted to a specific pattern of events. They are 
capable of expansion or contraction. The events can be changed in 
accordance with what the parties had in mind concerning the allocation of 
risks of non-performance. Through the list method, the parties provide their 
own choice of contingencies and they are able to determine the scope of their 
contingency clauses. They can list those events which are in line with their
needs and their interests. Indeed, they are able to discriminate among
contingencies, selecting those which reflect the circumstances of their trade, 
discarding irrelevant events.305 This method reduces the scope for any 
argument that the contingencies listed are not within the provisions of the 
force majeure clause.
302. See Evan McKendrick, op. cit., at 23.
303. G. R. Delaume, Excuse of Non-performance and Force Majeure in Economic Development 
Agreements, 10 Colum. J. Transn'l. L. 1971, 242, at 245.
304 Supra, pp. 298-301.
305. See Leon E. Trakman, The Contractual Allocation of Unusual Contingencies in International Oil 
Sales (S.J.D. thesis, Faculty of Harward Law School, 1977), at 369 et seq.
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Although the clause has these advantages, it is not acceptable as a 
comprehensive clause for the following reasons: First, contingencies which 
are not mentioned in the list will not be considered as force majeure. Not 
every contingency that may occur in future can be specified in advance: even 
the most comprehensive clause may have its omissions. This method is 
exposed to the danger that a certain contingency which later proves to be of 
major significance may not have been listed in the clause. If such a 
contingency is not listed, it may give rise to the inference that its omission was 
intentional. Secondly, this approach does not provide criteria which the listed 
events must meet, so as to be considered as force majeure. In other words, it 
does not prescribe the conditions under which the party is excused. For 
instance, a reference to "war" per se is insufficient to disclose the intentions of 
the parties: the word can be interpreted as a narrow concept such as a 
declared war by which the performance of contract is physically impossible, or 
it can be interpreted as a wider concept to include, for example, the situation 
where threats of war have not prevented the performance of the contract.
(iii) "Qualitative clauses",306 viz., clauses which only give a general definition of 
force majeure. In this case, the clause provides either an abstract definition of 
force majeure or general criteria for determining whether or not an event 
amounts to force majeure. Here are some examples:
"Force majeure means any cause or circumstances that a party can not 
reasonably control."; or
". . . tous les evenements echappant au control des parties et paralysant 
totalement les actives de I'Entreprise."; or
"For the purpose thereof force majeure shall mean all causes and events 
beyond the control of the parties which can not be foreseen and, if 
foreseeable, are unavoidable."
This alternative has the utility of being able to cover events which the 
parties did not anticipate at the time of contracting and enables them to 
ensure that contingencies having the characteristics provided in the definition 
will be regarded as force majeure.307 It avoids the need to compile a list of 
contingencies which would have been regarded as force majeure by the 
parties.308
306. The expression is borrowed from Clive M. Schmitthoff, Frustration of International Contracts of 
Sale in English and Comparative Law, 127 (In Helsinki Discussions, op. cit.).
307. See UNCITRAL, op. cit., at 236; Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Hardship, Force Majeure and Special 
Risks Clauses in International Contracts, In Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in 
International Trade and Finance, Edited by N. Horn, 1985, at 166).
308. UNCITRAL, op. cit.
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However, this type of general definition of force majeure clearly has the
disadvantage of being less precise than the list method. In some situations, it
may be difficult to determine whether or not a particular contingency is
covered by the clause.309 The parties may have different views as to the scope
of the clause. A fortiori, this is so when judges or arbitrators are confronted by
such a general definition since they afford no more than a general directive to
the solution of actual cases. Thus, nice questions of interpretation are not
excluded and the clause may give rise to different constructions.
(iv) A clause which contains a general definition followed by illustrative
exempting impediments. This alternative is much preferable to those
discussed above. As we have seen, these clauses give rise to difficult
questions of construction. The list method may not be comprehensive, and the
general definition of force majeure is often uncertain in its scope. A general
reference to force majeure without any further definition may give rise to the
application of the general doctrines prevailing in one country or another with
unpredictable results. To avoid these difficulties, the parties should draft a
clause which provides a detailed list of events and also has a general
definition of force majeure in order to cover those events not listed but which
meet the criteria contained in the definition.310 In such a clause, the general
definition provides guidance but is supplemented by an illustrative list of
events which the parties intend to recognise as constituting force majeure.
This alternative, which is unfortunately seldom found in the contracts, would
combine the flexibility afforded by the definition with the certainty arising from
expressly specifying of force majeure events in the list. Two points should,
however, be taken into account. The first is that the parties should expressly
state that the list is illustrative and not exhaustive. The second is that the
illustrative list of force majeure events should also meet the criteria contained
in the general definition. Two examples of such clauses are as follows:
"In this contract, force majeure shall be deemed to be any cause beyond the 
reasonable control of the contractor or the purchaser (as the case may be) 
which prevents, impedes or delays the due performance of the contract by the 
obligated party and which, by due diligence, the affected party is unable to 
control, despite the making of all reasonable efforts to overcome the delay, 
impediment or cause. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, 
force majeure may include, but shall not be limited to any one or other of the 
following: any war or hostilities; any riot or civil commotion, earthquake, flood, 
tempest, lightening . . . .";311 or
309. Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, op. cit.
310. Cf. ICC Force Majeure Clause, op. cit.
316
"(1) A party is exempt from the payment of damages, or of an agreed sum, in 
respect of a failure to perform an obligation under this contract if he proves 
that the failure was due to a physical or legal impediment beyond his control 
and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment 
into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or 
overcome it or its consequences (General definition).
(2) The following are examples of events which are to be regarded as 
exempting impediments, provided that they satisfy the criteria set forth in 
paragraph (1), above: . . ",312
5.1.2. ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE SUGGESTED 
DEFINITION
The provision defining force majeure should follow a pattern in which 
certain conditions must be met before an event of force majeure, as defined, 
can be recognised as such. The general definition should be circumscribed 
within reasonably precise limits. In this respect, a comprehensive definition 
should clearly provide the elements necessary to establish the occurrence of 
force majeure. It is now appropriate to discuss and analyse which elements 
should be included in the definition of force majeure.
(i) PROXIMATE CAUSE
The problem of cause is perhaps the most difficult part of the force 
majeure clause which can be dealt with satisfactorily. However, as Hurst 
rightly says, it is probably better for the draftsmen to attempt to come to grips 
with the problem than to ignore it completely.313 The following example 
illustrates the problem. Suppose a situation where there is an oil embargo 
which greatly reduces the supply of oil. The embargo, however, does not 
totally cut off the production of oil. If a seller is unable to carry out a contract 
for the delivery of crude oil, should a judge conclude that the embargo caused 
the non-performance even though oil is available on the black market? To 
take another example, should a seller be excused performance because of a 
lengthy strike caused by excessive wage demands made by the seller's 
labourers when the seller could have settled the strike by accepting the 
labourers' demand?
It is accepted by writers'314 and courts'315 that the general rule is that the 
occurrence which is relied upon to invoke the force majeure clause must be
311. Article 34.1 of UNIDO, op. cit.
312. This clause is cited in UNCITRAL, op. cit., at 240.
313. Thomas R. Hurst, Drafting Contracts in an Inflationary Era, op. cit., at 902.
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the proximate or effective cause of the failure to perform. For example, in 
Wheeling Valley Coal Corp. v. Mead,316 the trustee in bankruptcy of a mining 
company contracted with the lessee of a mine. The contract provided for a 
minimum payment of royalties by the trustee to the lessee. The contract also 
contained a force majeure provision that excused the above payment upon 
the occurrence of certain events including interruption of mining due to 
government acts. Shortly after the execution of the contract, wartime 
regulations increased labour costs but prohibited price increases for the 
mineral product. The lessee brought an action to recover arrears in the 
payments of the minimum royalty. The trustee relied on force majeure317 The 
court held that, although the government acts were significant factors leading 
to the shutdown of the mining operation, inasmuch as these were only some 
of the factors involved, the proximate cause requirement was not satisfied 
since the financial insolvency of the operator was the major cause for non­
performance of the minimum payment obligation.318
When it is clear that national courts will apply the proximate cause 
doctrine, to provide such a rule in a force majeure clause may seem 
unnecessary as it only restates the appropriate law. However, if the parties 
wish other causes or events which are not effective or proximate causes, 
nevertheless to constitute force majeure, they must do so clearly and precisely 
in the clause.
There is also the problem of multiple causation. This occurs when the 
performance of the contract is prevented by two or more causes of force 
majeure but the impact of each on the party's performance can not be 
assessed. The non-performance is not attributable to any one particular event 
of force majeure but rather to the aggregate effect of two or more events of 
force majeure. It is therefore desirable for a force majeure clause to include 
that in these circumstances the party seeking relief may rely upon the 
aggregate effect of all relevant events.319 A typical example is as follows:
314. See, e.g., Notes, Clauses in Contracts Excusing Default in Performance, Colum. L. Rev. 1920, 
776, 777; Gregory P. Williams, op. cit., at 437; John Kelly, op. cit., at 397; H. A. Lewis, Comments, 
Allocating Risk in Take-or-Pay Contracts: Are Force Majeure and Commercial Impracticability the 
Same Defence? 42 SW. L. J. 1989,1047,1062. See also Williston, Sec. 1968 (1920).
315. See, e.g. III. Mid-Continent Co. v. Tennis, 122 Ind. 17, 102 N.E.2d 390 (1951); Swift and Co. v. 
Columbia Ry., Gas and Elec. Co., 17 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1927) (Cotton crop shortage did not 
discharge mill from obligation because shortage not the cause of failure of mill to perform).
316. 186 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1950).
317. Loc. cit., at 221.
318. Loc. cit., at 223.
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"Multiple causation: Whenever interrupted or diminished performance is 
traceable to two or more events or causes of force majeure, and whenever 
under such circumstances it is not feasible or practicable to trace a precise 
quantum of performance to any one such cause, but only to all such causes in 
the aggregate shall suffice as an excuse whenever each such cause would 
have been a force majeure cause by itself."320
(ii) LITIGATION STRATEGY (ONUS OF PROOF)
The clause should assign to the party claiming the benefit of force 
majeure the burden of showing that he falls within the clause. Typical 
examples of this can be as follows:
"A party is not liable for failure to perform any of his obligations in so far as he 
proves: . . ."; or
"The failing party will not be excused unless it is in a position to establish that: 
it is not in default at the time of the occurrence of an event of force majeure 
and has made all reasonable efforts to avoid . . .".
Most of the contracts studied did not lay down a duty to prove the 
existence of force majere, although this is not uncommon in general 
contractual practice.321 However, the rationale underlying this requirement is 
logical because the party seeking relief, in fact, claims the force majeure so as 
to benefit from its effects; thus, it seems fair that he should prove it. Moreover, 
this requirement in the clause also prevents the party from evading its 
obligations by causing a force majeure event. There are a number of cases in 
national courts establishing that the party claiming the benefit of a force 
majeure clause bears the burden of proof.322 However, an express provision to 
that effect in the general definition of force majeure seems to be unnecessary 
because it only repeats the general norm that the party who relies upon it 
must prove the existence of force majeure. Thus, if this requirement is not 
expressed in the clause it will probably be implied in any event.
319. John Kelly, op. cit., at 397.
320. Cited in Marvin O. Young, Construction and Enforcement of Long-Term Coal Supply 
Agreements - Coping with Conditions Arising from Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Events - Force 
Majeure and Gross Inequities, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, 1981, 127, at 160.
321. C f M. Fontain, Les Clauses des Force Majuere, op. cit., at 483-484; G.R. Delaume, Excuse for 
Non-performance and Force Majuere in Economic Development Agreements, op. cit. at 254.
322. For English cases see Brauer and Co. (Great Britain) Ltd. v. James Clark (Brush Materials) Ltd. 
[1952] 2 All E.R. 497, C.A.; Tradax Export S. A. v. Andre and Cie S. A. [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 416, 
C.A.; Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbh. v. Westzucker Gmbh (No. 2) [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 214; 
Tradax Export S. A. v. Cook Industries Inc. [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 358; Andre v. Tradax [1983] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 251, 254. For Amerincan cases see Bangor Peerless Slate Co. v. Bangor Vein Slate Co., 
270 Pa. 161, 113 A. 790 (1920); Logan v. Blaxton, 71 So. 2d 675 (1954).
(iii) USE THE CRITERIA OF "BEYOND CONTROL" AND "NON- 
FAULT" OF THE PARTY SEEKING RELIEF IN FORCE 
MAJEURE CLAUSE
The circumstances under which a party claims constitute force majeure 
must be beyond his control and not occasioned by his fault or negligence. 
This principle should be expressed in the definitional provision of force 
majeure. The test of "beyond control" has distinct value in commercial 
contracts as the test of responsibility. Roughly speaking, circumstances 
beyond control are those for which the party is not liable. It is clear that 
circumstances which can be controlled or manipulated by a party may never 
be considered as an excuse for non-performance. If a party caused an event 
or allowed it to occur, then to use its occurrence as a basis for excuse would 
amount to a gross violation of the good faith principle. This is, in effect, the 
principle of Roman law, "venire contra factum proprium".323 It is probably the 
most widely recognised characteristic of force majeure definitional 
provisions.324 However, the criterion introduces a cause and effect analysis 
into the force majeure clause, i.e., an event or a contingency must cause an 
effect which is beyond the party's control.
Although it may appear that the test of "beyond control" means 
circumstances not due to the fault of the party,325 in the present writer's view, 
"fault" is different from "beyond control". Fault in its broad sense means 
intentional and negligent acts;326 whereas "beyond control" is a standard 
applying irrespective of intention or negligence.327 For example, a strike may 
not be caused by the fault of the employer but nevertheless may be within the 
employer's control. References to "fault" without mentioning "beyond control" 
or references to "beyond control" without specifying "fault" are therefore 
misleading. If both are included in the clause, a more accurate picture of the 
circumstances in which force majeure arises is obtained. Therefore, from a 
drafting point of view, the occurrence of events should be beyond control, and 
arise without the fault of the promisor. This approach is a better way to
323. N. Horn, op. cit., at 135.
324 See G. R. Delaume, Excuse for Non-performance and Force Majeure in Ecocomic Development 
Agreement, op. cit., at 255. See also Force Majeure clauses contained in ICC, Publication No. 421, 
op. cit., and UNIDO, op. cit.
325. Affolter, Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 248.
326. See chapter three, pp. 128 etseq.
327. See W.W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, Edinburgh, 1987, at 353.
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regulate the parties' actions so as to prevent abuses of force majeure excuse. 
This test is also suggested by an American court:
"In order to use a force majeure clause as an excuse for non-performance the 
event alleged as an excuse must have been beyond the party's control and 
not due to any fault or negligence by the non-performing party. Furthermore, 
the non-performing party has the burden of proof as a duty to show what 
action was taken to perform the contract, regardless of the occurrence of the 
excuse."328
It has to be added that in order to emphasise that the word "fault" also 
covers "negligence", the latter should be expressly mentioned in the clause. 
As discussed before,329 in English law, for example, it is not yet clear that 
whether fault includes negligence in the context of frustration.
In addition, the party seeking relief under the clause must be in good 
faith. This requires that he has made reasonable efforts to avoid or overcome 
the supervening event and its impact, so as to resume performance as soon 
as it is possible to do so.330 Thus, according to the suggested definition, no 
party will be entitled to rely on an event of force majeure unless he can 
demonstrate three facts:
(i) that the occurrence of the event was beyond his control and not occasioned 
by his fault or negligence;
(ii) there were no reasonable steps which he could have taken to avoid or 
overcome the consequences of that event;
(iii) the occurrence of the event was unforeseen or unforeseeable.
In practice, most force majeure clauses impose an obligation upon the 
party claiming force majeure to take all reasonable alternative measures to 
continue performing the contract. For example, the UNIDO model form 
contract,331 provides that a party is obliged to take all reasonable steps to 
overcome the circumstances of force majeure to the degree possible to 
facilitate the execution of the contract. The duty to take reasonable steps to 
avoid or overcome the event of force majeure is of great importance in the 
context of long-term contracts; since the long period of time over which the 
contractual performance is to be rendered will usually permit almost any event 
of force majeure to be avoided or overcome before the time for the completion
328. Martin v. Department of Environment Resources, 548 A.2d 675, 678 (Commonwealth Ct. Pa.
1988).
329. See chapter three, pp. 136,137.
330. H. O. Hunter, Commentary on Pitfalls of Force Majeure Clauses, J. C. L. 1991, 214, at 216.
331. Op. cit., Art. 34. Cf. ICC, op. cit.
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of performance has expired.332 Another rationale underlying this rule is that if 
the party has the ability to prevent the occurrence of an event, this suggests 
that the event by itself did not actually prevent the performance and thus, the 
force majeure event was within the control of the party. Therefore, this rule 
provides a standard by which an event qualifies as "beyond control" or "within 
control".
However, an important point which a draftsman will need to address is 
to define the standard of performance required of a party in seeking to avoid 
or overcome the event. This, of course, involves determining what degree of 
impossibility or impracticability should excuse the party under a force majeure 
clause. Must the event be one which is completely insurmountable or is it 
sufficient that it must be extremely difficult or burdensome to overcome? This 
standard can vary substantially from contract to contract. In some contracts 
the standard is that performance must be prevented and materially affected by 
the force majeure. In others, it may be sufficient that force majeure renders 
the performance impracticable. At any rate, the draftsman should clarify the 
standard in the clause. In the present writer's view, the most appropriate 
standard is that the event renders performance impossible since, as argued 
before,333 this avoids confusion and uncertainty. The problem of hardship and 
other related matters should not be dealt with in a force majeure clause but in 
other clauses such as a hardship clause.
What should be the basis of reference in relation to "beyond control"? 
What should be the test to determine whether the force majeure event could 
have been avoided or overcome? Should the test be subjective or objective? 
Draftsmen are free to stipulate either an objective or subjective test or even 
refer to mixed criterion. On an objective test, reasonable behaviour and 
control is expected of the party. The parties are expected to act in the way 
that an ordinary and reasonable person would act under the circumstances to 
remove an obstacle which prevents the performance of the contract. On a 
subjective test, reasonable ability is not the criterion but the ability of the 
actual party to control such an event. Sometimes it will be difficult to discover 
the ability of the actual party, in which case, the reasonable control standard 
does ensure that the parties conform to an objective standard of competence 
in fulfilling their duties. Nevertheless, whatever test is chosen, it should be
332. Edmond M. Carney, The Nature and Extent of the Excuse Provided by a Force Majeure Event 
under a Coal Supply Agreement, East. Min. L. Rev. 1983,11-1, at 11-33.
333. Supra, 306-309.
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clearly expressed in the definitional provision of the clause. The present writer 
believes that the basis of reference should be the mixed criterion, viz., 
"subjective, objective test". "Actual control" should be the first reference in the 
clause, viz., the obligor must do all in his "actual" power to avoid or overcome 
the impediment. The clause should then provide that if from the surrounding 
circumstances it is not possible to discover whether "actual" diligence was 
exercised, reference should be made to the reasonable control test or "due 
diligence", which is used in Civilian systems.334
In summary, the definitional provision of force majeure must include, at 
least, the following elements in its definition:
- the criterion of beyond control;
- non-fault(including non-negligence) of the party seeking relief;
- duty to avoid or overcome the event; and
- the foresight test.
A typical example of such a definition is as follows:
"For the purpose of this agreement, a failure shall be regarded as caused by 
force majeure only if the party seeking relief proves that the event was 
actually unforeseen (or reasonably unforeseeable), outside the actual (or 
reasonable) control of the party failing and was not caused by that party's fault 
or negligence and that the party failing has taken all its actual (or reasonable) 
precautions or measures with the object of avoiding or overcoming the event 
and of carrying its obligations hereunder."
It should be noted that the parties should make completely clear what is
the basis of reference viz., subjective, objective or mixed. Moreover, the
wording of the definition can be modified as long as it contains the above
elements.
(iv) USE THE CRITERIA OF "CONCRETE-ABSTRACT 
FORESIGHT" IN FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE
The "foresight test" is another important and essential element which 
should be contained in the definitional provisions of force majeure. It is 
generally held that the party seeking relief can not claim the benefit of relying 
on force majeure with respect to an event the occurrence of which was 
foreseen at the time of contracting. Some writers335 believe that a foreseeable 
event should sometimes be regarded as force majeure and suggest that in
334 Objective standard which is often used in Civilian systems, is under the rubric of "due dilegence". 
See de Vries, Civil Law and Anglo-American Lawyer, 1976; Von Mehren, The Civil Law System, op. 
cit.
335. For example, see N. Horn, op. cit., at 134.
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interpreting a force majeure clause, too much emphasis should not be placed 
on the issue of foresight. It is the present writer's view that such an "anti 
foresight test" should not be preferred to the use of the foreseeability criterion. 
There is no good reason why there should not be a foresight test in the 
clause. The existence of the test in the clause gives more weight to the 
stability of contracts, removes future uncertainty and it is more consistent with 
the principle of freedom of the contract. Moreover, it is irrational to say that a 
party who has foreseen the contingency, has not assumed the risk of its 
occurrence. If the contingency is foreseen by the obligor, he can either refuse 
to contract or make provision for its occurrence in the contract. Otherwise, it 
should be inferred that he has consciously entered into such a contract and 
has assumed the risk. For example, in construction contracts in Britain, certain 
types of works are more difficult and more expensive to perform in December 
than in June. Although a British contractor is not expected to control the 
weather, he is expected to know the problems bad weather causes. If he 
enters a contract to work in December, the contractor's claim that the work is 
more difficult or more expensive should not be accepted., since the weather 
conditions at that time of year are foreseeable.
Most legal systems address the issue of excusable non-performance 
when there is an unforeseen or unforeseeable contingency.336 In interpreting a 
force majeure clause or other general clauses such as "acts of God" and 
"unavoidable delays or accidents", national courts often employ the foreseen 
or foreseeable criterion ,337 However, according to the principle of freedom of 
contract, the parties are at liberty to define force majeure in whatever manner 
they desire.338 The operation of force majeure due to the lack of a foresight 
test will not be affected, unless the clause otherwise provides.339 Parties may 
wish to negate the "foresight test" in the clause or stipulate that the clause 
may be relied upon by the party seeking relief notwithstanding that the 
contingency relied upon was foreseeable if not foreseen, viz., using subjective 
criterion. They may also use the objective instead of subjective criterion. 
However, whatever the intention of draftsman, it is clearly useful to indicate in 
the clause the test that is to be used.
336. See chapter three, pp. 105-128.
337. See for example Logan v. Blaxton, 71 So.2d 675 (1954).
338. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co. 768 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tex. App. 1989).
339. 6 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 1931 (Rev. ed. 1938); Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 457 (1932).
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Each criterion has its own effects since there exists a distinction 
between an event which is "foreseen" (subjective test) and an event which is 
"foreseeable" (objective test). An "unforeseen" event is one which was not 
actually contemplated by the party. An "unforeseeable" event is one which 
could not reasonably have been contemplated by a reasonable man. In the 
foreseeability test, the standard of the reasonable man is used which may 
penalise a party who fails to anticipate the foreseeable event. Although such a 
standard is often employed by the courts340 and the overwhelming majority of 
force majeure clauses use this criterion, the disadvantage of this test is that 
while a court may deem a contingency foreseeable, it does not mean that the 
parties actually contemplated it. The deficiency inherent in the test is its 
unrealistic overestimation of the foreknowledge of parties.
The objective foreseeability test raises a special problem in the context 
of strikes. According to the test, the occurrence of strikes will be rarely 
unforeseeable by the parties to contracts.341 Courts which use this test will 
always consider a strike to be foreseeable. For example, in Mishara case,342 
the court held that a labour strike was foreseeable so its occurrence could not 
constitute an event upon which an impracticability claim could be founded. 
Hindsight is another factor which decreases the value of the objective test.343 
There is a danger that once an event has occurred, it will appear in retrospect 
to have been reasonably foreseeable, although before its occurrence it was 
not actually contemplated by the parties. For example, in 1944 it was very 
easy in the United States to say that a reasonable man must have 
contemplated the war when he considered the matter in 1940. Nevertheless, 
in 1940 many did not actually think war would come.
Because of these problems, it is suggested that the "concrete abstract 
foresight test" should be used by parties when drafting force majeure clauses. 
According to this criterion, which is a combination of the subjective and 
objective standards, attention is primarily focused on whether the party 
seeking relief has actually foreseen the event. Where the party is actually able 
to foresee the occurrence of the event, he will not be entitled to excuse of 
performance even though the event may not have been foreseeable by a 
prudent party at the time of contracting. The fact that a particular risk was not
340. See chapter three, pp. 105-128.
341. See Note, Labor Strife and UCC Sec. 2-615: On Strike and You're out? op.cit., at 682.
342. Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mexed Concrete Corp., Mass. 122, 310 N.E.2d 363 (1974).
343. Cf. Stewart Macaulay, op. cit., at 835, 836; Hurst, Freedom of Contract,... op. cit., at 568.
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foreseeable by a reasonable man in and of itself is an insufficient justification 
to grant excuse when the event was actually foreseen by the party seeking 
relief. Conversely, a promisor should be granted excuse if he actually did not 
foresee the event even though it was foreseeable by a reasonable man. In 
determining what the parties actually foresee the following factors are relevant 
viz., the provisions of the contract, the specific facts involved, the bargaining 
power of the party, surrounding contingencies, the parties' negotiations before 
the conclusion of the contract, provisions in similar contracts which the party 
seeking relief has entered, the nature and source of the contingency and its 
remoteness to the subject matter. All are indicative of whether it was the type 
of a risk of which a party would generally be aware. If after considering these 
factors, the court can not determine whether the contingency was or was not 
foreseen by the obligor, only then should reference be made to the objective 
test.
(v) DEFINE AND ENUMERATE THE RELEVANT EVENTS OF 
FORCE MAJEURE AS COMPREHENSIVELY AS POSSIBLE
Apart from the definition of force majeure, the typical well-drafted 
clause should list as many types of events as the parties imagine or envisage 
as necessitating excuse of non-performance of the contract. Two points 
should be taken into account. The first is that the list should be illustrative and 
not exhaustive. If the list is exhaustive it means that events which are not 
enumerated in the list will not be considered as force majeure. The difficulty 
with exhaustive list is that it is not, and never will be, complete. Draftsmen are 
simply not capable of foreseeing and incorporating all categories of every 
contingency which may occur in future.344 To create such a list excludes by 
implication those force majeure events that are not listed in the clause.345 
However, in order to ensure that a list is merely illustrative, the clause should 
expressly stipulate that the list is not intended to be exclusive. The list will be 
open-ended if the following words or phrases are used: viz., "not limited to", 
"such as", "any such similar causes", "the enumeration is non-inclusive", 
"etc.". Examples of illustrative lists are as follows:
"A force majeure event within the above mentioned definition may result from 
events such as the following, this enumeration not being exhaustive: war, 
natural disasters, explosions . .."; or
344 See Norman Prance, Energy Contract Planning: Allocating the Risks and Consequences of 
Commercial Impracticability, 3 Hasting Int'l. L. Rev. 1980, 435, 445.
345. Field Container Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n., 712 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1983).
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. . for the purpose of this article, force majeure shall include but not limited 
to any events such as war, insurrection, civil commotion, strike, storm, tidal 
wave, flood, epidemic. . or
"The damages resulting from war, earthquake, civil commotion . . . efc."; or 
"Any failure or delay in the performance by either party . . .  to the extent that it 
is caused by the occurrences unforeseen . . . beyond the control of the party 
affected . . ., including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, acts 
of governmental authority, acts of authority, acts of God, strikes, fires, floods, 
explosions, war, . . .".
The second point is that the illustrative list should meet the criteria 
contained in the provisional definition of force majeure in the clause, 
otherwise, the definitional provision of force majeure and its list of events will 
fulfil different functions. Moreover, the parties will have to rely on varying 
judicial interpretations of the clause. But, as discussed before,346 a general 
definition supplemented by an illustrative list of exempting events which meet 
the criteria of the definition can give guidance to the judges and arbitrators to 
settle disputes under the intended scope of the general definition. In addition, 
this method ensures that the listed events will be treated as force majeure if 
they meet the criteria provided in the definition.347
The list should be drafted in the widest terms to cover as many events
as possible. The parties will have to plan for such contingencies in advance
and preference should be given to those events which are more likely to affect
the contract. Indeed, the parties should discriminate among the events,
selecting those events which reflect, for example, their trade circumstances,
and discard unrelated events. Thus, lists of events will be different in different
types of contracts. For example, specific events in international oil contracts
will differ in fundamental aspects from the list of events in international sale of
machinery. While in the former, specific contingencies would be events such
as explosions in oil refineries, blockages in oil pipelines, tanker collisions, oil
spills at sea etc.,348 in the latter, specific contingencies would include rust and
changes in the tensitility of the machinery sold. For example, in a contract for
the sale of steel, the list may contain the following clause:
"Natural and superficial rust due to atmospheric conditions shall not entitle the 
buyer to refuse payment or acceptance of the products . .  .".349
346 Supra, 298-301.
347 UNCITRAL, op. cit., at 236.
348. Leon E. Trackman, S. J. D. thesis, op. cit., at 370.
349. Cited in Leon E. Trackman, op. cit., at 407.
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In other words, the parties should list those events which are more 
related to their contract and are more likely to occur. The definitional provision 
in the clause may be supplemented by natural events or acts of God (such as 
violent storms, cyclones, avalanches, earthquakes, tidal waves, floods, 
lightning); or
man made ones (such as war, riots, revolutions, political disasters, hostilities, 
insurrection, strikes, acts of authority); or
other events such as explosion, fire, destruction of machines, changes in 
national and international financial, political or economic conditions, changes 
to currency exchange rates and exchange control regulations.
5.1.3. SUGGESTED DEFINITION AVOIDS THE APPLICATION 
OF THE MAXIM OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
It is common in force majeure clauses to list various events and then 
include a "wrap-up" or "catch-all" clause in such terms as "any cause beyond 
the control of the party seeking relief' or "any accident or incident of any 
nature beyond control". This feature of force majeure clauses leads to 
uncertainty and instability in contracts. Moreover, the parties actually do not 
know when the defence can be invoked, since the construction of the clause 
may be subject to ejusdem generis rule. This maxim is a rule of judicial 
interpretation, according to which where general terms are preceded by a list 
of specific events, the general words are not to be given their wide meaning 
but are to be considered as applying only to persons or things of the same 
general class or the same general type as those things which are specifically 
enumerated.350 There are a number of American cases where the maxim has 
been applied. In New York Coal Co. v. New Pittsburgh Coal Co.,351 for 
example, the force majeure clause in a coal lease provided that in cases of 
strikes, walkouts, fires, floods, and "any other cause beyond the control of the 
lessee" the clause would be operative. However, the roof in a portion of the 
mine could not be supported by any means and was so dangerous that the
35°. See e.g., Goldsmith v. United States, 42 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1930); Aleksich v. Industrial Accident 
Fund, 116 Mont. 69, 151 P.2d 10 (1944); Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264, 266-267 (10th Cir. 
1963); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 988 (5th Cir. 1976).
351. Ohio St. 140, 99 N.E. 198 (1912). See also Bennett v. Howard, 175 Ky. 797, 195 S.W. 117 
(1917); Standard Silk Dyeing Co. v. Roessler and Hasslacher Chemical Co. (D.C. 1917) 244 Fed. 250 
(A British order in council putting an embargo on goods shipped from Germany was not within the 
the meaning of the phrase, "causes beyond their control"); Elkhorn-Huzard Coal Co. v. Fairchild, 202 
Ky. 635, 260 S.W. 1115 (1924); Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v. Southern Fuel Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 
1329-30 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 99 (1987). See also Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnel 
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 988 (5th Cir. 1976).
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miners refused to work in that area. By applying ejusdem generis rule, the 
court held that the refusal of miners to work in that area for safety reasons did 
not constitute a strike and that the general language concerning causes 
beyond the lessee's control did not apply to a permanent situation such as the 
condition of the roof inasmuch as all the preceding events listed in the clause 
were temporary in nature.
Unlike the position in America, the predominance of authority in 
England is that a "wrap up" clause will not be construed in accordance with 
the ejusdem generis rule.352 For example, in Ambatielos v. Anton Jurgens 
Margarine Works,353 the House of Lords held that such a "wrap up" clause 
should not be construed ejusdem generis with the specific events enumerated 
earlier in the force majeure clause. However, in Sonat Offshore S.A. v. 
Amerada Hess Development Ltd., and Texaco (Britain) L td .354 the court 
reached a contrary decision. There it was held by the Court of Appeal that the 
general clause, "or other cause beyond the reasonable control of such party", 
was to be construed ejusdem generis, and not disjunctively, with the words in 
the catalogue, and therefore did not extend to breakage or failure of drilling 
equipment on an oil rig caused by the alleged negligence or wilful default of a 
party.
At an international level, this issue arose in a well-known case where 
the Ex-USSR ban on oil export led to the arbitration in Jordan Investment 
Ltd. and Sojusneftexport of 1985.355 In this case, refusal to grant export 
licences was not listed in the force majeure clause. Therefore, the buyer 
relying on the maxim of ejusdem generis, argued that the general principles of 
construction of contracts would apply. In rejecting the buyer's argument, the 
award stated that the refusal of licences by the Ministry was covered by the 
words "any other cause beyond the control of the non-performing party".
It is the present writer's contention that there are drafting solutions to 
this problem. In order to negate the ejusdem generis rule, the general 
provision should be added to the definitional provision of force majeure. This 
provides the solution as the general definition with its elements, precedes the 
specific enumeration of events. It might be argued that by so doing, the
352. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Westzucker GmbH (No. 2) [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 130, C.A.; 
Bremer v. Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Continental Grain Co., [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 269, at 283, 
Anker J.
353. [1923] A.C. 175.
354. 1 Lloyd's Rep. 145, 148.
355. This case will be disdcussed later. See infra, pp. 341-343.
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construction of the clause will fall under a variant of the maxim inclusio unius 
est exclusio alterius.356 The answer to this question is that the specific events 
are listed in an illustrative way and not by way of limitation.357 Thus, the use of 
such phrases as "including but not being limited to", "not limited to", "such as" 
and "the enumeration is non-inclusive"358 has the effect that the list of events 
is not exclusive. To include events which may give rise to disputes, the 
language of the clause should be of the utmost clarity. In this way, the clause 
being limited by rules of construction such as the ejusdem generis rule will be 
avoided.
5.1.4. POSSIBLE EXEMPTING EVENTS
There are a few events that may give rise to dispute and call for special 
attention when drafting the clause. These events may not be beyond control 
yet are treated as sufficient excuse for non-performance. From the outset, the 
parties should make it completely clear whether or not they wish these events 
to be regarded as force majeure.
(i) STRIKES:
Where there is a strike by the obligor's own employees, it may be 
difficult to determine whether he can rely on the strike as force majeure. 
Strikes may be within the control of the party asserting the defence, since he 
could meet the strikers' demand and some degree of performance may be 
possible if attempts are made to operate the enterprise during the strike.
Another problem arises in view of the ideological controversies which 
exist between the capitalist and socialist societies. In the latter, there may be 
ideological resistance to force majeure where the event consists of a strike or 
other industrial actions, because it is assumed that the term "industrial 
disputes" are not beyond control.359
Apart from socialist societies, the prevailing opinion today considers a 
strike to be an event of force majeure. It is expressly provided in the ICC 
suggested force majeure clause360 and is cautiously reflected in Article 34 of
356 The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another., or, the certain designation of one person is an 
absolute exclusion of all others (.Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325).
357 See also John H. Stroh, The Failure of the Doctrine of Impracticability, The Corporation L. Rev. 
1985, 195, at 226, note 100.
358. See pp. 312-316.
359. See Helsinki Discussions, op. cit., at 237.
360. Supra, at 277.
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the UNIDO model form turnkey contract.361 Domestic laws also consider 
strikes as having exempting effects provided that certain preconditions are 
met. In English law, where the industrial action is carried out by the employees 
of the party seeking relief, the courts may conclude that the contract is not 
frustrated on the basis of "self-induced frustration".362 However, the English 
courts have generally accepted that if the party claiming benefit of force 
majeure, has taken reasonable steps to avoid the strike, he may be able to 
rely on clause. In B. and S. Contracts and Design Ltd. v. Victor Green 
Publication,363 where a party to a join-venture agreement failed to establish 
that it had taken all reasonable steps to solve the dispute, the court did not 
permit the party to rely upon the force majeure.
In the case of a strike by a third party, and in the absence of an 
express contractual provision on the point, if the strike causes a radical 
change in the nature of the obligation,364 for example, by causing delay, the 
contract may be held to be frustrated.365
In the Civil law a strike is also treated as having exempting effect.366 In 
French law, a strike is an event of force majeure provided that it was 
unforeseeable as well as irresistible and not imputable to the obligor. In 
Bouvierv. E.D.F,,361 the court held that the strike was in fact irresistible, since 
it concerned all the employees and covered the whole territory of France; but 
it did not constitute force majeure because before the strike there was 
evidence of dissatisfaction amongst the employees and the negotiations had 
not been satisfactory, with the result that the strike was foreseeable by the 
employer.
These points should be taken into account when drafting the clause. 
When contracts are concluded between parties from socialist and non­
socialist countries, the party from non-socialist country should make it clear
361. ". . . any strikes, lock out or concreted acts of workmen (except where it is within the power of 
the party invoking the force majeure to prevent);.. .."
362. Budgett and Co. v. Binnington and Co. (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 320, affirmed [1891] 1 Q.B. 35 (C.A.). 
For the concept and analysis of self-induced frustration, see chapter three, pp. 132 et seq.
363. [1984] I.C.R. 419 (C.A.). See also Channel Island Ferries Ltd. v. Sealink U.K. Ltd. [1987] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 559, affirmed in [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 323 (C.A.).
364. See Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C. [1956] A.C. 696, at 729.
365. See Hickv. Raymond and Reid [1893] A.C. 22 (H.L.); The Nema [1982] A.C. 724.
366. P. Le Toumeau, La Responsibilite Civil, 1982, pp. 240-241, 248; Mazeaud, Responsibilite, 
(1970), at 710; Mazeaud, Lecons, (1985) at 637.
367. Trib. Gde Instance April 29th 1963, D. 1963. 673; Ste Anon. Musee Grevin v. E.D.F., (Civ. Com. 
Nov. 21st 1961 D. 1968. 279. C. Cass.).
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from the outset whether or not strikes are considered as force majeure. 
Secondly, a strike should be expressly included in the list of events. Moreover, 
the particular kinds of strikes which are intended should be specified viz., legal 
or illegal, wildcat or organised, industry wide or local, etc. The parties may 
choose to give exempting effect only to certain kinds of strikes, for example, 
strikes recognised by respective trade union. Thirdly, it could be argued that 
the existence of a strike in the clause will encourage employees to take 
industrial action if they believe that the potential termination of a contract is a 
pressure which they can put on their employer.368 The draftsman can counter 
this: he may restrict the possibility of termination to strikes by the employees 
of third party. He may provide that only those strikes that do not arise from 
labour relations between the party and his employees, for example, a strike 
which covers the whole country or sympathy strikes, are to be considered as 
having exempting effect.369 Finally, he may provide that settlement of strikes 
and other disputes is a matter wholly in the discretion of the party claiming the 
benefit of force majeure.310 In that case, there will be force majeure even 
though the strike can be settled by acceding to the demands of the strikers. 
Such a clause may be as follows:
". . . A strike or other labour disturbance shall be deemed to be beyond the 
control of the party whose performance is prevented by such strike or labour 
disturbance, and nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as requiring 
either party to accede to the demands of employees, whether or not 
represented by a union or other organisation, which such party considers 
contrary to its interests. Subject to the foregoing, a party claiming excuse by 
reason of force majeure shall exercise good faith efforts to remedy the cause 
thereof as soon as practicable under all the circumstances."371; or
"Party in removing or remedying such cause, shall not be required to settle 
strikes or lockouts or government claims by acceding to any demands when in 
the discretion of the party it would be inadvisable to accede to such 
demands."372
368. McBryde, op. cit., at 356.
369. UNCITRAL, op. cit., at 238.
370. M. E. Wright, Effects of Changed Circumstances on Mineral and Petroleum Sales Contracts, 
AMPLA Yearbook, 1984, 331, at 345.
371. Cited in O. Young, Construction and Enforcement of Long-Term Coal Supply Agreements - 
Coping with Conditions Arising from Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Events - Force Majeure and 
Gross Inequities Clauses, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, 1981,127, at 159.
372. Cited in Trackman, S.J.D. thesis, op. cit., at 400, note 63.
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Although leaving the resolution of strikes and other labour disputes to 
the sole discretion of the affected party is defended by some writers,373 in the 
present writer's opinion this should not be supported since a strike is an event 
which can be controlled and manipulated by the employer. Indeed, the 
employer could precipitate a strike in order to use its occurrence as a basis for 
a claim under force majeure clause and thus be excused performance of a 
contract which he found unsatisfactory. Thus, it is submitted that a strike by 
the party's employees should not be regarded as force majeure.
(ii) WAR:
War is another event which is listed in most force majeure clauses. It is 
sometimes difficult to determine when a war can be regarded as a force 
majeure. The word "war" has many potential meanings. For example, it may 
be claimed that there is a war, when there is no actual fighting on the ground, 
at sea or in the air. Such was the position for several years between Egypt 
and Israel until their final peace treaty in 1979.374 Moreover, there may be an 
actual war which does not affect the performance of a contract, for example, 
in the construction of industrial works,375 frequent air raids near the 
construction site may be very dangerous but may not actually prevent the 
performance of the contract.
The parties should therefore make it clear whether to allow excusable 
non-performance if there is any type of war, declared or undeclared, or 
whether only "declared war" should constitute a circumstance beyond control. 
Again the parties should make it clear whether the existence of war is to be 
decided as a matter of common sense or international law (formal 
declaration). They should therefore avoid using the word "war" without giving 
it an express meaning. For example, the following clause ". . . including but 
not limited to earthquake, flood, war, . . .", is open to criticism, because it is 
not clear whether it refers to declared or undeclared war. Nor is it clear 
whether it refers to actual war or whether it refers to a situation where the 
performance of contract is actually prevented. In Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki 
Kaisha v. Bantham Steamship Co. Ltd. (No.2),316 the charterparty provided
373. For example see John Kelly, op. cit., at 394; M. E. Wright, op. cit., at 345; Edmund M. Carney, 
The Nature and Extent of the Excuse Provided by a Force Majeure Event under a Coal Supply 
Agreement, Eastern Mineral Law Institute, 1983, 11-1, at 11-36.
374. See Brian Davenport, War Clauses in Time Charterparties (In Force Majeure and Frustration of 
Contract, Edited by McKendrick, op. cit.), at 135.
375. See UNCITRAL, op. cit., at 237.
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that: "Charterers and owners to have the liberty of cancelling the charterparty 
if war breaks out involving Japan." Relying on this clause, the owners 
cancelled the charterparty on the ground that such a war had broken out. The 
charterers did not accept the cancellation and claimed damages. The Court of 
Appeal rejected the argument that the word "war" had any technical meaning 
derived from international law.377 The matter was to be decided in a "common 
sense way". This case clearly illustrates that how the word "war" could be 
interpreted in different ways. While the charterer meant the word to mean an 
official declaration of war, the court regarded it to be construed in a "common 
sense way".
Having made clear what type of war is intended, the parties should also 
expressly provide in the clause whether the commencement of war is 
sufficient or whether hostile action which actually prevents the performance is 
intended. Otherwise, and in view of uncertainty that abounds in this area, the 
parties may encounter an unpredictable result.
(iii) ACTS OF A THIRD PARTY
Further difficulties arise where the failure of a party to perform his 
obligation under a contract has been caused by a third party, viz., supplier or 
subcontractor. The question arises whether, and to what extent, the party is 
exempt from the payment of damages for a failure caused by persons to 
whom he entrusts performance or with whose help he performs. For example, 
in a construction contract, it is common to engage subcontractors to perform 
some of the contractor's obligations under the contract.378 In international 
contracts, it is also common for a seller, for example, a trading house,379 to 
buy and sell commodities on the world market. The trading house will often 
buy the commodity from a third party and runs the risk that the third party will 
not supply the commodity with the result that the seller can not deliver the 
goods he had sold.
However, contractual clauses rarely deal with this problem and 
accordingly general legal rules of the proper law of the contract will be 
applicable. An exception is Article 79 of Vienna Convention which attempts to
376. [1939] 2 K.B. 544. See also Brian Davenport, op. cit., at 134-135.
377 For the meaning of war in public international law, see McNair and Watts, The Legal Effects of 
War, 4th ed. 1966.
378. See chapter XI, "Subcontracting" in UNCITRAL, op. cit.
379. See the example in pp. 304, 305.
334
deal with the difficulty.380 But, as we have seen, there are various opinions on 
how this Article should be interpreted. National laws rarely solve the problem. 
According to German law,381 for example, the obligor is prima facie liable for 
such persons. This means that his performance is excused if his supplier's 
performance is likewise excused under the force majeure provisions of the 
principal contract.382 However, the scope of this general rule may be restricted 
by provisions of law or judicial practice and doctrine, which charge the obligor 
in some kinds of contracts with the full risk of obtaining the subject matter of 
the contract.383 In these circumstances, the party is not released from his 
obligation to perform. For example, in a contract of sale, the trade house is 
obliged to seek alternative sources of supply or face the prospect of being in 
breach.384 If the force majeure clause does not expressly refer to this event in 
its list, the party concerned will remain liable. Accordingly, if relief is intended, 
the clause must expressly so provide. In the example of the trading house, it 
has been suggested385 that the seller can protect itself in one of two ways: It 
could provide in the clause that performance is to be suspended or terminated 
if it is unable for any reason to obtain the goods, or specifically identify the 
country of origin of the contract goods. An example of such clause is as 
follows:
". . .  including but not limited to defaults of suppliers or sub-contractors for any 
reason whatsoever, . .
Such a general provision in a force majeure clause is, however, open to 
subjective manipulation because circumstances will vary from case to case 
and the formula may not, therefore, produce a fair result in every case. The 
relation of the supplier or the sub-contractor to the two main parties or to one 
of them should be made explicit, for example, where the supplier has been 
named in the contract whether the goods can be obtained from other available 
sources. Again, it should be stated whether the supplier or sub-contractor has 
been appointed by the obligee or obligor. If the third party is appointed by the 
obligor, he will remain liable even though it was the third party who had 
defaulted, whatever the reason for the default. If the particular supplier or sub­
380 Supra, pp. 257, 258.
381. See Para. 278 of German Civil Code.
382. A. Wisniewski, Force Majeure Clauses in Polish Trade with the West, Yearbook on Socialist 
Legal Systems, 1987, 343, at 353.
383. See e.g., Para. 279 of German Civil Code.
384. Cartoon, op. cit., at 233; Yates, Drafting Force Majeure and Related Clauses, op. cit., at 204.
385. See Cartoon, op. cit., at 234; Yates, op. cit., at 205.
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contractor was imposed upon the seller by the buyer, then the seller could 
escape liability by arguing that non-performance was as a result of the buyer's 
action,386 provided the seller could establish that the buyer should have 
foreseen the possibility of the third party's failure which caused the seller's 
failure to perform.387
In drafting such a clause, attention should be also focused on whether 
there is a very specific product, whether any raw material concerned is 
commonly available, or whether a public utility such as a water or electricity 
supplier, which often has a monopoly, is involved.
Thus, in general, the failure of a supplier or a sub-contractor is not per 
se an extraordinary event, unless the failure by the third party whom the 
obligor has engaged to perform the whole or part of the contract, is also due 
to an extraordinary event. In other words, the party is only exempt from liability 
if its non-performance complies with the conditions described in the suggested 
definition of force majeure and the third party whom he has engaged would 
also be exempt under the suggested definition. Thus, the clause may be 
drafted as follows:
"If the party's failure to perform by a third person whom he has engaged to 
perform that obligation, the party is exempt. . . only if:
(a) with respect to the party, the criteria [suggested definition] set forth in 
paragraph (1) are satisfied and
(b) the third person would be exempted if the provisions of paragraph (1) 
[suggested definition] were applied to him."388
(iv) ACTS OF AUTHORITY
Another event which may give rise to dispute is acts of authority or acts 
of state. An act of authority refers to any unforeseeable hindrance arising from 
an act by a public authority exercising effective powers.389 These acts could 
take the form of restrictions on import, export, payment, exploiting natural 
resources, building, labour, etc.390 It is common in contracts to include acts of 
state or government among those events which constitute a defence to an 
action for breach of contract if these acts prevent performance. Refusal by a
386. Cf. Article 80 of the Vienna Convention, at pp. 261-262.
387 Barry Nicholas, The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law, op. cit., at 237.
388. Cited in UNCITRAL, op. cit., at 240. The phrase in square brackets relates to this writer's 
suggested definition. Cf. Para. 2 of Art. 79 of the CISG.
389. Council of Europe, op. cit., at 16.
390. See ICC, Publicaion No. 421, op. cit., at 14.
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government to grant official licenses which are necessary for the fulfilment of 
the contract, where, for example, export and import are prohibited, is one of 
governmental intervention.391
With respect to acts of authority in general and export and import 
prohibitions, in particular, the following important points should be taken into 
account:
It is advisable to make clear in the contract which party has responsibility for 
applying for such a licence, and in case of refusal or withdrawal of 
authorisation, which party will bear the risk.392 If the contract makes express 
provision, then no problem will arise. If there is no express provision the 
solution will differ according to the applicable law. Under English law, for 
example, the duty is imposed on the party who is in the best position to obtain 
the licence. In practice, this will usually be the seller,393 because he is familiar 
with the rules of export in his country.394 Sometimes, this duty falls upon the 
buyer,395 or, indeed on both parties (co-operation). In Kyprianou v. Cyprus 
Textiles Ltd.,396 although the responsibility for obtaining the licence rested 
with the seller, his inability to obtain the licence resulted from the buyer's 
failure to send him a certificate which was required by the authorities and 
without which the licence could not be obtained.
Secondly, the party responsible for obtaining authorisation would be 
well advised to ensure that the contract provides that performance is 
conditional upon the authorisation being obtained. If the contract expressly 
stipulates the nature of this duty, there will be little difficulty. For example, if 
the contract is made "subject to licence", then that party will only be required 
to use reasonable efforts or due diligence to obtain the licence. Indeed, as he 
does not warrant to obtain it, if he uses his best endeavours but nevertheless 
fails to get the licence, the contract is discharged.397 If the contract does not
391. See Basil Eckersley, International Sale of Goods - Licences and export prohibitions, L. M. C. Q. 
1975, 265.
392. ICC, Publication No. 421, op. cit., at 14.
393. See A.V Pound cms Co. Ltd. v. M.W. Hardy and Co. Inc., [1956] A.C. 588. According to the 
INCOTERMS, in the absence of contrary provision, the seller under a C.I.F. and F.O.B. sales 
contracts, has to bear the risk and the expense to obtain the authorisation necessary for the export of 
goods.
394 Basil Eckersley, op. cit., at 266.
395. See, e.g., H.O. Brandt and Co. v. H.N. Morris and Co. [1917] 2 K.B. 784. See also Benjamin's 
Sale of Goods, 1974, at 1479.
396. [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 60.
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provide that performance of the contract is conditional upon the necessary 
export licence being obtained, the obligor is clearly at risk if the licence is not 
granted. In these circumstances, his obligation is absolute. An example is 
Peter Cassidy Co. Ltd. v. Osuustukkukauppa I.L. Ltd.39* In this case, there 
was a provision in the contract which read: "delivery: prompt, as soon as 
export licence granted". Although the sellers used all due diligence to obtain 
an export licence, they failed in their application. Devlin J. held that as a 
matter of construction the seller had undertaken an absolute obligation that a 
licence would be granted. Thus, the sellers were liable to pay damages for 
failing to deliver under the contract.
Thirdly, the question of obtaining authorisation or a licence becomes 
more difficult where legislation is modified after the inception of the contract 
and a new regulation is introduced that prevents the acquisition of a 
necessary licence which the parties envisaged would be granted. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of quite special circumstances, it is generally 
considered that these events are not force majeure 399 This result may appear 
particularly unfair when the other party is an agency of the government 
responsible for issuing the licence. The parties have three alternatives to 
counter this situation.400
(I) They may agree that the contractor take absolute responsibility for 
obtaining necessary licence, allowing no excuses for failure. This solution is 
obviously unfair.
(II) They may divide responsibility or restrict the contractor's liability where 
authorisations or approvals can not be obtained. This solution appears to be 
much better than the first alternative, especially if a government or its agency 
is not involved in the contract.
(III) The third alternative is that the clause provides that any refusal by a 
government to grant an official licence will not be the responsibility of the 
contractor if he acted in good faith; the refusal of the licence will therefore be a 
force majeure event, justifying the contractor's excusable non-performance 
iand entitling the contractor to an extension of time or compensation. This 
solution is particularly desirable where the other party is an agency of the 
state.
391. See Brauer Co. v. Clarke [1952]2 All E.R. 497, 499, 500 (C.A.). See also Benjamin, op. cit., at 
1478; B. Eckersley, op. cit., at 266.
398. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 273.
3" . Karl-Heinz Bockstigel, op, cit., at 167.
400. See McNeil Stokes, Construction Contracts, 2d ed. New York, 1980, at 118.
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Sometimes the effect of governmental acts is merely to suspend or 
postpone the performance of the contract. Thus, it is desirable for parties to 
provide in the force majeure clause for the suspension rather than the 
termination of the contract. However, if the government prohibition extends 
beyond a stipulated time, then the clause should provide that the party has 
then the right to terminate the contract. This problem will be discussed in 
detail later.401
Finally, an important question is whether a state trading organisation 
can rely on the act of its own government as a force majeure defence. For 
example, a state trading organisation is subject to an act of its government 
that prevents or delays the performance. In this situation, delicate issues arise 
in the context of contracts between state trade organisations and foreign 
purchasers or sellers. The government agency may argue that the 
governmental act is a supervening illegality, but the other party may reject it 
on the basis of self-induced force majeure. This issue had been explored in 
number of cases. The cases are: C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Centrala Handlu 
Zagranieznego (Rolimpex case) and Jordan Investments Ltd. v. 
Soiuznefexport (Jordan Investment case).
(a) THE ROLIMPEX CASE402
In this case, a Polish exporting monopoly for sugar (Rolimpex) 
contracted to sell 200,000 tons of sugar to an English company. The contracts 
were subject to the rules of the London Refined Sugar Association (R.S.A.). 
These rules provided that performance of the contracts was subject to force 
majeure as defined by rules 18(a)403 and 21.404 Because of heavy rain and
401. Infra, pp. 344-348.
402. [1979] A.C. 351; [1978] 3 W.L.R. 274 (House of Lords).
403. The rule contained the following provisions:
"Should the delivery in whole or in part within the delivery time specified be prevented or delayed 
directly or indirectly by Government intervention, ie in the shipping port, . . . war, strikes, rebellion, 
insurrection, political or labour disturbances, civil commotion, fire, stress of weather, Act of God, or 
any cause of force ma/e«re(whether or not of like kind to those before mentioned) beyond the seller's 
control, the seller shall immediately advise the buyer (by cable or teleprinter if  abroad) of such facts 
and of the quantity so affected . . . .  [T]he buyer shall have the option of cancelling the contract for 
the affected quantity . . . .  Should the buyer elect not to cancel the contract but the delivery of the 
sugar in whole or in part still remains impossible 60 days after the last delivery date provided for by 
the contract, the contract shall be void for such quantity without penalty payable or receivable."
404 The rule contained the following provisions:
"The buyer shall be responsible for obtaining any necessary export licence. The failure to obtain such 
licence/s shall not be sufficient grounds for a claim of force majeure if  the regulations in force at the 
time when the contract was made, called for such licence/s to be obtained."
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flooding, the harvest of sugar proved insufficient to meet both domestic and 
export requirements. The Polish government imposed an immediate ban on 
the export of sugar and cancelled all export licences. In arbitral proceedings, 
the English buyer claimed damages against Rolimpex for non-delivery. 
Rolimpex, relying on the clause, argued that it was excused performance by 
reason of government intervention outside its control. The tribunal held for 
Rolimpex on the basis that Rolimpex was an entity independent of the 
government and there has been no collusion between Rolimpex and the 
government. The award was upheld by the House of Lords.
The critical issue was whether Rolimpex was consulted or controlled in 
the conduct of its business by the Polish government and whether the 
enterprise had played any part in creating the turmoil that led to its failure to 
perform. The decision raised considerable concern in international business 
community.405
The view of House of Lords was that Rolimpex could not, on the 
evidence, be regarded as an organ of the Polish state and was not controlled 
by the government. The delivery of the sugar in pursuance of the contracts 
was therefore prevented by the intervention of the government. Those Law 
Lords who dismissed the appeal,406 accepted that the action taken by the 
government was beyond the respondent's control. Moreover, the directors 
employed in Rolimpex did not induce the Council of Ministers to authorise the 
ban and did not influence its continuance or effect. They also opposed the 
government decree prohibiting exports. Thus, there was no collusion or 
conspiracy between Rolimpex and the Polish government. The House also 
found that the government was not using its powers with the intention of 
affecting this specific contract and had acted from general considerations. 
Their Lordships accepted the argument that the state trading enterprise and 
the government were separate entities and there was therefore force majeure 
as defined in rule 18(a) of RSA. Lord Wilberforce added407 that the word 
"obtain" in rule 21 of RSA, meant "get" and did not give rise to any obligation 
or warranty that once the licence was obtained it would remain in force. Thus 
rule 21 did not operate as a saving clause for the appellant and did not take 
the case out of rule 18.
405. M. Fontain, Les Clauses de force Majeure dans les Contrats Intemationaux, op. cit., at 502.
406 Czarnikow Ltd. v. Rolimpex [1979] A.C. 351 (Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhome, Lord Fraser 
of Tullybelton and Lord Keith of Kinkel) (Lord Salmon dissenting).
407 [1979] A.C. 351, at 364.
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The view of the House of Lords with regard to the issues of "control" and 
"separateness" may be correct where a capitalist society is involved. In a 
capitalist economy, exports are in commercial hands rather than state 
controlled ones. But in socialist economies, there is no genuine separate legal 
personality between the state and a state agency such as Rolimpex. While 
independence from the state is equally true of the export departments of most 
large corporations in the West,408 this is not the case where exports are 
controlled by government through state trading enterprises for the purpose of 
implementing the country's economic plan. Lasok409 forcefully argues that the 
House of Lords failed to grasp a basic understanding of how a socialist 
economy works. All economic activities were owned by the Polish government 
and, in accordance with Polish constitution, these activities were removed 
from the hands of private individuals.410 Lasok concludes that the apparent 
separate legal personality of Rolimpex was no more than an administrative 
convenience and did not actually represent an organisation whose economic 
interests were independent of the government, such as exist in Western 
countries.411
The case is therefore unsatisfactory on two grounds: First, on the 
interpretation of the export licence obligations provided in rule 21 of RSA, it is 
the present writer's view that under rule 21 the seller has accepted an 
absolute obligation to obtain a licence. The defence of force majeure can not 
ordinarily be invoked by a party that has disabled itself from performance. 
Secondly, the House of Lords was wrong in finding that Rolimpex was 
independent from the Polish government. As Lasok has explained, the so- 
called independence of Rolimpex to decide whether or not it should implement 
the contract with Czanikow did not, in reality exist. Accordingly, it is submitted 
that the act of the Polish government amounted to self-induced force majere 
and the plaintiff should have been entitled to damages for breach.
The case again illustrates the importance of a properly drafted force 
majeure clause. If the clause in question had been better drafted the buyer 
might, indeed, have won the case. Traders should be very careful when 
contracting with state trading enterprises. For if the words "government
408. J. Becker, The Rolimpex Exit from International Contract Resposibility, 10 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics, 1978, 447, at 455.
409. K. Lasok, Government Intervention and State Trading, 44 Mod. L. Rev. 1981, 249.
410. Loc. cit., at 254.
4n .Loc. cit., at 257.
341
intervention" are used in the clause, the rule in Rolimpex, in spite of its critics, 
will probably apply.
Another solution is that the parties to contracts with governments or 
governmental agencies, should use stabilisation clauses.412 Under such a 
clause, the government undertakes not to change its legislation in a manner 
adversely affecting the performance of the contract.413 However, it is not 
completely clear to what extent a government may undertake an obligation 
which limits sovereign powers.414 Such a clause may still leave room for a 
government to declare an emergency situation that could excuse non­
performance, but it seems that it does not permit excusable non-performance 
where there is a mere prohibition on exports.415 Detailed analysis of 
stabilisation clauses is beyond the scope of the current thesis.
(b) JORDAN INVESTMENTS CASE
The second case is the arbitration Jordan Investments Ltd. and 
Sojusneftexport of 1958.416 By an agreement made on July 17, 1956, the Ex- 
Soviet corporation undertook to deliver a quantity of fuel oil to Jordan 
Investments Ltd. The contract contained a clause417 exempting the parties 
from performance in case of force majeure. In pursuance of the contract, the 
seller applied to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade for an export licence on 
August 4, 1956, i.e., a few days after the outbreak of Israeli-Egyptian conflict 
which led to the Suez crisis. On November 5, 1956, the Ministry advised the 
seller that export licences would not be granted and that the performance of
412 N. Horn, op. cit., at 135.
413. See Delaume, Transnational Contracts, vol. 1, part 1 ch. v (1980), at 25; Walde, Negotiating for 
Dispute Settlement in Transnational Mineral Contracts, 7 Denver J. Int'l. Law and Policy, pp. 33-75.
414 N. Horn, op. cit., at 128.
415. Loc. cit., at 135.
416. For the facts and analysis of the case, see David M. Sasson, The Soviet -Israel Oil Arbitration, J. 
Bus. L. 1959, 132; Harold J. Berman, Force Majeure and the Denial of an Export Licence under 
Soviet Law: A Comment on Jordan Investment Ltd. v. Soiuznefteksport, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1960, 1128; 
Martin Domke, The Israel-Soviet Oil Arbitration, 53 Am. J. Int'l. L. 787.
417. The clause (clause 7) had provided that:
"Force majeure. Neither of the parties shall be liable for any damage or non-compliance with the 
terms of this contract or any part of these terms, if  this damage or non-compliance is due to one or 
more of the following events preventing one or the other party from performing his duties under the 
contract in whole or in part: natural disasters, fire, flood, warlike, acts of any kind, blockades, strikes 
on the vessel carrying goods under this contract, acts or demands of the Government or other 
authoritative agency of the country under whose flag the chartered tanker belongs (but excluding the 
Government and authoritative agencies of the state of Israel), and any other cause of whatever nature 
beyond the control of the non-performing party."
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the contract was prohibited. Thereupon, the seller informed the buyer that the 
contract was cancelled on the ground that the denial of a licence constituted 
force majeure under clause 7. In the arbitration proceedings before the 
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in Moscow, the buyers submitted that 
the seller had undertaken an absolute obligation to obtain an export licence 
and the clause had not included any terms excusing the defendant's 
performance. The buyers argued that since the refusal of an export licence 
was not mentioned in clause 7, it could not be invoked by the seller as an 
excuse for non-performance. It was also contended that the Ministry's 
prohibition could not affect the question of liability vis-a-vis the buyers, since 
both the Ministry and the sellers were one at the same time, i.e., organs of the 
Russian state. Denial of an export licence may constitute force majeure in a 
capitalist economy, where government is distinct from commercial firms, but 
not in a socialist economy where all trading enterprises are controlled by the 
government.418 The buyer stated that the seller, contrary to the requirement of 
Article 18, did nothing to overcome the obstacles created by the Ministry. The 
buyer's arguments did not succeed. In the opinion of the Arbitration 
Commission, the denial of a licence, though not specifically listed in the 
clause, was nevertheless covered by the "catch-all" provision at the end of the 
clause.
Apart from the question whether or not the above cases are decided 
correctly, the most important point to be gleaned is that the parties should 
draft the force majeure clause with as much clearly as possible.
5.1.5. PRE-EXISTING CAUSE
Can a force majeure clause excuse performance even although the 
event relied upon existed prior to performance of the contract? In Trade and 
Transport Inc. v. linco Kauin Kaisha Ltd. (The Angelia),419 Kerr J. held that 
a party would not be excused by relying on an event or cause which was 
already in existence at the time of contracting where: (a) the pre-existing 
cause would inevitably operate on the adventure; and (b) the existence of 
facts which constitute the excepted cause are known to the parties at the time 
of the contract, or at least, to the party who seeks to rely on the exception. In 
so holding, the court extended the criterion which had earlier been advanced
418. See Harold J. Berman, op. cit., at 1136; Nicholas Sokolow, La Force Majeure dans les Contrats 
entre Societe Occidentales et Centrales Commercials Sovietiques, International Trade Law and 
Practice, 1978, 323, 327-328.
419. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 210; 2 All E.R. 144.
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in Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. Ministry of Agricuiture, Fisheries and
Foods420 by adding that the pre-existing cause can not be relied upon "if the 
existence of such facts should reasonably have been known to the party 
seeking to rely upon them and would have been expected by other party to 
the contract to be so known."421 Although the House of Lords in Poineer 
Shipping Ltd. v. BTP Tioxide Ltd. (The Nema)422 subsequently doubted the 
result in The Angelia 423 their Lordships did so by relying upon other grounds, 
and did not question the correctness of the principle explained by Kerr J.
However, if the parties wish to be entitled to rely upon a pre-existing 
cause of force majeure, the draftsman should take steps to ensure that the 
clause so entitles the parties.424
5.2. CONTENTS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FORCE 
MAJEURE CLAUSE
5.2.1. PROVIDE CERTAIN AND PROPER CONSEQUENCES
The provisions of the clause should clearly indicate what is to be the 
effect on the contract of a force majeure event. The draftsman should give 
careful attention to the consequences of force majeure. A number of major 
factors should be taken into account when drafting the clause. Otherwise, the 
clause may be defective, with the result that the issues will be governed by the 
applicable law. The absence of precise directions by the parties may therefore 
lead to the termination of the contract under the proper law which is not 
always a desirable solution in many commercial transactions. In practice, 
many force majere clauses are not drafted comprehensively and are defective 
in that they merely excuse performance on the occurrence of events 
amounting to force majeure. However, the circumstances may differ, they may 
be temporary or uncertain, lengthy or permanent. Moreover, the nature of the 
contract also plays an important role with regard to the consequences of force 
majeure. An acceptable clause should serve, at least, the following purposes:
420. [1962] 1 Q.B. 42.
421. [1973] 1W.L.R. 220, at 227.
422 [1981] 2 A11E.R. 1030.
423. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 210; 2 A11E.R. 144.
424 See John Kelly, op. cit., at 393.
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The fundamental purpose of force majeure is to excuse the party relying upon 
the force majeure event what would otherwise constitute a breach of contract. 
Such performance may be excused partially, totally, temporarily or 
permanently. This is accomplished by using phrases such as "Neither party 
hereto shall be liable for any non-performance . . ."in the definitional provision 
of the clause. This will relieve the party not only from damages but also from 
penalties and other contractual sanctions. Secondly, the clause should also 
clearly provide whether the contract is terminated, suspended or can be 
modified. The draftsman should ask himself the question, "If force majeure 
circumstances arises should the contract be suspended or cancelled or 
modified". He should take into account the two categories of intervening 
events of force majeure; those which have the effect of putting an end to the 
contract and those which have the effect of merely suspending the 
performance. Moreover, he should also consider the nature of the contract 
concerned, because different contracts demand different consequences.425 If 
suspension is the desirable alternative, then the draftsman should stipulate 
how long it will be suspended.
(i) TERMINATION OR SURVIVAL OF THE CONTRACT?
This is a very important question which should be clearly addressed in 
the clause. The nature of the events and the nature of the contract concerned 
will be crucial factors in determining whether force majeure should have the 
effect of suspension or termination. In short, the draftsman should use 
suspension, termination, or integrated suspension-termination procedures in 
accordance with what is most appropriate in the context of the particular 
contract concerned.
(ii) SUSPENSION OF PERFORMANCE OBLIGATIONS
Commercial transactions may be affected by delays as a result of force 
majeure events. For example, production facilities may suffer temporary 
breakdown or the performance of the contract may be impeded by 
government restrictions, inspections, licensing controls, etc. In such cases, the 
performance of the contract is temporarily impaired: thus, obligations can not 
be performed by the date specified in the contract. To illustrate the point, 
suppose a temporary sugar embargo makes it impossible for the seller to 
perform his obligation, but after the embargo is lifted, delivery again becomes 
possible. Does the buyer have the right to terminate the contract completely
425. Supra, 301-304.
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when the performance can not be made at the time specified in the contract, 
or is he required to accept performance at a later time? With regard to the 
seller, is he required to perform at the earliest possible date or is his obligation 
to deliver terminated completely by the embargo? In the absence of express 
stipulations in the contract, a court will probably take the view that the contract 
is terminated upon the happening of the force majeure event, on the basis that 
the parties did not agree to be bound in the event of such an occurrence. 
Moreover, as we know, the English doctrine of frustration suffers from a high 
degree of remedial rigidity and, in a temporary interruption in supply, 
performance of the contract may be terminated immediately.426
The parties have two choices open to them to regulate delays in 
performance. They may suspend it on a temporary basis or they may 
terminate the contract. It is desirable that the contract should be made as 
flexible as is possible. Increased use should be made of contractual devices 
such as suspension which are intended to restore rather than terminate 
performance, when performance is only temporary affected by a force 
majeure event. Suspension of the contract seems a better solution, since 
performance will be resumed when the supervening event or its impact has 
abated. A suitably drafted force majeure clause can provide the contracting 
parties considerable remedial flexibility.
For example, in a temporary interruption in supply where the parties do 
not want the contract to be terminated immediately, a clause can give the 
party affected by force majeure clause a long period in which to perform his 
obligations. The parties, have usually a strong interest that performance 
should continue. Suspension of contract is based upon the business interests 
and upon the needs of parties. In long-term contracts such as natural 
resources agreement, the device of suspension in the clause ensures the 
continuity of performance by suspending the contract if there is a supervening 
event. This device ensures the survival of the agreement between the parties 
in the future. The seller can not rely upon delay caused by force majeure so 
as to terminate the contract and, in turn, the buyer can not reject the seller's 
performance when the contract is performed upon the abatement of the force 
majeure event. Through a properly drafted clause, both parties are prohibited 
from avoiding their obligations on the ground of delay where the delay gives 
rise to tolerable, rather than intolerable, harm. Moreover, relations between
426. See Ewan McKendrick, Force Majeure Clause: An Explanation, 4 Law for Business, 1992, 59, at 
61.
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the parties in long-term agreements, such as natural resources agreements, 
will not be curtailed prematurely.427
Contracts calling for performance over a period of time should therefore 
provide that if force majeure occurs, its immediate consequence will be 
suspension rather that termination of performance of the contract. Such is the 
case, in contracts for the export and erection of machinery, turnkey contracts 
and long-term supply contracts.428 For example, in the engineering trade, a 
considerable period of time elapses between the date when the contract is 
concluded and the end of the period when performance should have been 
completed. In this kind of situation, a far more flexible solution is required than 
termination of performance. To give another example, a party is obliged to 
build a hotel. Before the aluminium panels needed for the construction have 
been imported into the country, the government lays a temporary embargo on 
the entry of aluminium in any form. In that case, the better solution is 
suspension rather termination. Termination not only puts an end to the 
contract but will usually harm the parties' business relationship. A properly 
drafted clause should, however, provide that if the force majeure event 
continues beyond a certain time, either party will have the right to terminate 
the contract.429
It is the present writer's contention that performance should be allowed 
to continue in situations where it remains possible, and accordingly would 
encourage and propagate the use of suspension force majeure clauses in 
long-term contracts. In drafting construction contracts, natural resources 
agreements or turnkey contracts, etc., which are long-term contracts, the 
parties should favour continuity rather than termination. While this is contrary 
to the approach in the Vienna Convention430 and several national legal 
systems,431 it protects the defaulting party from rescission or termination of the 
contract by the other party.432 Therefore, the old fashioned force majere 
clause which only allows for the termination of the contract, should be 
abandoned by lawyers who draft long-term contracts.
427 For the advantages of suspension provision in international oil sales, see Leon E. Trackman, 
S.J.D. thesis, op. cit., at 212 etseq.
428. George R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts, (issued 1988), op. cit., at 22,23.
429. See Nevill Maryan Green, op. cit., at 506.
430. Supra, pp. 245 et seq.
431. See generally chapter four, pp. 141 etseq.
432. Cf ICC, Publication No. 421, op. cit., and UNIDO, op. cit.
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The provision allowing suspension has to be drafted with extreme care, 
to avoid possible abuse by either of the parties. Clear and precise standards 
for suspension, as well as the circumstances under which performance is to 
be suspended, should be prescribed by the parties. The suggested definitional 
provision433 should be used in the force majeure clause. This definition makes 
it clear under what conditions performance will be suspended. It will prevent 
any disagreement and disputes as to whether or not a particular set of 
circumstances qualify for suspension.
The value of a suspension provision will in practice depend upon the 
way it is formulated in the clause. The parties should make clear how long the 
suspension is to operate. They should also stipulate what effect the 
suspension will have upon their obligations. However, particular caution is 
needed in considering each of these issues. It is not sufficient merely to 
provide for suspension: attention should also be given to what is to happen on 
the expiry of the period, if the supervening event still subsists.434 This will 
obviously depend upon the facts, the nature of the contract, the needs, and 
commercial judgment of the parties at the time of contracting and finally upon 
the parties' respective performance. The parties can agree to provide for a 
further extension of time or for the automatic cancellation of the contract. The 
deficiency in this approach is that the possibility of a number of extensions 
may give rise to uncertainty and delay.435 Accordingly, they may provide a 
time limit for suspension of contractual obligations, after which either party or 
one party has the right to terminate the contract so as to limit their losses.436 
The parties may agree that the time for performance is prolonged for a 
reasonable period. The criterion of reasonableness may be taken into 
account, not only with regard to the defaulting party's ability to resume 
performance, but also the interests of the other party to continue with the 
contract in spite of late performance.437 It is obvious that the party is obliged to 
minimise losses or resume performance as quickly as possible.438
The parties may agree on additional rights and duties. For example, in 
a contract of sale the parties may agree that during the period of suspension 
or the period when there is a reduction in the quantity of material delivered,
433. Supra, 315-316.
434 See Ewan McKendrick, Force Majeure Clause: An Explanation, op. cit., at 61.
435. Loc. cit.
436. See Green, op. cit., at 506.
437 ICC, Publication No. 421, op. cit., at 16.
438. Cf. force majuere provided in Article 34 of UNIDO.
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the buyer will be free to purchase material from alternative sources to remedy 
the disruption or augment the shortfall.439 However, in this case, the buyer 
should be careful to provide in the contract that he need not accept delivery of 
material, the supply of which was suspended by the supervening event. The 
parties may also agree that the seller be required to make up any shortfall of 
delivery during a specified period after suspension has ended or, alternatively, 
to the extent that the seller is able to do so within its normal delivery schedule. 
Moreover, attention should be given to the question whether such shortfall 
quantities are to be supplied at the price at the time of actual delivery or at the 
time when deliveries should have been made, if they had not been 
suspended.440
Where an event is of short duration or limited in its impact so that little 
hardship results, it would not be appropriate to provide the right of 
suspension. It is submitted that to do so would be contrary to the spirit of 
cooperation which characterises the relations of the parties. Thus, the parties 
should agree to restrict suspension or extension of contractual time limits, to 
situations in which performance is made impossible for stipulated minimum 
periods.441
(iii) TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT
Termination of the contract will sometimes be the desirable remedy. 
The basis upon which termination can be sought will vary. For example, 
termination is available when a force majeure event which has been deemed 
temporary, lasts for more than a specified period. Termination of the contract 
may also be sought immediately when performance is definitely frustrated" 
i.e., is absolutely or permanently "impossible". For example, in mineral and 
petroleum sales contracts, permanent, total force majeure should result in 
termination of the contract in which case there will be no obligation to make up 
supply. In this example, termination of contract is contingent upon 
impossibility. In international contracts between parties associated for the 
purpose of executing a specific project,442 a unique specialised member of the 
group may be prevented by force majeure from further participation in the
439. See Trackman, op. cit., at 294-296 who discusses this issue in international oil sales.
440. John Kelly, op. cit., at 398.
441. Delaume, Excuse of Non-Performance and Force Majeure in Economic Development 
Agreements, op. cit., at 256, 257.
442. See United Nations (E.C.E.), Guide for Drawing up International Contrats between Parties 
Associated for the Purpose of Executing a Specific Project, op. cit., at 91, Sec. 76.
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work. Consequently, the continuation of the performance of the contract with 
the client becomes impossible., since the unique specialisation of the member 
affected by force majeure makes a replacement impossible. This is a situation 
in which the early termination of the contract is inevitable.
Sometimes termination is preferable even though suspension of 
contract is available. For example, a seller may be unable to perform for an 
extensive period of time and his expected performance is too far in the future 
to warrant suspension or where the conditions existing after the delay 
fundamentally diverge from the circumstances existing before the delay. In 
these situations, where the costs exceed the benefits of awaiting 
performance, suspension of performance is not desirable. In other words, the 
convenience associated with terminating performance outweighs the 
convenience of performing at a later time.443 This is the position taken by the 
Restatement of Contract (First)444 under which temporary impossibility merely 
suspends the promisor's duty of performance unless the delay would impose 
a burden on the promisor substantially greater than would have been imposed 
on him had there been termination.
The nature of the contract, is also a factor which plays a significant role 
with regard to the effect of force majeure leading to termination of the 
contract. In certain contracts, such as those which presuppose rapidly 
concluded performance and those which are more or less speculative, such 
as contracts for sale of commodities, the usual consequence of the clause 
should be the termination of the contract445 to prevent a party from taking 
advantage of the circumstances for personal gain. This restrictive approach 
precludes the possibility of manoeuvre by the interested party. Thus the 
provisions of GAFTA446 under which extension is automatically granted is 
open to criticism, although the relevant clause is in favour of the seller only, it
443. See Trackman, op. cit., at 212, 213.
444 Sec. 462. See also Restatement of Contrats (Second), Sec. 269. However, the American cases are 
divided on this point, e.g., compare United States Trading Corp. v. New mark Grain Co., 56 Cal.App. 
176, 205 P. 29 (Dist. Ct. App. 1922) & Nordman v. Royner, 33 T.L.R. 87 (K.B. 1916) (No discharge 
for temporary impossibility) With Wasserman theatrical Enterprise v. Harris 137 Conn. 371, 77 A.2d 
329 (1950) and Citizens Home Ins. Co. v. Glisson, 191 Va. 582, 61 S.E.2d 859 (1959) (Promisor 
excused for temporary impossibility).
445. See supra, at 267.
446. Clause 23 provides:" .. .  If  shipment be delayed for more than one calendar month, Buyers shall 
have the option of cancelling the delayed portion of the contract, such option to be exercised by 
Buyers giving notice to be received by sellers not later than the first business day after the additional 
Calendar month. If  Buyers do not exercise this option, such delayed portion shall be automatically 
extended for a further period of one month. If  shipment under this clause be prevented during the 
further one month's extension, the contract shall be considered void..." .
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gives the buyer certain advantages as well. For example, the buyer has the 
option to cancel the contract if the interrupting circumstances still prevail at the 
end of the period of suspension. The point is that he can watch the market 
and exercise the option to cancel if the market goes against him. If the market 
rises, he can decide not to cancel, in which event the period of shipment is 
automatically extended. On the other hand, if the market falls, he can cancel 
the contract and obtain the goods a lower price elsewhere. If he has entered 
into a contract to resell, his margin of profit will be greater.447
No doubt, the draftsmen will take these factors into account when 
drafting the consequences of force majeure.
(iv) SUBSTITUTE PERFORMANCE
If it is the intention of the parties that in the event of force majeure a 
substitute performance is expected, then it is essential that the parties state 
this clearly in the clause. For example, in a contract of sale, the seller should 
ensure that in the event of force majeure he is not obliged to supply from 
another source to perform the contract. In a coal supply agreement, the seller 
can make the following provision:
"If seller is excused from supplying coal from the mine or mines designated in 
this agreement as the source of coal . . . seller shall not be required to 
substitute coal from any other source . .  .".448
However, if the contract identifies the source from which the commodity is to 
be supplied, then it is unnecessary that the clause should state that the seller 
is not required to substitute the commodity from another mine. The nominated 
source may be the only source owned by the seller.449 It should be noted that 
if, for example, the contract confers on the seller the right to supply coal from 
a mine other than that provided in the agreement, the draftsman should 
ensure that such a right is not interpreted as an obligation to do so upon the 
occurrence of supervening event at the mine designated in the agreement.450
(v) PARTIAL EXCUSABLE NON-PERFORMANCE AND 
ALLOCATION OF SUPPLIES
If due to a force majeure event, the promisor can give part 
performance, should he do so? For example, in an oil contract, the event may
447. See Cartoon, op. cit., at 35.
448. Cited in Marvin O. Young, op. cit., at 161.
449. See John Kelly, op. cit., at 394-395.
450. Loc. cit.
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prevent the contractor from delivering all or only some of the supply. A well- 
drafted clause should deal with this problem451 and its consequences. A 
comprehensive clause not only should take proper account of those causes 
which are permanent and totally prevent performance, but should also take 
proper account of causes which, while permanent, only prevent part 
performance of the contract. In such cases, the clause may operate to excuse 
partial performance for remainder of the contract. Thus partial excusable non­
performance may not necessarily terminate the parties' relationship in toto. 
Whatever the intentions of the parties, it should be expressed clearly in the 
clause. If they intend that under certain circumstances and under certain 
specific instances of force majeure that total performance is not expected, 
then the clause should be drafted with clarity and cogency. Conversely, if full 
performance is expected, the clause should say so.
A seller may have sufficient product to satisfy one individual buyer but 
not enough to satisfy his contractual obligations to other buyers.452 The 
causes of shortage in the production and supply of commodities may range 
from physical factors to administrative regulations. A breakdown in production 
or transmission facilities, unfavourable weather conditions leading to the 
damage or loss of cargoes at sea, and new conservation regulations which 
require producers to cut back on production are illustrative of events which 
could lead to this situation. Disruptions in supply should not necessarily 
terminate the contact. In such circumstances, an adjustment in performance 
through the device of shortage provisions in the contract may be a better 
solution than terminating the contracts. Such a provision in the force majeure 
clause enables the seller to reduce supplies to the buyers if there is a 
curtailment in production caused by a supervening event.
If the clause does not deal expressly with this problem, the proper law 
of the contract will operate. In this respect, the position under English law is 
far from settled.453 In the United States of America, section 2-615(b) of the 
UCC imposes on the seller the duty to allocate his output among his 
purchasers in such a manner as he may determine to be "fair and 
reasonable". As discussed before,454 the inherent defect of allocation of goods 
based on the seller's discretion, lies in the fact that the seller may abuse his 
discretion. The seller may be tempted to discriminate in favour of more
451. For a detailed analysis of this problem, see chapters 5.
452. For a detailed discussion of this issue see chapter 5.
453. Supra, pp. 224-229.
454 Supra, 211-215.
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profitable customers to the detriment of the other buyers. UCC grants the 
seller almost unrestricted discretion. Buyers have no insurance that the seller 
will exercise his discretion fairly. Indeed, the seller is free to provide no 
reasons at all or, at best, artificial reasons for allocating the goods. Moreover, 
restriction on the seller's discretion imposed by the provisions of section 2- 
615(b) of UCC does not necessarily avoid possible abuse. The seller who is 
allowed by UCC to allocate the available goods as he considers "reasonable 
and equitable" may, it is true, impose upon the buyers his own perception of 
fairness and reasonableness, giving minimum weight to the buyers' 
reasonable needs. Thus the seller is free to avoid his commitments to less 
important customers. In short, the allocation of available goods will be based 
on the business interests of the seller and his personal relations with his 
customers.
These shortcomings of UCC should not however prevent the buyer from trying 
to provide a mechanism in a force majeure clause which will give a fairer 
result. No doubt, the seller will seek an unrestricted discretion in allocating the 
goods. He may wish to favour one customer over another and reserve that 
right to do so in the contract. In such circumstances, he may include a priority 
clause to favour his most important customers. This could be alleviated, if the 
buyer is given the choice to terminate the contract or accept a reasonable 
share. As discussed before,455 allocation in a ratio based on the physical 
volume of the goods ordered is a fairer and more reasonable mechanism. It 
provides equal treatment among buyers as each buyer will receive a uniform 
pro rata of supply for which he contracted.
The parties should also agree that during the period of reduction in 
supply, the buyer will be free to purchase from other suppliers such quantities 
as the seller does not deliver because of excusable partial non-performance.
5.2.2. SPECIFY A PROPER RESTITUTIONARY PROCEDURE SO 
AS TO ACHIEVE JUSTICE AND TO MINIMISE THE LOSS 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Although termination of a contract by excuse doctrines does not 
constitute breach, the parties may still have certain obligations after the 
occurrence of force majeure. Indeed, the simple determination that one party 
or the other is excused from further performance by reason of supervening 
event is only part of the solution. There remains the question of what to do 
with the parties when the contract is excused. The force majeure event may
455. Supra, at 214.
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discharge further performance, but what about part performance before that 
event? What is the solution when one party has expended an excessive 
portion of his resources at the time of excuse? Should the loss be left where it 
falls or should there be an adjustment procedure to be used to achieve some 
albeit rough, equality in sharing the costs?
These are very difficult and complex questions that can not be easily 
answered by courts in the absence of a negotiated agreement between the 
parties. Unfortunately, in practice, most force majeure clauses simply leave 
the question to be resolved by the courts. There is therefore much to be said 
for providing an effective contractual mechanism resolving these issues in a 
just and fairway . This mechanism should define the parties' mutual rights and 
obligations consequent upon excuse. By providing such a mechanism, the 
related questions will be resolved easily and speedily. Moreover, the parties 
should stipulate that in a case of excusable non-performance where the 
principal obligations are not fulfilled, competent court will have jurisdiction to 
make adjustment according to the negotiated agreement between the parties. 
No doubt contractual regulation offers greater flexibility than existing national 
regimes.456 In this respect, some important recommendations have already 
been discussed.457 The English Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 
in comparison with the British Columbia Frustrated Contracts Act 1974, the 
New South Wales Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 and the South Australia 
Frustrated Contracts Act 1988, suffers from a number of significant 
deficiencies. The deficiencies of sections 1(2) and1(3) of the 1943 Act can be 
avoided by the parties using a force majeure clause which expressly provides 
a more equitable solution. It is not enough merely to exclude the operation of 
the 1943 Act, since the situation will then be governed by the common law 
rules which will make matters worse.458 Secondly, it will not suffice to rely upon 
the force majeure clause because the contract may be frustrated despite the 
presence of the clause.459 In that case, when the contract is frustrated, the 
clause can not regulate its consequences.
The solution lies in the parties making express provision in the clause 
for the consequences of frustration of that contract, so as to exclude the
456. See chapter four and five.
457 See generally part one, two and three.
458 Supra, pp. 143-145.
459. See Ewan MacKendrick, Frustration and Force Majeure - Their Relationship and Comparative 
Assessment (in Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract), op. cit., at 27 et seq.
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operation of the 1943 Act.460 It has been suggested461 that in order to exclude
the operation of the that Act, the parties could draft the following:
"in the event of frustration (for whatever reason) of this contract it is agreed 
that each party shall make restitution for all benefits conferred (with an agreed 
method of identification and valuation of the benefit) and that any loss caused 
by frustration of the contract shall be divided equally between the parties."
It should however be noted that in some cases operation of this clause may
not achieve a fair result. As discussed before,462 where a party incurs
unusually high incidental reliance losses, to make the other party share the
loss will not be just and may force him to spend much more than he would
have spent if the contract had not been discharged.
In the present writer's view, if it is at all possible, the traditional rules of 
restitution should not be abrogated. For example, when a party's loss has 
actually benefited the other party, the remedy of restitution should be applied. 
Secondly, since both parties are ex hypothesi faultless, any loss caused by 
force majeure should be divided between them. Thirdly, in exceptional cases, 
where equal division of loss would be inequitable, the clause should provide 
an appropriate adjustment procedure.
There is no doubt that other solutions lie in the hands of the parties 
themselves. For example, the parties may agree that the non-performing party 
should reimburse the expenses reasonably incurred in reliance on the 
contract by the party willing and able to perform. The parties may provide that 
in case of permanent force majeure, that a cancellation charge be paid by the 
party claiming force majeure. For example, in a coal agreement,463 the parties 
may wish to provide that the buyer will pay an agreed cancellation charge 
which will be a charge representing some portion of the capital investment of 
the seller in developing the mine. The parties may also agree that the seller 
should receive a proportion of the anticipated profit which has been eliminated 
by the buyer's successful claim of force majeure. If the force majeure proves 
to be temporary and for other reasons it proves possible to sell the product of 
the mine after the termination of the contract, then the force majeure clause 
could provide for a return of the cancellation charge to the buyer on a pro rata
460. See Sec. 2(3) of the 1943 Act. See also supra, pp. 160-161.
461. Ewan McKendrick, The Consequences of Frustration - The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 
Act 1943, op. cit., at 69.
462 Supra, at 150.
463. See Jeffrey J. Scott, Coal Supply Agreements, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, 1977, 107, 
at 134.
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basis.464 Whatever the mechanism, it is the present writer's contention that it 
should result in a "no winner", "no loser" situation.
At this point, the views expressed by the ICC are open to criticisms. 
The ICC suggested force majeure clause - contrary to the Vienna Convention 
and most national laws - provides that in the case of termination of the 
contract, each party is allowed to retain what he has received, but should 
account to the other party for any unjust enrichment resulting from the other 
party's performance.465 This mechanism is silent about reliance expenditure 
and performance which has not led to the end product. This mechanism is too 
general and may not be suitable for every kind of contract. In contrast with 
ICC, the general conditions for supply of plant and machinery for export, ECE 
contract No. 188,466 provide in the contract that division of the actual out-of- 
pocket expenses is placed on both parties. In machinery know-how 
agreements, a party may not be allowed to retain what he has received. In 
such contracts, on termination the party must return to the other party all 
existing manifestations of the know-how in the form of drawings, models and 
the like.467 In this context, accounting to the other party for any unjust 
enrichment appears irrelevant. If an international services contract is 
terminated due to a force majeure event, what is to be accounted is the 
allowances of the personnel as are payable up to the date of their departure 
from the obligee's country, in so far as such payments or allowances have not 
been paid before such termination. The obligee may also agree to pay the 
costs of repatriating the obligor's personnel.468 What is important for the 
obligee is to receive the obligor's services: he pays as long as he receives the 
services. Therefore, when the contract is terminated, what he pays is related 
to those services which he has received, not any enrichment he has obtained.
In spite of these criticisms, it may not be advisable to strike out the ICC 
suggested solution entirely, as long as the defaulting party retains the right to 
terminate the contract., since in some situations, the ICC may provide a better 
solution than the other alternatives, or, indeed, may be the only solution of the 
problem.
464 Loc. cit.
465. ICC, Publication No. 421, op. cit., Para. 9. See also United Nations, Economic Commission for 
Europe, Guide for Drawing up International Contracts on Consulting Engineering, Including Some 
Related Aspects of Technical Assistance, op. cit., Sec. 87.
466. See supra, pp. 264, 265.
467 See generally L. W. Melville, Forms and Agreements on Intellectual Property and Industrial 
Licensing, op. cit., at 4F-21, 4F-22.
468. Loc. cit., at 6M-20.
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Parties are therefore advised to pay careful attention by allowing a 
party to retain what he has received is suitable in the context of their particular 
contract and, if not, what other alternative should be adopted. The present 
writer has argued that when performance of the contract is excused, parties 
should at first attempt to return to their position as it was before the contract 
(restitutio in integrum) or, if this is not possible, to provide reasonable 
remuneration for what has been done. For example, in international contracts 
on industrial co-operation,469 when the contract is excused, it seems that an 
appropriate way of solving the problem is that the parties draw up a balance- 
sheet of what has been obtained by each of the parties and to grant 
compensation to each party in proportion to the difference. It would also be 
necessary to make it clear in the clause the fate of any licenses which have 
been granted by one party to the other party, since in the case of termination 
of the contract, the party holding a technology license may keep using it for a 
further periods; or even indefinitely, with or without payment. In that case, 
where it is intended that the license should continue in force beyond the 
period of the validity of the contract, the question should have been already 
settled in the contract. Moreover, it is also advisable to provide in the clause 
that parties will discharge their respective duties towards creditors and sub­
contractors at the date of termination of the contract.470
In turnkey contracts being performed in countries far from the 
contractor's home base, a reasonable solution to the problem is that the 
employer pays for any services or performances which have been done. He 
should also pay the costs of materials or goods which have been ordered by 
the contractor as being necessary for works, including the contractor's plant 
and temporary works. Insofar as the contractor's construction plant is 
concerned, the employer may agree to share the cost of its removal from the 
site to the country of registration of the contractor. With regard to payment for 
costs of repatriating the contractor's staff or workmen, the employer may also 
agree to share the costs or to pay a proportion of the related costs. Finally, 
against all of these payments due to the contractor, the employer should be 
entitled to set off any sums due to him by the contractor in respect of advance 
payments for construction, plant and materials and for any other monies which 
were likewise recoverable from the contractor under the terms of the contract 
at the time when the termination took place.471
469. United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva), Guide on Drawing up International 
Contracts on Industrial Co-operation, op. cit., Sec. 57.
,470. Loc. cit., Sec. 58.
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Another important matter which should be taken into account when 
drafting a force majeure clause relates to the additional costs required for 
continuation of performance during a period of suspension. Unfortunately, 
most clauses deal only with the question as to whether, and under what 
conditions, a contract is terminated or suspended. According to these clauses, 
neither party can claim from the other any extra payment whether in 
compensation, indemnity, damages, demurrage or whatever. The clause 
leaves open the question of who must bear the additional costs of 
postponement. Consider a construction contract which is suspended by an 
embargo of aluminium panels which are required in the construction. Who 
must pay the additional costs during the suspension? The parties may wish to 
include a provision requiring them to share the costs required for continuation 
of the performance of contract.472 They may agree that during a period of 
suspension one of them pays a proportionate share of the expenses. For 
example, in a coal supply agreement,473 the buyer may accept to pay some 
proportionate share of the seller's actual expenses in maintaining the mine 
and mining property during the postponement. In engineering contracts, the 
contract may even provide that the owner is obliged to reimburse the 
consultant for the payment of costs incurred during a force majeure 
suspension.474
As discussed before, the essential feature of most force majeure 
clauses is that each party bears his own losses. What is clear is that this 
traditional force majeure provision does not provide an adequate solution for 
every different contract. For example, in turnkey contracts, suspension of a 
project can spell financial disaster for a contractor.475 He will only be paid for 
the work actually done or goods actually delivered. He will probably not be 
reimbursed for the often heavy costs of keeping his personnel idle or 
repatriating them and having to reassemble a team on short notice at a later 
time; nor for the costs of equipment lying idle and deteriorating, nor for 
consequences of inflation which will make performance at a later date very
471. Cf F.I.D.I.C. Conditions of Contract, 1987, Art. 65.8.
472. See United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva), Guide for Drawin up 
International Contracts on Consulting Engineering, Including Some Related Aspects of Technical 
Assistance, op. cit., Sec. 87.
473. See Jefferey J. Scott, op. cit.
474 See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Analysis of Engineering and Technical 
Assistance Cosultancy Contracts, op. cit., at 504, 505.
475. See Walter W. Oberreit, Turnkey Contracts and War: Whose Risk? (In The Transnational Law of 
International Commercial Transactions, Edited by N. Horn and C. M. Schmitthoff, 1982, edited by 
Horn and Schmitthoff), at 193.
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much more expensive. The contractor may also suffer additional, 
unreimbursed expenses in having to take delivery of equipment from suppliers 
and having to settle claims from third parties involved in the project. His 
contracts with sub-contractors may not be identical to his contract with the 
client and therefore, it may not always be possible to rely upon the force 
majeure clause against his suppliers and sub-contractors.476 
Because of these inadequacies, wider coverage than that afforded by the 
traditional force majeure clause is needed. It has been suggested that the 
client or the host government should bear the effects of the force majeure.411 
But this "solution" only shifts the loss from one party to the other. The solution 
is similar to the effect of a typical force majeure clause the only difference 
being that in traditional force majeure clauses it is the obligor who bears the 
loss while here it is the obligee who bears the loss. A provision requiring both 
parties to share the costs equally is a better solution.
Another issue relates to the cost of repairing or rebuilding all or any 
part of the facility destroyed by force majeure event during the period of 
suspension. Who is required to repair or rebuild the facility destroyed by force 
majeure? To what extent do insurance provisions affect the contractor's duties 
after the occurrence of force majeure? As most of the contracts require the 
contractor to keep the facility adequately insured as construction progresses, 
it should be clearly stipulated that the proceeds of the policy should be used 
as a fund available for the cost of repairing or rebuilding.478
To sum up, it should be said that to provide a suitable mechanism in 
the clause for solving these issues, will resolve the related problems much 
more easily and speedily than reliance on the applicable law. It is contended 
that a force majeure clause can not be considered comprehensive or 
acceptable unless provision is expressly made for solutions to these 
problems.
5.2.3. PROVIDE A NOTICE REQUIREMENT IN A FORCE 
MAJEURE CLAUSE
It is advised to provide in the clause what the party invoking excuse 
must do to establish that a force majeure event has happened. This is most 
easily accomplished by a notice provision that requires the party to give notice
476. Loc. cit.
477. Loc. cit.
478. See United Nations Centre on Transnaional Corporations, Fearares and Issues in Turnkey 
Contracts in Developing Countries: Technical Paper, op. cit., at 66.
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to the other party outlining the event claimed to be force majere and the 
performance that has been prevented by the occurrence of the event. The 
overwhelming majority of clauses include a notice requirement under which 
the party seeking relief has to report to the other party within a prescribed 
time. There are obvious advantages of such a requirement. If the parties do 
not have a notice requirement, different opinions could arise concerning the 
date of commencement of any legal consequences as there is no recorded 
notification of the occurrence of the force majeure.419 Moreover, if notice is 
promptly reported, it will be much easier to investigate the true extent of the 
force majeure event than if it is, for example, suddenly revealed several years 
later.480 This requirement will also be to the advantage of both parties., since 
its consequences will be a speedy resolution of any dispute which may arise.
Indeed, when the force majeure is reported, the parties have the opportunity 
to resolve any problems through negotiation. Further, upon notification, it will 
be much easier for the parties to consider what measures to take to prevent or 
limit the effects of force majeure, and to prevent or mitigate the loss caused or 
which is likely to be caused by the failure of the performance.481
What matters should be addressed in a reporting clause? In response, 
it is suggested that an acceptable reporting clause should contain the 
following elements:
The clause should specify the person by whom the report is to be made. For 
example, in sale contracts, this would usually be the buyer or seller, but in 
construction contracts it is commonly the architect or engineer. Secondly, time 
limits should be stipulated in the clause. Generally, the clause should require 
that the party asserting the force majeure should notify the other party 
promptly, when feasible, or within a definite numbers of days, such as 7 days,
14 days, or 30 days. In practice, a relatively short-time span, viz., between 7 
days and three months, is often to be found.482 Much will obviously depends 
upon the type of the contract and the importance which the parties attach to 
the passage of time. At the time of occurrence of force majeure, a party may 
not actually know whether the force majeure event is so serious as to produce 
a delay which would justify reliance upon the clause at all. If he sends a notice 
promptly, the other party may rightly challenge whether the event upon which
479. See Martin Bartels, op. cit., at 32.
480. See M. P. Furmston, Drafting of Force Majeure Clauses (In Force Majeure and Frustration of 
Contract, Edited by Ewan McKendrick, op. cit), at 24.
481. UNCITRAL, op. cit., at 240.
482. M. P. Furmston, op. cit.
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he relies does in fact prevent performance so as to excuse him. If, on the 
other hand, he leaves notification until he is certain of the effect of the force 
majeure, then on the ground of a mere technicality, it may be too late to 
comply with the notice provisions required before he can rely upon the clause. 
It seems that the safest way of solving this dilemma is expressly to provide 
that the party should send a notice specifying the grounds for bringing the 
clause into operation whenever he comes to the conclusion that he is likely to 
suffer delay in performing the contract because of force majeure which has 
already occurred, even if the occurrence of force majeure has happened 
sometimes in the past.483
Thirdly, the party seeking relief should not send a vaguely worded notice. The 
clause should require that the statement of notice specify details of the event 
describing the asserted circumstances. This is particularly significant where 
the party who receives the notice has an adjudicating function., because a 
reasonable decision requires an adequate supply of information. That is why 
construction contracts often require the contractor not only to notify the extent 
of the effect of the event but also to report an estimate of its consequences on 
his progress.484 A comprehensive clause should also provide for the 
anticipated duration of the event to be notified, where possible, and that the 
affected party should continue to keep the other party informed of all 
circumstances which may be relevant for an assessment of the force majeure 
event.
Fourthly, it is desirable for the clause to specify the form which the notice is to 
take. It should be clear whether the notice will be in writing or by fax or by 
telex, etc. This will prevent any dispute which may arise in future.485 
Fifthly, when the contract is suspended due to force majeure, it is advisable to 
require double notices v/'z., a notice to trigger suspension of contractual 
obligations and a second notice to terminate the contract.
Finally, the clause should provide for the consequences of a failure to report. 
It should be made clear whether the requirements provided in the notice 
provision are directory or mandatory486 i.e., whether failure to report at the 
right time and in the right way is fatal to any claim. This will enable the party 
concerned to know precisely when the other party's failure to comply with the 
notice requirement will prevent him from relying on the clause and so put him
483. Christo, op. cit., at 81.
484 M. P. Furmston, op. cit., at 25.
485. See chapter 7, pp. 208, 209, and 261.
486. Furmston, op. cit.
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in breach. Such certainty can not be attained if the terms of the clause are 
silent on the matter. The clause should make it clear whether failure to give 
such notice would only make the defaulting party liable in damages or 
deprives him of the right to rely upon the force majeure. According to the ICC 
standard force majeure clause, a party who fails to notify in time will not only 
be liable in damages but also will be deprived of the right to rely on the clause 
in respect of any time before notice was given.487 In some contractual 
relations, this may be rather harsh if it was difficult for the party seeking relief 
to realise at once whether he required to rely upon the clause. It seems that in 
these situations, the party invoking relief should merely be liable for any 
damages resulting from the omission.488
The parties may agree that the notice should not only specify the 
details of the event but also furnish certain proof that the conditions of force 
majeure do in fact exist. Usually, confirmation by a public authority, notary 
public, a consulate or Chamber of Commerce may be required by the 
clause.489 In the absence of such certificate, the obligor may find it difficult to 
prove his claim in possible arbitration or court proceedings. Proof of existence 
of force majeure may also prevent the other party taking action against the 
party affected by force majeure. Without such a certificate, the obligor may be 
faced with court or an arbitration proceedings.
The parties may also provide that in any case, the party receiving the 
notice may, after appraisal of the information received, object to the assertion 
of force majeure. Here a solution may be found through negotiation or, failing 
a satisfactory result, by the appropriate means for settlement of disputes, viz., 
by arbitration, if so agreed, or in court.490
6. FINAL SUGGESTION:
CHOOSE A CERTAIN LEGAL SYSTEM AS A PROPER LAW OF 
THE CONTRACT AS AN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARD
Parties should depend on the express terms of their agreement rather 
than on the rules of the system of law applicable to their relations. Obviously, 
the more detailed and more comprehensive a force majeure clause is, the
487 Para. 5.
488. ICC, Publication No. 421, op. cit., at 15.
489 See UNCITRAL, op. cit., at 240.
490. See United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva), Guide for Drawing up 
International Contracts on Consulting Engineering, Including Some Related Aspects of Techcnical 
Assistance, op. cit., at 22, Sec. 83.
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less room there is for issues to be determined under the applicable law. 
However, even if the parties have the opportunity and time to draw up force 
majeure or hardship clauses to the best of their ability, the uncertainties of 
future developments can never be securely covered. Moreover, no clause can 
ever be completely planned; every clause presents the possibility that events 
will occur for which planning was incomplete by reason of omission or 
ineffectiveness, or both. Therefore there will remain certain questions which 
must be decided in accordance with applicable law.491
As we have seen, no generally accepted international law is applicable 
in this situation and different domestic laws deal with excusable non­
performance in different ways. In case controversy arises over the 
interpretation of the clause, it would be advisable that the parties specifically 
refer to the legal system492 with which they are most familiar, for the 
interpretation or supplementation of, their own force majeure provisions as 
additional protection and security so that any undesirable result of an 
unfamiliar domestic law is eliminated.
7. CLOSING REMARKS
It is hoped that the chapter has been helpful to lawyers who are faced 
with the challenging assignment of drafting force majeure clauses. These 
clauses are very important and must be carefully negotiated and drafted in 
order to avoid unexpected consequences and costly litigation. We have, 
considered past mistakes in drafting such clauses, and hopefully this thesis 
will assist in avoiding most of these, if not all, in the future. Although it is 
virtually impossible to foresee and satisfactorily deal with all the related 
problems, the parties should certainly make every effort to reach a sensible 
and fair solutions. The greater the efforts made by the parties to draft a 
comprehensive clause, the lesser is the probability that the courts will have to 
deal with the issue.
491. See Bockstigel, op. cit., at 166.
492. It has been said that the private international rales should supplement the adopted international 
norm as well. See Nadelmann, The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods: A Conflict of 
Laws Imbroglio, 74 Y. L. J. 1965, 449, 456-459; Berman, The Uniform Law on International Sale of 
Goods: A Constructive Critique, 30 L. & Contemp. Prob. 1965, 354, 357.
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CONCLUSION:
As demonstrated by our comparative survey, it can unhesitatingly be 
concluded that a viable practical standard of excusable non-performance, 
satisfying the purpose of universality and uniformity in international level, does 
not exist. Each legal system has its own unique set of regulations. The reason 
is that these differences are on the one hand sometimes reflected in the 
techniques and methods used by the above systems and, on the other, are 
rooted in a dissimilar socio-political and economic background. As has been 
seen, at Common law, the doctrine of frustration operates to discharge a 
contract when the performance has become impossible or if there is a 
fundamental change of circumstances under which performance becomes 
totally different from that contemplated by the parties at the time of the 
conclusion of contract. It seems that the Common law views the contract as 
an instrument of liberalism and private autonomy, whereas Civil law has 
ascribed a social function to private agreements, which are thereby affected 
by extra-contractual considerations. This fundamental differences find 
expression in the unwillingness of the Common law to recognise a liberal 
excusable non-performance on the one hand and the rejection of modification 
of contract as a general form of relief on the other. On the contrary, in Civil 
law, particularly in Germany, owing to the occurrence of a series of 
developments, more than one doctrine have been developed to deal with the 
question of supervening events. These include impossibility, which is provided 
in BGB, and the doctrine of wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage which has been 
developed as a result of academic and judicial opinion. Obviously, German 
law has a more flexible approach in dealing with excusable non-performance 
in the sense that excusable non-performance does not always lead to 
termination of the contract. Since the effect of intervening events may vary in 
accordance with the nature of the event upsetting performance, the court may 
terminate the contract or adjust the contract to the changed circumstances.
Despite the prima facie differences between the various legal systems 
under discussion, all systems of law provide some form of contractual relief in 
certain supervening circumstances, for example, a party may be excused in 
circumstances where contractual performance is rendered physically or legally 
impossible. However, the scope and application, as well as the terminology of 
such legal relief, varies between jurisdictions. Having briefly presented the 
development and the present condition of the way different legal regimes have 
faced the problem of excusable non-performance, we can observe that there 
is insignificant similarity in result which is not enough for achieving a uniform
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standard of excusable non-performance to resolve the problem at 
international level. Under French law, the yardstick of force majeure is that no 
excuse is allowed unless the performance has become absolutely impossible. 
Under German law, though the concept of impossibility of performance is not 
substantially different from French law, nevertheless, the fact that certain 
obligations may become ruinous, is not ignored. In such cases, a modification 
of the contract is conceived so as to restabilise it and to prevent it from 
becoming a source of injustice.
With regard to the doctrine of frustration, it should be said that force majeure 
is much more limited than frustration. However, frustration is sometimes close 
to force majeure and sometimes to imprevision, but it never coincides 
completely with either of them. Thus, while French force majeure is very strict, 
the German law probably stands at the other extreme, with the common law 
systems in the middle.
In comparing the English doctrine of frustration and the American doctrine of 
impracticability, the narrowness of the scope and the application of English 
doctrine is underlined. It is clear that the doctrine of impracticability, at least in 
theory, is wider in scope - recognising claims of impossibility, commercial 
impracticability, and frustration of purpose. It also provides a wider range of 
remedies - incorporating modification and adjustment, and the principle of 
partial excusable non-performance. This is because the American doctrine is 
inspired with a general policy to use equitable principles of good faith, fairness 
and reasonableness. Such notions are therefore irrelevant in the application of 
doctrine of frustration. However, although the American doctrine may, in 
comparison with English law seem less restrictive, its application, like the 
application of other doctrines of excuse, remains rather uncertain. Given that 
the American doctrine of impracticability is generally more comprehensive and 
has wider remedies, it may be argued that this element of uncertainty is 
perhaps even more significant. Thus, an English lawyer who is not familiar 
with the words like "impracticable" or "occurrence of contingency" or 
"performance which would be materially more burdensome", will be surprised 
to find how little the actual decisions differ from what he would have expected. 
Even within a single system there are differences between the formulation of 
law and its application. Further, the doctrines used in this field are very 
confused, uncertain and even conflicting. To some extent this is probably the 
result of the policy of the judiciary, inasmuch as the Common law is developed 
partly by deliberate techniques used by the courts to avoid or to enlarge 
previous decisions.
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Apart from the above differences, the doctrines of excuse in England, 
America, and Germany, and to lesser extent, the rules of excusable non­
performance in France, reveal difficulty in conceptualisation and classification 
problems. For example, although the American doctrine of impracticability 
recognises notions of impossibility, commercial impracticability, and frustration 
of purpose, the distinction between claims based upon the above are not 
always distinguishable. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the 
terms, impossibility and commercial impracticability, are invariably and 
interchangeably used with impossibility. In English law, conceptual and 
classificatory problems stem from the historical origins of some of these rules 
and principles, and from the development of the doctrine of frustration in the 
early part of twentieth century.
We can conclude that the above laws on supervening events are not 
entirely satisfactory and reliance on them may lead to unpredictable results. 
Thus, it is proposed that a legal system will face the consequential risk of 
insufficiency and inadequacy in regulating the problems of excusable non­
performance. Another conclusion which can be drawn is that it may not be 
possible to indicate which legal system is, on the whole, preferable or more 
conceivable as to the question of excusable non-performance, since each 
legal regime has its own particularities and characteristics and has developed 
as a result of social, economic and political conditions surrounding its 
jurisdiction. However, it is possible to suggest that a particular system has a 
better and more workable approach in certain circumstances and as to certain 
issues.
It is clear that the problem of excusable non-performance becomes 
much more critical when parties elect to remove their relationships from 
domestic level to international level. In that case, parties usually face 
distinctive risks and burdens. The particularities of these contracts arise out of 
their two typical elements; namely, the transnational character and the long­
distance nature of the stipulated shipments. Specifically, with respect to the 
intervening events, there are special complications of international trade 
contracts. For example, a change in the circumstances occurring after the 
conclusion of the contract and relied upon by the parties is more likely to 
occur and be more critical than in domestic transactions, because of the 
stricter governmental regulations, the frequent fluctuations of exchange rates 
and the greater risk of damage to the goods. In that case and a fortiori, 
domestic rules are often ill-adapted to cope with the needs of modern 
transnational commercial transactions and may not be particularly valuable.
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For example, as discussed above, most doctrines of excuse operate within 
very narrow confines and that they do not possess the flexibility which parties 
may look for in a rapidly changing and uncertain world. The English doctrine 
of frustration, although improved by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 
Act 1943, is still narrow. The courts are not sympathetic toward expanding the 
scope and application of the doctrine. Even the concept of partial excusable 
non-performance, especially with regard to allocation of available goods, fails 
to persuade courts to introduce an element of flexibility in determining claims 
of partial frustration.
It should also be acknowledged that there is no acceptable universal 
standard of excusable non-performance (autonomous lex mercatoria) 
embodying its own practices and customs respected by all nations. Even the 
1980 Convention on International Sale of Goods, just as 1964 Hague 
Convention, suffers from certain important deficiencies. Although draftsmen of 
the Conventions have tried to advance a new concept of excusable non­
performance by combining different approaches, no satisfactory result has 
been achieved. The specified international rules, as has been seen, have 
adopted a mixed approach from both Civil and Common law. Flexibility of the 
wording of the Articles has caused different interpretations which is contrary to 
the aim of the Conventions. There is not even a uniform interpretation of the 
Conventions among those commentators who themselves played important 
roles in drafting the ULIS and CISG. Contracts for the sale of goods governed 
by the Vienna Convention should still include express force majeure or 
hardship clauses, where appropriate, since Article 79 of that Convention which 
seems to be designed to deal with impossibility of performance, is more 
restricted in scope than the doctrine of frustration and most well-drafted 
express clauses. Attention should, at the same time, be given by draftsmen
explicitly to exclude the Article under the provisions of Article 6.
Moreover, widely different criteria for solving the problem of supervening
events have been suggested by certain scholars. These are not completely
clear, nor comprehensive and are difficult to comply with the related
situations. The suggested tests are either too strict, too objective or too
subjective. Further, the different needs and practices of different type of
contracts can not easily fall within them.
Notwithstanding some of useful practical effects of the ICC suggestions 
and ECE exemption clauses, there are other matters to be considered and the
problem of excusable non-performance should not be regarded as closed. 
There are important factors from a drafting point of view which should be
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taken into account. With regard to other standard form contracts, it is clear 
that they have not introduced an acceptable force majeure clause contributing 
to the unification and harmonisation of the law of excuse of non-performance 
in international commercial transactions. Standard and individual contracts, 
furthermore, employ very dissimilar standards. Most of them do not treat both 
parties impartially, and employ different models echoing the superior and 
inferior bargaining situations of the parties.
However, since reliance on the doctrines of frustration, impossibility, 
impracticability, French force majeure and German wegfall der 
geschaftsgrundlage might lead to unpredictable and even surprising results; 
as there exists no homogenous and universal standard of excuse of non­
performance respected by all nations with the support of all scholars; as 
standard form contracts do not treat the parties impartially and each of them 
reflects the superior or inferior bargaining power of the parties, it can be 
argued that the only possible alternative is to rely more heavily upon the terms 
of the contract by drafting a comprehensive force majeure or hardship clause 
rather the general legal doctrines prevailing in one country or another. Thus, 
the parties can make their own law and this need not necessarily be a system 
of national law. Given the uncertainties attending the above mentioned rules 
and approaches, it is clear that a prudent lawyer will not rely upon the so- 
called rules but will consider another alternative so as to protect the parties' 
expectations in the event of supervening events. Thus, parties who want to 
preserve such flexibility would be well advised to incorporate into their contract 
appropriately drafted force majeure or hardship clauses. It seems that this is 
the only unquestionable way to solve the harsh questions of excusable non­
performance. By delegating law-making authority to the parties, the law 
permits them to agree freely on the creation, substance, modification and 
termination of their own contractual relationship. The use of more explicit 
immunity clauses in commercial contracts provides a clarity of content and 
predictability of result. Through drafting techniques, the parties themselves 
determine the ambit and effects of their immunity clause. Each party knows 
the terms of his contract as well as the binding nature of his own duties. 
Moreover, these clauses provide an excellent and unique opportunity to 
determine beforehand the nature and extent of performance in the event of 
change of circumstances and force majeure events without suffering the 
effects of judicial gap filling. Immunity clauses are, indeed, much more flexible 
in their potential application in comparison with domestic laws. An immunity 
clause in the form of force majeure offers to the parties the opportunity to
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escape the limitation of the above doctrines and in the form of the hardship 
clause it affords parties a flexible approach to deal with unforeseen 
circumstances and ensure the stability of long-term contractual relationship as 
well.
However, in the course of writing and particularly in the final chapter of 
this thesis, I have given, as far as possible, my opinion on certain questions 
without purporting that they are the only or certainly the right deductions. 
Thus, in order not to overlabour the point, this conclusion restates very briefly 
the important suggestions and recommendations, which have already been 
made and discussed, as follows:
- It seems that the best possible solution for the problem of excusable non­
performance lies in the contract itself by providing a well-drafted immunity 
clause.
- Immunity clauses should be drafted according to the facts surrounding the 
circumstances.
- Beware of using imprecise clauses such as "usual force majeure conditions 
apply" or "unforeseen circumstances excepted". They may have no effect.
- The force majeure clause must relate to the substance of the contract in 
which it is to be included.
- Avoid the use of force majeure clause contained in standard form contracts.
- Hardship may arise in circumstances that do not amount to force majeure. In 
such a case, a properly drafted hardship clause will be helpful.
- Do not include force majeure and hardship provisions in the same clause.
- As an indication of the parties' good faith, the benefit and protection of force 
majeure clause should be provided for both parties.
- Force majeure must be precisely and carefully defined and should 
incorporate a list of specific related events. Further, it is preferable to:
(i) use the criteria of "beyond control" and "non-fault of the party seeking 
relief"; and,
(ii) to use the criteria of concrete-abstract foresight in the definitional 
provision of the clause.
- Beware of the problems of partial excusable non-performance such as 
failure of the sources of supply and always provide a right to pro rate.
- Provide certain and proper consequences of force majeure on the 
contractual relationships.
- Specify a proper restitutionary procedure so as to achieve justice and to 
minimise the loss between the parties.
- Provide a notice requirement in the clause.
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- Choose a certain legal system as a proper law of the contract as an 
additional safeguard.
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion and drafting suggestions will 
be helpful to the lawyers who are faced with the challenging assignment of 
drafting force majeure clauses. The draftsmen should draft proper clauses so 
as to prevent past mistakes, and hopefully this thesis will assist in avoiding 
most of these, if not all. It is hoped that deficiencies will be reduced to a 
minimum by the inclusion of the ideas set forth in this thesis. Although it is 
virtually impossible to foresee and satisfactorily deal with all the related 
problems, the parties should certainly make every effort to reach a desirable 
solution. The greater the efforts made by the parties to draft a comprehensive 
clause, the lesser is the probability that the courts will have to deal with the 
issue if excuse is aided by some indication of the intent of the parties to the 
contract.
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